

RECORDS
OF
BAHRAIN
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS
1820-1960

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Publisher's note: Records of Bahrain consists of archival and documentary material drawn from British archives within the India Office Records and the Public Record Office. The documents have been edited and arranged to provide a comprehensive introduction to the history of Bahrain from 1820 to 1960.

Material has been arranged within each volume according to broad subjects such as internal political affairs, social and economic development, regional and international relations. Within these general divisions the documents are reproduced chronologically. Volumes one to four were edited by Penelope Tuson, with the assistance of Emma Quick; volumes five to seven were edited by Anita Burdett.

Contents

POPULATION AND RESOURCES

- 1.01 **Selections from the Records of the Government of Bombay, 1818-1856** 3
- Chronological table of events connected with the Uttoobee tribe of Arabs (Bahrein), from the year 1716 to 1844. . . prepared in the year 1844 by Lieutenant A. B. Kemball, Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf [from *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 140-152*]
- Historical sketch of the Uttoobee tribe of Arabs; from the year 1716 to the year 1817. Prepared by Mr Francis Warden, Member of Council at Bombay. With continuations of the same, from the year 1817 to the close of the year 1831, by Lieutenant S. Hennell; from 1832 to August 1844, by Lieutenant A. B. Kemball; and from the latter period to the close of the year 1853, by Lieutenant H. F. Disbrowe; successive Assistants to the Resident in the Persian Gulf [from *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 361-425*]
- Extracts from brief notes containing historical and other information connected with . . . the islands of Bahrein . . . and other ports and places in the Persian Gulf; prepared in the year 1818 by Captain Robert Taylor, Assistant Political Agent in Turkish Arabia [from *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 22-29*]
- Extracts from memoranda on the resources, localities and relations of the tribes inhabiting the Arabian shores of the Persian Gulf by Lieutenant A. B. Kemball, Bombay Artillery, Assistant Resident at Bushire. Submitted to Government on the 6th January 1845 [from *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 91-94, 104-107*]
- Statistical and miscellaneous information connected with the possessions, revenues, families &c of the Ruler of Bahrein, by Captain A. B. Kemball, Resident at Bushire. Submitted to Government on 1 July 1854 [from *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 289-292*]
- 1.02 **Lieutenant Thomas Tanner's Memoir on Bahrain, 1817** 107
- Bahrein island [from: *J. Horsburgh, India Directory or directions for sailing to and from the East Indies, 3rd edn, London 1826, p. 315*]

- 1.03 The Arabian Coast Naval Survey, 1821-1828** 111
 Bahrein: extract from Memoir descriptive of the navigation of the Gulf of Persia; with brief notices of the manners, customs, religion, commerce and resources of the people inhabiting its shores and islands. Prepared by the late Captain George Barnes Brucks, Indian Navy, (1829-1835) [from *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 531-33, 564-571*]
 Trigonometrical plan of the island and harbour of Bahrain. Surveyed by Lieutenants G. B. Brucks and W. E. Rogers, 1825. Published by J. Horsburgh, 1828 [IOR: X/3630/21] (See Map Box: map 01)
- 1.04 Surveyors and travellers, 1832-1837: Wyburd and Wellsted** 125
 Lieutenant W. H. Wyburd's journals of an excursion into Arabia, 1832 [IOR: L/MAR/C/570]
 Lieutenant J. R. Wellsted's travels in Arabia, 1830-1837 [from: *travels to the City of the Caliphs, along the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, London 1849, volume 1, pp. 114-129*]
- 1.05 The second Gulf Survey, 1857-1860** 167
 Memoir on Bahrain, by Lieutenant R. W. Whish [Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society, xvi, 1860-1862]
 Survey of Bahreyn Harbour and the Khaur-el-Bab, executed on H.M.S. *Mahi* IN as opportunity offered, whilst stationed as guard vessel between Bahreyn and Demam from October 1859 to March 1860, by Lieutenant R. W. Whish [Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society, xvi, 1860-1862] (See Map Box: map 02)
 The Persian Gulf Pilot, 1864: Bahrein Island; Manameh; Jebel Dukhan; Maharag Island; Ras Zarwan; Fusht al-Yarem; Khor al-Bab [from *The Persian Gulf Pilot compiled by Captain C. G. Constable and Lieutenant A. W. Stiffe, London, Admiralty Hydrographic Office, 1864, pp. 112-122*]
- INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS**
- 1.06 The General Treaty with Britain, 1820; British policy towards Bahrain, 1820-1823; Bahraini relations with Persia and Oman** 191
 Translation of the Preliminary Treaty, signed 5 February 1820, with Sayyid Abdul Jalil b. Sayyid Yas al-Tabatabai, Vakil of Shaikhs Sulaiman b. Ahmad and Abdullah b. Ahmad of Bahrain [from *Treaties and undertakings etc. in force on 1st January 1906 between the British Government and the Rulers of Bahrain, 1820-1914, IOR: R/15/1/740*]
 General Treaty with the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf, 1820, signed at Sharjah by Sayyid Abdul Jalil b. Sayyid Yas, 5 February 1820, and at Bahrain by Shaikhs Sulaiman and Abdullah b. Ahmad Al Khalifah, 23 February 1820 [IOR: R/15/1/740]
 Bahrain affairs in connection with the British expedition against Ras al-Khaimah, 1819-1820 [from: *Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, volume I, Calcutta, 1915, pp. 846-848*]

- Designs of Persia and Maskat on Bahrein; question of arrangements for maintaining security in the Gulf; unauthorized agreement concluded by Mr Bruce with the Prince of Shiraz, September 1822; removal of Mr Bruce and appointment of Lieutenant Macleod as Resident at Bushire, November 1822; Lieutenant Macleod's report on his tour of the Gulf, February 1823; Governor's advice to the Imam of Maskat and the Sheikh of Bahrein as regards the former's claim for tribute, 1822 [from J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853, Calcutta, 1906*]
- 1.07 Peace agreement between Shaikh 'Abdullah b. Ahmad of Bahrain and Rahmah b. Jabir of Khaur Hasan, February 1824** 219
 E. G. Stannus, Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Government of Bombay, 7 February 1824, enclosing Articles of agreement entered into between 'Abdullah b. Ahmad and Rahmah b. Jabir; Government of Bombay to Stannus, 27 April 1824 [IOR: P/385/47, Consultation of 28 April]
 Printed copy of articles of agreement [from *A collection of treaties, engagements and sanads relating to India and neighbouring countries compiled by C. U. Aitchison, 5th edn, revised to 1930, Delhi, 1933, vol xi, pp. 85-8*]
 Sketch of the proceedings (from 1809-1818) of Rahmah bin Jaubir, Chief of Khor Hassan; prepared by Mr Francis Warden, Member of Council at Bombay; with continuation to the period of that chief's death in 1826; and also a brief sketch of the proceedings (down to the year 1831) of Shaikh Busheer bin Rahmah, son and successor of the above chief; by Lieutenant S. Hennell, Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf [from *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 521-529*]
- 1.08 Persian aggression; the death of Shaikh Salman b. Ahmad, 1825** 239
 Governor in Council, Bombay, to the Court of Directors, 2 July 1825 [IOR: L/P&S/6/177]
- 1.09 Renewed hostilities with Rahmah b. Jabir, 1825-1826; Bahraini victory, December 1826** 279
 Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of Bombay, 12 November 1825, enclosing letter from Shaikh 'Abdullah b. Ahmad, 19 October 1825 [IOR: P/386/3, Consultation of 11 January]
 Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of Bombay, 14 December 1826 [IOR: P/386/17, Consultation of 24 January 1827]
- 1.10 The war with Muscat, 1828-1829** 305
 The attack on Bahrain, August-December 1828: Agent at Bahrain to Captain David Wilson, British Resident Bushire, 16 November 1828; Mulla Husain, Agent at Sharjah, to Wilson, 28 November and 4 December 1828 [IOR: R/15/1/48]
 Negotiations, 1829: Major D. Wilson, Resident in the Gulf, to the Government of Bombay, 13 August & 5 September 1829, enclosing notes of a conference with Haji 'Abdul Amir, Agent

of H.H. the Imam of Muscat respecting negotiations for peace between the Chief of Bahrain and His Highness, 23 August 1829, and translation of a note from Haji Abdul Amir, 24 August 1829; Wilson to Shaikh 'Abdullah b. Ahmad, 24 August 1829, and reply, 29 August 1829; Wilson to Shaikh 'Abdullah b. Ahmad, 4 September 1829, and to the Imam of Muscat, 4 September 1829 [IOR: R/15/1/42]

Peace Agreement with the Sultan of Oman, 2 December 1829: conclusion of peace between the 'Atbi Shaikhs and the Saiyid of 'Oman, 2 December 1829 [from: *Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, volume I, Calcutta, 1915, pp. 854-856]

1.11 Relations between the Shaikhs of Bahrain and the Wahhabis, 1830-1836

J. G. Lorimer's account of the Agreement between the Shaikhs of Bahrain and the Wahhabi Amir Turki b. Sa'ud, 1830 [from: *Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, volume I, Calcutta, 1915, pp. 856-857]

Lorimer's account of the Agreement between Shaikh 'Abdullah b. Ahmad Al Khalifah and the Wahhabi Amir Faisal b. Turki, 1836 [from: *Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, volume I, Calcutta, 1915, p. 858]

1.12 Rebellion of Al bin 'Ali and Al Bu 'Ainain, 1835-1839; the Egyptian advance into eastern Arabia, 1837-1839

Hostilities between Shaikh 'Abdullah b. Ahmad and 'Isa b. Tarif, 1838: S. Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Government of Bombay, 8 November 1838, enclosing letter from Shaikh 'Abdullah b. Ahmad of Bahrain, 18 October 1838; Hennell to 'Abdullah b. Ahmad, 28 October 1838; Hennell to the Government of Bombay, 26 & 27 November 1838, enclosing letter from Hennell to Commodore G. B. Brucks; Hennell to the Government of Bombay, 11 December 1838, enclosing letter from 'Abdullah b. Ahmad, 30 November 1838; Hennell to Brucks, 10 December 1838; Hennell to the Government of Bombay, 24 December 1838; Summary of correspondence, 1836-1838, by J. P. Willoughby, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, 25 February 1839; Minute by James Farish, Governor of Bombay, 25 February 1839 [IOR: L/P&S/5/375, Enclosures to Bombay Secret Letter to the Court of Directors, No. 67, 18 May 1839]

S. Hennell, Resident in the Gulf, to the Government of Bombay, 10 April 1839, enclosing letter from Lieutenant T. Edmunds, Assistant Resident in the Gulf, regarding the state of affairs at Bahrain and the stations and condition of the Egyptian forces in Najd under Kurshid Pasha [IOR: L/P&S/5/375, Enclosures to Bombay Secret Letter to the Court of Directors, No. 67, 18 May 1839]

The agreement with Kurshid Pasha, 1839: S. Hennell, Resident in the Gulf, to the Government of Bombay, 30 May 1839, with enclosures; Undertaking by the Shaikh of Bahrain to pay the sum of \$2,000 per year to the Egyptians on the understanding that his local authority will be observed and that no representative of the Egyptians will be sent to reside in Bahrain, July 1839 [IOR: L/P&S/5/376, Enclosure to Bombay Secret Letter No. 87 of 16 July 1839]

355

361

Departure of Al bin 'Ali Shaikh 'Isa b. Tarif from Abu Dhabi, December 1839: S. Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, to Government of Bombay, 27 December 1839 [IOR: L/P&S/5/381, Enclosure to Letter No. 5 of 31 January 1840]

1.13 Civil war in Bahrain, 1840-1847; opposition to Shaikh 'Abdullah b. Ahmad; deposition, April 1843; exile and attempts to overthrow Shaikh Muhammad b. Khalifah, 1843-1847

The expulsion of 'Abdullah b. Ahmad from the Shaikhship, 1840-1843; continuance of the civil war, 1843-1849 [from J. G. Lorimer's *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, volume I, Calcutta, 1915, pp. 866-870, 872-879]

Reports from Bahrain, November 1842-November 1847:

Lieutenant-Colonel H. Robertson, Officiating Resident, to the Government of Bombay, 22 November 1842, enclosing letter from A. B. Kemball, Assistant Resident, 4 November 1842; Minute by Governor in Council [IOR: P/390/32, Consultation of 31 January 1843]

Robertson to the Government of Bombay, 27 January 1843, enclosing letters from Haji Jasim, Agent at Bahrain, 2-21 January 1843 [IOR: P/390/33, Consultation of 8 March 1843]

Robertson to the Government of Bombay, 27 March 1843, enclosing letter from Haji Jasim, 18 March 1843; Shaikh 'Abdullah b. Ahmad to Robertson, 20 March 1843; Haji Jasim to Robertson, 23 & 30 March 1843; Kemball to the Government of Bombay, 17 April 1843, enclosing Haji Jasim to Robertson, 10 April 1843; Minute by the Governor in Council, 5 May 1843 [IOR: P/390/37, Consultation of 18 May 1843]

Kemball to the Government of Bombay, 22 April 1843; Minute by the Governor in Council, 30 June 1843; Haji Jasim to Resident, 22 April 1843; Kemball to the Government of Bombay, 29 April 1843, enclosing letter from Shaikh 'Abdullah b. Ahmad, 16 April 1843 [IOR: P/390/42, Consultation of 26 July 1843]

Kemball to the Government of Bombay, 2 September 1843, enclosing letters from Haji Jasim, 21 August 1843 and Shaikh Jabir b. 'Abdullah of Kuwait, 26 August 1843; Kemball to Jabir b. 'Abdullah, 31 August 1843 [IOR: P/390/46, Consultation of 4 October 1843]

S. Hennell, Resident in the Gulf, to the Government of Bombay, 20 October 1846, enclosing letters from the Agent at Bahrain, 27 September & 11 October 1846 [IOR: R/15/1/108]

Death of 'Isa b. Tarif: Hennell to the Government of Bombay, 1 December 1847, enclosing letters from Haji Jasim, Agent at Bahrain, 9, 19 & 21 November 1847 [IOR: R/15/1/111]

1.14 British influence: slave trade agreements, 1847-1856; Muhammad b. Khalifah's request for British protection, 1849

Translation of an Agreement entered into by Shaikh Muhammad b. Khalifah, Chief of Bahrain, for the abolition of the African slave trade, 8 May 1847 [IOR: R/15/1/740]

Translation of a further engagement entered into by Shaikh Muhammad b. Khalifah with the British Government for the more effectual suppression of the slave trade, 10 May 1856 [IOR: R/15/1/740]

499

583

Muhammad b. Khalifah's request for British protection, 1849: Major S. Hennell, Resident in the Gulf, to the Government of Bombay, 28 February 1849, enclosing a letter from Muhammad b. Khalifah, 9 February 1849, and Hennell's reply, 28 February 1849; Government of Bombay to Hennell, 31 May 1849, enclosing letter from Secretary to the Government of India, 16 May 1849 [IOR: L/P&S/5/461, *Enclosures to Bombay Secret Letters, No 57 of 231 May 1849 and No 61 of 1 June 1849*]

1.15 Relations with the Wahhabis, 1851-1859

603

Peace agreement between Bahrain and Amir Faisal b. Turki Al Sa'ud, 1851: Lieutenant-Colonel S. Hennell to the Government of Bombay, 3 May 1851, enclosing letter from Haji Jasim, Agent at Bahrain, 26 April 1851; Hennell to the Government of Bombay, 27 May 1851, enclosing letters from Haji Jasim, 12 & 18 May 1851; Government of Bombay to Government of India, 26 June 1851; Hennell to the Government of Bombay, 5 August 1851, enclosing letter from Commodore Porter, Commanding Gulf Squadron, 31 July 1851, and letters from Haji Jasim, 28 July & 2 August 1851; Hennell to the Government of Bombay, 9 August 1851 [IOR: L/P&S/5/470-471]

Projected attack on Bahrain by Muhammad b. 'Abdullah and Wahhabi forces, 1854: Captain A. B. Kemball, Resident in the Gulf, to the Government of Bombay, 21 August & 23 October 1854 [IOR: R/15/1/143]

Agreement between Shaikhs Muhammad b. Khalifah and Muhammad b. Abdullah, May 1855: Captain A. B. Kemball to the Government of Bombay, 3 April 1855, enclosing letters from Haji Jasim and Amir Faisal, 31 March 1855; Kemball to Amir Faisal, 3 April 1855; Kemball to the Government of Bombay, 26 May 1855, enclosing agreement between Shaikh Muhammad b. Khalifah and Shaikh Muhammad b. Abdullah [IOR: L/P&S/5/485]

The projected Wahhabi invasion of Bahrain, 1859: extract from J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Bahrein affairs, 1854-1904* (Simla, 1904) [IOR: L/P&S/20/C241, pp. 5-9]; Amir Faisal b. Turki Al Sa'ud to Captain Felix Jones, Political Resident, 3 November 1859, and reply, 29 November 1859 [IOR: L/P&S/5/504, *Enclosure to Letter No 13 of 27 March 1860*]

1.16 Agreement with the British Government, 31 May 1861

721

Muhammad b. Khalifah blockades Wahhabi ports but compelled to raise the blockade by the British and sign a perpetual treaty of peace [from J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Bahrein affairs, 1854-1904* (Simla, 1904), IOR: L/P&S/20/C241, pp. 10-11]

Terms of a Friendly Convention entered into between Shaikh Muhammad b. Khalifah, Independent Ruler of Bahrain, on the part of himself and successors, and Captain Felix Jones, Her Majesty's India Navy, Political Resident of her Britannic Majesty in the Gulf of Persia, on the part of the British Government, 31 May 1861 [IOR: R/15/1/740]

1.17 The war with Qatar, 1867-1868

729

Treaty violation by certain Arab Chiefs; breach of maritime truce by Chiefs of Bahrein and Aboothabee [from *Government of India Foreign Department Political Proceedings, February-June 1868*, IOR: P/438/1]

POPULATION AND RESOURCES

1.01

Selections from the Records of the
Government of Bombay, 1818-1856

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS

CONNECTED WITH

THE GOVERNMENT OF MUSKAT,

FROM THE YEAR 1730 to 1843;

WITH

THE JOASMEE TRIBE OF ARABS,

FROM THE YEAR 1765 to 1843;

WITH

THE UTTOOBEE TRIBE OF ARABS (BAHREIN),

FROM THE YEAR 1716 to 1844;

WITH

THE WAHABEE TRIBE OF ARABS,

FROM THE YEAR 1795 to 1844;

WITH

THE BENIYAS TRIBE OF ARABS,

FROM THE YEAR 1793 to 1843;

AND WITH

THE DEBAYE (BOO FELASA) TRIBE OF ARABS,

FROM THE YEAR 1834 to 1843.

THE WHOLE PREPARED, IN THE YEAR 1844, BY

LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL,

ASSISTANT RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

UTTOOBEE TRIBE OF ARABS.—BAHREIN.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1716	The Beni Subah, Al Yalahimah and Al Khaleefa, considerable tribes of Arabs, the first under Shaikh Soleyman bin Ahmed, the second under Jaubir bin Uttoobee, and the third under Khaleefa bin Mahomed, enter into a compact, and take possession of Koweit, belonging to the Persians.
1766-75	Khaleefa bin Mahomed, with a portion of his tribe, passes over and settles at Zobara, where, after gradually drawing over the rest of his own tribe, completely separating himself from the other two, he establishes his independence.
	The Yalahimah, shortly after expelled from the port and town of Koweit by the Beni Subah, seek and obtain the protection of their kinsmen at Zobara. Quarrelling in a few years, they quit Zobara, and take up their residence at Raveish, a barren spot, a short distance eastward of Zobara.
	A desperate feud arises between the tribes, which terminates in the almost total destruction of the Yalahimah.
1776	On the attack of Bussora by the Persians, some of the merchants of that place, and one of the Shaikhs of Koweit, with many of the principal people, retire to Zobara, and the power, wealth, and influence of the Beni Khaleefa rapidly increase.
1777	The fears and jealousy of Shaikh Nassir, the Persian Governor of Bushire and Bahrein, are thereby excited. His repeated attempts, however, to reduce Zobara, are ineffectual.
1782-83	On the death of Kureem Khan, and the warfare and confusion which ensue, the Zobara Arabs make a descent upon Bahrein, compel Shaikh Nassir to retire to the fort, and, having plundered and destroyed the town, return to Zobara.
	A military force, in a large fleet from the Persian Coast, blockade Zobara, and, after some fruitless and unsuccessful negotiations on the part of the Arabs, assisted by Shaikh Rashid, of Ras-ool-Khyma, land to storm the place; but, resolutely attacked by an unexpectedly large force, are

Date.	Occurrences.
	compelled to throw down their arms, and escape to their boats. Several of the principal men are killed. A Koweit fleet arrives the same day at Bahrein, sets fire to, and plunders the town.
A. D. 1783	The Zobara Arabs, assisted by their kinsmen from Koweit, capture Bahrein from the Persians on 28th July. The four sons of Jaubir bin Uttoobee, dissatisfied on this occasion with the rewards and rank assigned to them, quit the island in disgust; and, after wandering for a few years, establish themselves at Khor Hassan, and commence a system of piracy.
1800	The Imaum of Muskat reduces the island of Bahrein, and sends all the head men, consisting of twenty-five families, to Muskat. The Uttoobees return to Zobara, and solicit the protection of the Wahabees, which is readily extended.
1801	Early this year the Uttoobees, with the assistance of the Wahabees, retake Bahrein.
1809	The Uttoobees deprecate the wrath of the British Government, urge exemption from the general chastisement of the pirates by the British forces, and solicit the countenance of the British Government in throwing off the Wahabee yoke, and quitting the main; also some trifling support to enable them to remain undisturbed at Bahrein. The British Government abstain from all interference.
1810	The Wahabee ruler assumes the government of Bahrein and Zobara, and appoints Abdoolah bin Oofcysan Vukeel over those places, and the Kateef and Guttur districts, to convert the Uttoobees to the Wahabee faith. The Uttoobees continue in administration, but pay tribute to the Vukeel.
1810-11	The Imaum, taking advantage of the attention and resources of the Wahabee ruler being engaged in checking the invasion of the Turkish troops under Ibrahim Pasha, attacks Zobara and Bahrein, burns the former, and lands on the latter. The Wahabee Vukeel, Oofcysan, is made prisoner, and the Uttoobees recover the island.
May, 1811	A desperate action was fought between Ramah's fleet, accompanied by a fleet of boats belonging to the Joasmees of Ejman, and the Uttoobees of Bahrein, in which the latter are victorious.
1815-16	The Imaum attacks Bahrein. His troops land at Arad, and

142

UTTOOBEE.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. Oct. 1816	are signally defeated, with great loss, two of his relations and principal Sirdars being killed. The Wahabee Chief, incensed against Shaikh Ramah bin Jaubir, for having taken part with the Imaum of Muskat, directs his property and family to be seized and brought up to Deriah : he escapes with them, with great difficulty, to Bushire.
1818	Ramah bin Jaubir proceeds to, and lands with some guns at Kateef, which, in concert with Ibrahim Pasha, he batters, and commences to rebuild his old fort at Damaum, destroyed by the Wahabees in 1816.
1819	Seventeen Indian women, captured by the pirates of Ras-ool-Khyma, are restored to liberty, by the Bahrein Chiefs releasing a number of Joasmee prisoners in exchange, at the instance of Captain Lock, of His Majesty's vessel <i>Eden</i> , on that ship visiting the island, accompanied by five other vessels of war, for the purpose of inquiring into the report that several Indian women had been brought from Ras-ool-Khyma, and publicly sold in the bazar at Bahrein, which proved unfounded.
1819-20	Ramah bin Jaubir is informed by the British authority that his vessels would not be permitted to leave Kateef to cruise against the people of Bahrein, unless acting with an authorised State, in regular warfare.
Feb. 1820	He proceeds with his three vessels to Bushire, in order to co-operate in an expedition projected against Bahrein by the Prince of Shiraz. On his way down to Tanzee his large Buggalow is wrecked on the Berdistan Shoal, and he and his people escape with great difficulty with their lives.
April.	Ramah bin Jaubir refuses to become a member of the General Treaty, under the plea of his being the servant of the Persian Government. The Governor of Bushire engaging to be responsible for his future peaceable conduct, the excuse is admitted. After the capture of Ras-ool-Khyma by the British expedition, the Shaikh of Bahrein delivers up the vessels belonging to the piratical powers, which were in his harbour. The General Treaty is first signed at Ras-ool-Khyma by the Vukeel of the Uttoobee Shaikhs, and subsequently by themselves in Bahrein.

UTTOOBEE.

143

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1821-22	The Bahrein Chiefs agree to pay 30,000 German crowns tribute annually to the Imaum of Muskat, who, in return, engages to release some of the Uttoobee Shaikhs detained by him, and restore all the vessels and property belonging to Bahrein, which he had put under an embargo on their way up from India. Of the tribute, 12,000 crowns are subsequently remitted. Ramah bin Jaubir nevertheless (with reference to the security of the Bushire Shaikh for his future good conduct) continues his aggressions upon the trade of Bahrein. The Uttoobee Chief complains to the British authority. A remonstrance is made to the Shiraz Government, who order him to be called to account, and his son and family to be detained as hostages. Ramah in the mean time had quitted Bushire, and placed himself under the protection of the Imaum, but returns to Bushire in November; the Imaum disavowing him, and declaring that no reliance was to be placed upon his word.
1823	Ramah bin Jaubir takes up his residence at Damaum, with a view, although old and blind, of prosecuting his inveterate feud against the Bahrein Chiefs.
1824	A peace is concluded between the Bahrein Chiefs and Shaikh Ramah bin Jaubir of Khor Hassan and Damaum, through the Resident's mediation. Ramah blockades Kateef, with the view of recovering the tribute formerly paid him by that place, and is successful.
1825	He continues his aggressions against the trade of Kateef, plundering its boats, and murdering their crews. Remonstrances of the British authorities fail, and two vessels of war are stationed near Damaum for the protection of peaceable traders. It was directed, however, that no interference should be made as long as his hostilities were confined to the people of Kateef, and the cruisers are again withdrawn.
1825-26	Hostilities again break out between Ramah bin Jaubir and the Uttoobees. The parties apply to the British Resident to proclaim a truce; but Ramah, refusing to admit the people of Kateef to a participation of it, that functionary declines all interference, except such as would lead to a general pacification.
1826	Ramah proceeds to Bushire, and failing to induce the British

Date.	Occurrences.
	Resident to interfere in his behalf, receives on board a reinforcement of Beloochees, and returns to Damaum; on entering which place he fires a salute, as a mark of contempt. Ahmed bin Soleyman, a nephew of the reigning Shaikh, attacks him in his vessel. A desperate action takes place. Ramah sets fire to his own magazine, and blows himself and crew into the air.
A. D. 1826	Busheer, the son of Ramah, surrenders Damaum unconditionally. His life and liberty are granted him, and he proceeds to Muskat, where His Highness the Imaum presents him with a Buggalow, to enable him to gain a livelihood by trade.
	Through the influence of the Imaum, Busheer is permitted by the Wahabee Chief to build a fort at Darcen, a place on Tirhoot, an island opposite to Kateef, where he is joined by many of the Aboosemate tribe, bitter enemies of the Uttoobees.
	Suliman bin Ahmed, the colleague and elder brother of Shaikh Abdoolla, dies, and is succeeded in his property and political influence by his eldest son, Shaikh Khaleefa, who accordingly shares the net revenue of the island equally with his uncle, with whom the executive power and transaction of all public business still remain, the concurrence of the nephew being, however, considered necessary.
1827	A piracy is committed by Obed or Abdoolla bin Mohunnah, an inhabitant of Biddah, a Bahrein dependency, upon a Bushire boat, off Gonara.
1828	The Chief of Biddah, stabbing an individual of Bahrein, is placed in confinement by his feudal superior. The inhabitants thereon becoming refractory, are removed to Roweas and Fowarah, more immediately under his control, and their fort is destroyed by the same authority.
	Obed bin Mohunnah commits further piracies, but is himself, after a desperate resistance, taken prisoner on his landing at Zcerah, on the Persian Coast, to make inquiries regarding the destination of a Buggalow then at anchor. Being convicted by the British authorities, he is handed over to the Shaikh of Bushire, whose subjects had suffered from his late piracies, but contrives to escape. The crew of his

Date.	Occurrences.
	boat, on their way to Aboothabee, plunder four Aseeloo boats. Full redress is, however, afforded for this act, by Shaikh Tahnoon.
A. D. 1828 Nov.	The Bahrein Chiefs signally defeat the Imaum's expedition against the island.
Mar. 1829	A Bahrein fleet, under the command of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, in person, set out on a cruise to harass the Imaum's trade and coasts. His Highness sends out two frigates to meet it, which, after an ineffectual attempt to capture the Uttoobee Buggalow, the <i>Syar</i> , with which they fall in, return to Muskat without doing anything.
	The Bahrein fleet fail to capture an Aseeloo Buggalow, which fairly beats them off. They commit a piracy, in seizing a Morebat (neutral) vessel, evade two Muskat vessels of war which they meet, and return to Bahrein in safety. Redress to a certain extent was obtained for the piracy upon the Morebat vessel.
2nd Dec.	A peace most favourable to the Uttoobees is concluded between them and the Imaum; the tribute they formerly paid to cease, and no interference whatever to take place in each other's concerns.
1830-31	Shaikh Abdoolla is called upon by the Wahabee Chief to pay the annual Zukat or tribute, besides 40,000 German crowns, as the alleged value of a number of horses left under his charge by the Wahabees many years previous. A demand is at the same time made for the surrender of the fort of Damaum to Busheer, the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir. The Shaikhs despatching a near relation to wait upon the Wahabee ruler at Riaz, an arrangement is made, that the supremacy of Ameer Toorkey bin Saood should be acknowledged at Bahrein, and the Zukat paid by the Uttoobees, in return for which he promises them his protection.
1831	The sincerity of the Wahabee ruler considered doubtful, from his establishing Busheer the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir at Dareen, with whom they had necessarily a most inveterate feud.
Jan. 1832	Busheer quarrels with the inhabitants of Kateef, destroys the fort he was building, and leaves with his dependents for Muskat.

146

UTTOOBEE.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1832	A piracy, committed on a Congoon boat in Hallilah Bay, is traced to Hussoom of Fowarah, a dependency of Bahrein, and the captured boat recovered.
1833	The Shaikh of Bahrein refuses allegiance to the Wahabees, and resolves to retaliate all attempts at aggression. The Imaum pledges himself to him not to interfere in the quarrel. He instigates the Amayir Tribe, who, leaving the neighbourhood of Kateef, take up a position at Damaum, and establish a very close blockade of the former port.
1834	The British Agent is ill-treated and grossly insulted by the sons of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, whom the father does not exert himself to check. The appearance of a considerable naval force in his port induces him to afford ample satisfaction. On the death of Toorkey, and in the absence of his son from Kateef, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed succeeds by bribery in obtaining possession of the fort of Tirhoot, on the island of that name.
31st May	Khaleefa bin Suliman, the nephew and colleague of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, dies, and is succeeded by his son Mahomed, to whom, however, the power and share in government possessed by his father are not immediately accorded. A party of the Amayir, under the command of one Mushrif, make an attempt to recover their possessions at Lahsa and Kateef, but are defeated by the Wahabee General, Omr bin Oofeysan, and compelled to take refuge under the guns of Tirhoot.
1835	The Wahabees fail in an attack upon Tirhoot. Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed resumes the strict blockade of Kateef and Ageer. The internal dissensions of Bahrein begin to wear a serious aspect. The Chiefs of Huailah, dependents of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, conspire against his authority, and enter into treasonable communications with the Imaum and the Wahabee Chief. They are moreover joined by one of his sons, who, securing the services of a body of Wahabees, sets his authority at defiance, and commits depredations on the trade of Bahrein. Capturing, also, some neutral vessels, he is compelled to make reparation by the British Resident. He proceeds to Muskat to solicit aid. His Highness the Imaum not only refuses to take any part in these civil broils, but sends his son Hullal, in one of his

UTTOOBEE.

147

Date.	Occurrences.
	frigates, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation; but his efforts are rendered unavailing, by the irregular and hostile conduct of the subordinates, which leads to the secession of two influential inhabitants of Bahrein, and their dependents, who take refuge at Aboothabee.
A. D. 1835	Esai bin Tarif desires permission to carry on hostilities against the trade and territories of his late master, which is refused, he having established himself in a friendly, or at least neutral port.
May June 1836	Abdoolla bin Ahmed, alarmed at the threats of Persia, with whom the Imaum might co-operate, enters into terms with the Wahabees, he promising to pay the small annual tribute of 2,000 dollars, and the Wahabee Chief engaging to supply a contingent of troops to repel any invasion of Bahrein, and not to call for the vessels of that island in the event of his purposing to attack Muskat.
	The disturbances and confusion increase on the island, in consequence of the tyrannical and oppressive conduct of the subordinate members of the Chief's family.
1837	The Huwajir and Amayir, taking advantage of the disturbed state of affairs in Nujd, in consequence of the struggle for power between Amcer Fysul and the pretender Khalid, commence the systematic plunder of all boats belonging to Kateef, and occasionally those from Bahrein. Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed punishes and brings them to order.
1838	Attempts are made to effect a reconciliation between the Chief of Bahrein and the Al Ali under Esai bin Tarif and Bin Salameh, but without effect. Hostilities are, however, postponed.
1839	On the fall of Amcer Fysul, his General, Omr bin Oofeysan, seeks and obtains asylum at Bahrein. Amcer Khalid demands his surrender, and that Damaum be given up to him. Tribute, and the surrender of Tirhoot, had been before demanded. The Bahrein Chief evades compliance, on the plea of connection with, and submission to, the Persian Government. Korshid Pasha, the Egyptian Commander, avows to the British authority his intention of attacking and reducing Bahrein. The latter remonstrates and protests, and

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1839	<p>reminds him of the assurances of His Highness Mahomed Ali Pasha to Her Majesty's Government.</p> <p>One Hajee Kasim, formerly supercargo of a trading vessel, is sent from Bushire as envoy from the Government of Shiraz to Bahrein, having an escort of ten Sirbaz, to reside on the island as Persian Agent, and be the medium of receiving and transmitting the annual tribute, which the Persian authorities vainly flattered themselves the Bahrein Chief was disposed to pay for their countenance and protection. Hostilities are carried on between the Al Ali at Aboothabee and the people of Bahrein, which entail much distress upon the merchants of the latter. The Assistant Resident is despatched, to bring about a reconciliation. As no terms would be entered into that had not the guarantee of the British Government, his mission is of no avail.</p> <p>The friendship between Esai bin Tarif and the Chief of Aboothabee is interrupted: the latter, who was under friendly communication with the Chief of Bahrein, requires him to leave his country, or settle there permanently as a peaceable subject. He is therefore obliged to relinquish the prosecution of further aggressions.</p> <p>Abdoolla bin Ahmed becomes tributary to the Egyptians, notwithstanding his having promised to communicate with the Resident previous to placing himself under the protection of any other foreign power; being aware of the light in which Korshid Pasha's proceedings are viewed by the British Government, and the encouragement he had received from them to assert his rights and maintain his independence. He declares, however, that it has been expressly stipulated by him that no Agent of the Pasha should reside in Bahrein. The quarrels and dissensions among the members of the Uttoobee Chief's family grow more serious. He brings over a body of mercenary Bedouins from the main land. His own weak and vacillating conduct greatly disgusts the inhabitants.</p> <p>Esai bin Tarif and his dependents remove from Aboothabee, on the termination of the pearl fishery, and settle on the island of Kenn, whence, he is forewarned, he will be precluded from carrying on aggressive warfare against any part of the Arabian Coast.</p>

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1840	<p>Mahomed bin Khaleefa, the young Chief of Bahrein, is invited to assume authority over Lahsa and Kateef, but is opposed in doing so by the elder chief. An open collision between the two is with difficulty averted; a hollow reconciliation takes place. Mahomed bin Khaleefa addresses a letter to the British authorities, offering his services, and soliciting assistance against his grand-uncle. He then proceeds to the Guttur Coast, and commences a system of annoyance and opposition to his superior.</p>
1841	<p>A piracy, committed in the previous year upon a Koweit boat, is traced to a follower of Shaikh Moobaruk, the son of Abdoolla bin Ahmed. The father is compelled to make reparation, by the payment of the value of the property plundered.</p>
1842	<p>An open rupture takes place between the parties,—the immediate, but only ostensible, cause of contention being a girl sought in marriage by a dependent on either side. Mahomed bin Khaleefa is driven out of Munama (which town is given up to plunder by Abdoolla bin Ahmed to his victorious followers, and property belonging to British merchants shares the common fate), and flies to the main land. He proceeds to Lahsa and Riaz, to solicit the aid of the Wahabee ruler, Abdoolla bin Soncyan.</p> <p>Abdoolla bin Ahmed, finding that the son and dependents of Humood bin Omerce, a person most obnoxious to him, had taken refuge in the British Agent's house, demands and obtains their surrender by means of threats of violence, when they are immediately cut to peices. The Agent's conduct throughout the affair is so irregular and condemnable, that he is dismissed. The Uttoobee Shaikh is not without blame however. Abdoolla bin Ahmed proceeds to Khor Hassan, which he also gives up to plunder.</p> <p>Abdoolla bin Ahmed, not coming to terms with the Wahabee ruler, in consequence of his refusing to release his staunch adherent, Shafee, the head of the Huwajir Tribe, the latter favours the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa.</p> <p>Esai bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah solicit and obtain permission from the British Resident to espouse the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and due intimation is given of this coalition to Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed.</p>

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1842	Mahomed bin Khaleefa establishes himself on the Guttur Coast, whose inhabitants are well inclined towards him, and keeps open the communication with his colleagues. The Wahabee ruler endeavours to mediate between the parties, but without effect. He releases Shafce, who promises to use his influence towards a reconciliation. 'The Uttoobee Chief unwisely uses threatening language to the Wahabee ruler, to induce his observance of perfect neutrality.
1843	Mahomed bin Khaleefa prosecutes his successful operations on the main land. A piracy is committed upon a boat carrying British colours, in the harbour of Munama, by the immediate dependents of Abdoola bin Ahmed. Mahomed bin Khaleefa lands with a force on the island, and shortly obtains possession of Munama, which offers no resistance. A Charrak boat is plundered in the harbour of Munama by some of the Huwajir and Suloota Tribes.
April.	The forces of the colleagues join from Kenn. They attack Muharag, defeat the troops of Abdoola bin Ahmed, and compel him to take refuge in a small fort, close to the town. Abdoola bin Ahmed surrenders at discretion, and is allowed to leave the island, with his personal property and followers. His sons are permitted to remain. Abdoola bin Ahmed proceeds to Damaum, the only place now left acknowledging his authority, held by his eldest son, Moobaruk.
June.	Abdoola bin Ahmed annoys the trade of Bahrein. The colleagues in consequence blockade Damaum. Both parties make overtures to the Wahabee ruler. Shaikh Janbir, of Koweit, proceeds with his fleet to Bahrein, with a view to mediate a peace between the contending chieftains, but fails in his object. Mahomed and Ali, the sons of Abdoola bin Ahmed, and Hajee Bushab his Vizier, are made prisoners by the Governor of Kateef, who places them at the disposal of the Wahabee ruler. Abdoola bin Ahmed endeavours to engage the assistance of the Chiefs of Ras-ool-Khyma, Shargah, and Debaye, who refer him to the Resident for his permission. 'The ex-chief

Date.	Occurrences.
	comes in person to Bushire with this object. The colleagues had made overtures with a view to secure the aid of the Shaikhs of Aboothabee and Amulgavine. The British authority declines on this account, and for obvious reasons, to give his sanction.
A. D. 1843 Oct.	Professors of military aid are unauthorisedly made to the ex-chief by an individual of Bushire, one Shaikh Sulman, on the part of the Persian Government, which the former affects to believe. The ex-chief leaves Bushire, and proceeds to Nabend, on the Persian Coast. Esai bin Tarif and his dependents abandon Kenn, and settle at Biddah, a dependency of Bahrein.
Dec.	The ex-chief revisits Bushire, with the avowed object of having an interview with the Resident, but declines the latter's invitation to meet him on board a vessel of war. His real object appears to be to endeavour to procure the aid, so unauthorisedly promised by Shaikh Sulman. He earnestly urges his claims by letter to the Resident, to the interference and assistance of the British Government in his behalf, which are not admitted. A Bahrein boat, seized near Aseeloo by the dependents of the ex-chief, is, after much correspondence, restored in July 1844.
Jan. 1844	The ex-chief, still in Bushire Roads, again urges his claims to assistance, and is peremptorily refused. The long promised land forces under the Wahabee ruler arrive, and lay siege to Damaum, which is under blockade by the fleet of the coalesced chieftains. Two boats, despatched by the chief and people of Koweit, with supplies for Damaum, are captured at Khore Balbul, by some vessels detached from the blockading fleet. Although the seizure is perfectly legal and just, Mahomed bin Khaleefa is subsequently induced to restore the boats, rather than incur the risk of a war with the powerful Shaikh of Koweit. The ex-chief lands, is received with honours, and takes up his residence on shore, his hopes of military aid from the Persian Government increased; but after waiting three months without any signs of intention to join his cause being shown, determines upon taking his departure. He visits the Resident.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1844	He proceeds towards Damaum, and endeavours to throw supplies into the beleaguered fort, now driven to the last extremity for provisions; but fails, is himself chased, and takes refuge at Koweit.
April.	Damaum capitulates, and is garrisoned by Wahabee troops. The ex-chief revisits Bushire, and has an interview with the Resident on the sea shore, about three miles from the town, on the subject of certain overtures made to him by the Wahabee ruler. The British Resident declines interfering. The ex-chief proceeds to Nabend, on the Persian Coast. Mahomed bin Khaleefa, the <i>de facto</i> ruler, is required to pay the value of that portion of the property plundered from the Charrak boat, which had fallen to the share of the Suloota, who had abandoned the cause of his opponent, and become his adherents. He accedes without hesitation.

HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF THE

UTTOOBEE TRIBE OF ARABS;

(BAHREIN;)

FROM THE YEAR 1716 TO THE YEAR 1817.

PREPARED BY

MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,

MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY.

WITH

CONTINUATIONS OF THE SAME,

FROM THE YEAR 1817 TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNELI;

FROM 1832 TO AUGUST 1844,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;

AND FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;

SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

UTTOOBEE ARABS (BAHREIN).

ABOUT A. D. 1716, three considerable tribes of Arabs, called the Beni Subah, Al Yalahimah, and Al Khaleefa, urged

A. D. 1716. by motives of interest or ambition, entered into a compact, and took possession of a spot of ground on the north-western shore of the Persian Gulf, called Koweit. The Beni Subah were subject at this time to Shaikh Soleyman bin Ahmed; the Beni Yalahimah to Janbir bin Uttoobee; and the Beni Khaleefa to Khaleefa bin Mahomed.

2. These chiefs strengthened the new settlement by intermarriages with the daughters of the other clans, with the view of being enabled by such alliances to resist the attacks of the Beni Khalid, who were a very powerful tribe.

3. The three tribes determined to follow the occupation of merchants and agriculturists, and to share the profits equally. In the formation of an administration, it was agreed that the sons of the Beni Subah should exercise the functions of government, those of Yalahimah should superintend and control the maritime, and the Beni Khaleefa the mercantile branch of their concerns.

4. In the course of fifty years, by a prudent and cautious policy, the new settlement attained a very high degree of prosperity: but the accumulation of wealth rendered the mercantile branch desirous of seceding from the original league, that they might singly enjoy and add to their acquired riches.

5. They were obliged to have recourse to dissimulation to effect their purpose. Khaleefa bin Mahomed, an artful and politic chief, undertook to accomplish it. He represented to the other two the prospects of wealth that presented themselves by proceeding to the shores of that part of the Persian Gulf the most productive of pearls, and, by forming a settlement on some contiguous spot, to conduct the fishery themselves. Lured by the advantages thus held forth, the Beni Khaleefa Chief was permitted to leave Koweit, with a part of his tribe. He accordingly passed over and settled at Zobara, on the Arabian shore.

By his talents and his treasures he soon acquired a considerable portion of the fishery, and by his prudent liberality to the neighbouring Arab Chieftains, and to those of his former associates, he drew over the rest of his own tribe to the new colony, and at length completely separated himself from the other two, and established his independence at Zobara.

6. The sons of Subah and Yalahimah discovered too late the true motives that influenced Khaleefa's conduct, but were unable to resent it.

7. The more powerful clan of the two, the Al Subah, soon felt the absence of their commercial brethren, in a deficiency of their finances; and, following the example of their renegade brethren, first refused the Al Yalahimah their share of the revenue, and ultimately expelled them from the port and town of Koweit.

8. The Yalahimah Tribe sought and obtained the protection of their kinsmen at Zobara, to each of whom, according to his rank, was assigned an adequate income. In a few years they renewed their claims to rights founded on their original compact, which they were not, however, in a condition to enforce.

9. Urged by necessity, and a sense of wrong, the Yalahimah quitted Zobara, and took up their residence at Raveish, a barren spot at a short distance eastward of Zobara, and turned their whole attention to the increase, equipment, and preservation of their fleet, contemplating the object of revenging themselves on their proud and perfidious neighbours. They commenced an extensive system of maritime depredation, and, by capturing their property, created in the minds of the Beni Khaleefa fears for their existence, and such a thirst for the punishment and destruction of the Yalahimah Chief, that, adding to their own force all the mercenaries their pecuniary resources could obtain, they environed the marauders on every side. The treasures which the Yalahimah had amassed, which they were determined to defend to the last, and the feelings of animosity that existed between them, led to a desperate contest: the Yalahimah Chief having been killed at an early period of the action, the overwhelming superiority of their enemies obtained a complete victory, and a few infants and females were alone saved from the massacre that ensued.

10. Subsequently to this event, the influence and power of the Beni Khaleefa rapidly increased. They acquired

A. D. 1775-76. an accession of wealth and respectability, on the attack of Bussora by the Persians, at which period one of the Shaikhs of Grane retired to Zobara, with many of the principal people, and accompanied by some of the Bussora merchants also. A great part of the pearl and Indian trade in consequence centered at Zobara, and at Grane, during the time the Persians occupied Bussora; and those places

increased in strength and consequence. This state of prosperity excited in particular the fears and jealousy of Shaikh Nassir, of the Bomeheere Tribe, who was also Shaikh of Bushire and of Bahrein, and who had been empowered by his sovereign of Persia to reduce Zobara. Repeated but ineffectual attempts were accordingly made to reduce that place between the years 1777 and 1801.

11. Availing themselves of the general warfare that prevailed in the Gulf on the death of Kureem Khan, the Zobara

A. D. 1782-83.

Arabs made a descent on the island of Bahrein, and, after a short conflict, obliged Shaikh Nassir to retire to the fort: after plundering and destroying the town, they returned to Zobara, taking with them one of the Bushire gallivats that had been sent to Bahrein to receive its annual tribute to Persia.

12. In pursuance of orders from Ali Moorad Khan, Shaikh Nassir prepared an expedition against Zobara, for the destruction of his powerful rival, in which he was to be assisted by the Shaikhs of Bunder Reig, Genowa, Dushistan, &c. The fleet sailed from Bushire with two thousand of the Dushistan Arabs for Bahrein, under the command of Shaikh Mahomed, Shaikh Nassir's nephew. Though deemed sufficient to attack Zobara, it appeared to be Shaikh Nassir's object to bring the Arabs to terms by blockading their port, for which purpose the Persian fleet kept constantly cruising between Zobara and Bahrein.

13. The Uttoobes, unable to oppose them, offered through Meer Gunceeh, of Bunder Reig, to restore the whole plunder taken at Bahrein, as the price of peace. That Shaikh proving unsuccessful in his negotiations, Shaikh Rashid of Julfar engaged to settle all the differences to the satisfaction of both parties.

14. These negotiations also failing, the Persian troops landed at Zobara to storm the fort, which they expected to reduce with little opposition. The Persians, however, had scarcely landed, when they were resolutely attacked by a force much greater than they expected, which sallied from the fort, and, after an obstinate conflict, the Persians threw down their arms, fled, and embarked on board their gallivats. Shaikh Mahomed was killed in the action, and a nephew of Shaikh Rashid's, and some men of consequence belonging to the Shaikh of Ormus. Intoxicated with their success, the want of means of transport alone prevented the Zobara Arabs from proceeding to the attack of Bahrein.

15. The Grane* fleet, consisting of six gallivats, and a number of armed boats, arrived on the same day at Bahrein, set fire to, and plundered the town, and obliged the force left to protect it to return to the fort.

* The Al Khaleefa, or Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs, occupy Grane.

16. Shaikh Nassir, after this unsuccessful attempt, proceeded with Shaikh Rashid to Asceloo, to re-equip a force for another attack of Zobara. The latter would appear, notwithstanding his recent interference as a mediator, to have taken an active part against the Uttoobes, on account of their having captured a boat of his, and put eighteen of her crew to the sword. Shaikh Nassir, however, returned to Bushire on the 12th of June, and on the 5th of August Shaikh Rashid arrived with the Persian garrison of Bahrein, which they had been under the necessity of surrendering on the 28th of July.

17. The Al Subah, who had continued to increase their power and possessions at Koweit, hearing of the distress of their old confederates, prepared to relieve them. On their way to Zobara with that view, they intercepted a small fishing-boat, which had been despatched by Shaikh Nassir to his son at Bahrein, to apprise him of his defeat, charging him to be resolute and watchful in defending the island until assistance should reach him. The information was valuable, and led to their adopting prompt and decisive measures. They immediately sailed to Bahrein, and obtained possession of the principal forts. The news of this success having reached Zobara, every effort was made by the Al Khaleefa to raise auxiliaries for the subjection of the island, which they soon accomplished.

18. On the conquest of Bahrein, they proceeded to reward their companions on this service. The four sons of Jaubir bin Uttoobee were among the number. These, not at all instructed, nor improved by their habits of life, and without even the power their father appeared to possess to substantiate their claims, demanded from the Khaleefa Chief the enjoyment of territorial and political rights, which being refused, they left the island in disgust, and prosecuted the mode of life in which their ancestors had been bred, in which they have ever since persevered.*

19. Active preparations were still made by the Shaikhs of Julfar and Ormus to join Shaikh Nassir in another attack of the Zobara and Grane Arabs, in which they were to be assisted by a force of six thousand men, which Ali Moorad Khan promised to furnish at the close of the year. However, every design to proceed on a second expedition appears to have been abandoned for a time.

20. Preparations for that purpose were, however, renewed in the close of the following year, and on the 12th of February 1785 Shaikh Nassir proceeded by land to Congoon, and the Bushire and Bunder Reig fleets sailed for that place

* For a continuance of their history, see "Khor Nassau," in the latter part of this Selection.

on the 21st, where they were to be rejoined by the Shaikhs of Ormus and Julfar. A small force from Shiraz had already arrived at Congoon, to join the expedition. The death of Ali Moorad Khan, however, arrested the prosecution of offensive operations against the Uttoobes.

21. The contests for the succession that ensued in the interior of Persia on that event, in which Shaikh Nassir of Bushire took a part, left the Uttoobes in

quiet possession of Bahrein, and no mention is made of them until the year 1799, when the Imaum of Muskat, in compliance with the wish of the Beglerbeg of Fars, proceeded with four ships and six Dows, and armed gallivats, to attack the Uttoobes, and subdue Bahrein. The Uttoobes had only three ships, which were on trading voyages to India, which were all taken, laden with merchandize, by the Imaum, on their return.

22. The Uttoobes at Bahrein wrote on this occasion to Shaikh Nassir at Bushire, stating that the island originally belonged to the Turkish Government, but that it was many (about seventy) years since they were in possession of it; that they were now desirous of becoming subject to the King of Persia, to whom they would pay a tribute. Shaikh Nassir availed himself of this invitation, and privately proceeding to Bahrein, received the tribute for the preceding year.

23. In the year 1800, the Imaum of Muskat reduced the island of Bahrein, and sent all the head men, consisting

A. D. 1800-01. of twenty-five families, to Muskat. The Uttoobee Shaikhs proceeded to Zobara with their followers, and solicited the protection of the Wahabees, which was readily extended. In the following year, assisted by all the Wahabee dependents in the district of Khutter, the Uttoobes attacked and retook Bahrein, having forced the Imaum's governor and his son to leave the island with only their private baggage; and in consequence of the Persian Shaikhs having assisted Syud Sultan in the reduction of Bahrein, the Uttoobes made prize of every Bussora or Persian vessel they fell in with.

24. The Uttoobee Arabs at Zobara became at this period, in common with every tribe on the Arabian shore of the Gulf, under the control of the Wahabee power. They would appear, however, to have been at war with the Muskat Arabs since Syud Sultan lost his life in an engagement with the Uttoobes, joined by the Joasmeees.

25. It is difficult to trace the varying policy of the different tribes in the Gulf, influenced as they were, at a period so unsettled, by those changes which affected their interests. In 1805 we find the Uttoobes promoting a plan projected by Syud Beder, the Imaum of Muskat, to destroy the Joasmeees, and to throw off the Wahabee yoke. Captain Seton expressed

A. D. 1804-05.

an opinion on this occasion, "that this coalition would succeed, and ought to be encouraged, as the Wahabee, in gaining the ascendancy, would order the Muskatees to plunder every vessel they met, as the Uttoobes and Joasmeees had been obliged to do."

26. Orders having been issued by the British Government for the attack of the Joasmee vessels in the Gulf, the Shaikhs of Zobara and Grano required information in respect to the nature of those instructions, as they were aware of the outrages committed on our trade by the Wahabees; and the Uttoobes being their subjects, they wished to know if the Government had included them in the orders in question. They explained that the Wahabee Shaikh was daily pressing them to proceed on a piratical cruise to India; that they had evaded a compliance with his wishes, and that he had received their excuses, as the Wahabees had not the power of compelling them to join in their plans, for want of a naval force, and for fear of inducing them to retire from Zobara to Bahrein; but as the Wahabee had set aside the Chief of the Joasmeees, and established his own officers in the Scer principality, they were apprehensive that they should be obliged to join in their piratical schemes. These Shaikhs required a direct answer whether, in the event of their retiring from the main, and withdrawing themselves from the Wahabee allegiance, the British Government would lend them such support as would enable them to remain undisturbed at Bahrein,—the greatest assistance they would require would be a vessel or two for a short time.

27. Captain Seton urged in strong terms the advantages of such a connection, in securing the future tranquillity of the Gulf. Their situation on one side of the Joasmeees, and that of Muskat on the other, held out every prospect of effectually checking this new and pernicious system, arising out of the avarice and fanaticism of a desperate tribe in the centre of Nujd, who, reducing their neighbours to poverty and misery, have made them the unwilling instruments of their robberies and piracies; that it would be supposing the British Government had lost sight of those generous principles that had heretofore actuated their policy, to imply a doubt that they would step forward to rescue from such abominable slavery those who by their trade had so long encouraged their Indian produce and manufactures; that it would be imagining the British Government to be blind to its own interests to conceive that it would allow these traders to be drawn into a state of actual robbery and piracy, preying on their own subjects and allies, without an effort to prevent it.

28. Captain Seton explained on this occasion that the Uttoobes, carrying on a brisk trade direct from Bahrein to India, without touching at Muskat, and thus evading the half duties paid by the other States in

the Gulf to Muskat, induced Syud Sultan to attack Bahrein in 1800; that compelled by that attack to seek the protection of the Wahabees, they had suffered so much from their tyranny, that of late the Uttoobees had endeavoured to conciliate the Muskat Government, had frequented the port, and paid duties, as other States. The Imaum had also on every occasion shown them a preference, and encouraged them; and that the only obstacle that opposed the conclusion of a solid agreement between the Uttoobee Arabs and those of Muskat was the want of a guarantee, who would secure the due performance of it on both sides.

29. The Bombay Government entertaining doubts as to now far the Persians would be equally disposed to come into such a plan as the Imaum of Muskat, abstained from all interference.

30. The Uttoobees manifested the same disposition, when the Wahabee Shaikh, having established his influence over the Joasmees and Muskat, was urging them to proceed against Grane and Bussora, which they declined.

31. The Wahabees in 1810 assumed the government of Bahrein and Zobara, and appointed Abdoolah bin Oofeysan Vukeel over those places, together with the district of Kateef, and the whole of the Khutter district.

32. The Uttoobees continued in administration of the island; they were, however, obliged to pay tribute to the Vukeel, who was placed at Bahrein to convert the Uttoobees to the Wahabee faith.

33. The successful progress of the Turkish troops under Ibrahim Pacha having obliged Abdoolah bin Saood to collect his adherents and his troops, the garrisons of Zobara and Bahrein were reduced. The Imaum seized this opportunity of attacking those places; the former was burnt, and, landing on the latter place, the Wahabee Vukeel, Oofeysan, was made prisoner, and the Uttoobees recovered possession of the island.

34. In 1811 a desperate action would appear to have been fought by the Uttoobees and Rahmah bin Jaubir, who was in connection with the Wahabees, in which the Uttoobees were victorious.

35. In 1813 we find the Uttoobees of Bahrein offering to co-operate with a fleet of from fifteen to twenty sail, and two thousand men, in an expedition which the Imaum contemplated against Ras-ool-Khyma, and proposed to join His Highness at the port of the Heza Arabs, a little to the eastward of Aboothabee, and between it and Ras-ool-Khyma.

36. Mr. Bruce having proceeded to Bahrein, for the purpose of ascertaining more correctly the engagements and views the Arabs of Bahrein and the Joasmees had towards the Imaum, who was on his way with a large

expedition to reduce those Arabs to his allegiance, arrived at that island on the 19th of July. He was received with marked kindness by Shaikh Abdoolah bin Ahmed, who was fully prepared to oppose any native force the Imaum might bring against him. Mr. Bruce looked upon it as fortunate his having visited the island, for he found the impression which the Imaum had made on the minds of the tribe against us to be so great, and had impressed them with such a thorough belief that we had determined to take up his cause, and support him to the utmost in our power, that, from the full conviction that we should seize all their vessels if they visited our ports, they were deliberating upon joining the Joasmees pirates as a mode of existence; which was thus fortunately prevented. "Shaikh Abdoolah, in explaining the cause of dispute between him and the Imaum, said that Syud Saeed had broken his treaty with them, and that in the most faithless way; that he never wished to be upon any terms but the most friendly with the State of Muskat, nor had he or any of his tribe ever done anything contrary to this view; that the Syud had seized fifteen sail of his vessels, richly laden, from India, and that at a time when they supposed him most friendly towards them, as they had only put into Muskat on the faith of the Syud's own letter to Shaikh Abdool Rahman, in charge of the fleet, when off the port; that not content with this, he had written to the Wahabee Chief privately, saying, if he would march down and attack Bahrein from the main, he would do so by sea with his vessels,—that this very letter had been sent to him by the Wahabee Chief, with offers of any kind of assistance he required, to support him against the Imaum, and that he had availed himself of these offers, which the Imaum's conduct had compelled him to do, particularly as Rahmah bin Jaubir was the person who had joined the Imaum, and who he intended to put in charge of the island if he should conquer it; but in this he trusted in God he would not succeed, as he was fully prepared to receive His Highness with any force he could bring; that he had 7,000 men at present under arms, and could procure from the Wahabee Chief as many more as he might require; that Shakhboot, of the Beniayas Tribe, as well as the different chiefs on the Persian shore, had refused to join the Syud, who, in consequence, had applied to the prince at Shiraz to furnish him with troops; but at this he was not alarmed. He then asked in a direct manner in which light was he to look towards us,—friends or enemies. On Mr. Bruce's saying, why should he doubt our being friends, he replied that the Syud had given out we had taken up his cause, and intended to join him with four or five ships, to assist in reducing the island; that he was not conscious of ever having done anything towards us, contrary to the strictest rules of friendship, or

would they ever do so; that he was exceedingly happy Mr. Bruce had arrived, as he was on the eve of sending over to Bushire, to ascertain if there was any truth in the Imaum's reports; that if we did intend to assist him, he confessed candidly he was not able to cope with us; but as for any native power, he was not alarmed; that his ports were ever open, and should continue so to us, and every aid at all times rendered to our vessels, whenever they should arrive; and asked if we would allow his vessels to continue to visit India on the terms they had hitherto done. On Mr. Bruce replying certainly, he was overjoyed, and said he now did not care anything for the Imaum, as this was the most he had at heart. He said the Imaum had always given out that it was owing to his intercessions we allowed the Arab States to visit India. To convince him the more fully of our friendly disposition, Mr. Bruce said he would, although not authorised by Government, draw out a few articles of agreement, which we would exchange, and had no doubt but that they would be approved of, and be sanctioned by the British Government. He was highly satisfied with this. He then informed Mr. Bruce that the Wahabee Chief had directed a large force to march against Muskat by land, under command of one of his brothers, which would compel the Imaum to return; that then he should fit out all his vessels and boats, and proceed to blockade Muskat; and that he might rely on the strictest orders being given to his boats to respect the British flag in the highest degree, from a ship to the smallest boat. He hoped hereafter our vessels would frequent Bahrein more than we had hitherto done; that there was a great field open to us, as they had hitherto received a great portion of their Indian goods through Muskat, which we could now furnish them direct by our own ships,—particularly the article of rice, several ship loads of which were annually required for the interior of Arabia, and which went all from Bahrein, and came *via* Muskat."

37. Mr. Bruce represented the Beni Attaba Arabs of Bahrein to be a very strong and powerful body of maritime Arabs, who carry on a very extensive traffic with India, and who have always been very peaceably inclined, preferring commerce to a predatory life, but which they were on the verge of falling into, from the late extraordinary proceedings of the Imaum of Muskat.

38. That from the account of Bahrein, the Government would be able to appreciate the necessity of keeping on terms of friendship with its inhabitants, when such an extensive mart for commerce and speculation was held out, and when the balance of trade was so much in our favour, we only supplying the produce of our soil and labour for specie and pearls.

39. The Imaum was at this time on his way to the attack of Bahrein;

and in a letter to the British Government stated that he was urged to the measure by the Uttoobees having joined the pirates, and acknowledged themselves subject to the Wahabees. His Highness added, "that when that power reduced the island, the Uttoobees sought an asylum at Muskat, and surrendered their country to him. Under that assurance, he went forth with his fleet and army, and wrested the country from the possession of the Wahabees, and gave the Uttoobees a place of abode in it, on their engaging to remain subject to his authority; but they had broken the treaty with him, and joined the Wahabees a second time."

40. A few days after Mr. Bruce left Bahrein, His Highness arrived at the island. The troops landed at Arad,* and commenced an attack, with some prospect of success, but ultimately experienced a signal defeat, with great loss, two of his relations and principal Sirdars being killed on the occasion.

41. The Imaum, after this defeat, proceeded to Congoon with the whole of his fleet, for the purpose of taking on board a reinforcement of troops which the Prince of Shiraz had engaged to furnish, on condition of the Imaum's engaging to defray their expense, and to pay an annual Peshkush should the troops embark and the expedition be abandoned, but if they landed and reduced Bahrein, the Imaum was to pay 10,000 Tomans annually to the Government of Shiraz.

42. The expedition was abandoned, the Imaum discovering that the Government of Persia had been actuated by motives of treachery, and contemplated his seizure, and that of the different Arab Chiefs, and carrying them off to Shiraz.

43. In the following year Mr. Bruce represented the Chief of Bahrein to be affording the fullest and most effective aid in his power, in grain and stores of all kinds, to the Joasmcees, who hourly frequented the ports of the island, and that the piratical boats kept up a constant communication with Bahrein, to which place they conveyed all the property they captured, great portions of which finds its way across to Bushire and the other ports on the Persian side of the Gulf, by the Grane boats which trade to the island.

44. The subsequent unfriendly conduct of the Shaikh of Bahrein, when he defied our power, is entirely irreconcilable with the friendly spirit that distinguished it on his interview with Mr. Bruce. The encouragement and protection which the pirates met with at that port, in the reception and disposal of their plunder, are subjects of further representation by the Resident at Bushire.

45. Mr. Bruce remarked that the pirates not only experienced a

* An island separated from Bahrein by a narrow channel for boats.

ready mart for their plundered property at Bahrein, but purchased, with the proceeds, supplies of dates and rice, and of all kinds of stores necessary for their vessels, which were brought to Bahrein in abundance by the ships belonging to Arab owners residing at Bombay.

46. That it was impossible under these circumstances to look on Bahrein in any other light than that of a piratical port; for although they may not individually commit piracies in their own vessels, the assistance they afford to those freebooters operates to the same end, and, in fact, considerable numbers of the crews of the pirate boats are actually composed of the inhabitants of that island, who proceed to Ras-ool-Khyma, and enter on board for a cruise. If successful, they return to their homes; if not, they continue there until their avarice is satisfied.

CONTINUATION OF THE FOREGOING SKETCH, TO THE YEAR 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL.

Mr. Warden terminates his account of this tribe in A. D. 1817, by alluding to the opinion entertained by Mr. Bruce, that although not actively engaged in piracy themselves, they could be looked upon in no other light than as piratical, as they were the receivers and purchasers of a great portion of the property plundered by the Joasmees, and not only gave them free access to their ports, but supplied them with all kinds of provisions and warlike stores.

Notwithstanding the signal defeat experienced by the Imaum in his attack upon this island, the Uttoobes were kept for some time in a state of suspense, in consequence of His Highness proceeding with his fleet to Congoon, to wait for the reinforcements promised him by the Shiraz Government, for the purpose of making a second attempt. But their apprehensions were subsequently removed by the arrival of a messenger by name Sikundur Khan, who was sent over by that Court to Bahrein, to offer terms to the Shaikhs, which they agreed to, and, in return for the presents which they sent, were presented with honorary dresses by the Prince of Fars.

In the month of February 1819, a report having been received that several Indian women had been brought from Ras-ool-Khyma, and publicly sold in the bazar of Bahrein, Captain Lock, of His Majesty's Ship *Eden*, in company with five vessels of war, proceeded to that island, to procure their liberation. After some negotiation, the Bahrein Shaikh succeeded in convincing the

British authorities that the report was without foundation, and entered into an agreement with Captain Lock, by which he bound himself down to prevent the sale of captured British property in his territory,—to which engagement it appears, however, from subsequent accounts, he did not pay the slightest attention. At Captain Lock's request, he opened a communication with Hussain bin Rahmah, the Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, offering on the part of the British Government the release of a number of Joasmees prisoners, in exchange for several females who had been captured by the pirates. This proposal was finally agreed to, and seventeen Indian women were thus restored to liberty.

On the 17th January 1820, after the capture of Ras-ool-Khyma, and the destruction of the Joasmees fleet, by the expedition under Sir W. G. Keir, the Shaikh of Bahrein delivered up the vessels belonging to the piratical powers which were in his harbour, to Captain Lock, of His Majesty's ship *Eden*, for the purpose of being destroyed; and at the same time entered into an agreement not to admit any boats of the above description into his port until permitted by the British Government. The General Treaty between the British Government and the Arabian Chiefs, negotiated by General Keir, was first signed in Ras-ool-Khyma by the Vukeel of the Uttoobee Shaikhs, and subsequently by themselves in Bahrein.

Influenced, probably, by the general impression conveyed by the success of the British troops, and the increased degree of confidence acquired by the Imaum from his co-operation with them, the Al Khalcefa (Shaikhs of Bahrein) deemed it prudent to take measures to avert the attack preparing by His Highness, in conjunction with the Prince of Shiraz, against their island. They accordingly sent an Agent to Muskat, who concluded an agreement, by which they bound themselves to pay His Highness 30,000 German crowns per annum; both parties, however, stipulating for the guarantee of the British Government, which does not appear to have been afforded. In return, His Highness engaged to release some of the Uttoobee Shaikhs detained by him, and restore all the vessels and property, belonging to Bahrein, which he had put under an embargo, on their way up from India. Of this tribute the sum of 12,000 crowns was subsequently remitted.

In April 1822, an Agent of the Bahrein Chief made a verbal request, on the part of his superiors, that the British Government would mediate an adjustment of the dispute between them and Rahmah bin Jaubir, on the principle of *status quo ante bellum*. This was acceded to, and instructions to the effect were issued to the Resident at Bushire, with a strict reservation, however, that the Government was not to be pledged in any way to enforce the fulfilment of the conditions. Shortly after Shaikh Abdoolah

A. D. 1820.

A. D. 1822.

A. D. 1819.

374

UTTOOBEEES.

bin Ahmed proceeded to Bassadore, but, from the unreasonable expectations of himself and Rahmah bin Jaubir, the Acting Political Agent failed in settling their dispute.

About the end of this year a Buteel belonging to a Bahrein merchant was taken in Bussora river by His Britannic Majesty's ship *Sophia*, on a charge of piracy committed on a Bushire boat. The Buteel and crew were carried to Bombay, but the charge of piracy not being considered as substantiated in the Recorder's Court, she was released, together with the crew, and an explanation of the circumstances afforded to the Chief of Bahrein, who however disavowed the proceedings of the vessel in question.

In February 1824, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed made up his quarrel with Rahmah bin Jaubir (through the mediation of the Resident in the Persian Gulf), upon several conditions, among which it was stipulated that the Bahrein Chief should be permitted to chastise the Aboosemate Tribe, which had fled from his territory, and taken refuge at Demaum, without any interference on the part of Shaikh Rahmah in their favour.

Shaikh Mahomed bin Shakboot, the brother of Shaikh Tahnoon, failing in his endeavours to obtain the assistance of the Mohariba Tribe in renewing his attack on Aboothabee, sought the protection of the Shaikh of Bahrein, and took up his residence in Huailah, which is within the territories of the Uttoobee Chief, but over which he has little control. In the beginning of 1824, a report was made by the Resident that he had received information of a piracy having been committed on a boat from Debaye (a town in strict alliance with Shaikh Tahnoon bin Shakboot), by Mahomed bin Shakboot. This proceeding appeared to the Resident in the Persian Gulf to call for immediate notice and chastisement, and he accordingly required Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, as the ostensible superior of Huailah, to take steps for this purpose, and offered the use of the squadron in the Gulf to co-operate if he found himself unable to do so alone. The Government, in its reply to the report, expressed its opinion that it would have been better to make further inquiries into the affair before offering the use of the marine force against Huailah, and at the same time detailed the reasons which made the case in question come rather under the description of a feud for supremacy than a case of piracy. The whole account of the transaction, however, was subsequently reported to be entirely without foundation.

In 1825, Salmin bin Nassir, the elder brother of Shaikh Abdoolla, died, and was succeeded in his property and political influence by his eldest son, Shaikh Khaleefa, who in consequence shared the net revenue of the island in equal propor-

A. D. 1822.

A. D. 1824.

UTTOOBEEES.

375

tions with his uncle. Notwithstanding this arrangement, the executive power and transaction of all public business still remained in the hands of Shaikh Abdoolla, although the concurrence of his nephew to every act of the Government was considered necessary. An attempt, made at this time by the Resident, to effect a reconciliation between the Aboosemate Tribe and their former chief (the Governor of Bahrein), was unsuccessful.

Information having been received in Bombay that His Highness the Imaum proposed supporting the claims of the sons of the late Shaikh to the supreme authority in Bahrein, and that he intended to take advantage of the first favourable opportunity to seize the island for himself, a strong letter of advice was addressed to His Highness by the Governor, in which, after pointing out the evils likely to arise from such a line of conduct, he was earnestly dissuaded from interfering in any way in the actual disputes of that island as long as other powers abstained from doing so.

In the latter end of this year a Bahrein boat, on her way to Muskat, was attacked by two Shargah vessels near Anjar, and not only plundered of a considerable quantity of dollars, but three of her crew put to death. Although Shaikh Abdoolla did not prefer any complaint himself on this occasion, it was thought necessary by the British authority that immediate and active notice should be taken of it; and preparations were accordingly made to enforce satisfaction, by blockading the port of Shargah. This vigorous measure had the desired effect, and an arrangement was made by the Joasmee Chief, which fully satisfied the Governor of Bahrein.

In August 1825 the Resident at Mocha reported to the Government, that some delay having taken place in that town in settling a claim of 400 dollars preferred against certain traders by the Nakhoda of a Bahrein Buggalow, that person had boarded by night a Mocha vessel lying in the harbour, and, after wounding one man, and binding the rest of the crew, had carried off twenty bags of coffee, belonging to the Company's broker. This case being referred to the British authority in the Persian Gulf, he reported that the Buggalow in question having put into Muskat on her way back, His Highness the Imaum had compelled the Nakhoda to give up the property taken, which had been restored to the proper owner.

About the commencement of 1826 Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed was nearly involved in a serious quarrel with Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee, in consequence of his having permitted some of the subjects of the Benihas Chief to settle in Biddah, and from thence harass the trade of Aboothabee. On being

A. D. 1826.

applied to on the subject by the Resident, he disavowed their proceedings, and stated they had left his territories, but that he would seize them if they ever returned.

Nearly at the same time as the above occurrence, the ill-will so long subsisting between the Uttoobee Shaikh and Rahmah bin Jaubir came to an open rupture, in consequence of three men belonging to the latter being put to death by the inhabitants of Bahrein, on a suspicion of their having endeavoured to set fire to the town. In retaliation of this proceeding, Rahmah seized a Bahrein boat, put one of the crew to death, and threw two others overboard. The presence of the English cruisers (stationed off Demaum for the protection of the trade of Kateef from the aggressions of Shaikh Rahmah), however, prevented the two chiefs from carrying on regular hostilities against each other, and as they were not prepared for active warfare (Rahmah on account of the smallness of his force, and the Uttoobee Shaikh owing to his apprehensions for the safety of his trading vessels then absent in India), they were both well satisfied with the arrangement, and were proportionably alarmed on the removal of our vessels of war, agreeably to the orders of the Bombay Government. An attempt was made by both parties to have a truce for some time proclaimed, but the British authority declined interfering in any measures that did not tend to the re-establishment of general tranquillity. Hostilities were accordingly carried on until the end of 1826, when Shaikh Rahmah's Buggalow was attacked by a Bahrein vessel of equal size. After a desperate action of some hours, finding that he had no chance of success or escape, Bin Jaubir set fire to his magazine, and blew up himself, vessel, and crew.

In the month of May 1827, a daring act of piracy was committed on a Bushire Butcel off Gunowa, while on her way to Bunder Dillum with passengers and treasure, by an individual of the Monasir Tribe, named Obed or Abdoolah bin Mohunnah, who had lately taken up his residence in Biddah, under the protection of Abdoolah bin Ahmed, the Chief of Bahrein. Several of the people on board the Butcel were put to death, and the remainder, after being completely stripped, were landed on the Persian Coast near Bordakhan. Every exertion was made to trace and seize the perpetrators of this outrage, as well as to recover the plundered property, but with little success. The principal actors in it were ascertained to be the individual above mentioned, and Hussein bin Jassim, a native of Bahrein; and subsequently a small portion of the stolen goods was found in that island, and restored to the owners. To our demands for the seizure and surrender of the above two individuals, Shaikh Abdoolah replied that it was not in his power to do so, as they had fled from his territories,—which was really the case.

A. D. 1827.

The British authority, however, did not cease his exertions and inquiries, and availed himself of the opportunity afforded, in a personal interview with the Bahrein

Chief in April 1828, to point out the necessity of his doing everything in his power to bring the notorious characters before alluded to to condign punishment.

The Boo Ayen Tribe, residing in Biddah, having in May 1828 displayed symptoms of a refractory spirit on the occasion of their Chief, Mahomed bin Khamees, being placed in confinement by the Uttoobee Shaikh, for stabbing an inhabitant of Bahrein, the latter caused their fort to be destroyed, and all the inhabitants to be removed to Rowcees and Fowarah, where they were more immediately under his control.

Some time before this arrangement took place, the notorious characters Soocdan bin Zaal and Syf bin Thykhan, already mentioned as having fled from Shaikh Tahnoon's authority, and taken refuge with the Uttoobee Chief, left Biddah, and returned to their old residence in Aboothabee.

In the month of September 1828, Obed bin Mohunnah, the chief of the pirates who committed the outrage on the Bushire Butcel in 1827, again put to sea in a large boat, with a number of followers. After taking out the cargo of two or three small vessels near Bahrein, he proceeded over to the Persian Coast near Zeerah, where he landed, for the purpose of making inquiries regarding the destination of a small Buggalow, then at anchor: but the suspicions of the natives being excited by a report of his boat being filled with armed men, he was taken prisoner, after a desperate resistance. The crew of his vessel, chiefly composed of the Monasir Tribe, finding their chief detained, made the best of their way over to the neighbourhood of Aboothabee, on the Arabian Coast, plundering on their way four Aseeloo boats of all their pearls and cargoes near Seer Beniyas, for which aggression, however, full compensation was subsequently afforded by Shaikh Tahnoon.

Obed bin Mohunnah was detained some days in Zeerah, and afterwards sent to Bushire at the request of the political authority, where a strict examination having been set on foot, he was satisfactorily identified as the person who planned and executed the attack upon Bin Musharee's Butcel in 1827. A short time afterwards, on an application being made by Shaikh Abdool Russool for the prisoner to be given up to him, to answer for the murder and plunder of his subjects, he was delivered over to that personage by the Acting Resident, and would probably have met with the punishment his crime so well merited, had he not been enabled to effect his escape in the confusion attending the storm and plunder of Bushire by Prince Timor Mirza in November 1828.

The reports of the Imaum's preparations for the attack of Bahrein having now become very prevalent, the chief of that place applied all his energies to meet the impending storm, and spared no exertions to place himself in the best posture of defence his resources would admit. The small and middling sized vessels were ranged round Muharag, the large Buggalows collected together in the Khore of Fasht, the forts repaired, and large reinforcements of Arabs, both horse and foot, brought in from all quarters. The chief source of the Uttoobee Shaikh's alarm was the circumstance of Shaikh Tahnoon joining the Imaum against him; and he endeavoured, both by large presents and earnest entreaties, to induce that chief to remain neutral,—apparently without effect, although subsequent events afford every reason to believe that it was treachery on the part of the Beniyyas Chief that caused the failure of His Highness' enterprise. After being considerably scattered by a violent gale on the 27th October, His Highness' fleet entered Bahrein harbour on the 31st, and cast anchor off Sutra, outside the Khore of Killa. Khaleefa bin Suliman, the nephew of the Bahrein Shaikh, immediately proceeded with a body of troops, and took post opposite to His Highness' vessels, and subsequently a second party, under the command of the governor's son, was sent to support him. After remaining there three days without any active operations, he received orders to take up a position near Horah, to the east of Munama. During the first four days after their arrival, the Imaum's people were employed in opening the passage of the Khore of Killa, which had been blocked up by means of sunken boats filled with stones. This being effected, two small vessels and eleven Buggalows entered, but before anything more decisive was attempted, an effort was made by the Chief of Makulla, Shuheer, to induce Abdoolla bin Ahmed to agree to such arrangements as would spare the effusion of blood. Whether this was with the knowledge of His Highness is unknown,—at all events the only answer returned was one of defiance. On the night of the 5th November, a part of the Imaum's troops landed near the fort of Sutteah, and took possession of that place, and the next day an abortive attempt was made by some of His Highness' vessels to cannonade the town of Munama and fort of Killa. Affairs remained in *statu quo* until the 9th, when the Imaum was astonished to learn that the Beniyyas, under Shaikh Tahnoon, were landing without any orders. Alarmed at the probable consequences of this imprudent, if not treacherous proceeding, His Highness collected all the troops available in such an emergency, and, accompanied by his Nubian slaves, hastened to the shore, but arrived only in time to witness the total defeat of his partisans by the Uttoobee forces, under the command of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who had marched out of Munama,

and taken up a position opposite to the Imaum's troops, on finding that town threatened. The alleged immediate cause of the defeat appears to have been a sudden charge made on the flank and rear of the Muskat army by the Bahrein horse, which, at the commencement of the action, had been concealed in some contiguous date groves. The Beniyyas were the first to give the example of flight, and they are said to have turned their arms against their own allies, and not only plundered them, but occasioned a considerable loss of lives, by preventing the fugitives from saving themselves in their boats. His Highness was carried off the field by his Nubians, but was obliged to swim a considerable distance before he was taken up, and while in the water received a spear wound in the sole of his foot. At the sight of this unexpected repulse, an universal panic seems to have seized the whole fleet, which immediately weighed and sailed out of the harbour, leaving behind a brig and a Buggalow, which in the confusion were run ashore, and fell into the enemy's hands. The Buggalow was subsequently got off by the Uttoobees, but the brig, having been stripped of everything on board by that tribe, was set on fire during the night by some of the Imaum's people. His Highness in this disastrous affair is said to have lost upwards of five hundred men, and appears to have quite sunk under the failure; for after making several ineffectual attempts to conclude a peace with the Bahrein Shaikhs, he sailed on the 21st November with all his fleet for Muskat, to the great joy of the Uttoobees, and the infinite discredit of himself. His Highness appears to have displayed throughout the whole affair an absence of decision, energy, judgment, and skill. The check which he had sustained, though not a trifling one, was certainly not of sufficient consequence to induce him to abandon so suddenly this long cherished project, in which his interest and fame were so deeply committed, and the only conclusion that can, therefore, be come to on the subject, is that he must have had some hidden reasons for taking such a precipitate step, arising either from the want of union in the various tribes composing his force, or the treachery of some of the chiefs immediately about him.

The Bahrein Shaikhs were no sooner satisfied that His Highness had dropped all further ideas of invading their island, than they determined to become the assailants in their turn, and accordingly made preparations for the equipment of a fleet of seven large vessels, which subsequently sailed on the 21st March 1829, under the personal command of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, in the direction of Muskat, for the purpose of cruising against the Imaum's territories. Two frigates were sent out by His Highness to meet the Bahrein fleet, and on their way up, falling in with the

Uttoobee Buggalow called the *Syar*, they made an unsuccessful attempt to capture her, and finally returned to Muskat without doing anything. If, however, they gained no great credit by their conduct on this occasion, the Bahrain vessels did not distinguish themselves by their superior bravery. On their way down the Gulf, they met a large Buggalow, belonging to their inveterate enemy the Shaikh of Aseeloo, but after several hours hard fighting were all beaten off, and the Buggalow reached her own port in safety. After cruising some time in the neighbourhood of Muskat, the Bahrain fleet attacked and captured a Buggalow belonging to Morbat, a place between Muskat and Mocha, in no way connected with the Imaum. With this prize they set out on their return to Bahrain, but when off Cape Moobaruk they were intercepted by two of Syud Saeed's ships of war. The Uttoobees immediately ran into shoal water, and placing the Morbat vessel in such a position as to shelter them from the cannon of the Imaum's frigates, they first transferred to their own Buggalow everything on board, and then, having scuttled and sunk her, they took advantage of the darkness of the night to alter their course, and, having by this means evaded the Muskat men-of-war, reached Bahrain shortly after.

During this period, the British authority had been using every exertion to induce the belligerents to settle their quarrel; but the Bahrain Chief declared he would make no peace that did not receive the guarantee of the British Government. As this of course was out of the question, and finding Shaikh Abdoolla deaf to all advice, the Resident declined interfering any farther.

While, however, the correspondence for the termination of hostilities between Muskat and Bahrain was carrying on, the political authority in the Gulf was engaged in another discussion with Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, which gradually assumed a serious aspect. It will be recollected that when the Bahrain fleet was cruising off Muskat, it captured, plundered, and destroyed a vessel belonging to Morbat. As this was considered an act of piracy in every point of view, the captor was peremptorily called upon to return all his ill-gotten booty,—a demand which he evaded, on various pretexts, for a considerable period, until the Resident sent over two vessels of war, and stated explicitly, that if immediate attention was not paid to his demand for the cargo of the captured vessel, strong and unpleasant measures would be forthwith carried into operation. This menace produced considerable effect: property to the amount of Rs. 8,000 (being all that was not converted into cash and distributed) was given up, and a considerable quantity of goods belonging to people residing in Bahrain restored to the owners. On this occasion a reference was made by the British authority to the Government, as to whether further proceedings should be adopted to com-

pel the Bahrain Shaikh to pay in cash for such part of the plundered cargo as was not forthcoming; and at the same time it was stated, that to effect this object it would be necessary to blockade the port with four ships of war, and perhaps to destroy the shipping by means of shells and Congreve rockets, for which latter purpose a small vessel would be required. The Government, however, satisfied with the redress already obtained, determined to take no further steps in the affair.

On the 2nd December 1829, peace was concluded between the Chief of Bahrain and the Imaum of Muskat, through the mediation of Shaikh Mahomed bin Nassir, upon the terms that the tribute formerly paid by the Uttoobees to His Highness was to cease from henceforward; that no interference whatever should take place in each other's concerns, but that in the event of either Muskat or Bahrain being threatened by an enemy, mutual assistance was to be afforded. This last condition was not reduced to writing, being merely verbal. Shaikh Tahnoon was admitted as a party to the treaty, but the Aboosemate Tribe (principally residing in Aseeloo) was specially excluded by the Uttoobee Shaikh.

Everything appears to have gone on quietly in the island of Bahrain until the end of 1830, when Shaikh Abdoolla bin

A. D. 1830.

Ahmed was called upon by the Wahabee Chief to pay the annual Zukat or tithe, besides 40,000 German crowns, the alleged value of a number of horses left under his charge by the Wahabees many years previous. A demand was at the same time made for the surrender of the fort of Demaum to Busheer, the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir.

Aware how gladly His Highness the Imaum would join Shaikh Toorkey with his fleet, in any attack upon

A. D. 1831.

Bahrain, the Uttoobee Chief endeavoured to interest the British authority in the Persian Gulf in his favour; but finding that the Government were determined not to interfere in his internal affairs, he despatched a near relation to Riaz, to wait upon the Wahabee Shaikh, and make the most favourable terms in his power. After some discussion, it was arranged that the supremacy of Shaikh Toorkey bin Saood should be acknowledged, and the Zukat paid by the Uttoobees, in return for which he promised them his protection,—thus, *if bonâ fide* in his professions, putting an effectual termination to the designs of the Imaum upon their territory.

The Uttoobee Chiefs, however, at the present time still continue to entertain suspicions as to the ultimate views entertained by Shaikh Toorkey bin Abdoolla oos Saood regarding them. The recent establishment of Busheer, the son of their late enemy Rahmah bin Jaubir, upon Demaum, under the sanction and authority of the Wahabee Shaikh, has

382

UTTOOBEES.

given them great offence, which has not been diminished by the circumstance of Busheer having been joined by the larger portion of the Aboosemate Tribe, between which and the Uttoobees a most inveterate feud still subsists.

FURTHER CONTINUATION OF THE PRECEDING, TO THE YEAR 1844,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL.

We learn from the termination of Captain Hennell's Sketches, that the establishment of Busheer, the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir, at Demaum, through the influence of the Wahabee Chief and the Imaum of Muskat, had given great offence to the Uttoobees, which was aggravated by the accession to the number of that chief's dependents of the larger portion of the Aboosemate Tribe, with whom they (the Uttoobees) were at feud. The views of the patrons of Busheer appear to have been,—of the former, that his proximity to Bahrein would act as a check to the Uttoobees, and lead to the more punctual fulfilment of their engagement to pay annual tribute; of the latter, that he should have a useful and devoted adherent in the event of his again undertaking the attack of Bahrein.

The attempt (in January 1832) however failed, and Busheer having quarrelled with the inhabitants of Kateef, destroyed the fort he had just built, and left with his dependents for Muskat,—an event which was looked upon with the greatest satisfaction by the authorities in the Gulf, as removing one cause of continued disputes and misunderstandings in these quarters.

The piracy of a trifling nature, as having been unattended with any aggravated circumstances, committed in November 1831, in Hallilah Bay, by a person named Hussoom of Fowarah (a dependency of Bahrein), on a fishing-boat belonging to Congoon, was now traced. The boat was recovered, and subsequently restored to its owners, and the pirate denied refuge on the Arabian Coast. It appeared that, on leaving Hallilah Bay, Hussoom proceeded to Ajeer, where he attempted to surprise a Bahrein boat, but the crew being upon their guard, he was taken prisoner, together with eight of his people. After a detention of several days in Ajeer, the prisoners contrived to effect their escape, and proceeded to Huailah, where the captured boat was recovered from the pirate, and he with his people refused admittance into that or any other port of the Bahrein dominions.

A. D. 1832.

UTTOOBEES.

383

Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who with his sons Moobaruk and Nasir had remained for a length of time at his possessions on the Guttur Coast, to watch the proceedings of the Wahabees, now made up his mind to refuse allegiance to them, and to retaliate all attempts at aggression. His first step was to endeavour to induce the Imaum of Muskat, which he did successfully, to pledge himself not to interfere in the event of hostilities breaking out between Bahrein and Shaikh Toorkey, and the next to confederate the neighbouring Arab Tribes who were inclined to fall into his views and designs of opposition to the extension of Wahabee authority, and induce them, by money and promises, to make incursions into all parts of their territories.

A. D. 1833.

He secretly instigated the Amayir Tribe, who, quarrelling with Shaikh Toorkey, left the neighbourhood of Kateef, and taking up their position in Demaum, established a very close blockade of the former port, plundering all vessels that attempted to enter, and putting to death all inhabitants of Kateef found on board any boats whatever.

At this time a gross insult was offered to the British Government in the person of its Native Agent, by the sons of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed. The cause of dispute would appear to have been a sum of money due by the Agent, on account of some mercantile transactions, to the Shaikh himself, which his sons were desirous of possessing, in opposition to their father's wishes. They demanded, and by abuse and ill-treatment enforced, payment of certain large sums of money; nor would the old Shaikh either settle the matter with them, or protect the Agent against their extortion. The offence was aggravated by a repetition of the ill-treatment while the Agent was actually employed in his official duties, having left his concealment for the purpose of going on board a British vessel then in the harbour. This, and the failure of early remonstrances in obtaining redress, rendered it imperative that some public and undeniable reparation should be insisted upon. The appearance of a respectable force, and the threat of resorting to coercive measures, at length induced the Shaikh to comply with the demand upon him, that his son, or, in the event of his failing to do so, he himself, should come on board the senior officer's vessel, with a Khelut or dress of honour for the Agent, and that the persons who had been instrumental in the ill-treatment should be flogged, either on board the ship, or alongside in one of his own boats, in presence of the crew.

A. D. 1834.

On the demise of Toorkey bin Saood, and the absence of his son and successor, Fysul, from Kateef, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed succeeded, by bribery, in obtaining possession of the fort of Tirhoot, a dependency

of Kateef, producing annually from its date groves, and the usual taxes, an income of 30,000 dollars.

The vicious and oppressive conduct of the sons of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, added to the death on the 31st May 1834 of Shaikh Khaleefa bin Suliman (nephew and colleague of Abdoolla bin Ahmed), whose authority upon the island of Bahrein had been little inferior to that of his uncle, which relieved his turbulent and refractory brothers and sons of all control, promised eventually to prove a fertile source of anarchy and confusion.

A party of the Amayir Tribe (before mentioned as having joined the Shaikh of Bahrein) under the command of one Mooshrif, now made an attempt to recover their possessions at Lahsa and Kateef, but met by Omer bin Oofeysan, the Wahabee governor of the former town, were defeated with great loss, and compelled to retreat under the guns of Tirhoot, now held by the Bahrein Chief.

Upon the ejection of Abdoolla bin Moosharee, and the failure of the attempt thereon made by the Wahabees to recover Tirhoot, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed resumed the strict blockade of Kateef and Ajeer, and commenced plundering the boats belonging to those places.

While the war was being thus carried on with varied success, neither party gaining any material advantage, the attention of Abdoolla bin Ahmed was called to the internal dissensions in his own family, and among his relatives, which, owing to his own misrule, partiality, and leniency, began to wear a most serious aspect. The Chiefs of Huailah, until lately dependent upon his authority, now not only opposed him, but entered into communications of a tendency inimical to his interests with the Imaum and the Wahabee Chief. They were, moreover, joined by one of the sons of the old Shaikh, who, obtaining the aid of several hundred Wahabees, set the power of the father at defiance, and captured several boats belonging to Bahrein, within a short distance of that island. Another son, Ahmed, made his escape from the Coast of Guttur, and proceeded to Muskat, for the avowed purpose of soliciting His Highness the Imaum to espouse his cause, and to supply his party with ammunition and warlike stores. Some seizures having been made at sea by Ahmed, the circumstances were brought to the notice of the British authorities, who called upon him to make restitution,—a demand with which he did not hesitate compliance. His Highness the Imaum not only declined taking any part in the dispute so unhappily existing between the Shaikh of Bahrein and the members of his family, but sent his son Syud Hillal in one of his frigates to mediate between the contending parties. Syud Hillal's efforts, however, to effect a reconciliation, were nullified by the proceedings of the nephews and partisans

of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who, immediately subsequent to the re-establishment of peace, instigated a portion of the Al Gowarah Tribe to proceed against Huailah, where they sank a boat, and killed a dependent of Esai bin Tarif, one of the heads of the opposite party, who, on complaining of this infraction of the agreement so lately entered into,* to the Bahrein Chief, could obtain no satisfaction. He, therefore, accompanied by Bin Sulemah and their followers, seceded from Bahrein, and took refuge at Aboothabee, whence he desired permission of the British authorities to carry on hostilities against the trade and territories of his late master,—a request which was of course denied him, on the grounds that he had established himself in a friendly, or at least neutral port, whose chief must either be responsible for his acts, or make common cause with him against Abdoolla bin Ahmed.

About the middle of the year 1836 Abdoolla bin Ahmed, alarmed at the revival of the claims of Persia, in consequence of the receipt of a communication from the energetic Mootamid of Shiraz, calling upon him as a Persian subject to tender his submission to the reigning Shah, and the possible contingency of the Imaum's co-operation being afforded in any attack upon the island, resolved to make up his quarrels as far as possible with the Arabs on the mainland, and, by a timely submission to the Wahabee Chief, to engage his support and assistance in case of invasion. Terms were accordingly entered into, Abdoolla bin Ahmed paying the small annual tribute of 2,000 dollars, and the Wahabee Chief on his side engaging to supply a contingent of troops to repel any invaders of Bahrein, and not to call for the vessels of that island in the event of his purposing to attack Muskat. The communication with Kateef and Ajeer was now therefore re-opened.

In consequence of the grinding oppression exercised by the sons and nephews of the Uttoobee Chief, many of the wealthiest inhabitants, finding that there was no security to life or property, left the island, to settle in other parts of the Gulf. The old Shaikh himself, too, unable to tolerate their refractory conduct, had determined upon proceeding with his family and immediate followers to Khor Hassan, but was induced to give up this intention by their expressions of contrition for past offences, and professions of obedience and amendment for the future. His conduct towards them was most unaccountable,—that, having the power and authority to repress them, he should tacitly acknowledge himself a cypher in the government, by studiously shutting

* The principal articles of this agreement were that each should retain the advantages he might have acquired during the war; that Huailah should be evacuated and demolished; and that the inhabitants should return to Bahrein, under the guarantee of the Imaum for their safety.

his eyes to their tyrannous and extortionate proceedings, which, if unchecked, promised, at no very distant period, to effect the ruin and depopulation of the rich and fertile island.

The Shaikh was nevertheless fully aware of the probable results of these divisions in his family; and apprehending the necessity which might occur for bringing over troops from the mainland, for the purpose of re-establishing his authority, and the scene of bloodshed and plunder that must necessarily ensue, took the precaution, customary and sufficient in the eyes of the Arabs to absolve him from further blame or responsibility, to warn a Bushire merchant, in the presence of the British Agent, for the information of the rest, and also of the Shaikhs of that town, that he must no longer look to him for redress or protection.

The Shaikh then prepared for his removal to Khor Hassan, by despatching to that place two of his wives, with their families, together with the furniture of the houses,

even to the very doors,—a proceeding which much alarmed his sons and relatives, as leaving them in doubt as to what ulterior measures he might have in contemplation; and tended for a time to check their insubordinate and unruly conduct.

The Amayir and Huwajir Tribes, (the Huwajir inhabiting Demaum, under the authority of the Uttoobee Chief,) taking advantage of the disturbed state of Nujd, in consequence of the struggle for power between Ameer Fysul and the pretender Khalid, commenced the systematic plunder of all boats belonging to Kateef, including also, occasionally, those from Bahrein. Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed therefore solicited and obtained the sanction and authority of the Resident to chastise them, which he did by forcibly seizing two of their boats, in effecting which five of their number were killed.

Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, although anxiously desirous for the return to his authority of the rulers of the Al Ali and Boo Ejman, who had with their tribes seceded to Aboothabee; yet, with marked obstinacy and inconsistency, would make no concession, or yield no point which could lead to an amicable settlement; and further, complained (in October 1838) of permission being granted equally to them as to him, in the event of his desiring to resort to hostilities, forgetting that through the Resident's remonstrances and exertions alone had the Al Ali for three years past been restrained from revenging the injuries they had sustained at his hands, and imagining, apparently, that while free himself to adopt forcible measures against the Al Ali, they, on the other hand, were to be withheld from offering any opposition in self-defence.

All persuasions and attempts at mediation having failed, both parties were informed that no further interference would be made, and that on

the termination of the month Ramzan, when the pearl fishery would be concluded, they would be considered as at war, and at liberty to pursue their own plans for the attainment of what they considered their just rights, being at the same time warned of the restrictive line, whose limits were to be carefully observed.

Before the expiration of this limited period, Shaikh Abdoolla despatched his confidential minister to Bushire, to intimate his desire "to come to an amicable arrangement, if such could be effected with honour"; avoiding, however, to yield concessions that might lead to some understanding, and still tenaciously adhering to the condition he had before considered as a *sine qua non* of their return to Bahrein, to which he was aware they had as positively made up their minds not to consent, and modifying it only in their favour with the promise that their security and lawful claims should be guaranteed by the British Government,—a guarantee which could not of course, as he was aware, be afforded. The Coast of Guttur was then offered as their place of residence; and with the chance of such being accepted, as well as to avert the distress and misery incidental to war, the Resident placed a British vessel of war at the disposal of the Bahrein Chief, for the purpose of conveying himself or his accredited Agent to negotiate with the refugees at Aboothabee. The services of this vessel were declined on its arrival at Bahrein, it being supposed that any terms proposed would not, if accepted, be adhered to, unless guaranteed by the British Government. War therefore became inevitable.

Some objections were at the time made by the old Shaikh to the "war limit"; but the superior advantages of its restrictions to his own subjects over those of his opponents being pointed out, these were overruled and abandoned.

The conduct of the Shaikh throughout (for it was evident he was unwilling to go to war) would appear to sanction the supposition of his entertaining the belief that the British authorities were prepared to go any lengths rather than that hostilities should break out between himself and Aboothabee, and therefore to compel the return of his fugitive subjects to their allegiance in accordance with his wishes.

Upon the fall of the Wahabee ruler, Ameer Fysul, his General, Omer bin Oofeyan, sought and received asylum at Bahrein. His surrender was demanded of the

Uttoobee Chief by the usurper Khalid, as also that the fort of Demaum should be given up to him. These demands much alarmed Shaikh Abdoolla, who evaded compliance with them, as well as those previously made for tribute, and the surrender of Tirhoot, under the pretence of connection with, and submission to the Persian Government. The

fears entertained by the Uttoobee Chief, that whatever concessions or submissions he was prepared to make would only lead to further exactions, and eventually to the entire loss of his authority, were now confirmed by the avowal of Korshid Pacha, the Egyptian commander, by letter to the British authority, of his intention to attack and reduce the island to subjection. The grounds upon which he stated himself to have come to this determination, it is needless to mention, were perfectly invalid: might, and the desire of aggrandisement, constituted his only rights; even the flimsy pretext of supporting the pretender (Khalid) against the legitimate ruler (Fysul) being abandoned, and Central Arabia openly claimed as a possession of Mahomed Ali Pacha by right of conquest.

Upon the strength of the overtures made by the Uttoobee Chief to the Persian Government, a certain Hajee Kasim, formerly supercargo of a trading vessel, was selected as envoy from the Prince of Shiraz to Bahrein, bearing a Rukum and dress of honour for its chief, and attended by an escort of ten Sirbaz. He was under directions to remain at Bahrein as Persian Agent, and to be the medium of receiving and transmitting the annual tribute, which the Persian authorities vainly flattered themselves the Bahrein Chief was disposed to pay for their countenance and protection.

Hostilities were in the mean time carried on between Bahrein and the Al Ali at Aboothabee, which entailed much distress upon the inhabitants of the former. The merchants, being naturally anxious for the restoration of peace, solicited the interference and mediation of the Resident, who accordingly despatched his Assistant, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation. Nothing resulted from this mission, as no terms would be entered into that had not the guarantee of the British Government. It was, however, ascertained that the Beni yas Chief had no intention of making common cause with Esai bin Tarif,—indeed that these two were no longer on friendly terms, the former requiring the latter either to leave his country, or settle there permanently as a peaceable subject. Civilities, too, in the shape of presents, had been interchanged between the Bahrein and Beni yas Chiefs, who shortly after entered into a treaty of peace, which of course deprived Esai bin Tarif of the alliance of the latter, and put an end to his carrying on aggressions against the former from the now friendly port of Aboothabee, which he consequently determined upon leaving on the conclusion of the pearl fishery, consenting of course to suspend hostilities up to that period.

Although no positive pledge of support and assistance in the maintenance of the integrity of his possessions could at this time be afforded by the British Government, yet Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed

having promised that he would communicate with the Resident, previous to placing himself under the protection of any other foreign power, it was not without much dissatisfaction that an intimation was received, through the Egyptian authorities, of his having become tributary to them; more particularly as he had received every encouragement from the British authorities to assert his rights, and was well aware of the light in which Korshid Pacha's proceedings were viewed by them. The fact was, that this chief felt hurt and annoyed that a more decided line had not been adopted, and also that authoritative influence was not employed to subdue the Al Ali, and compel their return to his territories, instead of their being, on the contrary, permitted to carry on hostilities against him; forgetting, apparently, that he had himself forced the British Government to withdraw from all interference, inasmuch as he had solicited to be allowed to attack them, whereas they had been repeatedly restrained from becoming the aggressors.

The Shaikh excused himself for having entered into any agreement with Korshid Pacha on the grounds that, having given up all hopes of support and assistance from the British, and conceiving himself left to his own unaided resources, and threatened with a war with Aboothabee,—his trade harassed by the aggressions of Esai bin Tarif,—his Bedouin subjects on the main going over in great numbers, and submitting to Korshid Pacha, who was then threatening an invasion,—the difficulty of defending Bahrein from an attack if made from the opposite coast, there being many places which admitted of a fleet of a hundred boats making its way across in a few hours, without the possibility of being approached by either ship or Buggalow, on account of the shallow water and numerous shoals,—he considered his own interests were best consulted by his agreeing to pay the Pacha so trifling a sum as 2,000 dollars a year, to secure the integrity of his own territories, and the undisturbed possession of his own authority over them, as it had been expressly stipulated by him that no Agent of the Pacha should reside in Bahrein.

He admitted that both himself and every other Arab detested the being at all connected with, or coming under the rule of the Egyptians; and declared, that if the British Government would give a distinct and written pledge to protect him and his from all attacks and aggressions, he would drop all further connection with him, and avow himself a dependent of Great Britain; but declined giving the substance of the above in writing, on the plea that, for the present at least, he had got rid of a pressing evil by a comparatively trifling sacrifice, and could not seriously commit himself until he had received the fullest and most satisfactory assurance from the British Government of its protection.

The quarrels and dissensions among the members of the Uttoobee Chief's family were by no means smothered by the sense of the impending danger. Finding that the heads of the tribe would not take part with him in an attack upon his sons and nephews, from the dread of encountering the effects of their deep and uncontrolled resentment, when, as before, they should have adjusted their misunderstanding by apparent submission, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed had recourse to the plan of entertaining a number of men belonging to the independent Bedouin Tribes on the main, for the purpose of overawing his disobedient kinsmen.

So great was the disgust created in the minds of the inhabitants of Bahrein by his weak and vacillating conduct, and the heavy exactions which, encouraged by the promised support of Korshid Pacha, he was beginning to levy, that the Boo Gowarah, a tribe numbering about 2,000 men, residing principally at Fowarah, applied for permission to quit, with a view to placing themselves under the protection of the British Government; and the most influential inhabitants only wanted a leader, to unite together and remove him from the chief authority.

No sooner had Esai bin Tarif and the greater portion of his dependents settled on the island of Kenn, on their peaceful removal from Aboothabee, than their desire to retaliate for the losses they had sustained at the hands of the Chief of Bahrein returned, and Shaikh Esai more than once expressed his wish to be permitted to cruise against the trade of that island, and also to seize from the Shaikh of Debaye a Buteel formerly belonging to himself, but confiscated, subsequent to his secession, by Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and presented by that chief to the Debaye Chief (Muktoom bin Butye). Although by the evacuation of Nujd by Korshid Pacha and the Egyptian army one great obstacle to the renewal of hostilities against Bahrein had been removed, yet the restrictive war limit having been once established, its infringement could on no account be permitted; more especially as it had been fully explained to Shaikh Esai, when in Muskat, that so long as he remained on Kenn, whose peculiar position without the boundary was pointed out to him, he must give up all idea of carrying on aggressive war against any part of the Arabian Coast. A similar reply was again given in May 1841, on the Resident's visiting the island of Kenn.

The project of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, of establishing himself at Kateef and Lahsa, the prosecution of which was favoured by the disaffection produced by the highly oppressive conduct of the Agent of Korshid Pacha, proved to be decidedly in opposition to the views of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the superior chief; and great risk was incurred of the two coming to open collision, and thus hastening a result

which the real enmity and jealousy existing between them, as well as the overbearing conduct of relations on either side, had long threatened to produce. Although a reconciliation was effected between the parties, and the impending rupture between them for a time averted, it was evidently nothing but a hollow profession on the part of both, but particularly the young Chief Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who subsequently addressed a letter offering his services to the British Government, and soliciting assistance against his grand uncle. He soon after proceeded to the Guttur Coast, and engaging the good will of the inhabitants, set up a species of opposition most annoying to his superior.

A piracy committed early in the previous year, upon a Kowcit boat, off Boo Syf, baffled every endeavour on the part of the British authorities and agents in the Gulf to discover the perpetrators, until August 1841, when a clue was found, which tended to the inculpation of an individual named Syud bin Azeez, a follower of Shaikh Moobaruk (the son of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed), residing at Demaum. It was advisable, nevertheless, that it should be impressed upon the minds of the Maritime Arabs, that no lapse of time would be permitted to afford impunity to crime, which in this case having been traced and brought home to the culprit above mentioned, a demand was made upon the Uttoobee Chief for the payment of 274 Mahomed Shah rupees as the value of the plundered property, or the surrender of Syud bin Azeez and his boat. The former alternative was complied with, and the money paid.

Another case of aggression was likewise committed on the banks about the commencement of the pearl fishery, by some of the inhabitants of Bahrein. One Ali bin Yoosoof, an inhabitant of Lingah, having taken on board his boat at Kateef 250 bags of dates and 80 mats, was on his way to Bahrein, when she grounded on a Subcenah situated to the westward of Ras Reccan. While the crew were engaged in floating their boat, five Buggarabs, commanded by a person named Jallijeh, came off from the shore, and plundered them of 180 bags of dates, and the 80 mats, worth altogether 240 Mahomed Shah rupees. The complainant proceeded to Muharag, to lay his case before Nassir bin Abdoolla, the Bahrein Chief's son, who, in reply, promised to recover his property; but finding himself put off from day to day, without any prospect of receiving reparation, and ascertaining that his dates had been carried off to the banks, he returned to Lingah, and represented what had occurred to his Chief, Syud bin Guzeeb, who recommended him to the Resident for redress.

This being a case very closely allied to piracy, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed was held responsible that satisfaction should be afforded. As

the delinquents stated that they had only taken such portion of the cargo of the Lingah boat as had been regularly agreed upon as salvage, it was arranged that the value of the property claimed should be lodged in the hands of the British Agent, until the claim for salvage should be substantiated by oath of Zun Tulaak, in the presence of the Native Agent, which having been done according to form before the Kazee, the money was returned.

The authority of the old Shaikh being now openly defied by his sons, who had each from one to three hundred followers, ready to commit any act of violence or aggression at the bidding of their leaders, the island became rapidly the scene of increased anarchy and confusion: as a natural consequence, the trade had diminished to nearly one-half within the last few years.

At this time (April 1842) Ameer Khalid came from Demaum to Khor

A. D. 1842.

Hassan, to meet Shaikh Abdoolla, who treated him with great respect, and led him to hope that he would assist him in the recovery of Kateef to the utmost in his power. After visiting Mahomed bin Khaleefa at Bahrein, the ex-Wahabee ruler returned to Demaum.

The Bahrein Chief, however, if he ever entertained such an intention, had already too much on his own hands to admit of his acting up to his promise, for the serious dissensions in his own family, as about to be detailed, had reached to such a pitch as to demand his utmost attention.

The immediate and ostensible cause of the present open rupture originated in the opposition offered to the marriage of Ahmed, the son of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, with a young girl, the daughter of one Abdool Rahman bin Rashid. The suitors respectively threatened to possess her by force,* when her guardian, Moobaruk bin Khaleefa, appealing to their mutual relation, Mahomed bin Khaleefa, against the injustice and disgrace of permitting such a violation, he having already selected one from his own family to be her husband (Mahomed bin Moojarrin bin Fail), angry discussions and threats were produced, and the efforts of the old chief, who came over from Khor Hassan for the purpose, failing to effect an amicable arrangement, both parties began to collect troops, calling in principally the ignorant but warlike Bedouins from the mainland, themselves in no way interested in the quarrel, and led on solely by the prospect of emolument and plunder.

* The damsel on whose account so much disagreement had arisen resided at Muharag, and was on the commencement of hostilities at the mercy of her would be suitor, who, she moreover consenting, might without immediate opposition have possessed himself of her person; but as the real ground of the dispute had no reference whatever to her, so the contest did not cease with her possession.

The towns of Muharag and Munama formed the head quarters of the respective chiefs. These are merely separated by a narrow gut, in many places fordable at low-water. Abdoolla bin Ahmed in possession of the former, and the more powerful at sea, had complete command of the harbour of Munama, which he contrived effectually to blockade.

Several skirmishes took place between the contending forces, in which were killed Dhyj, the brother of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and the grandson of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, Mahomed bin Moobaruk, without, however, any decisive advantage resulting to either side; and the parties maintained their respective positions until the middle of June, when Abdoolla bin Ahmed, making a simultaneous attack by land and sea, entirely defeated the forces of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and obtained possession of his town.

That chief fled with a few followers to the Guttur Coast, and thence to Lahsa and Riaz, to solicit the aid of the new Wahabee ruler, Bin Sooneyan.

The Bedouin troops in the pay of Abdoolla bin Ahmed were let loose to plunder the town which had fallen into their hands. Friends and enemies shared the same fate; property was indiscriminately plundered; and, among the rest, some goods belonging to British subjects.

Many people and much property had been injudiciously, indeed irregularly, received under his protection, by the British Agent on the island: among the former were the sons and several dependents of one Shaikh Humood Omeree, who had been actively engaged in the last struggle.

It appeared from the Agent's statement, that the Zenana and children of Humood found refuge in his house with his sanction, but that his son and immediate dependents, on Mahomed bin Khaleefa's forces being broken, fled there for protection, and, finding the door open, entered without his permission; that having done so, he was unable to eject them without force, which he was unwilling to exercise.

Abdoolla bin Ahmed coming shortly after, with his victorious followers, demanded that the abovementioned should be given up to him; threatening, in the event of refusal, to level the house with the ground, and kill and plunder all the persons and property therein, the former amounting in number to above 1,000 individuals, and the latter in value to between thirty and forty thousand Keroonees.

Fearing and believing that that chief would carry his threat into execution, and thus the lives of himself, his family, and so large a number of harmless individuals be sacrificed, he thought it advisable to throw

down (from the top of his house) the persons demanded, who had hardly reached the ground when they were cut to pieces.

Abdoolla bin Ahmed, well knowing the timid and imbecile character of the late Agent, appears to have confined himself to threats and remonstrances to obtain the fulfilment of his object. When called upon, he offered the following explanation:—that at the commencement of the outbreak he had sent for the Agent, and given him the option of either coming with all his family and dependents, and taking up his temporary residence at Muharag, or proceeding on board the British vessel which happened at the time to be at anchor in the harbour; alleging that his mercenary Bedouins, being perfectly uncontrollable, he had reason to apprehend that some injury might result to himself or his house. That the Agent would not consent to this arrangement, but returned to Munama, and received under his protection a great quantity of property belonging to the inhabitants, which, on the place falling into his hands, he had found great difficulty in restraining his Bedouins from plundering; but that finding that the dependents of Humood bin Omeree, of the Amayir Tribe, of whom he was the head, —who were particularly obnoxious to him, by reason of their having killed his relative,—had taken refuge in the Agent's house, he sent to explain this circumstance, and requested their surrender, which was no sooner granted than the persons in question were cut to pieces.

The Shaikh's proceedings could not be pronounced entirely free from blame, he having himself in *propria persona* demanded the surrender of the victims, threatening the Agent, his family, and friends with instant death in case of refusal. As his own presence, however, appeared to have been with a view as well to secure his great object of possessing himself of his enemy as to prevent any outrage on the British Agent, and all other accounts corroborated his earnest desire to save the Agent from harm, both before and after capturing the town of Munama,—a courtesy which that individual requited by receiving under his protection a blood enemy of the chief, and thus unjustifiably taking a part in the civil broils,—no further notice was taken of his conduct, which yet deprived him of all claims to the sympathy of the British Government in the troubles which afterwards befel him; but the part taken by the Agent in the affair, as having been, too, induced generally, there was good reason for supposing, by the prospect of pecuniary benefit in return for the protection he afforded to persons and property, subjected him to immediate dismissal.

After the pillage of Munama (an impolitic measure, however severe a punishment the rebellious conduct of its inhabitants appeared to call for, as rendering him highly unpopular, and totally alienating them from his interests), Shaikh Abdoolla proceeded with his Bedouins to

Khor Hassan, on the main, which too he delivered up to partial plunder. He then, with a view to concentrating and strengthening his resources on the Guttur Coast, planned and commenced the rebuilding of Zobara, now deserted, but which forty years before had been the Uttoobee head quarters.

Omer bin Oofeysan, the Wahabee General, and Governor of Lahsa, having seized the person of the Chief of the seaport town of Sohat, and compelled the destruction of that fort, the inhabitants (for the most part pearl divers), at the instigation of Shaikh Abooola bin Ahmed, seceded to Bahrein, to the number of about three-fourths of the population.

The continued detention as a prisoner, by the Wahabee ruler, of Shaikh Shafee, the Chief of the Huwajir, a staunch adherent of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, whose release had been declared a *sine quâ non* by that chief to the entertainment of any overtures of peace between them, precluded compliance on the part of the latter with the demands of the former, for the suspension of the blockade of his seaports of Kateef, Sohat, &c., and determined the former in favour of the cause of his guest, Mahomed bin Khaleefa, to whose solicitations his power had not as yet attained sufficient stability to admit of his actively acceding, in consequence of some of the Bedouin Tribes having failed to tender their submission to his authority. Mahomed bin Khaleefa accordingly commenced collecting forces on the mainland, for the purpose of renewing the war.

Affairs were in this state, and the unpopularity of the Uttoobee Chief at his height, when Esai bin Tarif, of the Al Ali Tribe, residing at Kenn, and Busheer, (with from three to four hundred adherents,) the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir (the famous Pirate Chief of Demaum, who in the latter end of 1826, worsted in an engagement with a very superior Uttoobee force, to avoid capture, with his own hand set fire to the powder magazine, and blew up himself and his vessel), visited Bushire together, for the purpose of intimating to the Resident their desire to make common cause with the junior Uttoobee Chief, who had invited them to join his standard; and of soliciting his permission to wage open war accordingly upon Bahrein.

The reason given by the latter for becoming a party to this formidable coalition* was, that in consequence of the blockade maintained by Abdoolla bin Ahmed, he was unable to carry away the produce of his paternal estates at Demaum (near Kateef).

* The outline of the cause of Esai bin Tarif's discontent has been already given. The public opinion was now very strong that the late disturbances at Bahrein had been instigated and fomented by him, who, having no adequate means singly of attacking Shaikh Abdoolla, forced on gradually by his intrigues that great object of his ambition, a powerful coalition against his enemy.

The Resident's sanction for the prosecution of open and proclaimed war having been duly given, these chiefs were reminded of the restrictive line, within the limits of which they would be compelled to confine their warlike operations at sea; and so also was the Shaikh of Bahrein, on the Assistant Resident's visit to that island, where he was deputed solely for the purpose of making known to him the public designs of his enemies, and their declaration of war against him.

This communication was received with much surprise and apprehension by the Uttoobee Chief, who appeared to doubt that permission had been granted to the parties coalescing. He stated that the news had reached him too late; that most of his vessels and dependents had left on their trading voyages, and that, his country therefore denuded of troops, and his means of defence gone, he earnestly hoped that hostilities would not be permitted to commence until their return; that otherwise, with however great contempt he looked upon the power of each individually,—the two, Esai bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah bin Jaubir, as insignificant, and the Wahabee Chief as deficient in shipping and means of transport,—it would not be in his power to cope with them united; hinting that he would be compelled to make the best terms he could with the latter, thereby virtually ceding the island to him,—a measure which he conceived would not be approved of or allowed by the British Government; that he had opened a negotiation with that ruler for the release of Shaikh Shafee, his relation, offering in return to deliver up Ajeer (a large and strong fort on the coast between Demaum and Kateef), and to raise the blockade of his seaport. He expressed his willingness to permit of Busheer removing his property from Dennaum; but that he could not admit of his taking any of his large vessels into that harbour,—in other words, of his placing men and means at the disposal of his enemies.

His request for the suspension of hostilities until the return of his vessels was in the first instance referred to the British Government.

Mahomed bin Khaleefa's first object was to establish himself on the Guttur Coast, in order to have at his disposal the naval resources of its inhabitants, and to keep open his communication with his colleagues.

The Wahabee ruler now again opened a communication with the Bahrein Chief, acting the part of a mediator, and recommending peace with his grand nephew. He further released Shafee, who promised, on his arrival at Demaum, to exert his utmost influence to restore peace.

Shaikh Abdoolla, however, whether treating lightly the means and talent of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who must nevertheless be henceforth looked upon as by no means a despicable rival, or putting little trust in the sincerity of the Wahabee ruler, treated his mediatory efforts with

slight attention,—indeed employed somewhat threatening language, to urge his observance of perfect neutrality.

The representations at the same time (January 1843) of the chief men of his territories at Guttur, on the mainland, of their inability to defend themselves against any attack by Mahomed bin Khaleefa, proved that that chief had not abated in his preparations for hostilities, in which he was undoubtedly secretly assisted by the Wahabee ruler, without whose connivance or countenance he must certainly have abandoned them. The small fort of Meezeer, in Guttur, fell into the hands of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who, sending his troops, had forestalled those of his opponents in its occupation. The latter, on their approach, finding that it was already in his hands, retired, without attempting its recovery. A communication was thus established with the colleagues of Kenn. Several boats, also, coming over from that island, excited the fears of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who for the second time conveyed a request (February 1843) to the British authorities, similar in its object to his previous one, having reference to the proceedings of Esai bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah; but as, at the same time, reports were received at Bahrein from Kenn by a Muskat boat (which, arriving from the head quarters of his enemy, should scarcely have been deemed worthy of credit by a discreet and wise chief), that these parties had abandoned the objects they had in view, in the belief that the Wahabee ruler had withdrawn his aid and countenance from the cause of the younger in favour of the elder chief, the communication of these reports to Bushire led to the supposition that the necessity for making the request* had passed away, and that, consequently, it did not require a reply.

* This request was again implied as requiring reply in the report made subsequently by the British Agent of a conversation which passed between himself and Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and again conveyed in the Agent's report of the 23rd of the same month; and further implied in the Shaikh's letter of the 20th March, when he was informed that there was no other reply than that given by the Assistant Resident when he met him.

Those references are here noticed, because the ex-chief pertinaciously but unfoundedly attributed his misfortunes to his having been led to consider himself secure from attack by the confederated forces, in consequence of a promise which he alleged to have been made by the Assistant Resident when that officer was deputed to Bahrein in November 1842, that hostilities should not be permitted to commence until his boats and adherents had returned from their trading voyages.

The following are extracts of a letter from the ex-chief of the 29th December 1843, and of Captain Hennell's reply of the 30th December, bearing upon this subject:—"For instance, when I told your man Hajee Jassim that it was my intention to launch my boats, and take the initiative with the people of Guttur and Kenn, before they could attack me, he forbade my doing so, saying that the English would not permit this. This is known to all the inhabitants of Bahrein and Bushire, and every one else. When your Assistant came to Bahrein, he told

The inhabitants of the Guttur Coast favoured decidedly the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and established him in Fowarah, whence he proceeded with a considerable force in five Buggalows, and effected a landing opposite to Ruffah (a village, with a fort, six miles in the interior of the island of Bahrein). Abdoolla bin Ahmed immediately sent a force, under the command of his son Nassir, who succeeded in gaining possession of the fort before the invaders could reach it. A fight took place, from which no positive advantage was obtained by either party; several men were killed, and some wounded. Measures, however, were adopted to surround them by land, and cut off their retreat by sea.

In the course of the hostile operations which ensued, a piracy was committed (March 1843) by the dependents of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, upon a Gooncha carrying British colours, and having on board a packet and some stores to the address of the Commodore at Bassadore.

It appeared that that chief had issued orders that no vessels should be permitted to remain at anchor in the harbour of Munama (the town on the main island opposite to Muharag), and on the vessel in question anchoring there, two boats were despatched with a message to the Nakhoda to weigh and return to Muharag. The crews of these, boarding, plundered her cargo, and, among the rest, the packet and stores adverted to; hauled down the flag, and tore it to pieces,—an aggravation of their crime which admitted of no excuse. The necessity of sending

me that Bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah had obtained permission to commence hostilities against me, and asked whether I had committed any aggression upon them. I replied in the negative. He then inquired what was the cause of their enmity. I answered that Fysul bin Saood wished to establish them in Biddah, for the purpose of plunder and rapine. At the time, also, when all my ships were scattered about in Bombay, Malabar, and Yemen, your Assistant told me that both the parties were prohibited from hostilities until the return of my vessels, and that an order would be sent to me by the Resident. Hajee Jassim, your Agent, was present when this conversation took place. On this account I was negligent, and did not send and get other men to assist me, in the place of those who were absent in my vessels. When, therefore, my subjects who inhabit the Guttur Coast perceived that my country was denuded of troops, they were instigated by a spirit of plunder to rise up against me, and that took place which God has brought to pass. For the above reasons you have now ground (for assisting me)."

Reply.—"Touching your complaint that my Assistant, when at Bahrein, had led you to believe that Esni bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah would not be permitted to attack you while your ships and men were absent in India, and that consequently you were negligent, and did not get troops to assist you in the place of those who were away, I would beg to observe that you are quite mistaken in supposing Captain Kemball ever gave such a promise. You are aware that his sole object in visiting Bahrein was to warn you that Bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah had asked for and obtained permission to commence hostilities against you, and all he offered was to communicate your wishes to Colonel Robertson. When, however, you did not receive any answer from that officer on the subject, you ought to have been sure that he could not comply with your request for the temporary prohibition of hostilities until the return of your vessels."

two boats to warn off a friendly or neutral vessel was not apparent, and favoured, on one side the belief that the Shaikh did not know that the Gooncha was under the British flag, or suspected its having been hoisted by his enemies as a mere ruse,—to the benefit of which suppositions he had some title, inasmuch as it remained a doubt whether the Gooncha had shown her colours on entering the harbour, or only when approached by the Shaikh's boats,—and as the armed vessels of the Kenn Chiefs were hourly expected to the assistance of their colleague, who, as before mentioned, had already effected a landing on the island; yet, on the other side, it was asserted that due information had been given him of the Gooncha being under British protection, and thus left room for the suspicion that the Arabs merely acted in conformity with the directions of their master. The despatch of two well manned boats, with a peaceable object, indicated at least a most culpable want of care and precaution on his part against irregularities, aware, as he undoubtedly was, that the party consisting of mercenary Bedouins, proverbially not gifted with great discrimination, could not withstand the temptation of securing a prize, which their superiority in numbers and warlike equipment placed within their power.

The Shaikh denied all participation in, or delegation of authority for, the outrageous conduct of his agents. A vessel of war was with all haste despatched, for the purpose of making a due investigation, with a view to the establishment of grounds for demanding redress. The occurrences at Bahrein in the interim, however, rendered this of little or no avail.

The brother of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, coming to Munama with a party of horse and foot, and favoured by the inhabitants, obtained possession of the place, and was very soon joined by the allied chiefs from Kenn in great force.

The combined forces proceeded immediately (April 1843) to the attack of Muharag, and, defeating the troops of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, compelled him to take refuge in a small fort, situated at no great distance from the town, which they so completely invested as very shortly to have it in their power to dictate their own terms. Allowing him no more than one Buteel and one Gooncha, for the conveyance of himself and his personal property and dependents, they permitted him to quit the island. On the ejection of the father, the fort of Arad, held by his sons, surrendered at discretion: these were, however, permitted to remain and reside on the island. Shaikh Abdoolla proceeded to Demaum (the only place now left that acknowledged his authority), of which his eldest son Moobaruk was governor. Every precautionary measure was taken by his opponents to ensure the good will or neutrality of the neighbouring States; and this was the more

necessary, as the return to their homes of their Guttur subsidiaries being suddenly called for, in consequence of advantage having been taken of their absence by the Monasir, an inland Bedouin Tribe, to plunder their territory, they were deprived of the services of a large proportion of their fighting men.

Immediately antecedent to the active hostilities which lost Bahrein to the old chief, a Charrak boat (sailing under the neutral flag of Persia), into which property just arrived from Bombay, consigned to two Banyan merchants of Bahrein, had been transhipped, was plundered in the harbour of Munama by the men of the Huwajir and Suloota Tribes, his dependents. The latter, however, passing over to the side of the conqueror, and becoming under his control, cast upon him the responsibility of their act, and the consequent obligation of recovering the value of the plunder which had fallen to their share. It would have been objectionable, and in a measure unjust, immediately to have urged payment upon Mahomed bin Khaleefa, while the contest appeared yet doubtful, and while, from his fallen state, and consequent want of means, as asserted by himself, and moreover from the intangibility of his position to our naval force, similar redress could not be exacted from his rival. It was not, therefore, till February in the following year, when the authority of the former was firmly established, that he was called upon to restore the value of that portion of the property plundered by the Suloota, a demand which he acceded to without hesitation.

Abdoolla bin Ahmed commencing a system of annoyance upon the trade of Bahrein (June 1843), the colleagues despatched several vessels to blockade Demaum, and restrain his boats within the limits of its harbour.

The recent contentions between the contending chieftains, and their present doubtful position, afforded the legitimate Wahabee ruler, Ameer Fysul, who had now succeeded in re-establishing his authority in Nujd, the opportunity and pretence for interference; indeed, his aid and countenance being earnestly solicited by either, he very soon exercised an important influence in the affairs of the island, and its dependencies on the opposite Coast of Guttur, with the almost certain prospect of restoring the payment of the annual tribute, which had not been exacted since the early days of the rule of his father, Toorkey bin Saood.

It would appear that Fysul had not forgotten nor forgiven his former disputes and quarrels with the old chief, who had had generally the advantage, and from the first was inclined to favour the cause of the younger. Much time was spent in negotiations with either, which their presents and tempting promises, and the yet unstable nature of his newly recovered position, rendered it his interest to prolong, and also prevented his immediately taking an active part.

Shaikh Jaubir, Governor of Koweit,* and a mutual friend of the contending chiefs, now (August 1843) volunteered his services as mediator. Aware that to effect a lasting peace between them was perfectly hopeless, on account of the conflicting views and interests of the colleagues on the one side, and the sons and subordinates on the other, between whom an irreconcilable hatred existed, and unprepared or unwilling to engage actively in the cause, this chief had hitherto refrained from any interference whatever.

Perceiving now, however, the elder chief reduced to the last extremity, and no longer able to resist, he evinced a generous desire to save him from further degradation, and, if possible, to induce him to return with him to Koweit; for this, it appeared, was his object, in the event of his mediation proving unsuccessful. Under these circumstances, no objection was offered to his carrying his proposal into effect, as conveyed in his communication on the subject to the British authority, who merely recommended his confining his proceedings to mediation alone, and not permitting them to assume the appearance of hostilities towards Mahomed bin Khaleefa, now allied, if not in a manner subject, to the Wahabee ruler, whose aid and countenance he had succeeded in securing, by the promise of renewing the payment of an annual tribute, such as was formerly exacted from the Bahrein Chief by his father, Toorkey bin Saood.

Shaikh Jaubir accordingly proceeded to Bahrein, accompanied by a fleet of eight large vessels, and there held a lengthened communication with the *de facto* ruler, the result of which was the despatch of a boat to seek the ex-chief, and invite him to a conference. The latter however, conscious, probably, that mediation alone, and not active interference, would be exercised in his favour, had left the neighbourhood (for Bushire), his pride precluding him from accepting or granting terms to those whom, though undoubtedly hereditarily entitled to a share of authority over Bahrein, he appears ever to have considered his subjects. His visit being thus rendered of no avail, and the further detention of his vessels from their commercial occupation profitless and prejudicial to the interests of his subjects, Shaikh Jaubir returned to Koweit, without having in any way achieved his object.

Mahomed, a son of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, with Hajee Bushab, the latter's Vizier, coming out of Demaum, which under these circumstances continued to be closely blockaded, for the purpose of collecting boats on the adjoining coast, were seized by the Governor of Kateef, who also made prisoner Ali, another son of the ex-chief, who had come over from Lingah with a small reinforcement of the Aboosemate tribe, to join his father.

* The Koweit boats carry the Turkish flag, and its inhabitants acknowledge a nominal dependence to the Turkish Government.

An attempt on the part of his sons, who visited the Coast of Oman with this object, to engage the assistance of Sultan bin Suggur, his son Suggur, and Muktoom bin Butye of Debaye, in their father's cause, having failed, these chiefs evading immediate, but holding out hopes of eventual compliance (on the termination of the pearl fishery), provided they were not forbidden by the British Government or the Wahabee ruler, the ex-chief visited Bushire in person, for the purpose of obtaining the required sanction of the British authority to their joining his cause.

It was reported that the chiefs in question, however much to all appearance in earnest, only wanted some plea or excuse to rid themselves of the importunities of the ex-chief, and abstain from any interference whatever in his quarrel, from the knowledge, probably, that the colleagues on the other hand were not idle in their endeavours to arrange a counter alliance with the Beniyas and Amulgavine Shaikhs, with a view to meet the impending emergency. A correspondence had been opened by Esai bin Tarif with the former (Khaleefa bin Shakboot), and the latter (Abdoolla bin Rashid) visited Kenn in person, and received a valuable present.

Under these circumstances, the ex-chief was informed, in reply to his application, that the British Government, although prepared to act the part of mediator, without affording any guarantee, could not so far interfere as to reinstate him in his lost authority, nor could it permit of the Shaikhs of Oman taking any part in a war in which they had no interest or connection, as being bound by agreements with the British Government, and by a truce among themselves, guaranteed by it, to abstain from hostilities of any kind on the seas, whereas the engagement of their assistance by opposite and contending parties could not but lead to confusion throughout the Gulf, and hostilities between the tribes themselves, who, from being in the first instance allies, would very soon become principals, and this too without any benefit accruing to himself.

It would appear that one Shaikh Sulman, the nephew of the Mujtahid of Bushire, a person having no legal authority, or situation under the Government, had commenced a correspondence with Shaikh Abdoolla, while that chief was yet blockaded in Demaum, holding out to him hopes of assistance from Persia, in troops and guns, to retake Bahrein. To this his visit to Bushire was doubtless mainly attributable, —not that he really believed the Persian Government had it in its power to sanction and carry through the unauthorised proffer of Shaikh Sulman, but that, anticipating non-compliance on the part of the British authorities to the requests he had to make, he hoped to turn the existence of such overtures to some advantage in urging his case, and inducing acquiescence; and accordingly intimated to them (October

1843) in pretty plain terms, that if his solicitations were unheeded he would be compelled to throw himself into the arms of Persia. A copy of Shaikh Sulman's communication was forwarded to Tehran, and the ex-chief was informed that any declaration of war on the part of Persia against Bahrein must emanate in the King or Government, and be open and proclaimed. The ex-chief, after a short stay at Bushire, returned to Demaum, and thence proceeded to Nabend, on the Persian Coast, to await the course of events.

Esai bin Tarif, to whom it had been intimated that so long as he continued to reside on Kenn he could not, for obvious reasons, be permitted to exercise any further interference in the affairs of the opposite coast, evacuated that island, agreeably to his expressed intention, on the termination of the pearl fishery, and proceeded with his tribe to Biddah, on the Guttur Coast,—an arrangement considered in every respect highly satisfactory, as bringing him within the limits of the restrictive line, and placing that port (exceedingly difficult of access) in the possession of a chief in whose sincere wish to put down irregularities at sea, of a piratical nature, every confidence was placed,—inclinations very different to those entertained by Salmin bin Nassir Soocdan, the former Shaikh of Biddah, whose proceedings, as already detailed in these sketches, left room for the suspicion that he secretly protected and encouraged predatory characters, in whose ill-gotten spoils he did not scruple to participate.

The ex-Chief of Bahrein again visited Bushire in December 1843, with six vessels, manned and armed, with the avowed purpose of having an interview with the Resident; but as he declined the invitation of the latter for a meeting on board one of the vessels of war then in the roads, given under the idea that his wish to visit him on shore was a mere pretext to cover his real purpose, which was to have a personal communication with Shaikh Sulman, and that if he really desired an interview he could make no real objection to the arrangement, it was concluded, with justice, that his real object was to endeavour to procure the aid from the Persian Government which had been so unauthorisedly promised by that intriguing individual.

He however, by letter, earnestly urged his claims to the interference and assistance of the British Government in his behalf, on the ground of his having rejected the overtures of the Wahabee Chief Fysul; as also his being a party to the General Treaty of 1820;—claims which were not admitted, as the letter of Ameer Fysul to his address, which he transmitted for perusal, so far from having a tendency to excite disturbances on the sea, appeared to exhibit a sincere desire for the promotion of peace and tranquillity, and for a reconciliation between himself and his grand nephew; and as the treaty alluded to had for its

only object the suppression of plunder and piracy, and nowhere contemplated any interference in lawful and acknowledged war, provided always such warfare did not lead to acts of aggression upon the lives and property of those having no concern therein.

While the ex-chief was yet at Bushire, a communication was received from his rival, complaining that a Buteel belonging to the son of Jaubir bin Busheer, of Bahrein, had been seized by the dependents of the former at Aseeloo, or Nabend, on the Persian Coast, and therefore within the neutral ground; and calling upon the Resident to exact redress. The remonstrance thereon had the effect of drawing from the ex-chief an order to the Governor of Nabend for the restoration of the Buteel. Before this document, transmitted by a British vessel, could reach its destination, an exchange of governors had taken place at that port, and the new one refused compliance with his instructions; nor was it till after much delay, and a lengthened correspondence, that the boat in question was restored to its owner (in July 1844), immediately previous to which time Shaikh Busheer bin Rahmah of Biddah most unauthorisedly seized and detained two Buteels belonging to Nabend, in retaliation for the continued detention of the vessel referred to: he however liberated them immediately on the receipt of the Resident's letter of remonstrance against his undue interference in an affair which was already in the course of adjustment by the British Government.

A further communication was received in January 1844 from the ex-chief, again earnestly urging his claims for the interference of the British Government, and soliciting its aid, on the ground of all his misfortunes having resulted from his having been taken unawares at a time when he had deemed himself perfectly secure, in consequence of his having been led by the British authorities to suppose that the colleagues would not be permitted to attack him until the return of his boats and subjects from their trading voyages. To this application a peremptory refusal was returned.

The long promised Nujdee land forces at length arriving, and laying siege to Demaum, the garrison was very shortly reduced to the last extremity for provisions and warlike stores. A supply, too, sent by the Chief of Koweit, failed of reaching its destination, and fell into the hands of the enemy, whose blockading squadron, gaining timely information of the arrival of the two boats in which it was embarked at Khore Balbul, whence it was intended to have been transported by camels to the beleaguered fort, despatched a force to intercept and make them prizes. Although the legality of the seizure was not for a moment questioned, and, the capture having been made within the restrictive war

limit, the British Government in no way called upon to interfere, so far as to attend to the complaint and requisition of the Chief of Koweit that it should compel the release of the boats, and the restoration of their cargoes, still it was deemed advisable to recommend Mahomed bin Khaleefa, rather than incur the risk of a misunderstanding with that powerful chief, to comply with his wishes, on the understanding that he should not interfere further in the quarrel, nor again attempt to throw any aid or supplies into Demaum. After some trifling hesitation, this judicious counsel was acquiesced in.

A few days after his arrival at Bushire, the ex-chief landed, and took up his residence in a bastion which had been prepared for his accommodation, while tents were pitched for the reception of his numerous followers, bringing his vessels (of which two only now remained with him) into the backwater, and drawing them up on shore. He was received with marked attention by the local authorities: a salute of three rounds of musketry was fired by the Sirbaz garrison, who were all paraded on the occasion. It is hardly probable that such marks of respect would have been exhibited, unless under instructions from the Ameer of Shiraz, and it was rumoured that Shaikh Abdoolah bin Ahmed had asked for the aid of a body of troops, to consist of 100 horsemen and 500 infantry, and that, in addition to taking upon himself all the disbursements incurred in their equipment, had offered to pay a large annual tribute to the Shah, and to leave his son as a hostage for the due fulfilment of this engagement.

After waiting nearly three months for a reply to his proposition, or some token of its being taken into favourable consideration, and finding that it was mere loss of time and labour, the ex-chief determined upon taking his departure.

Visiting the Resident, he stated that his principal object in soliciting an interview was to express his earnest hope that the friendship and countenance of the British Government, which he had formerly enjoyed for so many years, would be once more extended to him; that the feeling of his not being viewed by the British authorities with the same favour and good will which had once existed, weighed heavily upon him, and paralysed his efforts; that he sought no aid or support in the recovery of his just rights beyond the belief that he might hope for the renewal of the friendly countenance once afforded him; and that the British Government would not possess a firmer and more devoted adherent than himself. In reply, the fact that his proceedings had not been satisfactory to the British Government was not disguised; nor the rejection of the overture made to support him in opposing the establishment of the authority of Mahomed Ali Pacha over Bahrein: the violation of the residence of the British Agent, by the seizure and

slaughter of those individuals who had taken refuge there; the plunder of the goods of a British subject, by his followers, during the attack upon Munama; the seizure of British property from a boat carrying British colours; and the forcible robbery of the Charrak vessel by his adherents of the Huwajir Tribe, had certainly tended to diminish the friendly feelings entertained towards him.

He endeavoured to explain these causes of umbrage to the British Government, and added, that his only reason for coming to Bushire was to seek a temporary refuge, while he matured his plans; that he was fully aware of the hollowness of the professions made by the Persian authorities of affording him aid in the recovery of Bahrein, but that he had made a convenience of them, to suit his own purposes.

It was not doubted that the Shaikh was perfectly sincere in his wishes to remove the unfavourable impression his conduct had made upon the British Government; but no credit could be attached to his explanation regarding his motives for coming to Bushire; for he was certainly at one time buoyed up by the extravagant promises and professions made to him by Shaikh Sulman, and it was only when he had reason to believe that these were without authority or foundation that he affected to despise them.

The ex-chief's departure was probably hastened by the intelligence now received that the garrison of Demaum, so hardly pressed for provisions, had been compelled to propose to Ameer Fysul the surrender of the fort, upon certain terms which had been rejected. On leaving Bushire, he proceeded over to the neighbourhood of Bahrein, and attempted to send in a boat to them, with a supply of stores and provisions; but the blockading force were on the alert, and having succeeded in capturing the boat in question, despatched four Buteels in pursuit of the ex-chief. These, however, did not overtake him, and he found a temporary refuge at Koweit. The fort of Demaum very shortly after surrendered, the garrison stipulating only for the safety of their lives, and permission to carry away their personal property. Nassir bin Abdoola and his younger brother returned to Bahrein, but the elder brother, Moobaruk bin Abdoola, the governor, fled with Shafce, the Chief of the Huwajir, to join the Bedouin Tribes, towards Biddah. From Koweit, where on this occasion he had taken refuge, the ex-chief revisited Bushire, and, at his own special request, had an interview with the Resident on the sea shore, about three miles from the town, where he was unwilling, as he stated, but without giving his reasons, to land. His ostensible object proved to be, to consult the Resident regarding certain overtures, of a very favourable nature, he had received from the Wahabee ruler, urging that it was not to be supposed that the latter had volunteered to procure the restoration of his property, vessels, and

territorial possessions, without intending to bind him down by some stringent engagements; but his real one was to ascertain what effect such an intimation would have, and whether the British Government was prepared to frustrate or supplant this anticipated paramount Wahabee influence on Bahrein, and take upon themselves the office volunteered by Fysul.

He received in reply no encouragement, and was, moreover, assured that the British Government sought no territorial aggrandisement in this quarter, and had only one object, that of the suppression of piracy, and the maintenance of the tranquillity of these seas.

At the present time (August 1844) the ex-chief resides at Nabend, on the Persian Coast, but most of his sons are located at Muharag, without enjoying, however, any share in the government of the island. Shaikh Moobaruk bin Abdoola, it is reported, returned to Guttur, for the purpose of meeting Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and coming to some amicable arrangement, but that the latter positively refused to confirm or execute the agreement entered into with the sons of the ex-chief, in the presence of Ameer Fysul, and consented only to the ex-chief's returning to reside on the island as a private individual, provided his conduct was guaranteed by the British Government,—a condition which he was aware would never be accepted. It appears improbable that Mahomed bin Khaleefa and his brothers, the present Chiefs of Bahrein, will ever of themselves consent to the re-establishment of their grand uncle, Shaikh Abdoola bin Ahmed, at Bahrein;—at the same time, the deep jealousy of the power and independent bearing of Esai bin Tarif, entertained by the Khaleefa family, and growing desire to resist the encroachments of Ameer Fysul,* may induce them to give their consent to arrangements which, under other circumstances, they would have opposed by every means in their power.

CONCLUSION, TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

The proud and headstrong Abdoola bin Ahmed had, we are told by Captain Kemball, at the close of his narrative of the Uttoobee Tribe, taken up his position at a place called Nabend, on the Persian Coast. The rival claims for superiority between himself and his grand nephew,

* The demand for arrears of tribute, although twice made, has not up to this time (1844) been paid.

Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, still continued, and every possible plan was being resorted to by the refugee chief to induce the Persian Government to espouse his cause. They, on their part, had apparently entertained in a favourable light the proposals that were made to them, and showed, by the pomp and ceremony with which they received their visitor, on the occasion of his coming to Bushire in the early part of the year 1844, that there was at least a desire, if not an intention, to lend him assistance. The proceedings of the Persian authorities were studiously watched by the Resident, and their every movement and expression represented by him to higher authority. It was thought advisable to check, in the outset, this uncalled for officiousness on the part of Persia: instructions were accordingly issued by Her Majesty's Government to Colonel Sheil, begging him to acquaint the Persian Ministers that unless the right of the Shah to take part in the quarrels of rival claimants to the possession of Bahrein were beyond dispute, the interference of His Majesty would be viewed with much jealousy by the British Government in India, and might possibly lead to serious discussions with England. Such an announcement as this, coming as it did from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, tended, no doubt, to damp the ardour of the brotherly feeling shown by Persia to Abdoola bin Ahmed, and must likewise have blasted, for the present at least, all hopes that existed in the mind of the latter of obtaining assistance from that quarter.

From this period the ex-chief commenced a roving style of life,—first repairing with his Buteels to the neighbourhood of Bahrein, then suddenly quitting the island in search of plunder, and, after perpetrating all manner of mischief, returning to his place of asylum on the Persian Coast. By the Resident, these proceedings were beheld with much dissatisfaction, and eventually led to the issue of a positive order, prohibiting him from a continuance of hostilities against the trade and possessions of Bahrein, so long as he chose to reside on the shores of Persia. Fully, however, to comprehend the policy of the British Government with regard to the continued quarrels of the rival chiefs, it is necessary that we should watch the movements and doings of either party, and also observe the line of conduct pursued by the British towards them. Let us therefore proceed to consider a brief outline of all that occurred during the protracted struggle for the sovereignty of the Bahrein island.

Shaikh Abdoola had not been long at Nabend ere he set out on a cruise with his Buteels in the direction of his lost possessions, and proceeded into the immediate vicinity of Bahrein. His unexpected arrival in that quarter threw the pearl divers and others into a state of extreme alarm and confusion, and it was not until the ex-chief assured them

that he had no intention to molest them,—that he was merely in search of the boats of the Al Ali, whom he wished to encounter,—that their fears were in any way relieved. To effect his purpose, he sailed to Biddah in quest of Esai bin Tarif, but finding his enemy on the alert, and well able to resist, he returned to the neighbourhood of Bahrein, without attacking him. Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, when he heard of his arrival, sent a deputation of the principal merchants in the island to invite him ashore, and welcome him home: the reply, however, sent by the haughty Abdoola, that he required the fort of Muharag to be restored to him, together with other demands of a most preposterous character, precluding all hopes of a meeting being effected between himself and his relative, he quitted the place, and sailed to Kateef, whence, after despatching one of his sons on a friendly mission to the Wahabee Ameer, and the seizure of two small vessels on the Dabil Shoal, he retraced his steps to Nabend. The above seizure, although it took place within the war limits of the restrictive line, and its legality was therefore not to be questioned, from the peculiar position of the ex-chief on Persian soil, it soon became manifest that Mahomed bin Khaleefa would be subjected to a series of attacks and annoyances from his rival, without being able to retaliate; for the latter, at perfect liberty to carry on hostilities within the restrictive line, would be constantly lying in wait for favourable opportunities to annoy the people of Bahrein, and, ere the injured parties could take steps for effecting reprisals, would make good his escape beyond the limits of lawful warfare. It was highly necessary, therefore, to place matters upon a more equitable footing, and this could only be done in two ways,—either by effectually restraining the ex-chief so long as he resided on the Coast of Persia, or by suspending the operation of the restrictive line, and permitting the Shaikh of Bahrein to pursue and attack Abdoola bin Ahmed wheresoever he met him. The former mode had been already adopted towards Esai bin Tarif, Chief of the Al Ali, who, when located on the island of Kenn, had sought to disturb the people and dependents of Abdoola bin Ahmed at the time he was Shaikh of Bahrein; but the isolated position of Kenn, and the ease with which our British cruisers could approach the place, rendered it a matter of no difficulty to bring Esai bin Tarif to an immediate account, should he refuse to refrain from hostilities; whereas, in the case of the port of Nabend, which was difficult of access, unsheltered from the prevailing winds, and formed part and parcel of the main land of Persia, there would be no way of punishing the offender save by a recourse to blockade, or to a direct aggression upon Persian territory, by destroying his vessels, drawn up on the beach. The Resident therefore determined, in the event of a complaint being preferred by the Shaikh of Bahrein, and exhortation failing to restrain the ex-chief, to adopt the latter mode of

the two proposed, pending a reference to the Bombay Government regarding it. He strove first, however, as a precautionary measure, by a written address to the Governor of Nabend, pointing out the risk he incurred of laying himself open to attacks from the Chief of Bahrein, should he permit his guest to molest the people of that island, to curb and check the hostile propensities of Shaikh Abdoolla. Nor did he write in vain: this appeal to his feelings and interests was warmly responded to by Ahmed bin Syf, and followed up by the despatch of a confidential messenger to Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, apologising for the conduct of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and promising to do his utmost to restrain him. So far matters went smoothly enough; but the ex-chief had no intention to permit of restraint being placed upon his actions: he had entered into an alliance with the Tribe of the Beni Malij, and they were at feud with Shaikh Ahmed bin Syf; and to show the latter how little he cared for his authority, he hastened to seize two more vessels of Bahrein.

Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, incensed at the injury, but more incensed at his inability to resent it, deputed his own brother, Shaikh Ali bin Khaleefa, to Bushire, to advocate his cause with the Resident, and to beg that officer either to coerce the ex-chief, or to give him permission to retaliate. Shaikh Ali was informed that an intimation would be conveyed to Abdoolla bin Ahmed, that unless he restored all the prizes he had made, and abstained for the future from mischief, the operation of the restrictive line would at once be suspended, and he left to the mercy of his more powerful enemy. Meanwhile, however, until a reply had been received to the above communication, affairs must remain on their present footing. The British Envoy at the capital was likewise apprised of all that was doing, and through his medium was an order issued to the Ameer of Fars, "directing him to compel Abdoolla bin Ahmed to restore the boats he had taken at Bahrein, and to adopt measures for preventing disorders so injurious to the commerce of the Gulf." Plainly perceiving that a refusal to abide by the directions of the Resident would only be detrimental to his own interests, the ex-chief gave a verbal assurance, that so long as he remained within the territories of His Majesty the Shah, he would abstain from aggressions upon the trade and dependents of Bahrein. This announced intention he shortly after found himself compelled to obey, for the British Government wrote up stringent instructions to the Resident, desiring him to prohibit Abdoolla bin Ahmed from committing any acts of aggression upon Bahrein soil or trade, so long as he was located in Persia; and the ex-chief having shown a reluctance to confirm in writing the verbal promise he had given, a vessel of war was at once despatched to inform him that he was under restraint, whether he wished it or no.

Before prosecuting this part of the narrative, it is necessary to describe a case of piracy committed in the early part of the year by Humeed bin Mujdell, of the

Amayir Tribe, and to relate the steps that were taken to obtain redress from that lawless chief.

A vessel of Karrack, under the command of one Abdoolla, having taken in a cargo of wheat at Bunder Reig, proceeded over to Kateef. On entering the backwater, Abdoolla spied three Buggalows coming towards him, one of which, being considerably ahead of the others, approached his boat, and, after a series of manœuvres, boarded her, and made her a prize. The two other Buggalows, both vessels of Koweit, on one occasion hailed the captors, to know what boat they had taken; whereupon the Amayir Chief threatened to cut off the heads of his captives if they dared to utter a syllable. Some two days after the capture "they reached Ras Boo Ali, where they anchored, and plundered the Buggarah of everything she contained, viz. cargo, arms, cloths, &c. to the value of 1,500 Mahomed Shah rupees"; and when the Nakhoda represented that the property they were plundering belonged to a person under British protection, Humeed bin Mujdell laughed him to scorn, and said "Who are the English?"

The crew were then liberated, and, being allowed to leave the place in their Buggarah, they made their way back to Karrack, and related all that had occurred to them.

After some investigation, it was ascertained by the Resident that the Amayir Chief "having broken friendship with part of his tribe," had, previous to committing the piracy, been compelled to quit his usual place of abode, Jazirat Boo Ali, and taken refuge within the dominions of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who treated him kindly, and supplied him with arms and ammunition. He had not been long, however, with his new master, ere he repaired with a number of followers to a small island, named Gunna, which lies near the entrance of the backwater situate between Jazirat Boo Ali and Ras Draeeda. There he took up his quarters, and there, relying upon the strength of his position, he vaunted himself upon his deed of piracy, and expressed his utter contempt for any endeavours the English might make to bring him to punishment.

The piracy was of too open a character to be treated lightly, or "to admit of a compromise being made regarding it." In the month of May, accordingly, the Resident deputed his Assistant, Captain Kemball, with two vessels of the squadron, to Gunna, for the purpose of obtaining full satisfaction from Humeed bin Mujdell. Commodore Hawkins, too, proceeded in person, to superintend and carry into execution any measures that officer might be pleased to suggest; and two Native Buggarahs, fully armed and equipped, were engaged to accom-

pany the expedition. When the naval force approached the pirate's den, and Humeed bin Mujdell was called upon to afford redress for the wrongs he had committed, he sent back a reply of haughty defiance: he declared his perfect indifference for any plans the British vessels might think fit to adopt, and spoke in somewhat boastful terms of the deed he had done. The bold and resolute conduct of the Commodore, however, quickly brought the chief to his senses; for notwithstanding the strength of his position, and the numerous shoals that surrounded it,—so difficult of access that the *Coote* could not approach within five miles of it, and even the schooner *Constance*, after threading her way through an intricate channel, with frequently only six inches of water under her keel, was unable to get within effective range of her guns,—daylight of the morning succeeding their arrival found the town and vessels of the Amayir Chief closely confronted with a formidable line of gunboats, in battle array, all ready to pour forth their contents should resistance be offered, or satisfaction denied; and the insolent tone of contumacy hitherto held by the haughty pirate was instantly changed into one of profound submission. He hastened to wait upon Captain Kemball, and to pray for mercy, and finished by surrendering his Buggalow* as a pledge for the payment of the demands preferred against him.

Thus were brought to a successful issue, without loss of life, or bloodshed, the operations against Humeed bin Mujdell, which, though short in duration, when we consider the terrific heat of the sun in the month of June, the risk incurred by the vessels, and the exposure to which their crews were of necessity subjected, must be pronounced to have been both arduous and harassing.

We now revert to the rival chiefs.

In October 1845, a letter reached the Resident from Abdoolla bin Ahmed, intimating his intention to leave the Persian Coast, and proceed to Kateef, for the purpose of recommencing hostilities. Kateef was at that time held by a Wahabee Governor, Abdoolla bin Saeed, who, although professing feelings of amity for the Shaikhs of Bahrein, was well known to be secretly planning an attack upon their island. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the ex-chief, who had lately received intelligence from the Wahabee Ameer, was invited to join in common cause with the Kateef Governor, and repair to his neighbourhood, with a view to aid in displacing Mahomed bin Khaleefa. The bland demeanour and loud professions of friendship that were made by Abdoolla bin Saeed, in lieu of producing the desired effect upon the Uttoobee

* The Buggalow was redeemed in the month of October 1845, by the payment of 2,059 Mahomed Shah rupees in hard coin, and the deposit of property to the value of the balance of 141 Mahomed Shah rupees.

Chief, appear to have roused his apprehensions, and led him to act with a singular degree of energy; for not only did he positively refuse to acknowledge the sincerity of the Wahabee's advances, but he responded thereto by placing the ports of Kateef and Oojcer in a state of blockade. He also employed Humeed bin Mujdell as his recognised dependent, to assist him in the undertaking—an unwise and impolitic measure; for however unscrupulous, however ready to perpetrate any act that might be required of him, such an ally as Humeed bin Mujdell could hardly fail to lead his superior into all manner of difficulty, either by actual deeds of violence upon those that should be friends, or by a sudden resistance to his master's authority. Indeed, when we carefully study the character of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and observe the tone of his behaviour towards those beneath him, we can neither praise his justice nor commend his policy. We have already seen him heaping favours innumerable upon the faithless Humeed bin Mujdell,—a creature of lawless impulse,—one ready to forsake his cause so soon as a likelihood of obtaining better favours from others lay spread before him; and we presently find him receiving with the utmost formality and coldness a new and powerful ally, one richly deserving of reciprocation of friendship,—I allude to the noble Esai bin Tarif; with so much coldness, indeed, that we are struck with astonishment at the length of time and the faithfulness with which he adhered to his master's cause.

While affairs were in this condition, Abdoolla bin Ahmed made a stealthy approach in the direction of Kateef, and, having landed a messenger at Tanoorah, despatched him with letters to his son Moobaruk, and to Abdoolla bin Saeed, informing them of his being in the vicinity, and telling them to be on the alert, and ready for action. He promised to decoy the blockading force away from Kateef, by feigning an attack upon their vessels, and enticing them to leave the port in pursuit of himself, at which favourable moment he hoped no difficulty would be experienced by his son in carrying the island of Bahrein. The plan was plausible enough, and might, perhaps, have succeeded: the letters, however, were never destined to reach the parties for whom they were intended; they fell into the hands of the Amayir, who immediately carried them over to Shaikh Ali bin Khaleefa, and laid bare the plot that was about to be aimed at the overthrow of his brother. Preparations were set on foot without delay to withstand and defeat any attack that might be meditated on the island, and vessels were sent without the port, to waylay and oppose the advancing fleet of Abdoolla bin Ahmed. The latter made his appearance at the appointed time, but quickly found himself compelled to retire, for long ere reaching the port of Kateef he perceived the hostile armament sailing towards him. He withdrew, accordingly, with all the speed in

his power, and made good his escape from the hand of the enemy : and finding that all his plans were frustrated, he determined to visit Koweit, and there he arrived in safety, after effecting the seizure of a Bahrein Gooncha he fell in with on the way. When the Resident became acquainted with all the occurrences I have related, he wrote word to Mahomed bin Khaleefa, that for any acts of piracy that might be committed by Humeed bin Muddell he would be held responsible by the British Government, that chief having become his constituted dependent, and therefore amenable to his authority. He also addressed the Shaikh of Koweit, expressing a hope that he would not permit the ex-chief to commit aggressions upon the trade of Bahrein so long as he remained within his territory.

Matters continued somewhat in the same condition (Shaikh Abdoola residing at Koweit, and Mahomed bin Khaleefa keeping up the blockade of the ports of Kateef

A. D. 1846. and Oojeer) until the summer of 1846, when the Wahabee Governor of the former port (Kateef) had the presumption to address the Resident, telling him that unless he took measures to expel the Amayir Chief from the position he held, and made him restore a Gooncha and five boats he had seized belonging to people of Kateef, he would let loose the Beni Hajir and other tribes to commit all manner of piracy. By way of reply to the above threat, Abdoola bin Saeed was honoured with a visit from two British cruisers, that were sent to warn him in a friendly manner of the treatment he might expect to receive should he dare to carry into execution his haughty menace.

At this juncture, too, the Persian Ministers seemed once more inclined to espouse the cause of Abdoola bin Ahmed; and notwithstanding the distinct intimation they had received that interference by them with the affairs of the island of Bahrein would not be tolerated by the British Government in India, the Regent of Fars went so far as to invite the ex-chief in June 1846 to repair to Bushire, where, he assured him, he should be liberally entertained at the expense of His Highness, and could remain in peace and quiet until such time as his plans were matured, and the season for action had arrived. Whether or not His Majesty the Shah had any intention to revive his asserted right to the sovereignty of Bahrein, or whether the Regent of Fars had merely invited the ex-chief in hopes of being able to realize from him an amount of tribute, it is difficult to say, and also, from the turn that took place in affairs, a matter of but little importance; for Abdoola bin Ahmed, influenced no doubt by the favourable reception he met with from Shaikh Jaubir (Chief of Koweit), and buoyed up, perhaps, with the expectation of assistance from that chief, did not seem

inclined to trust himself anew to Persian protection, knowing, as he did, that they neither could nor intended to support him. He therefore, in August 1846, politely declined the invitation he had received, and begged leave to inform His Highness that a combination of circumstances precluded his availing himself of the aid and hospitality he so graciously proffered.

In the month of September 1846, shortly after making the above refusal, he re-visited the neighbourhood of Kateef, and took up his quarters in the immediate vicinity of Demaum. His sudden re-appearance caused the blockade of the port of Kateef, that had of late been somewhat relaxed, to be strictly enforced again, and led to two engagements between the land forces of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa and the Kateef Governor, wherein, however, the ex-chief took no personal part, and which terminated pretty evenly for both the belligerents, the Bahrein Shaikh proving victorious on the one occasion, and Abdoola bin Saeed on the other. Either party now applied to the Resident for permission to call in certain allies to join his cause, and in either case did the Resident refuse to comply. First came the Governor of Kateef, petitioning him in October 1846 to permit the Maritime Chiefs of Oman to aid him with their naval force against Mahomed bin Khaleefa. His request could not of course be granted : the British Government considered them all to be independent chiefs, and with one and all had they entered into treaties, whereby each one of their number bound himself to keep the peace, and not to disturb the tranquillity of the seas. Now it was plain that, if one party coalesced with the Governor of Kateef, and another with the Shaikh of Bahrein,—and this would infallibly happen,—they would wage war the one upon the other, and create maritime disorder. On such grounds did the Resident decline to permit any one of the Shaikhs to proceed to the assistance of Abdoola bin Saeed, and for the same reasons, too, when Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa shortly after sought the help of the Shaikh of Debaye (November 1846), was a refusal of necessity given.

In the early part of the ensuing year (1847), at a time when Abdoola bin Ahmed was quartered at Tirhoot, without any followers, and war was still raging between Kateef and Bahrein, a quarrel took place betwixt Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa and the Amayir Chief, which ended in the eventual secession of the latter from his master's authority. Some of his principal men went over to Nujd to make their peace with the Wahabee ruler; others opened a correspondence with the Governor of Kateef, in order to effect a reconciliation with him;—the whole, in fact, of the Amayir Tribe

A. D. 1847.

forsook the cause of the Bahrein Chief, and united themselves to the Wahabees, which caused Mahomed bin Khaleefa to address the Resident, informing him that Humced bin Mujdell, having renounced his allegiance, he could no longer be held responsible for any irregularities that chief might think fit to commit.

Somewhat later in the season (August), an amicable arrangement was entered into between Ameer Fysul and the ruler of Bahrein, by the terms of which the Ameer pledged himself, although he took Abdoolla bin Ahmed under his protection, and gave him asylum at Lahsa, not to aid or abet the ex-chief in any measures he might be pleased to adopt with a view to the re-establishment of his own authority. Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa engaged on his side to pay the Wahabee the sum of 4,000 dollars; and thus for a time terminated the protracted struggle between the Shaikh of Bahrein and the people of Ameer Fysul.

Scarcely, however, had Abdoolla bin Ahmed taken up his abode at Lahsa, under the wing of the Ameer, than his discontented spirit began once more to cry aloud, and to crave a fresh recurrence to mischief. He suddenly left the place, and returned to Demaum, where he launched one of his vessels, with the supposed intention of proceeding to Kenn, for the purpose of entering into a confederacy with the discontented Uttoobees on that island against Mahomed bin Khaleefa. The fears of the latter chief were at once revived: his mind, never at ease, became haunted with pictures of nought but attacks and conspiracies to depose him; nor were those fears relieved by the unlooked for defection of his dependent, Esai bin Tarif, who took offence at some proceeding on the part of his master, formed a coalition with "his former deadly enemy, the ex-chief, and demanded from Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa the restoration of the vessels and possessions of his grand uncle, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed."

Preparations were set on foot by either party for an immediate recourse to maritime hostilities, and a collision would no doubt have ensued, had it not been for the opportune arrival of Commodore Lowe, in the *Elphinstone*, who placed an interdict upon any engagement at sea until the sanction of the Resident had been fully obtained. In due course of time this permission was granted, and hostilities commenced. An engagement took place on the mainland near Fowarit, between the troops of Esai bin Tarif and those of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, the latter commanded by the Shaikh in person, which ended fatally to the Al Ali side, who lost their chief, and were signally defeated. Whatever prospects of success might have been hitherto held by Abdoolla bin Ahmed must now have been effectually blasted, for not only was he deprived of the services of a strong and powerful ally by the

death of Esai bin Tarif, but he had violated his engagement to the Resident, by proceeding to the Persian Coast in quest of reinforcements, and thereby forfeited all right to prosecute warfare against Bahrein, and rendered his vessels liable to seizure by the British cruisers.

Previous to the action above referred to, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa had expressed to the Resident, in the strongest terms, the apprehension he felt lest an attack should be made upon his island by the confederate chiefs, and had sought permission either to proceed against the Uttoobees located on the island of Ges, and bring them back to submission, or to be furnished with a guarantee that no aggression on their part against his possessions would be tolerated by the British Government. These were questions, in the opinion of the Resident, of too great weight and importance to permit of a reply being given before consulting the opinion of higher authority, and were therefore referred for the decision of Government, who wrote back instructions, that in the event of any attempts being made upon Bahrein, such attempts were to be resisted by the naval force in the Gulf. Intelligence of such vital importance to the interests of the Bahrein Chief it was not deemed advisable to communicate, for Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, once more relieved from apprehensions by the death of Esai bin Tarif, and by the utter failure of all Abdoolla bin Ahmed's endeavours to induce the Uttoabee refugees in Ges to espouse his side, it was thought that were he once assured of support from the British in the hour of danger, he would be lulled into a state of security, and cease to trouble himself with the adoption of measures necessary for the defence of his territories.

We now arrive at a point in our narrative more than usually interesting.

The small but fruitful island of Bahrein appears at different seasons to have excited in an extraordinary degree the ambitious desires of divers nations. His Majesty the Shah, or the authorities under him, we have already seen, had on two separate occasions manifested an inclination to assert a right of supremacy over it; the Imaum of Muskat has from time immemorial longed and craved to possess the fertile spot; and now we find the Turkish authorities intriguing, and seeking to induce Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa to renounce his state of independence, and own his allegiance to the Ottoman Porto. A letter was addressed by the Mootassellim of Bussora to the above chief, inviting him to acknowledge his dependence on the Sultan, and to "furnish lists of his vessels, crews, &c., in order that the requisite registers might be prepared and forwarded." A Turkish brig of war, too, visited the Gulf, and although she did not actually repair to Bahrein, the better perhaps

to conceal her designs, still there seemed no doubt that an effort was being made by the Porte to extend its influence over the Arab Tribes in the Persian Gulf. Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa sent, it is true, an evasive reply to the communication he had received from the Mootasellim of Bussora; but yet, from the tenor of a conversation held by him with the Resident, complaining that double duties had been levied from the vessels of his subjects and dependents by the custom house authorities at Bombay, and urging that no such demand had been made upon the ships of those who owned allegiance either to the Shah or the Imaum of Muskat,—that unless the British authorities therefore refrained from enforcing extra fees and customs from his people, he would be compelled to follow the example of the Shaikh of Koweit, and place himself under the guardianship of the Porte,—it became manifest, that if the British Government in India wished to preserve their paramount influence in the Persian waters they must adopt measures to rectify the present irregularities, by coming to a speedy understanding with the Bahrein Chief.

The harbour fees, &c. alluded to by Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa had been levied in consequence of his vessels not being furnished with the requisite passes; yet, to show him how unwilling the British authorities were in any way to alienate or estrange his affections, the amounts were subsequently refunded, and he was informed that for the future all Bahrein vessels leaving the Gulf must be provided with registers, signed by the Resident, "else would they render themselves liable to the extra duties levied on foreign vessels entering Bombay harbour."

The Resident, too, was instructed to ascertain the feelings of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and whether or not he was inclined to enter into a closer connection with the British; also to avoid as far as practicable all discussion with the Turkish authorities relative to the designs they had in view of establishing a supremacy over the island, as the matter was being referred for the decision and judgment of the Home authorities.

The Persian Consul at Bagdad wrote strong letters of encouragement to Abdoola bin Ahmed, assuring him of the support of the Shah towards the re-establishment of himself in his lost dominions, and begging him to make every preparation for carrying into effect the plans he might have in contemplation,—however momentous, however gigantic,—Persian assistance, full and powerful, would most surely be accorded him. Another letter did the same functionary address to the ruling Shaikh of the island, teeming with false assurances of friendship and amity; urging upon him in the blandest terms the great feeling of interest felt by His Majesty the Shah in his prosperity

and welfare,—a letter, in fact, one tissue of falsehoods,—neither more nor less than a ruse to blind and mislead the understanding of the self-sufficient Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa.

These attacks upon Bahrein independence were duly represented to the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, who wrote in reply that Meerza Abdool Jabbur (Persian Consul at Bagdad), in perfect ignorance of the relations existing between the ruler of Bahrein and the British Government, had thought it a clear matter of duty on his part to do all in his power to further the views of Abdoola bin Ahmed, who, from the day of his downfall, had been treated with so much consideration and respect by the Persian Government, but that now he was aware of the interest taken in Bahrein by the British State, he would abstain from further interference with the affairs of the island. Not many months after this had occurred, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa himself expressed a wish to the Resident that Bahrein should be taken under British protection. The Resident, who had been called upon to give his opinion as to the advisability or otherwise of entering into an alliance with the rulers of that island, had in the outset inclined against the measure; but the spontaneous offer of allegiance now preferred by Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, combined with other circumstances, led that officer to alter his opinion, and to recommend the immediate acceptance of the proffer made by the chief. After much consideration, however, the Government of India, considering it inexpedient to make any alteration in the character of the relations then subsisting between the British Government and the Chief of Bahrein, and the Home Government concurring in that view, the Resident at Bushire was in September 1849 directed to decline the offer of the Chief of Bahrein, assuring him at the same time of the continuance of the good will and friendship of the British Government. In this wise terminated the long discussion, protracted over a period of more than two years, respecting the proposed alliance with the Shaikh of Bahrein.

A few occurrences worthy of notice have been of necessity passed over during the relation of other matters that engrossed our attention, and must be briefly described ere passing on to the consideration of future events.

At the latter end of the preceding year, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa made an unsuccessful attempt to induce the Shaikh of Charrak to expel from Kenn the Bahrein fugitives who had taken refuge on that island. He also behaved most improperly in the matter of one Khaleefa, of the Gubeysat Tribe, who committed a number of piracies,—amongst others, one upon a vessel belonging to his own dependents,—and who, although detained by the Shaikh for a time, at the instance of

he British Agent was eventually set at liberty, ere a reply to a reference made on the subject by Hajee Jassim had been received. This proceeding being, in point of fact, nothing more or less than a direct violation of an agreement entered into with the British Agent, was strongly condemned by Colonel Hennell, and led to a humble apology being offered by the Shaikh for his unfaithful conduct, together with a promise that he would do his utmost to seize and detain both Khaleefa and his vessel.

From the day that Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa had assumed the reins of government, his mind had been one continued succession of hopes and fears; and no sooner had he been relieved from some heavy weight of anxiety or impending calamity, than the clouds were again observed to gather, and fresh troubles assailed him.

About this period occurred the death, at Muskat, of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who had touched at that port on his way to Zanzibar, whither he was proceeding on a visit to his once deadly enemy, the Imaum of Muskat, hoping to be able to prevail upon His Highness to aid him in the recovery of his lost possessions. Such an occurrence as this tended, no doubt, greatly to dissipate the fears entertained by Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa. The relief, however, was not of long duration, for four of the principal merchants of the Bahrein island, disgusted, it was said, with the arbitrary proceedings of the Shaikh, had in January 1849 secretly fled to the Persian Coast, and, taking up their quarters upon the island of Kenn, united themselves to the disaffected Uttoobes, who, already strong in numbers, being joined by parties of such weight and influence as these, became a most formidable enemy, and increased the alarm of the Shaikh to so great an extent that he deputed his brother, Shaikh Ali, to Bushire, to seek aid and advice from the Resident. Shaikh Ali was told, on arrival, that although the British Government would never permit of an expedition being organised from the Persian Coast for the purpose of attacking Bahrein, and the British cruisers would most assuredly seize or destroy any armed vessels found proceeding with such intent, yet, there being many and distant calls for the services of the vessels of the squadron, it was highly necessary that Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa should keep a strict look-out, and be well prepared to resist any sudden or unexpected attack that might, perchance, be made upon his territories during the absence of the ships of war. The Resident also strongly counselled him to strive, by conciliatory measures, to induce the seceders to return and settle upon the island. How far he followed the advice of the Resident does not appear, but through the intervention of that officer was a reconciliation subsequently effected between the Shaikh of Bahrein and Yoosef bin Ibrahim, the most influential of the four merchants who seceded from the

island. This person, together with two other seceders (Shaikh Mahomed bin Saeed, and Shaikh Jassim bin Mahomed), were conveyed to Bahrein by one of the British vessels, and, after some discussion and hesitation, matters were, in June 1849, amicably arranged between Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa and themselves.

In the following year (1850) a piracy was committed by some Bedouins of the Huwajir Tribe upon a Gooncha of Karrack. Towards the close of the month of

A. D. 1850.

June, the latter vessel "left Karrack with a crew of six men, and a cargo of wheat and barley, for Kateef." On arrival off Ras Tanoora, Abdool Rahman, her Nakhoda, was suddenly attacked by a party of twenty-six of the Huwajir Tribe, who were returning to their country in a Bahrein Buggarah, and, after a show of resistance, was compelled to surrender up his boat and people to the mercy of the pirates, who took them to the mainland, and stripped them of all they possessed.

The Resident had frequently warned the Chief of Bahrein that for any piratical acts committed by the Bedouins of the Huwajir Tribe he would be held responsible by the British Government, for not only had he connected himself by marriage with the people of that tribe, but he permitted them to frequent Bahrein in considerable numbers, and was, moreover, known to be secretly encouraging them in the prosecution of their lawless proceedings. Demands were accordingly made upon Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa for the payment of 100 Tomans, by way of compensation to the Nakhoda and crew, and instructions were issued to Commodore Porter to communicate with the chief, and point out to him the necessity of an immediate compliance with the Resident's requisitions. No measures of coercion proved necessary on this occasion, for notwithstanding the constant assertions of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa that he did not consider himself answerable for the acts of the Huwajir Tribe, he paid over without demur the 100 Tomans required from him, and brought the matter to a speedy settlement.

Scarcely had he adjusted the affair, however, apparently too with less reluctance than he was wont to display in cases of demands being preferred against him, than he suddenly plunged into the other extreme, and adopted a line of behaviour at once insolent and inexcusable towards the British Government. He received a number of letters from the Resident on the subject of certain complaints he had made to the British Agent regarding the death of one of his subjects, and at the contents of those communications he took offence, and sent back messages to Colonel Hennell, through Hajee Jassim, of the most "insulting and unbecoming character";—messages applying not only to himself in person, but reflecting upon the British Go-

vernment also. Explanation was demanded, and a ship of war despatched for the purpose of receiving the explanation. Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, repenting the hastiness of his conduct, deputed his brother, Shaikh Ali, to Bushire, to offer his humblest apologies, and to crave the Resident's forgiveness. The Resident declared his willingness (October 1850) to forgive all that had been said so far as concerned himself alone, but as the expressions used by Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa "bore reference to the British Government as well as to himself, Colonel Hennell considered it due to the dignity of the former, that on the first occasion of the Commodore proceeding to Bahrein the Uttoobee Chief should visit him on board his ship, and personally express his regret that anything incautiously spoken by himself, in a moment of irritation, should have been considered offensive or disrespectful to the British Government; and to this suggestion Shaikh Ali readily consented on the part of his brother."

We are now on the eve of great events,—of disturbances that again arose between Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa and the Wahabee Ameer. Fresh complications are presented to our view;—new disorders, in new shapes and new forms, of so violent and so dangerous a character, at this period occurred, that the Bahrein island was convulsed, and well nigh falling a prey to the combined attacks upon its independence.

Some three years before, it will be remembered, a peace was concluded between the Uttoobee Chief and Ameer Fysul. This peace had run a course smooth and uninterrupted, either party adhering to the terms whereunto he had pledged himself, until the present time, when divers matters transpired to engender a feeling of jealousy and enmity, which shortly after led to a rupture.

In the month of April 1850, Syud bin Mootluk repaired to the neighbourhood of Bahrein, and, on arrival, deputed his son on a visit to Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who received his guest with the utmost formality and coldness, and permitted him to leave the island without showing him the slightest mark of honour or respect. However imprudent such an act on the part of the Shaikh may have been,—however likely to be attended with grave results,—we cannot with justice blame his conduct; for only a short time previous to this occurrence Mahomed bin Abdool Raheem had been sent by Ameer Fysul on a mission to Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and every attention, every show of distinction had been heaped upon the envoy, who quitted Bahrein loaded with presents, and highly elated with the treatment he had experienced. These presents, these favours, one and all did they rob him of, when he returned to Kateef, and by order of the Ameer they confined Mahomed bin Abdool Raheem for having accepted the

gifts above mentioned. It was not likely, therefore, that Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, after such insults as these had been offered to his dignity,—after such indignities had been heaped upon one he had honoured, and merely because it was he that had honoured him,—would be eager to receive with grace or courtesy persons that might in future be deputed to his island on the part of the Wahabees. Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, when the above affronts occurred, remonstrated strongly with the Ameer, and went so far as to threaten to blockade the port of Kateef unless the envoy he had caused to be imprisoned were at once released, and unless fitting apologies were made for the unwarrantable acts he had been guilty of.

Such was the posture of affairs in the spring of 1850, and in such a position did they remain until the commencement of the ensuing year, when dangers began

to thicken, and Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa to tremble for the integrity of his dominions. Ameer Fysul arrived within two stages of Biddah; the inhabitants of the towns on the Guttur Coast (Fuwarit, Wukra, Doah, &c.) deserted the side of the Bahrein ruler, and went over to that of the Wahabee; negotiations that had for a long period been carried on, through the intervention of the Resident, to strive and induce the sons of the ex-chief to accept an annual allowance, and abide peaceably on the island of Kenn, had utterly failed;—indeed in the month of July affairs had reached a crisis truly imminent. Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, against his better judgment, had made offers to the Ameer of compromising matters, by the payment of a small yearly tribute, and these offers had been rejected with scorn, and replied to by demands of an exorbitant character; the sons of the ex-chief had been invited to leave the Persian Coast, and join the Wahabee.

It is needless entering further into detail on this matter: suffice it to say, that in the end of July 1851 a peace was concluded, through the good offices of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, between Ameer Fysul and Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa. The fort of Biddah, too, was handed back to Shaikh Ali bin Khaleefa, and the Wahabee Ameer returned to Lahsa.

The rest of our narrative, though extending over a period of more than two years, can be told in the fewest words. It comprises scarcely anything new, but is a mere repetition of olden scenes and olden fears. We have the launching of Buteels and the expectation of attacks; seeking the Resident's advice, and speaking disparagingly of him for giving advice; the oppression of subjects, and the flight of the oppressed; the deputing of envoys, armed with full powers, to effect agreements, and the return of the envoys, to be censured for the agree-

ments they had effected;—such, and such only, is the character of the doings of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa during the remaining portion of this narrative; and having already entered so fully into detail on the subject of the occurrences that took place during his late struggle with the Wahabees, and other foes, and as it is chiefly with the same foes that we have still to deal, it can hardly be necessary to do more than describe with the utmost brevity the few facts that remain to be told.

The peace so happily concluded during the summer of 1851 was in danger of being again disturbed early in the ensuing year, by the precipitate conduct of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who commenced complaining aloud, and bitterly inveighing against Ameer Fysul, for locating the surviving sons of Abdoolla bin Ahmed on the island of Demaum. He would not, he said, so long as they remained in the above locality, disburse one farthing of tribute; he would not allow himself to be trifled with, either by his kinsmen or by the Wahabee. Matters began once more to wear an unsettled appearance, and might in the end have proved serious, had not Captain Kemball, the Acting Resident, strongly counselled him to adopt a conciliatory rather than an arrogant tone of behaviour,—“to disarm rather than defy the Wahabee.” His brother, Shaikh Ali, too, a chief in every sense more temperate and wise than himself, did all in his power to restrain him, and succeeded, by dint of argument, in persuading him to pay the instalment of tribute that had now become due, and which a person on the part of the Ameer had been deputed to receive. The storm blew over, and for a short period the Uttoobee Chief showed more than his usual discretion. He deputed envoys to Bushire, to represent to the Resident the fears he entertained that a powerful combination was being secretly formed against him; that the Imaum of Muskat was planning an attack upon his island; that Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, not long since an ally, as also his recusant kinsmen, one and all were ready to join the league, with a view to ensure his downfall. These fears Captain Kemball in a great measure contrived to dissipate, but at the same time he advised the chief in no way to relax his efforts in defence of his territories; that although he did not actually apprehend that contingencies such as he foretold would arise, yet was it highly incumbent upon him to be well prepared to resist any sudden attack that might perchance be made on his territories.

Other matters there were, submitted by the envoys: they revived the subject of accommodation proposed to be effected between their superior, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and the sons of the ex-chief; they solicited the Resident's good offices to strive and induce Yoosoof bin Ibrahim to return and reside upon their island.

In reply, Captain Kemball commenced by expressing his surprise and

astonishment at the treatment he had so lately experienced at the hands of the Chief of Bahrein. That chief, said the Resident, had begged and craved his interposition to bring about an amicable settlement between himself and his recusant kinsmen; that chief had, in the presence of the British Agent, made use of expressions both uncalled for and disrespectful to himself,—the British representative.

To sum up in a few words:—Shaikh Ali, the last and most influential of the envoys deputed, after being reminded of the insulting language that had been held by his brother, supplied a written document, specifying that to such and such terms would Shaikh Mahomed agree, and in such and such places would he permit his kinsmen to reside; he also begged the Resident to forget the past, and accede to interest himself in his brother's behalf.

Captain Kemball, notwithstanding the wayward demeanour of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, being placed in possession of the exact terms that were to be offered, and thinking the general interests of peace would be benefited by an amicable settlement, agreed to sound the feelings of the sons of the late Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and, if possible, without however in any way compromising the British Government, to effect an arrangement. The Uttoobee Chief had no sooner ascertained the particulars of the interview held by his brother with the Resident, and become acquainted with the favourable issue of his mission, than he showed a disposition to withdraw from the terms that had been agreed upon. It is scarcely necessary to add that no accommodation was eventually effected; the sons of the late Abdoolla bin Ahmed continued to reside at Demaum, where they were kindly, and even liberally entertained by the Wahabee ruler.

One more point remains to be noticed. Yoosoof bin Ibrahim refused to return to his home, unless the Resident would promise “to shield him from future molestation”; and as Captain Kemball would not consent for an instant to such a proposal, the idea of a return was banished from his mind for ever.

Shaikh Yoosoof continued for a length of time to reside at Bushire, and subsequently left for Lingah, where, in the summer of the year 1853, he fell sick and died.

A. D. 1853.

EXTRACTS FROM BRIEF NOTES,

CONTAINING

HISTORICAL AND OTHER INFORMATION

CONNECTED WITH THE

PROVINCE OF OMAN; MUSKAT AND THE ADJOINING COUNTRY; THE
ISLANDS OF BAHREIN, ORMUS, KISHIM, AND KARRACK;

AND OTHER PORTS AND PLACES IN

THE PERSIAN GULF;

PREPARED, IN THE YEAR 1818, BY

CAPTAIN ROBERT TAYLOR,

3RD REGIMENT BOMBAY NATIVE INFANTRY,

ASSISTANT POLITICAL AGENT IN TURKISH ARABIA.

ISLAND OF BAHREIN.

The Island of Bahrain lies opposite to the port of Ogair, is thirty-three miles in extreme breadth, and seventy in extreme length, covering about eight hundred square miles. The Chiefs of the Beni Itbah, a foreign tribe of Arabs from Grane (or Koweit), have governed its aboriginal inhabitants for more than thirty-five years with absolute power. Not so, however, their Uttoobee brethren, who yield to superior authority with difficulty. The revenue collected by them amounts to the yearly sum of 100,000 Tomans, of which 20,000 Tomans is the original revenue, and 80,000 Tomans consist of arbitrary impositions of the governors. The pearl fishery produces to them 100,000 Tomans, of 12 Piastres Roomee each, which is divided among the members of the tribe in proportions, according to their rank and consequence.

Their fishing-boats amount to 1,400 sail, of which 700 are of larger burthen, 300 intermediate, and 400 of a small size. The larger are manned by one master, fourteen divers, and fourteen assistants, in all twenty-nine men; the intermediate with one master, nine divers, and nine assistants, in all nineteen men; the least with one master, seven divers, and seven assistants, in all fifteen men. The portions of the fishery are four to the master, and two to the divers; the assistants receive for the season a settled pay of from five to six Tomans. The fishermen borrow for their support, from noted bankers, amounts both of money and grain, on which these gain a profit of thirty per cent., or

more, as circumstances may influence. The larger crews require 100 Tomans in the year, the intermediate 50 Tomans, and the least 30 Tomans. The modes of payment and indemnification are as has been related of the people of Ras-ool-Khyma. The Governor of Bahrain levies a convoy duty on the pearl fleet of 2 Tomans yearly from each boat, all of which are escorted by seven war Bugalows during the fishing season.

The aboriginal inhabitants of Bahrain, now subjected to a foreign power, suffer from the tyranny of their masters more keenly than language can express. The island abounds in water, the date, and other fruit trees. The Bahreinees are 10,000 in number. The number and names of the Uttoobees and their allies are as follows: Al Khulefe, the Governor, 600 souls; Ali Zauyed, 1,200; A' Mauzeed, 2,000; Ali Muhavideh, 3,000; Ali Sulaim, 3,000; Ali Mao Sullim, 1,000; Ali Sumait, 900; slaves, 2,000; total number of Uttoobees and others, 13,600 souls.

There is considerable difference of opinion as to the origin of the first inhabitants of Bahrain. Some authors assert that they were ancient Persians, who, after a long residence, adopted the dialect of the inhabitants of the nearest coast; while others declare that they were descended from the Arab Tribe of Thamud, one of the oldest in Arabia (1900 B. C.), who were driven out of Yemen, or Arabia Felix, by Saba, son of Hamyar, into Hajar, or Arabia Petrea, and passed at length into Awal (Bahrain) subsequent to their dispersion by the Almighty for their want of religious faith.

Some centuries previous to Mahomedanism (A. D. 420), the idolatrous Natives were the governors of the island; but when Bahram, of the last or Sassanian dynasty of Persian Kings, achieved his partial conquest of the Arabs (A. D. 615), he possessed himself of it, and nominated a governor from the royal presence, who retained his seat until the era of the mission of Mahomed.

At this period the government of the island of Bahrain reverted to the original people, and remained with them as late as the reign of Keshan bin Abdool Malik, who vanquished them in the commencement of the eighth century (A. D. 723), and placed over them a ruler of the Oommiyyad branch of the Tribe Koraish.

They continued thus under a foreign power until the close of the Abbaside dynasty, in the eleventh century, when they again became subject to chiefs of their own race, until the sixteenth century, in the age of the Saffis (or Sophis), who took Bahrain, and deputed a Persian nobleman to the office of governor. During an interval of twenty years at this period, about the middle of the seventeenth century, Suif bin Sultan, the Yarabi, retained the island under subjection; when, in

the latter part of the same century, it was reduced by the Generals of Sultan Sulaiman the Sophi, and continued to recognise the authority of this dynasty until its close in the early part of the succeeding, or eighteenth century, in the person of Shah Sultan Hussein. Sultan the son of Suif next became possessed of the island, after a bloody and obstinate resistance; and retained the supreme authority until he was driven out by Nadir Shah, under whose power it remained until his death.

After this, during a period of fifty-seven years, it passed into the hands of four different chiefs of districts on the Persian shore of the Gulf, at no great distance from each other. The first of these was Jabara bin Yasir the Nasiri, surnamed Nasuri, Shaikh of Tahiri, who held it fourteen years; next, the family of the Shaikhs of Abooshahar retained the government for thirty years; after them, Mahomed bin Jabir, of the family of Haram Shaikhs of Aseeloo, for five years; from whom, after a sanguinary contest, it reverted once more to the Shaikhs of Abooshahar, for eight succeeding years, when the Uttoobees wrested the island from the Shaikhs of Abooshahar, and have retained it ever since.

The celebrated traveller Carsten Niebuhr gives the following more particular account of these sudden revolutions in the government of this island:—

“Within the last few years Bahrein has had many masters. It once belonged to the Portuguese, who were deprived of it by the Shaikh of Lahsa. He was himself in turn obliged to deliver it up to the Persians, who took the island headed by Imaum Kuli Khan, Governor of Ormus, in the name of a king of the Saffi dynasty. A Prince of Oman now possessed himself of it; but ceded it to the Persians for a sum of money, through the intervention of Shaikh Mahomed Majid, who was still governor of it at the period of the Afghan invasion of Persia, and was at his death succeeded by his son, Shaikh Ahmed. The citadel, or principal fortress of the island, had at this time a distinct and different commandant, on the part of the Sophis of Persia, one of whom, Mahomed Kuli Khan, who had succeeded a former officer in this charge, delivered the surrounding territory to Shaikh Mahomed Majid, of Naband (Nabor), of the race of Haram. From him it was taken by Jabara-al-Nasur, Shaikh of Tahiri, also of this family of Haram.

“While Nadir Shah maintained a naval force in the Persian Gulf, Taki Khan, Beglerbeg of Fars, reduced the island, and appointed a commandant of the citadel; but the moment that Taki Khan had proceeded to Oman with the fleet, Jabara reconquered the whole domain, except the citadel, which the commandant bravely defended, until

Kasim bin Jabir of Aseeloo came to his aid, and enabled him to drive Jabara from the island.

“At this time, however, as the public troubles of Persia were daily increasing, Mahomed bin Jaber, of Aseeloo, and of the race of Haram, brought the island under his own power, but was dispossessed of it by the united powers of Mir Nasr of Bender Rig, and Shaikh Nasr of Abooshahar. The first of these established a superiority over the second; and he was in turn driven out by the tribe Haram, who were themselves obliged to yield at length to Shaikh Nasr of Abooshahar. This chief, after many successive changes in the result of his military operations against the tribes Beni Hul and Haram, finally succeeded in making himself master of the island.” (A. D. 1765.)

With regard to this island, Justamond, in his History of the East and West Indies, has this striking and remarkable passage:—

“This Company (the English East India) have never attempted to establish themselves on the island of Bahrein, which we are at a loss to account for. This island, which lies in the Persian Gulf, has often changed its masters. It fell, with Ormus, under the dominion of the Portuguese, and was governed by the same laws. These conquerors were afterwards deprived of it, and it has since undergone a variety of revolutions.

“Tahmasp Koly Khan restored it to Persia, to which it had belonged. His death put a period to his vast designs, and the confusion into which his empire was thrown afforded a fair opportunity to an ambitious and enterprising Arab of taking possession of Bahrein, where he still maintains his authority.

“This island, famous for its pearl fishery, even at the time when pearls were found at Ormus, Karel, Kishen, and other places in the Gulf, is now become of much greater consequence, the other banks having been exhausted, while those near it have suffered no sensible diminution. The time of fishing begins in April, and ends in October. It is confined to a tract of four or five leagues. The Arabs, who alone follow this employment, pass their nights upon the island or the coast, unless they are prevented by the wind from going on shore. They formerly paid a toll, which was received by the galliots on that station. Since the last changes, none but the inhabitants of this island pay this acknowledgment to their chief, who is not in a condition to demand it from others.

“The pearls taken at Bahrein, though not so white as those of Ceylon and Japan, are much larger than those of the former place, and of a more regular shape than those of the latter. They are of a yellowish cast, but have this recommendation, that they preserve their golden hue; whereas the whiter kind lose much of their lustre by keeping,

particularly in hot countries. The shell of both these species, which is known by the name of mother-o'-pearl, is used in Asia for various purposes.

"The annual revenue arising from the fishery in the latitude of Bahrein is computed at 3,600,000 livres (£157,500). The greatest part of the pearls that are uneven are carried to Constantinople, and other ports of Turkey, where the larger compose part of the ornaments of the head-dress, and the smaller are used in works of embroidery. The perfect pearls are of course reserved for Surat, from whence they are distributed throughout all Hindoostan. The women have so strong a passion for this luxury, and the sale of this article is so much increased by superstition, that there is not the least reason to apprehend any diminution either in the price or the demand. There are none of the Gentiles, who do not make it a point of religion to bore at least one pearl at the time of their marriage. Whatever may be the mysterious meaning of this custom, among a people whose morality and politics are couched in allegories, or where allegory becomes religion, this emblem of virgin modesty has proved advantageous to the pearl trade."

At a time when the revenue from the pearl banks of Bahrein alone was at the lowest point, under the Shaikhs of Bushire, from the weakness and imperfection of their tenure and government, Neibuhr thus of it:—

"Bahrein is said at one time to have contained 365 towns and villages; but at present there is only one fortified town on the island, Awal (Bahrein), and not more than forty or fifty villages on the neighbouring islets. The remainder have doubtless been destroyed by the continual wars which have infested this country. The pearl fishery of these isles is still celebrated, but as the tribe Hul pay little or nothing for the permission to fish, the revenues of the Shaikh of Abooshahar, on account of the fishery and the date grounds, amount to no more than Rs. 100,000.

"Many persons who have been on these islands have assured me that excellent spring-water is found in a depth of two and a half fathoms, at some distance from the shore; and that the fishermen constantly dive to that depth, to replenish their jars."

Tavernier says:—"In the first place, there is a pearl fishery round the island of Bahrein, in the Persian Gulf, which belongs to the King of Persia, and there is a good fortress, garrisoned with three hundred men. The water they use in this island, and also on the Persian Coast, is salt, and of a bad taste, and it is only the Natives of the country that can drink it. With respect to strangers, it costs them a considerable sum to get it good, for they have to draw it from the sea, at a distance of from half a league to two leagues beyond the island. Those that go to

fetch it are commonly five or six, in a bark, from which one or two of them dive to the bottom of the sea, having a bottle or two hung at their girdles, which they fill with water, and then cork them tight; for at about two or three feet from the bottom of the sea the water is sweet, and of the very best quality. When those who are let down have filled their bottles, they pull a small cord, which has one end fastened to some person in the boat, and it serves as a signal for their comrades to draw them up.

"While the Portuguese were in possession of Ormus and Muskat, every Terate or bark that went out to fish was obliged to have a passport, which cost fifteen Abbases, and they continually employed several brigantines to sink those that had not got them; but since the Arabs have retaken Muskat, and the Portuguese have no strength in the Gulf, every man that goes a fishing pays to the King of Persia five Abbases only, whether his success be good or bad. The merchant also pays some small trifle to the king, on every thousand oysters.

"The second pearl fishery is over against that of Bahrein, on the coast of Arabia the Happy, near the city of Katifa, which, as well as the surrounding country, belongs to an Arabian Prince. All the pearls that are fished in these places are generally sold in the Indies, because the Indians are not so difficult as we, and buy indifferently the rough ones as well as the smooth, taking the whole at a fixed price. They also carry some to Balsora, while those that are carried to Persia and Muscovy are sold at Bunder Congo, two days' journey from Ormus. In all these places I have mentioned; as well as in other parts of Asia, they like better to see the water of a yellow cast than white, because they say that those pearls in which the water is a little tinged like gold always retain their brightness, and never alter, while those that are white seldom last longer than thirty years without; when, owing as well to the warmth of the country as the heat of the body, they take a dull yellow colour."

Notwithstanding the pearls found at Bahrein and Kateef approach a little upon the yellow, they are yet in as much esteem as those of Manaar (Ceylon); and throughout all the East they say they are ripe, and never change their colour.

The history, according to Native tradition, may now be resumed from the point at which it was relinquished.

The last, or Uttoobee conquerors, of Bahrein, who reduced it in A. H. 1194 (A. D. 1779), came originally from Koweit or Grand. They were formed by the intermarriage of three large tribes of Arabs, the Beni Sabah, under Shaikh Sulaiman bin Ahmed; the Beni Yalahimah under Shaikh Jabir bin Uttoobee, and the Beni Khalifah, under Shaikh, Khalifah bin Mahomed.

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On the union of these tribes, for the purpose of resisting the attacks of more powerful clans in the neighbourhood of Koweit, they determined to become at once merchants and agriculturists, and that the profits arising from these occupations should be equally divided amongst the whole. From the tribe Sabah were to proceed their governors, the Yalahimah were to produce seamen, and the Khalifah to conduct the commercial concerns.

The system had been pursued with success for fifty years, when the mercantile fédérates became anxious to enjoy singly their lucrative branch of the original league.

With this view Khalifah bin Mahomed, an artful chief, persuaded the members of the other two tribes to permit him to pass over to the pearl shore, near Bahrein, and as the purchase and sale of these constituted the principal source of their riches, to endeavour to procure a share of that fishery for themselves, instead of continuing to purchase from other hands.

The Yalahimah conveyed their brethren to Zobara, where they completely succeeded in their object, and at length refused a share of the profits resulting from its attainment to both the other parties in the original compact. The Beni Sabah, too, who remained at Koweit, also at length threw off the third party (the Yalahimah), who, stung by the injustice of this double defection, retired to Ruaisah, a barren spot a little to the eastward of Zobara, and commenced a system of reprisal on their commerce, which brought the Khalifah to the brink of ruin. Mutual hostilities now engaged these tribes, until the Yalahimah were attacked in their retreat, and cut to pieces, with the exception of some women and children.

About this time Shaikh Nasr, Governor of Bahrein, tempted by the prosperity of the settlement at Zobara, besieged it with vigour, but sustaining a shameful defeat, quickly despatched the intelligence to his son, whom he had left to guard the island, and charged him to be resolute and vigilant against foreign attack, until he should come to his assistance.

The boat conveying this despatch was taken on its passage, and the papers perused by the Sabah, who, having heard of the meditated attack of their brethren by Shaikh Nasr, were then advancing to assist them. Aware of the defenceless state of Bahrein, they immediately proceeded to the attack, and gained possession of its principal posts previous to the arrival of Shaikh Nasr's fleet, who, finding the island in possession of an enemy, returned to Abooshahar.

The Sabah communicated their success to the Khalifah at Zobara, who hastened to collect an army, in order to join their former companions, and reduced the unconquered parts of the island. All those

who would join them, and co-operate in the reduction of Bahrein, were upheld by the promise of grants of land, money, and exclusive privileges of tenure. This service was shortly completed, and the rewards conferred, in the distribution of which the four sons of Jaber bin Uttoobee claimed a voice in the government, and were refused, although by the original compact they possessed a just hereditary right to an equal share of the benefits of a conquest, in the completion of which they had shed their blood.

On this they left the island of Bahrein in disgust, and commenced the mode of life their progenitor had pointed out to them, in which they have since persevered.

Of the four brothers, sons of Jaber bin Uttoobee Yalahimah, Rahmah bin Jaber only is alive; Abdoolla bin Jaber was inhumanly butchered by the Prince of Fars, while living under his pledged protection; Shabin bin Jaber died five years ago, on his return from pilgrimage; and Mahomed bin Jaber was lately killed while defending the family of his brother, at Khor Hassan, from the attack of the Shaikhs of Bahrein.

After this conquest, the Uttoobees paid a trifling tribute to the Persians only four times, and then discontinued it altogether.

MEMORANDA
ON THE
RESOURCES, LOCALITIES, AND RELATIONS
OF THE
TRIBES INHABITING THE ARABIAN SHORES
OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

BY
LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL,
BOMBAY ARTILLERY,
ASSISTANT RESIDENT AT BUSHIRE.

Submitted to Government on the 6th January 1845.

MEMORANDA

ON THE

RESOURCES, LOCALITIES, AND RELATIONS OF THE
TRIBES INHABITING THE ARABIAN SHORES OF
THE PERSIAN GULF.

The total non-interference in the internal disputes and affairs of the piratical Arabian Chieftains, wisely enjoined as the first principle of the Government policy, added to the absence of any intercourse, commercial or otherwise, with their ports, by individuals and vessels of any nation, have precluded the attainment of any specific and accurate knowledge of inland localities, and extent of population and territory.

To fix the limits, therefore, of the lands actually belonging to, or claimed by, each tribe respectively, would, with our present information, be impossible; nor, indeed, do these often form the grounds of any great altercations or hostilities among themselves, owing to the barrenness and infertility of the soil; which being, moreover, very imperfectly cultivated, in consequence, probably, of the absence of the means or labour of irrigation, does not yield sufficient for the support* of its inhabitants in even their common article of food,—dates,—the fruit of a tree which may be said to be generally indigenous to Arabia alone, and renders its possession, accordingly, of no worth.

Upon the success of the pearl fishery, and the profits of the carrying trade which it brings into operation, must, under these disadvantages, depend the means of obtaining the positive necessities of life, and those trifling luxuries desirable to an Arab.† It is needless to observe how

* The Arabian ports, particularly Aboothabee, are consequently dependent upon other places for supplies of provisions, and are soon reduced to great distress by anything like an effective blockade.

† Captain McLeod, in reporting upon the Jansamee Tribe in 1823, stated as follows:—“The Jansamees procure all their materials for building, as well as their warlike stores, from Muskat, Bahrein, and the Persian ports in the lower part of the Gulf. In the construction of their vessels they use no other wood than Indian teak, and, in respect to arms, those principally of Persian manufacture. They possess no articles of export, since their pearls are generally purchased by merchants on the spot, and the produce of their country is not even sufficient for their maintenance. Their only employment is fishing, diving for pearls, and importing

CHARACTER AND SUBDIVISION OF THE TRIBES.

materially their own condition, and, by an easily deduced corollary, the safety of the Gulf, might be affected by the failure of a single season. The attention with which this point has been considered by the Government, in framing its policy, marks the anxiety and care, attended with great expense, which have been devoted to the maintenance of perfect tranquillity and security on the pearl banks to the subjects of the several petty chieftains who, however inimically disposed, are bound there to forget their quarrels, or suffer them to rest in abeyance.

The manners and religion of the Arabs of the piratical coast, being those appertaining to the Soonee sect of Mahomedans, are already too well and generally known to call for any further description in this paper.

Of a character deceitful, vindictive, and treacherous, but brave and independent withal, they hold in utter contempt all other nations, professing whatever creed; the conviction of the irresistible power of the British Government, whose weight they have in two instances been collectively brought to feel, together with its subsequent occasional exercise or demonstration in individual cases, have alone reduced them to succumb to its will, and restrained them from acts of piracy. They do not at the present time hesitate to admit, that the restraints imposed upon them once withdrawn, their boats, now, in their own phraseology, ignobly employed as beasts of burthen, to carry about dates and merchandize, would again, as in former days, overrun this Gulf and the Indian Seas in search of booty.

The inhabitants are divided into a number of large tribes, acknowledging each its feudal superior, which are, again, sub-divided into branches or clans, composed of the relatives and dependents of some connexion of the general head, or of a powerful and wealthy individual.

The superior of the tribe collectively has the general control of all; possesses the right of claiming at his pleasure their military services; and appropriates the small taxes that are levied.

Dates, grain, and other necessities of life, which they purchase with the price of those pearls. Their dates are chiefly brought from Bahrein and Bussora, grain and cloth from Muskat and the Persian ports. They are very poor, and, perhaps, can never find much employment in commerce, unless in carrying for others, although it is said they at one time possessed a very extensive trade.” The same holds good for the tribes in general to the present day, except that their own boats are now engaged in the Indian trade.

Such was the original object of the Maritime Truce, guaranteed by Government, and entered into for the six months including the season of the pearl fishery.

At the request of some, and with the concurrence of all the Chiefs, its time was extended to eight and twelve months, and finally to ten years, during which all hostilities at sea are forbidden.

The Kazee, or Ecclesiastical Judge, constitutes the only tribunal, and decides upon all cases according to the Mahomedan law.

It is by no means uncommon for one of the branches of a tribe, to the number sometimes of several hundred individuals, in order to escape excessive taxation and oppression, or with a view to secure to themselves greater immunities and advantages, to secede from the authority and territory of their lawful and acknowledged chief into that of another,* or to establish themselves and build a fort on some other spot,† and assert and maintain independence; nor is it a matter of great moment that the chief they are about to join, or whose friendship and countenance they must in the first place command, is a rival at implacable feud with their own: the advantages attending any numerical increase of subjects ensure them welcome asylum and protection. It will not escape observation, that the facilities thus mutually offered to seceders on the one hand, and the loss of authority and revenue consequent on their secession on the other, act, *vice versa*, as a salutary check to the tyranny and oppression of the respective chiefs.

The Arabs of the coast are more or less connected with the Bedouin tribes of the interior, either by ties of relationship, or from consideration of mutual interests and defence.

Of so great importance is their alliance or forbearance considered by the maritime chieftains, that these, particularly Sultan bin Suggur, who is especially interested in maintaining a sort of balance of power, find it their best policy to conciliate them by repeated and considerable presents.

To go over from one chief to another, with whom they may be or have been at feud, and even to plunder the territories and subjects of their patron, should he not coincide in, and follow out their views of ambition, honour, or revenge, or withhold the usual payment of blackmail, are shown by the sketches of the Arab tribes to be of constant occurrence with these fickle allies.

Khaleefa bin Shakboot may be said to possess the greater influence inland, and to command the services of the greater number of Bedouin auxiliaries.

* The Boo Muhair, at Shargah, are an example of the former.

† The Boo Felasa, of Debayc, of the latter.

LOCALITIES OF THE TRIBES.

BAHREIN.*

Bahrein is situated in the centre of a deep triangular-shaped bight on the Arabian Coast, lying between Ras Reecan and Ras Timoor. The access, owing to the shoals in the neighbourhood (more particularly those known by the name of the Debil and Teignmouth), is not unattended with risk, although no material obstacles offer to vessels navigated with average skill and caution. When within these shoals, the harbour is good, and well sheltered. The island itself is about thirty miles in length, and from nine to six in breadth. It does not appear that grain is cultivated to any extent, but the place abounds with date groves, gardens, and fields of clover, which are unusually

* Genealogical Table of the Al Khaleefa Ruling Family of Bahrein.

ABDOULLA bin AHMED—Joint Rulers—SULIMAN bin AHMED (deceased 1825).	
Of one Mother..	Moobaruk; has two sons, (one son, Mahomed, killed early in the civil war).
	Nassir; has two sons. Hassan; one son. Khaleefa.
Of one Mother..	Ahmed; two sons. Ali; one son. Mahomed; one son. Rashid; and a boy, two or three years old; besides several others, deceased at various ages.
	Khaleefa succeeded to his father's share of authority, and died 21st May 1834; had issue.....
	Ahmed; deceased. Humood. Mahomed.
	Mahomed; now Chief of Bahrein; mother the sister of Moobaruk bin Khaleef. Dhyj; killed in the early part of the struggle for supremacy. Ali; mother the sister of Isai bin Tarif. Ibrahim.

productive, owing to the facility of irrigation afforded by the numerous springs of fresh water on the island.

As no duties or customs are levied upon the imports and exports of Bahrain, the revenue of the Shaikh is principally derived from the produce of the date plantations, nearly the whole of which have been seized from the original owners by the Uttoobees. The total sum realized from this source may amount to 100,000 crowns per annum; but as this is divided in different proportions among the numerous relatives and connexions of the Uttoobee Chief, it is impossible to say what portion reaches his own coffers. Shaikh Abdoolla, however, derives a small income from the pearl boats, each of which pays from five to ten crowns, according to its size, on its return from the bank.

The chief articles of export from Bahrain consist of pearls, dried dates, and bullion. Of the former, about 350,000 crowns' worth are annually collected by the vessels belonging to the place, and something more than that quantity is brought in from other parts of the Gulf for sale. The total value of the exports may amount to about eight lakhs of dollars annually. The imports are principally from India, and are composed of rice, cotton, cloths, calicoes, spices, &c. to the extent of perhaps 600,000 dollars each year. Of these articles one-fourth may be expended in Bahrain, the remainder being re-exported to the different parts of the Gulf. About thirteen years ago the Shaikh began to levy regular customs upon the commerce of Bahrain, but after a trial of seven years the attempt was abandoned as a failure.

The only towns of any size are Munama and Muharag, near the harbour, and two smaller ones, called Ruffa and Jour, situated at some distance inland. It is said that formerly Bahrain possessed upwards of 300 villages, but at present there are not above fifty hamlets, averaging about twenty houses each. No fixed taxes are taken from the inhabitants, but whenever the Shaikh requires money, he levies forced contributions, particularly on the Bahreinees (or aborigines of the island), who, being descendants of the old Persian settlers, and consequently Sheeas in their religious tenets, are greatly oppressed. This class, perhaps, consists of about fifteen thousand individuals, while the Arab inhabitants, calling themselves Uttoobees, may be reckoned at an equal number, although those really belonging to this tribe do not exceed a thousand.

The Uttoobee Chief can muster a greater number of vessels than any other power in the Gulf. He has twelve large Buggalows, which are never employed in trade, and in cases of emergency he prohibits the departure of the merchant Buggalows which traffic with India: these consist of twenty-five, some of them of the first class, and most of the others of a respectable size. In addition to the above, twelve Buteels

and Ghoonchas are engaged in the Indian trade. The boats employed in the pearl fishery may be reckoned at about eight hundred.

The climate of the island is bad, and the inhabitants suffer more than those of other places when any contagious disease appears in the Gulf. The ravages of the cholera when it breaks out are very much greater there than in any other towns on the Arabian or Persian Coasts. The Gulf fever is also prevalent at certain seasons, and strangers sleeping on shore are liable to suffer from its deadly effects. Upon the whole, with the exception of Muskat, Kishm, and Bassadore, Bahrain may be considered the most unhealthy place in this quarter of the globe.

The power of the Bahrain Chief has of late years been much weakened, by the contumacious conduct of his sons, and the divisions which have arisen among his other relations. Some of them, particularly the family of his nephew, Khaleefa, are supposed to be friendly disposed towards the Imaum. The secession of Esai bin Tarif, with 400 followers, has also been productive of injurious consequences to Shaikh Abdoolla, the more so as that person, who is a man of great courage and energy, has now closely connected himself with the Government of Muskat, and, through its influence, will probably aid materially in promoting the views of Korshid Pasha in Bahrain.

Observations.—Such was the description, and detail of resources, &c. of the island of Bahrain, as given by Captain Hennell in 1839. Since that period, owing to the increased dissensions, and subsequent hostilities between the members and relatives of the ruling family, the population, prosperity, and commerce of the island have gradually declined.

Numbers of the principal and most wealthy inhabitants, to avoid the effects of increased anarchy and confusion, fled, upon the commencement of actual hostilities, to Koweit on the Arabian, and Lingah and other places on the Persian Coast, where they have since temporarily located themselves, in order to watch the course of events, and return with the first signs of peace and established government, and consequent security to life and property. Although the *de facto* ruler, Mahomed bin Khaleefa, has met with no decided opposition to his authority since his ejection of the old chief, his grand uncle, from the island, in April 1843, through the assistance of the latter's aggrieved and justly disaffected subjects, Esai bin Tarif and Bushire bin Ramah, yet Abdoolla bin Ahmed, refusing all compromise or understanding which does not stipulate his re-establishment in his former position and authority, continues to reside at Nabend, on the Persian Coast, having at his disposal four or five moderate sized vessels; and his intrigues and overtures, having for their object to engage in his favour the assistance and countenance of the Wahabee ruler, Ameer Fysul,

together with his occasional capture of the Bahrein trading vessels, proving that he has not abandoned his hostile designs, are not calculated to give confidence to the refugees.

Six large Buggalows (not including those belonging to the authorities), thirty to forty of the size employed in the Gulf trade, and from five hundred to six hundred pearl boats, probably make up at the present time the shipping of this once extremely commercial and fertile island; which, according to a rough estimate formed by Major Wilson, then Resident, numbered, in 1829, twelve large vessels, the property of the Chief Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and the other Shaikhs, his relations, mounting in all about fifty guns; twenty-one large merchant vessels now in Bahrein; five hundred common fishing and cargo boats; and fifteen hundred pearl fishing-boats.

The bulk of the population of Bahrein, which is entirely distinct from the Uttoobees, who are Soonces, consists of the aboriginal inhabitants, professing for the most part the Sheea tenets of the Mahomedan faith. These are greatly oppressed, and held in a most degraded state of vassalage by their Uttoobee masters, of which some conception may be formed from a remark by the same authority (Major Wilson) in 1829, that "the enormities practised by the Uttoobees towards the original inhabitants of Bahrein far exceed what I have ever heard of tyranny in any part of the world."

It may not be out of place here to notice the positive assertion made by Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed to the Resident, on the latter's visiting Bahrein in June 1839, that "there are many parts between the islands and the main where neither Buggalows nor ships would be of any service in preventing a large fleet of boats from making its way across in the course of a few hours." He added, that "in the time of Shaikh Nasir, he had himself successfully attacked Bahrein in this manner, although his antagonist possessed a strong naval force, but which could not be made available."

This assertion, however, requires confirmation, as well from the lateness of the discovery of the important fact it disclosed, as from the circumstances arising out of his policy at the time, as connected with the Egyptian commander, Korshid Pasha, having rendered it the interest of the Uttoobee Chief to make it.

Esai bin Tarif and Bushire bin Ramah, after their successful attack upon Bahrein, removed with their dependents to Biddah, a dependency of that island, upon the Guttur Coast.

Esai and his tribe, numbering about a thousand men capable of bearing arms, possess three large Buggalows (one copper bottom), which trade to India; five Buteels, each from eighty to a hundred tons; eleven large Buteels and Buggalows; and about a hundred and thirty pearl boats.

STATISTICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

CONNECTED WITH THE

POSSESSIONS, REVENUES, FAMILIES, &c.

OF

HIS HIGHNESS THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT;

OF

THE RULER OF BAHREIN;

AND OF THE

CHIEFS OF THE MARITIME ARAB STATES IN THE
PERSIAN GULF.

BY

CAPTAIN A. B. KEMBALL,

RESIDENT AT DUSHIRE.

Submitted to Government on the 1st July 1854.

BAHREIN.

I.—Predominant tribe, a branch of the Uttoobees, originally from Koweit. Patronymic of the ruling family, Al Khaleefa.

Mahomed bin Khaleefa bin Sulman bin Ahmed bin Khaleefa, Chief of Bahrain; age forty-one years. This chief and his immediate relatives or clan are commonly designated Al Sulman, from their common grandfather, to distinguish them from the rival branch of the family, now called Al Abdoolla.

II.—Chief's sons :—Khaleefa bin Mahomed, age eighteen years; Abdoolla, age thirteen years; Ahmed, age eleven years.

III. (A.)—Ali bin Khaleefa, brother of Chief, age forty years : exercises a considerable share of the government of the island.

Sons of preceding :—Abdoolla bin Ali, age fourteen years; Ibrahim, age eleven years.

Rashid bin Khaleefa, uterine brother of chief, age forty-seven years : of inferior capacity and influence; holds a subordinate position.

Mahomed bin Sulman, uncle of chief, age forty-five years.

Humood bin Sulman, brother of preceding, age thirty-five years.

Influential and trusted Dependents of Chief. III. (B.)—Mubarak bin Khaleefa Al Fazil, age sixty-five years.

Humood bin Mahomed, age forty years.

Abdool Wahab bin Abdoolla Al Khaleefa, age fifty years; Khaleefa bin Mahomed bin Abdoolla, age forty-five years; Khaleefa bin Mahomed bin Ali, age fifty-five years; Ahmed, brother of preceding, age fifty years. These dependents reside in Guttur.

III. (C.)—Hassan bin Abdoolla bin Ahmed Al Khaleefa, son of the Rival Branch, Al Khaleefa Al Abdoolla. late ex-Chief of Bahrain, age forty-nine years; Rashid, brother of preceding, age twenty years; Humood, ditto, age sixteen years. These three individuals reside at Bahrain, subsisting upon a pittance allowed them by the *de facto* Chief.

Mahomed bin Abdoolla bin Ahmed Al Khaleefa, son of the late ex-chief, age thirty-seven years; eldest son Khaleefa, age sixteen years. Has two other sons, respectively twelve and eleven years of age.

Ahmed, brother of preceding, age thirty-eight years; eldest son, Sulman, age eighteen years.

Ali, ditto ditto, of inferior birth on mother's side, age fifty-three years; eldest son, Hussein, age fifteen years.

Sulman bin Ahmed bin Sulman, seceder from the party of the *de facto* chief; age thirty-five years.

Khaleefa bin Humeed bin Abdoolla bin Ahmed Al Khaleefa, age thirty-four years.

Esai, brother of preceding, age thirty-two years.

Ali bin Nassir bin Abdoolla bin Ahmed, grandson of ex-chief, age twenty-seven years.

Hussein, brother of preceding, age twenty-five years.

Mahomed bin Mubarak bin Abdoolla bin Ahmed, grandson of ex-chief, age sixteen years.

The above, with their followers, hold possession of Damaum, on the main land opposite to Bahrain, under the protection of the Wahabee ruler, Ameer Fysul, from whom they receive a sum of money annually for their maintenance.

During the past fifteen years, a severe contest has been sustained, with occasional intermissions, between these competitors for the chieftship of Bahrain, to the almost complete ruin of the trade, and prosperity of the island.

IV.—The Chief of Bahrain is independent, but pays Zukat, or Whether Tributary or religious tithe, to the Wahabee ruler, at the rate of 4,000 crowns per annum.

V.—One hundred thousand crowns, derived from the produce of the extensive landed property in the possession of the ruling family, and the taxes on land, and on boats engaged in the pearl fishery. No customs or duties on exports or imports are levied at Bahrain.

VI.—The territory of Bahrain consists of the two islands known by that name, and the line of coast extending from the bottom of the bight in which they are situated to Khor-al-Adeed, on the other side of the promontory of Ras Tanoorah.

VII.—The larger island, which is thirty miles long, and of an average width of six miles, is generally low, though at its centre a range of small hills may be distinguished. The soil is fertile, and plentifully watered by numerous springs, rising to the surface of the ground. The smaller island, with the exception of one or two date plantations, admits of no cultivation. The Coast of Guttur partakes of the general character of the eastern shores of Arabia, and is barren and unproductive.

VIII.—Although Bahrain, owing to constant internal dissensions, has of late years greatly fallen off in population, and the wealth of its inhabitants, it still maintains a thriving trade, of which the exports and imports may be roughly estimated each at five or six lakhs of crowns, and sends from 1,000 to 1,200 boats to the pearl fishery.

292

BAHREIN—MARITIME ARAB STATES.

IX.—Its harbour, though in some degree difficult of access, is good, and well sheltered, and will admit vessels drawing not more than sixteen or seventeen feet of water.

Climate.

X.—The climate is bad.

Prevalent Diseases.

XI.—Fevers prevail, and strangers sleeping on shore are liable to suffer from its deadly effects.

XII.—The heat in summer is excessive; no idea can be formed of the average range of the thermometer, or of the average fall of rain.

Average Range of Thermometer.

XIII.—Fifty thousand inhabitants on the island. No correct estimate can be formed, without further inquiry, of the population of the dependencies of Bahrain on the Guttur Coast.

Estimated Population.

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Lieutenant Thomas Tanner's
Memoir on Bahrain, 1817

BAHREIN ISLAND, situated at the entrance of Dooat Es Elva, was visited in October, 1817, by Lieut. T. Tanner of the Company's Bombay cruiser, *Psyche*, and the following directions for vessels proceeding to that Island, are transcribed from his interesting and valuable observations:*

Departing from Berdistan Bank with the Hummocks of Kenn N. E., and Barn Hill East, steer S. by W. $\frac{1}{2}$ W. by compass, which is thought to be the best course. Having approached the parallel of 27° N., keep a trusty person at the mast-head to look out for shoals or discoloured water, which from aloft can generally be seen at a considerable distance: here, also, the lead must be kept briskly going, for by steering the course mentioned above, you will get upon the PEART or BAHREIN BANK, in about lat. $26^{\circ} 50'$ N., suddenly shoaling from 30 and 25, to 14, 10, or probably to 8 fathoms water on a sandy bottom.

With a favourable wind or in the night, keep under reduced sail, to obtain true soundings, and be ready to anchor instantly if you get less water than was expected. The soundings, however, as you proceed to the southward, will be from 9 to 8 fathoms, with overfalls occasionally from $9\frac{1}{2}$ to 7 fathoms. Attention to the tides is necessary, which run strong on the springs, particularly as you approach the Islands, and they set about E. S. E. and W. N. W.

With an adverse wind, work between the meridians of $50^{\circ} 45'$ and $51^{\circ} 5'$ E., which space may be considered the *Fair-way*; for on either side of these limits there are dangers, the extent and true situation of which are unknown to European navigators.

In lat. $26^{\circ} 50'$ N. lon. $51^{\circ} 10'$ E. the Favorite sloop of war had 6 fathoms rocky bottom, which was thought to be on the edge of the Crescent Shoal: betwixt this, and the shoals to the Westward (on one of which the *Durable* was lost, shortly to be described), may be considered the Fair Channel, as mentioned above. In this Fair Channel there appears to be no danger until you approach the Islands; and when in lat. $26^{\circ} 30'$ N. or $26^{\circ} 28'$ N., you will see from the deck the trees on ARAD ISLAND, called *Bluff Point*, bearing to the S. Westward, and distant 3 or 4 leagues, in soundings from 8 to $5\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms. If bound to the N. W. anchorage, haul up a point to the Westward of Arad, but a point to the Southward of it if bound to the S. E. anchorage: you will then soon raise the Island of Bahrein, which is somewhat higher than Arad, and lies more to the West.

ARAD ISLAND, extends nearly North and South, being very low, surrounded by the JELLA SHOALS and other Reefs, which stretch out from it $4\frac{1}{2}$ or nearly 5 miles in some places, particularly in a N. W. direction from Bluff Point; for if this Point bear S. E. by S., and a Portuguese Fort (in ruins on the Western part of Bahrein) S. W. $\frac{1}{2}$ S., you will be in $2\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms on the Western edge of Arad Reef, with the Rocks visible under the vessel. To avoid these Reefs in proceeding to the N. W. anchorage, haul to the Westward towards the Teignmouth's Shoal, till Portuguese Fort bears S. S. W. $\frac{1}{2}$ W. or S. S. W., which seems to be a good *leading mark* to avoid the dangers on either side. Teignmouth's Shoal is an extensive reef to the N. W. of Arad Reef, and 3 leagues North of Bahrein, being the outermost of the shoals, and Bahrein Reef nearly joins to its S. Western extremity.

* Communicated to me by Lieut. James Robinson, of the Company's Bombay Marine, an officer who by perseverance, with very little assistance, and in a gun-boat only, has completed a laborious and correct survey of the greatest part of the coasts of Banea.

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The Arabian Coast Naval Survey,
1821-1828

MEMOIR

DESCRIPTIVE OF THE

NAVIGATION OF THE GULF OF PERSIA;

WITH BRIEF NOTICES

OF THE

MANNERS, CUSTOMS, RELIGION, COMMERCE, AND RESOURCES OF
THE PEOPLE INHABITING ITS SHORES AND ISLANDS.

PREPARED BY THE LATE

CAPTAIN GEORGE BARNES BRUCKS,

INDIAN NAVY.

NAVIGATION OF THE GULF OF PERSIA.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

In laying the following account of, and directions for, navigating the Gulf of Persia, before the Government, it is necessary for me to state that much of that part from Ras Musseldom to Gebil Ali, on the Coast of Arabia, has been compiled from my Private Journals, kept prior to my joining the survey, corroborated by such information as I have since been able to obtain, and from the surveys themselves.

Not having been present during the greater part of the period the above coast was examined, and my predecessor not having left me any information on the subject, I trust that should any errors be found, which I confidently hope, if they exist at all, do so only in a trifling degree, I shall stand acquitted of a want of care in drawing up this Memoir.

On the remaining part of the coast I have been constantly employed, and consequently can vouch for the accuracy of what is there remarked relative to navigation.

In regard to the population, religion, manners, customs, trade, and resources, it cannot be expected that a person situated as I am, having been at sea ever since I was eleven years of age, should be able to write these, either in an historical manner, or with that attention to grammatical rules which a person having had proper time to benefit by education would do: what I have done is to try and place the situation, numbers, and manners of the people I have visited, and who are little if at all known, in as clear a point of view as my information and abilities would permit.

My information has been obtained in the following manner: I have proposed to the chiefs certain questions relative to the tribes, and their localities, of the revenues, trade, &c., which I have noted, with their replies. This I have done to several other persons at different periods, and then taken such of the substance as appeared to agree the best; but it is impossible to trust to the native accounts in this part of the world, consequently it can at best be considered but an approximation to the truth.

Another difficulty I consider it necessary to notice is, my short stay at the several places; the different accounts, particularly as to the

NAVIGATION OF THE GULF OF PERSIA.

population, I have had to reconcile; also the disinclination in the more respectable classes of natives to give information on these subjects. I have endeavoured to render everything as plain as possible: in all places the native name is retained; and on the Persian side, of such objects as are known to, and have been named by European navigators, the native name is given in addition to the one by which it is generally known to the European.

It is also necessary to notice that the Bushire Residency is throughout considered as our first meridian, calling it in lat. $29^{\circ} 00' 15''$ N., and long. $50^{\circ} 51' 30''$ E. Except the survey of the first season, and part of the second, the variation of the compass has always been obtained on shore, and it may as well be here mentioned, that from observations obtained at different periods during the sixteen years I have been in the marine, and corroborated by those made by Lieutenant McClure and others, the variation in the Gulf is decreasing at the rate of about four miles and a half yearly.

All the latitudes and longitudes have been observed on shore with an artificial horizon, as the refraction in the Gulf has been found so great that observations made with the natural horizon seldom agree two days together.

The soundings have mostly, when near the shore, been carefully taken by the boats, always anchoring when any particular change occurred, and being fixed by angle taken between two well defined objects. All shoals have been fixed by a trigonometrical chain being carried round them. In all cases where the survey has been trigonometrical, which has been the case altogether, except from Bushire southward and westward, and here it has been partly so, care has been taken, by occasionally measuring bases of corroboration, and obtaining celestial observations, to verify the work.

I beg to state that the utmost care has been taken throughout the survey to prevent errors, but that some may occur I think more than probable, but trust they will be so trifling as to be of no importance to the navigation of the Gulf.

In regard to the statement that closes this Memoir, relative to the rise of piracy, its causes, and suppression, it is from the best information I could get, and might be considered a subject for another pen than that of a sailor in regard to that part relative to keeping it down. It is impartially drawn up, from an intimate knowledge of the people, and what from long experience I know to be both the least expensive and most efficient means. To Lieutenant Houghton, of the Honorable Company's Marine, and Lieutenant Haines, of the same service, I feel indebted for much useful information.

GEORGE B. BRUCKS.

NAVIGATION OF THE

BAHREIN.

The island of Bahrein or Awal, and adjacent islands, were known to the ancients by the name of Tylos, and are mentioned by Arrian. We have no satisfactory accounts of them from that period, until in the possession of the Portuguese, who, soon after Ormus was taken by Albuquerque, established settlements here and at Kateef, and monopolised a great portion of the pearl fishery and trade of the Gulf. They were expelled soon after the fall of Ormus, by the Persians, who were shortly after expelled by Houd bin Jamain, the Shaikh of Alassar's people, who possessed the island for several years, when it was again conquered, after a severe struggle, by the Persians, and the whole of the Alassar town laid in ruins. Reinforcements soon arriving, the Alassar people again made head, and drove the Persians out of the island, and rebuilt several towns on the ruins of the former ones, which are to be seen at the present time.

About seventy or eighty years back, the grandfather of the present Shaikh, who was of a powerful family, originally from Alassar, of the Utopbee Tribe, entered into a secret treaty with the then Governor of Bushire, stipulating to pay tribute to the Persian Government, if by

GULF OF PERSIA.

their aid he was placed in possession of the island. Having many followers, this overture was attended to, and, by the assistance of the Persians, he was made Shaikh or governor, and continued during his life in peaceable possession of the government. Soon after his death, some of the people belonging to his son and successor (Ahmed bin Khaleefa) were murdered by the Governor of Bushire, when the Bahrein people flew to arms, and threw off the Persian yoke. A large army was assembled by the Persians, consisting of the people of Bushire, Dillum, Bundereig, Congoon, and Lingah, from the Persian side, aided by the people of what have since become the Pirate Ports, and invaded the island.

The people of Bahrein were assisted by the people of Alassar and Kateef. After a war of several months, with various successes, and the loss of many men on both sides, they became tired of the war. Several of the allies on both sides having quitted them, they entered into a treaty, by which the Persian troops were withdrawn, and the Shaikh (Ahmed) consented to pay tribute to the Persians, which was continued until about 1790, when the Persian yoke was entirely thrown off, and they have been independent of Persia ever since.

Although frequently threatened with invasion, it has never taken place. They have had several wars with the Imaum of Muskat, who invaded the island about nine years back, but was beaten off with great loss, his brother being killed. Having been on friendly terms with the Joasmee pirates,—indeed having been the mart for the sale of their plunder,—they were included in Sir W. G. Keir's treaty in 1819. They about the same time entered into a treaty with the Imaum of Muskat, and pay him an annual tribute of 9,000 dollars. There have been several wars of late between them and Rahmah bin Jaubir, of Demaum, near Kateef, who belonged to the same family. These were at one time settled through the mediation of the British Government, but the turbulent disposition of Rahmah could not remain quiet, and they again broke out with fresh violence, which ended in the death of that chieftain.

The island of Bahrein or Awal is between eighty and ninety statute miles in circumference, and about one-fifth of it is well watered, thickly inhabited, and partially cultivated; the remainder is either hilly or a desert—nearly equally divided.

There are the remains of several fine reservoirs and aqueducts built by the Portuguese, but falling fast to decay; as is the Portuguese fort, which has originally been a strong place, and protecting the Portuguese harbour, not now in use, having given way to that of Munama, near it. The only other ruins of any interest are those of a mosque built by the Alassar people.

NAVIGATION OF THE

The population of the island varies, but, from the best information I could obtain, with that of Muharag and Arad Famohay, amounts to sixty thousand men, consisting of the following tribes: the Uttoobees of Bahrein, the Shaikh's family; the Abookara, Al Zayed, Al Salata, Al Mahande, Mootsallema, Kaiser, Genahat, and some mixed tribes, in all said to be eighteen or twenty thousand men capable of bearing arms; the remainder, about forty or forty-five thousand, Bahreinees, are a mixed breed between Arab and Persian, mostly cultivators, merchants, and fishermen, who appear to possess more of the indolence and cunning of the Persian than the frank and open boldness of the Arab. The Arabs look with much contempt upon this class.

There are also in the Shaikh's pay about three hundred Siddees, and about eight hundred of the Beni Khalid Tribe. There are also about one hundred Banians, merchants and shop-keepers, at Munama. The Mahomedan religion of the sect of Omar is that of the place, but a large portion of the Bahreinees are Shceas. The total number of men under the Shaikh's government, he possessing the several places on the coast already mentioned, amounts to about seventy thousand. The pearl fishery alone employs nearly thirty thousand men, there being under the Shaikh's government two thousand four hundred and thirty pearl boats, each employing from eight to twenty men. Bahrein is also a place of great trade, and has belonging to it twenty large boats, Buggalows and Buteels, from three hundred and fifty to one hundred and forty tons, mostly employed in the Indian trade; and about one hundred from forty to one hundred and twenty tons, employed in the trade of the Gulf. An account of the exports and imports will be found attached.

The Shaikh, Abdoolla bin Ahmed, resides at Muharag, on the island of that name, which is a large town, and contains about six thousand inhabitants.

The principal town on Bahrein is Munama, and is the port of the island, most of the merchants either residing, or having their karavan-seria there. Most of the imports are landed here, and a duty of five per cent. was in 1826 established on Indian produce, and most articles from the Persian Coast, Bussora, and Muskat.

The other principal town on the island is Raffar, situated on a hill seven miles distant, the residence of Shaikh Khaleefa, the nephew and partner in the government of Abdoolla bin Ahmed. It consists of a square fort or Ghuree, surrounded by habitations, chiefly occupied by his followers. Numerous other small towns and villages are scattered over the cultivated part of the island, but none of sufficient note to require remark. On the eastern side of the island are the ruins of a large town called Jow, formerly the residence of the Shaikhs, abandoned

GULF OF PERSIA.

in 1800 for want of a sheltered port, and the inhabitants transferred to Muharag.

Off the islands, and mostly on the reefs, are situated springs of fresh water rising out of the sea; some are in two, three, four, and I have heard five, fathoms water. They obtain the water by holding a Mussuk over the mouth of a jar fixed over the spring.

The pearl fishery generally commences about the beginning of June, and is carried on with the greatest activity until October. During the period of the fishing, frequently pearls to the amount of from sixteen to twenty lakhs of dollars are obtained, and are exported in the manner mentioned in the account of the trade of the island. The Shaikh receives a small tax from every boat employed, besides having a number employed on his own account during the pearl fishery. It is all hurry, and the pearl bank exhibits an interesting sight; several thousand boats being seen at the same time, some sailing about, others at anchor, but all briskly employed.

The people of the island are much divided: those who are termed Arabs, and are not engaged in trade, are attached to the Shaikh and his Government; the other part, consisting of all those engaged in mercantile pursuits, and by far the most wealthy, are much dissatisfied, and it was by no means uncommon during the survey of the island for the people, when they thought themselves safe from being overheard, asking whether the English were not going to take possession of the island, and appearing both incredulous and disappointed when replied to in the negative.

The Shaikh also suspects such to be our view, as he cannot conceive why we should be at the expense and trouble of making these surveys, if we had no ulterior view. Bahrein is capable, under good government, of being very valuable, as the whole trade of the Arabian side of the Gulf might be centred in the island, which in itself is capable of the greatest improvement, and might be made to produce large quantities of wheat and barley, which grow in some few places, where cultivated, to the greatest perfection.

The soil of about one-fourth of the island is very rich, and, in proper hands, would be much improved, as the greater part, with the exception of the date plantations, a few barley, wheat, and clover fields, lies entirely waste. Much more of the island might be brought into cultivation by conveying the water by an aqueduct to those parts of the island now without it, and the springs at the reservoirs are fully equal to the supply. With the exception of the hills, and some small portions bordering on the sea, I do not think there is a part but what is capable of cultivation; but this is not ever likely to take place while the island remains under the present Government, as for want of encouragement

NAVIGATION OF THE

the people entirely neglect it. The island also produces citrons, pomegranates, mulberries, dates, figs, melons, and other fruits; also several kinds of vegetables. Cattle and poultry are also procurable, but rather dear, being brought from other places. The cloth bazar is pretty well supplied.

The islands of Muharag, Arad, and Samahoy are twelve miles round, and only separated at very high spring tides. They have a few date plantations on them, and about seven thousand five hundred inhabitants. There is very little water on them, most of that used being brought from Bahrein. There are two forts or Ghurees, one at Muharag, the other at Arad. Munama town is in lat. 26° 13' 50" N., long. 50° 36' 50" E.

The Shaikh has five war Buggalows, but can fit out fifteen or twenty. One of these is of about four hundred tons, and mounts twenty-two guns. The fortifications are a Ghuree at Muharag, on a sandy point, containing six or eight guns, and commanding the channel; two others, one at Arad and another at Samahoy, and a ruinous wall round the town. On Bahrein are Raffar, seven miles from Munama, and about fifty other Ghurees, with a number of towers in different parts; but their best defences are those supplied by nature in the reefs that surround the islands, as five hundred determined men might oppose the landing of as many thousands.

TRADE OF BAHREIN.

The following is an account of the exports and imports of Bahrein, in the year 1824, as stated by the Company's Broker and the Shaikh's Vizier:—

EXPORTS.		IMPORTS.	
	German Crowns.		German Crowns.
Pearls to India.....	1,200,000	Rice from Mangalore, 60,000	
Ditto to Arabia, Turkey, and Bussora	300,000	Morahs	65,000
Ditto to Persia	100,000	Rice from Bengal, 8,000 bags.	24,000
Various Articles, to India, Sind, &c.		Sugar, 600 bags	12,000
Dry dates	15,000	Sugarcandy, 500 tubs	5,000
Tortoise-shell	3,500	Pepper, 400 morahs.....	10,000
Bahrein canvas	3,000	Solder or block tin	2,000
Shark-fins	2,000	Iron, 5,000 bars	10,000
To Persia.		Lead, 2,000 pigs	2,400
Bahrein canvas	3,000	Steel, 100 tubs	1,000
Mats	1,200	Plank, and ship timber	17,000
		Coir	5,000

GULF OF PERSIA.

Exports (contd.).		Imports (contd.).	
	German Crowns.		German Crowns.
Date syrup	2,000	Cloth, blue and white, common and dungarees, 600 bales.....	100,000
Dry dates	1,200	Cinnamon	600
To Bussora.		Other spices	4,000
Bahrein canvas	5,000	Musk	2,000
Mats	1,200	Indigo	5,000
Coarse coloured cloth....	1,000	Turmeric, 400 bags	4,500
To Al Quaat or Grane.		Camphor	4,000
Bahrein canvas	5,000	Sandalwood	2,000
Mats	800	Drugs of various descriptions.	5,000
To various places.		Tamarinds	2,000
Sundries to the amount of	5,000	Sundries	1,800
Total..	1,651,900	Total from India..	284,300
		From the Red Sea and Muskat.	
		Coffee, 1,520 guntras	93,000
		From Muskat and the Persian Coast.	
		Dry fruit, grain, and India produce*	200,000
		From Bussora.	
		Dates, grain,* &c.	200,000
		From various places.	
		Sundries	30,000
		Total..	807,300

SHOALS FORMING THE HARBOUR OF BAHREIN.

JILLIA SHOAL.

Jillia Shoal, or Arad Reef, surrounds the islands of Samahoy, Arad, and Muharag, and forms the southern side of the entrance to the north-west harbour of Bahrein, and the northern to the south-eastern harbour. It is nearly dry in most parts at low-water. The north-western point is in lat. 26° 18' 40" N., long. 50° 37' 10" E.; the north-eastern in lat. 26° 18' 20" N., long. 50° 41' 50" E.; and the south-eastern in lat. 26° 10' N., long. 50° 44' 10" E. The tide at times sets strong towards this reef.

* A great portion of these articles was again exported to India, Muskat, and other parts; but they are not mentioned in the exports, which are confined to the produce of the island and fishery.

NAVIGATION OF THE

BLUFF GROVE.

A bluff grove of trees on Samahoy, generally called Arad Bluff, is a grove of date trees on the island of Samahoy, forming a bluff near the point. A small building stands on a mound near it. It is in lat. $26^{\circ} 16' 50''$ N., long. $50^{\circ} 39' 52''$ E.

FASHT AL YARRON.

Fasht al Yarron, or Teigmouth Shoal. This is one of the most extensive shoals in the Gulf, extending nearly nineteen miles in a northerly and southerly direction, and thirteen miles wide in an easterly and westerly. It forms the northern boundary of the north-west port of Bahrein, and is nearly dry in most parts. The soundings within half a mile of it are from three to four fathoms, and it is very dangerous, being composed of hard rock and sand. To pass clear of the eastern end, when bound to Bahrein, keep Arad Bluff S. by W. until you get mid-channel between the Al Yarron and Jillia Shoals. The several parts of this shoal are in the following positions, viz. north point lat. $26^{\circ} 32' 50''$ N., long. $50^{\circ} 30' 38''$ E.; east point, lat. $26^{\circ} 29' 10''$ N., long. $50^{\circ} 39' 10''$ E.; west point, lat. $26^{\circ} 27' 20''$ N., long. $50^{\circ} 24' 20''$ E.; south-eastern point, lat. $26^{\circ} 22' 20''$ N., long. $50^{\circ} 23' 50''$ E.; south-western point, lat. $26^{\circ} 15' 25''$ N., long. $50^{\circ} 38' 10''$ E.

GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR ENTERING THE NORTH-WESTERN PORT OF BAHREIN.

After crossing the pearl bank (which do in the meridian of $50^{\circ} 50'$ E.), and sighting Arad Bluff, steer for it, keeping it S. by W. or S. by W. $\frac{1}{4}$ W. by compass, until you get to the southward of the Al Yarron or Teigmouth Shoal, or, if the Portuguese fort on Bahrein is visible, which it will be in moderately clear weather, bring it to bear SW. by S., when haul up about W. by N., or WNW., so as to keep the Al Yarron Shoal nearest to you, if the wind is fair, until the fort bears SSW. $\frac{1}{4}$ W., or SSW. $\frac{1}{4}$ W., being guided by your approach to the reefs; then steer right for it, until Arad Bluff bears SE. by E., when, if going into the inner harbour, keep it one point open on your starboard bow, until you near the inner harbour reef, which round. Your lead, and a good look-out, as the reef shows plain, must be your guides, taking care not to come under three and a half fathoms towards the inner harbour reef, which round pretty close, and anchor within it in three and a half or four fathoms, clay bottom.

The reefs generally show themselves very plainly, except when calm near high-water. I would always recommend ships entering the inner harbour at half ebb, or last quarter ebb, as all the dangers are

GULF OF PERSIA.

then distinctly seen, but a stranger should not go in here without a pilot. To work in between the Al Yarron and Jillia Shoals, you should not approach the former nearer than three and a half fathoms, and the latter than three fathoms. After passing the north-western point of the Jillia Shoal you may work into three fathoms, until you get Arad Bluff E. $\frac{1}{4}$ S., when four fathoms to the westward and three to the eastward, until you approach the inner harbour reef.

The western part of the north-western port of Bahrein is bounded by the Al Yarron and a reef running off from Bahrein. There is a narrow channel between them, having only two fathoms in some parts.

The south-eastern port of Bahrein is only used by boats, one part of the entrance being extremely narrow, and the navigation being intricate; a pilot should be taken for this port, as clear directions cannot be possibly given.

1.04

Surveyors and travellers, 1932-1837:
Wyburd and Wellsted

3085

No 179 A Journal

On the 3^d of September 1835, I left Bushire for Bussora in the William the 1st intending to proceed by the Route of Zohair into Nedjed. We stopped at Kharak to take in a Beld for the River, where we had an opportunity of visiting Sheikh Nafier the son of the Cidnamah Governor of Bushire (who had lately been murdered) it is supposed, at the instigation of one of the lieutenants of the Prince of Fars, he had anchored his small fleet at Kharak, preparatory to his intended descent on Bushire, of the success of which he seemed to entertain little doubt, as he had been promised assistance by the Chiefs of the Lommanee Ports, to whom the plunder of Bushire has long been an object of desire.

From Kharak we were 17 days in reaching Bussora, during which time, I had numerous opportunities

of remarking the incapacity of the Pilot we had taken on board at Kharrak; he grounded us on every bank in the River. On our way up we passed the Buzsara fleet, which was blockading the mouth of Masfar. Hostilities at that time existing between that place and Chah, a greater Barlesque in a Navy I never beheld, three of the Ketches forming it, were matted from the stern to the fore beam with Breech and Cannon presenting the very fair simile of what seamen term a Fore Castle.

At Buzsara I observed the Chefas and Aghal of the Desert Arabs.

Kinding

Note. The Chefas is a red and yellow striped handkerchief worn as a head cloth; this was imposed on the Arabs by Shapur Zadeh as a badge of submission and has ever since continued in vogue with them.

The Aghal is a bundle of hair filled bound round the crown of the head and resembles the Bedouin Arab.

Kinding is impossible ^{30.5} to procure guides or companions to accompany me by the desert of Amaseer into Nadjd I came to the determination of proceeding by sea to either Bahrein or Keliff. I therefore left Buzsara for Mohanna from whence I had received intelligence of a Bugla being on the point of leaving for Bahrein on our arrival at Mohon I found the Kahloda intended leaving that evening I therefore engaged a passage in her representing myself as a Native of Sagar. From this I shall give a daily Journal of my progress October 13. 1832. On the evening of this day we dropped down the river to Moavia a small village and fort situated fourteen miles from the entrance of the Shahrul Arab, We were here joined by five Arabs of the Shafesa tribe who had

had been into Chank for the purpose of purchasing wood. I soon formed an acquaintance with them, and found them very entertaining and very droll, they gave me glowing descriptions of the beauty of their women and the nature and cost of their clothes. They seemed surprised at my ignorance of the prices of wood and dates and showed me some specimens of the former, recommending me to buy in a stock which they told me I should sell to other stages in Mithla.

I excused myself under the plea of having no funds, telling them that I had been home a soldier and had nothing intended staying on.

14 October I went one shore that morning at Manir. This village consists of 70 houses protected by a Mude Fort, it lays on the S.W. side of Shalabi Creek, and is under the jurisdiction of the Chahese, it is said anterior to the

Plague.

Plague to have supplied the ³⁰⁷runner with 10,000 Bags of dates. The whole of its present population consists of a decrepid old man and his two sons and the date plantations have been partially destroyed by the Musaid Bedouins. I entered several of the deserted habitations and found human skeletons in many.

15 October. Contrary winds prevailing and seeing no preparations for moving on the part of the Boat men I persuaded the Bedouins under the pretext of shooting to accompany me into the desert, intending to visit the Pula Gofas or Carab Cuh by the Alexander the Great from the vicinity of Mithla, to Koor Abdulla. We fell in with it about seven miles from the Banks of the River, it is about 150 yards wide and the banks in many places appear to have been supported by masonry, though partially filled with the sand of the desert, sufficient however to show

show the magnitudes of the undertaking.
We passed some tents of the Binu
Khaleel and stopped for the night at an
encampment of the Badami (Bedouins
where we were treated with Camels flesh, boiled)
meat and butter, milk.

October 16th 1833. We returned to the
Raghlah; we were detained at Mānān
until the 25th by S. C. Gules.

On rising this
morning I was agreeably surprised by
finding the Arabs in the act of weighing
their anchors the wind having
changed during the night to
North-West. We stood out of the river
and anchored in the evening, under
the lee of an extensive sand-
bank 20 miles from the mouth of the river.
I had given the Bedami a Sheep I had
purchased which they finished in the course of
the day including the entrails which
they eat uncooked.

October

309
181

October 27th
28th

Weighed in the morning
and nearly ran on shore on a Coral
Reef through the stupidity of the
Nakhoda, but were saved as the Arabs
told me by the mercy of God, and
the assistance of the Prophet. We
came to in the evening at Moshah

It blowing rather freshly,
the Arabs unwilling to tempt Providence
after their escape of yesterday, were
determined not to weigh till after
the North West had subsided; we
were here joined by five boats
from Hawat, or Gham, from one of
these (Wafel) a young Arab of the
name of Thowair took his passage
with us, he described himself as
an Arab of the Monasser tribe,
attached to Torka Ben Sahoud, he
seemed anxious to insinuate himself
into my confidence, but thinking
his designs sinister, I avoided him
as much as possible, his manners
however, were so plausible, that
I could hardly avoid being pleased
with

with him.

29th October. Weathered with a light Northwesterly breeze, in the afternoon it became cloudy, and blew at intervals in strong gusts, from all quarters of the compass, the Arabs frightened held a consultation, in which the majority were for putting back to Masrah, while the rest were for turning their head to seaward, to avoid the Coral Reefs which abound between Masrah and Elkatiff; the affair was settled by the elements throwing us on shore on a Coral Bank*, fortunately there was little sea, and we floated off with the night flood, the bottom was so much damaged, that we with difficulty made Katiff where they hauled her up on the beach.

30th October. Finding the repairs required by the Boat would occupy more time than I chose to waste, I determined on proceeding by land to Ajer, and persuaded the

* Note. This ridge was between Basa and Ras Gumar.

31st
1836

the Bedouins to accompany me, we hired camels at Katiff, and set out in the morning, we stopped at about 7 in the evening at a Well of brackish water, the country through which we had passed during the day was generally a desolate desert, excepting in the immediate vicinity of Elkatiff which abounded in Gardens and Springs.

31st October. Reached Ajer about noon, the country with little variation the same as yesterday. We here found a Boat on the point of sailing to Bahran. Having changed all my money into Gold at Busra I thought it advisable to go to Bahran, thinking it unsafe to change it in the interior, I therefore took leave of my friendly Bedouins (who left for their Native Village of Gishah), and embarked in her. Thence the Arab who joined us at Masrah did the same, and seemed to be determined to attach himself to

to me, which though unwilling I could hardly avoid.

1st November. We Anchored in the 1832. — afternoon in Bahrein Roads, and I asked the port of Gunmar to an old Six Pounder, which thanks to the badness of the Powder did not burst. Showance and myself went on shore in the evening, and took up our quarters for the night in one of the Mosques.

2nd November. Having changed as 1832. — many Pistols or Sections (into Dollars) as I thought would be sufficient to carry me across the Peninsula, I consented to accompany Showance to Rifa, he pretending to have business with Ethaleefa Ben Sulman the Sheikh of Bahrein. We rode out on hired Ajees, and on our arrival took up our residence in a good house, a breakfast was sent us by the Sheikh consisting of half ripe Dates, bread and

Butter.

3rd Nov. 1832. The Sheikh himself made his appearance in the afternoon, and I then became acquainted with who Showance really was, it appears that on a vague report of the generosity of Ethaleefa Ben Sulman, he had left his title (the Omtefika) under the expectation of receiving a present. At our interview with the Sheikh he represented himself as a relation of Aisan Ben Humood (the present Chief of the Omtefika) who had been obliged to leave in consequence of the feud which exists between Tanas the son of Ajeel and the Chief. The reception Showance met with from the Sheikh was not one at all calculated to inspire a hope of his expectations being fulfilled; he "however continued sanguine". After staying at Rifa until the 10th, during which time we were treated with every hospitality and attention. I left for Chanama Showance still pertinaciously adhering to

to his detestation of extracting
 anything from the generosity of the
 Chiefs while at Rifa. I had an
 opportunity of remarking the animosity
 which exists between the Bahrain
 Chiefs and the Imam of Muscat.
 An itinerant minstrel arrived
 with a budget of scurrilous verses
 lampooning the above personages
 this gave great delight to the
 Sheikh and his followers, and
 the Poet reaped a golden harvest.
 7th November. I was joined to day

by Shawaneh who cursed the want of
 liberality evinced by the Sheikh in
 not having given him any thing,
 and swore that their men could
 "neither give nor their women refuse".
 I laughed at him, and asked
 what grounds he had for
 expecting a reward from a man
 he had never before seen, and
 to whom he had never rendered
 the slightest service, he replied
 that the mere fact of his
 being a stranger and a
 follower

315
 1037
 follower of a Chieftain like Eason
 Bin Ghamad was quite a sufficient
 title to reward, and that a
 Northern Chief would be ashamed
 to allow a stranger Beduin an
 opportunity of scandalizing his name
 before assembled tribes. I took
 leave of Shawaneh this evening
 (intending to leave for Ajor in
 the morning, he returning to his
 tribe), and made him a present
 of a Persian Sabre, for the
 amusement he had afforded me.
 8th November. I left Bahrain for
 Ajor this morning, we had
 scarcely rounded the North West
 end of the Island when the
 Wind veered to the Southward,
 and we were obliged to take
 shelter in the Port of Agaria,
 a small Village on the South
 West side of the Island of
 Bahrain about 12 miles from
 Ammanah

9th, 10th Nov. Still detained, the
 Arabs

Arabs never thinking of starting,
but with a fair wind
11th November. The wind blowing
from the Northward we weighed
and stood for Ajser which bears
South West about 32 miles from
Agaria. At four in the afternoon
we anchored in Ajser Sound.

The Island of Bahrain ³³⁵ ¹⁸⁰⁷

This Island is about 28 miles
in length, from the Paragessa for to
S. A. the Rasid Bin, by 9 in breadth: it
originally belonged to the Persians
and was taken from them by the
Utterah Arabs, who landed from
the opposite Coast of Galues.

The part of the Island (on which
the tower of Manama stands, would)
but for a narrow isthmus which
connects it with Bufar form a separate
Island, abounds in springs and date
plantations and may on the whole be
considered fertile, although the extent
of its fertility does not admit a
sufficient quantity of grain being raised
adequate to the consumption of its
inhabitants. The larger portion of the
Island (on which is situated Bufar)
the Residence of the Khaleefa Bent.
Sulman, is sterile and desert, and the

the Soil which lays higher than that in the vicinity of Manama, is stony, and often running into low hills of the primitive formations abounding in the Ghazelle or hill country.

The Islands of Bahrain contains several towns and villages the principal of which is Manama, a place of considerable size and population, though the frequent visits of the Cholera Morbus, within the last five or six years has tended greatly to decrease the latter, its commerce is notwithstanding in a flourishing condition and the Bazaar is well supplied with the commodities of India and Persia, I was informed that 36 Vessels out of Manama visited India annually, 20 of which were Duglaks of from 100 to 280 Tons burthen.

The principal source to which the

the Arabs attribute the flourishing state of ¹⁸³⁷ of Bahrain is the production of the annual Pearl fishery which is said to yield 500,000 Dollars; the pearls are principally purchased by the Hindus and Bagdad Merchants and according to their shape size, etc. are either sent to India or Asia Minor; The ratio of increase in the price of these ornaments is increased commencing from the small Pearl & rising to that weighing a drachm and a half, which is the highest weight that pearls have been known to attain; in a conversation with some of the Divers they told me that the average gain in a prosperous season was about 20 Tomans each Diver.

Moharrag, a small Island and town contiguous to Manama the town nearly equals Manama in size, but does not possess its commercial advantages as the northern extremity of this Island is situated Arab

Arab, a large Village surrounded
by date plantations. It is the
seat of the family of Abdullah (Ben Ahmed)
Cousin to Khalifa (Ben Sultan)
the Chief of Bahrain.

The jealousy with which
the Bahraini Sheikhs view the
Invasion of Muscat since his alliance by
marriage with the Court of Oman has
induced them to enter into a treaty with the head
of the Wahabi confederacy to whom they pay
an annual tribute of 20,000 Rials.

The Majority of the landholders
in Bahrain are Persian extraction and of the
Shahi persuasion but are held in great
surveillance by the Mutehars who are Urofi
Saracens.

The general residence of the
Sheikhs of Bahrain is at Riffa and the administration
of justice is left in the hands of Negro Slaves which
is of course at a low ebb.

(True Extract)

Signed H. Norris
Chief Secretary

Transcription of previous document

JOURNAL

On the 3rd of September 1832, I left Bushire for Bussora (Basrah) in the
William the 4th intending to proceed by the Route of Zobeir into Nedjd.
We stopped at Kharak to take in a pilot for the River, where we had an
opportunity of visiting Sheik Nasser the Son of the Cidevant Governor of
Bushire (who had lately been murdered 'it is supposed at the instigation of
one of the Wives of the Prince of Fars'); he had anchored his small fleet
at Kharak preparatory to his intended descent on Bushire, of the success of
which he seemed to entertain little doubt as he had been promised assistance
by the Chiefs of the Jowamee Ports, to whom the plunder of Bushire had long
been an object of desire.

From Kharak we were 17 days in reaching Bussora, during which time, I had
numerous opportunities of remarking the incapacity of the Pilot we had taken
on board at Kharak; he grounded us on every bank in the River. On our way
up we passed the Bussora fleet, which was Blockading the mouth of Uafar,
hostilities at that time existing between that place and Chaub, a greater
burlesque on a Navy I never beheld, three of the Ketches forming it were
walled from the Stern to the fore beam with brick and Chunan presenting the
very facsimile of what Seamen term a Fore Castle.

At Bussora I assumed the Chefia* and A'gual of the desert Arabs.

Finding it impossible to procure guides or companions to accompany me by
the desert of Omaseer into Nedjd, I came to the determination of proceeding
by Sea either to Bahrein or Katiff. I therefore left Bussora for Mohamra
from whence I had received intelligence of a Bugla being on the point of
leaving that Evening. I therefore engaged a passage in her, representing
myself as a Native of S(h)arjar. From this I shall give daily Journal of
my progress.

13th October 1832. On the evening of this day we dropped down the river to
Moanir (Ma'amir) a small village and fort situated fourteen miles from the
entrance of the Shatool Arab. We were here joined by five Arabs of the
Dhafafed tribe who had been into Chaub for the purpose of purchasing Wool.
I soon formed an acquaintance with them, and found them very entertaining
and very dirty. The(y) gave me glowing descriptions of the beauty of their
women and the valour and extent of their tribe; they seemed surprised at
my ignorance of the prices of Wool and dates and thieved me some specimens
of the former, recommending me to lay in a stock which they told me I should
sell to advantage in Niddj. I excused myself under the plea of having no
funds, telling them that I had been born a soldier, bred a soldier and God
willing intended dying one.

14th October 1832. I went on shore this morning at Moanir. This village
consists of 70 houses protected by a mud fort, it lays on the S.W. side of
Shatool Arab and is under the jurisdiction of the Chaubese; it is said
anterior to the Plague to have supplied the revenue with 10,000 Bags of
dates. The whole of its present population consists of a decrepid old man
and his two sons and the date plantations have been partially destroyed by
the Nasara Bedouins. I entered several of the deserted habitations and
found human skeletons in many.

*The chefia (sic) is a red and yellow striped handkerchief worn as a head-
dress; this was imposed on the Arabs by Shapoor Zoolakaf as a badge of
submission and has ever since continued in vogue with them.

The agual is a camel's hair fillet bound round the crown of the head and
marks the Bedouin Arab.

15th October 1832. Contrary winds prevailing and seeing no preparations for moving on the part of the Boat Men I persuaded the Bedouins (under the pretext of shooting) to accompany me into the desert, intending to visit the Pala Copas or Canal Cut by Alexander the Great from the vicinity of Hillah to Koor Abdulla - We fell in it with it about seven miles from the Banks of the River; it is about 150 yards wide and the banks in many places appear to have been supported by masonry though partially filled with the sand of the desert; sufficient remained to shew the magnitude of the undertaking - We passed some tents of the Benu Khaled, and stopped for the night at an encampment of the Nasara Bedouins where we were treated with camel's flesh, boiled rice and butter milk.

16th October 1832. We returned to the Beeglah. We were detained at Moanir until the 25th by S.E. Gales.

26th October 1832. On rising this morning I was agreeably surprised by finding the Arabs in the act of weighing their anchor the wind having changed during the night to North West. We stood out of the river and anchored in the Evening under the lee of Arar, an extensive sand bank 20 miles from the mouth of the river. I had given the Bedouins a Sheep I had purchased which they finished in the course of the day including the entrails which they eat unwashed.

27th October 1832. Weighed in the morning and nearly ran on shore on a Coral Reef through the stupidity of the Nakhoda but were saved as the Arabs told me by the mercy of God, and the assistance of the Prophet. We came to in the evening at Moshaub (Ras al-Mish'ab).

28th October 1832. It blowing rather freshly the Arabs unwilling to tempt Providence after their escape of yesterday, were determined not to weigh till after the North West had subsided; we were here joined by five boats from Kowait or Grain. From one of these vessels a young Arab of the name of Thowannee took his passage with us; he described himself as an Arab of the Monaseer tribe, attached to Torkee Ben Sahoud. He seemed anxious to insinuate himself into my confidence, but thinking his designs sinister, I avoided him as much as possible; his manners however, were so plausible, that I could hardly avoid being pleased with him.

29th October 1832. Weighed with a light northerly breeze. In the afternoon it became cloudy, and blew at intervals in strong gusts, from all quarters of the compass. The Arabs frightened held a Consultation, in which the majority were for putting back to Moshaub, while the rest were for turning their heads to seaward, to avoid the Coral Reefs which abound between Moshaub and Elkattiff; the affair was settled by the elements throwing us on shore on a Coral Bank. Fortunately there was little Sea, and we floated off with the night flood; the bottom was so much damaged that we with difficulty made Katiff where they hauled her up on the beach.

30th October 1832. Finding the repairs required by the Boat would occupy more time than I chose to waste, I determined on proceeding by land to Ajeer ('Uqayr) and persuaded the Bedouins to accompany me, we hired camels at Katiff, and set out in the morning. We stopped at about 7 in the evening at a well of brackish water, the country through which we had passed during the day was generally a sandy desert, excepting in the immediate vicinity of Elkattiff which abounds in gardens and springs.

*This ridge was between Boo Allee (Abu Ali) and Ras Sanura (Ras Tannurah).

31st October 1832. Reached Ajeer about noon, the country with little variation the same as yesterday. We here found a Boat on the point of sailing to Bohrean (Bahrayn). Having changed all my money into Gold at Bussors. I thought it advisable to go to Bohrean, thinking it unsafe to change it in the interior. I therefore took leave of my friendly Bedouins (who left for their native village of Gisheh (Jishshah)) and embarked in her; Thowannee the Arab who joined us at Moshaub did the same and seemed to be determined to attach himself to me, which, though unwilling I could hardly avoid.

1st November 1832. We anchored in the afternoon in Bahrean Roads, and I acted the part of Gunner to an old six pounder, which thanks to the badness of the powder did not burst. Thowannee and myself went on shore in the Evening, and took up our quarters for the night in one of the Mosques.

2nd November 1832. Having changed as many Venetians or Sctrins (into dollars) as I thought would be sufficient to carry me across the Peninsula, I consented to accompany Thowannee to Rufa (Rifa'), he pretending to have business with Khaleefa Ben Sulmaun the Sheik of Bohrean. We rode out on hired asses, and on our arrival in Moodheef or Guest House, a breakfast was sent us by the Sheik consisting of half ripe dates, bread and butter milk. The Sheik himself made his appearance in the afternoon and I then became acquainted with who Thowannee really was; it appears that (5th November) on a vague report of the generosity of Khaleefa Ben Sulamaun, he had left his tribe (the Montefeik) under the expectation of receiving a present. At our interview with the Sheik he represented himself as a relation of Aisan Ben Mumood (the present Chief of the Montefeik) who had been obliged to leave in consequence of the feud which exists between Farras the Son of Ajeel and that chief. The reception Thowannee met with from the Sheik was not one at all calculated to inspire a hope of his expectations being fulfilled, he 'however continued sanguine' - After staying at Rufa until the 6th during which time we were treated with every hospitality and attention I left for Manama, Thowannee still pertinacious by adhering to his determination of extracting something from the generosity of the Chief. While at Rufa I had an opportunity of remarking the enmity which exists between the Bohrean Chiefs and the Imaum of Muscat - An itinerant Minstrel arrived with a budget of scurrilous verses lampooning the above personages these gave great delight to the Sheik and his followers and the poet reaped a golden harvest.

7th November 1832. I was joined today by Thowannee who cursed the want of liberality evinced by the Sheik in not having given him anything, and swore 'that their men could neither give nor their women refuse.' I laughed at him, and asked what grounds he had for expecting a reward from a man he had never before seen, and to whom he had never rendered the slightest service. He replied that the mere fact of his being a stranger and a follower of a Chieftan like Easen Ben Ghumood (sic) was quite sufficient title to reward, and that a Northern Chieftan would be ashamed to allow a stranger Bedouin an opportunity of scandalizing his name before assembled tribes. I took leave of Thowannee this evening (intending to leave for Ajeer in the morning, he returning to his tribe) and made him a present of a Persian Sabre for the amusement he had afforded me.

8th November 1832. I left Bahrean for Ajeer this morning, we had scarcely rounded the North West end of the Island when the wind veered to the Southward, and we were obliged to take shelter in the port of Agaria (Aquariyyah), a small village on the South West side of the Island of Bahrean about 12 miles from Manama.

9th and 10th November 1832. Still detained, the Arabs never thinking of starting but with a fair wind.

11th November 1832. The Wind blowing from the Northward we weighed and stood for Ajeer which bears South West about 32 miles from Agaria - At four in the afternoon we anchored in Ajeer Sound.

The Island of Bahrein

This Island is about 28 miles in length (from the Portegese for (t) to the Rasel Bun (Ras al-Barr) by 9 in breadth. It originally belonged to the Persians and was taken from them by the Uteabee Arabs, who landed from the opposite coast of Guterar.

The part of the Island (on which the tower of Manama stands, would but for a narrow Isthmus which connects it with Rufar, form a separate Island) abounds in springs and date plantations and may on the whole be considered fertile, although the extent of its fertility does not direct a sufficient quantity of grain being raised adequate to the consumption of its inhabitants. The larger portion of the Island (on which is situated Rufa the resident of the Khaleefa Ben Sulmaun) is sterile and desert, and the soil which lays higher than that in the vicinity of Manama is stoney, and often running into low hills of the primitive formation abounding in the Ghazelle or hill antelope.

The Island of Bahrein contains several towns and villages the principal of which is Manama a place of considerable size, and population, though the frequent visits of the Cholera Morbus within the last 5 or 6 years has tended greatly to decrease the latter. Its commerce is notwithstanding in a flourishing condition and its Bazars are well supplied with the commodities of India and Persia. I was informed that 36 vessels out of Manama visited India annually, 20 of which were Bughlars of from 100 to 200 Tons burthen.

The principal source to which the Arabs attribute the flourishing state of Bahrein is the productiveness of the Annual Pearl Fishery which is said to yield 300,000 Dollars; the pearls are principally purchased by the Hindoo and Bagdad Merchants and according to their shape, size and color are either sent to India or Asia Minor. The ratio of increase in the prices of these ornaments is immense commencing from the Seed Pearl and rising to that weighing a drachm and a half, which is the highest weight that pearls have been known to attain; in a conversation with some of the Divers they told me that the average gain in a prosperous season was about 20 Tomauns each Diver.

Moharrag, a small Island and town contiguous to Manama in size, but does not possess its commercial advantages. At the northern extremity of this Island is situated Arab, a large village surrounded by date plantations. It is the patrimony of Abdulla Ben Ahmed Cousin to Khaleefa Ben Sulman the chief of Bahrein.

The jealousy with which the Bahrein Sheiks view the Imaum of Muscat since his alliance by Marriage with the Court of Sheraz has induced them to enter into a treaty with the head of the Wahabee confederacy to whom they pay an annual tribute or Zekant.

The majority of the landholders in Bahrein are of Persian extraction and of the Sheah persuasion but are held in great surveillance by the Utubees who are Unefia Sounees.

The general residence of the Sheikh of Bahrein is at Rufa and the administration of justice is left in the hands of Negro Slaves which is of course at a low ebb.

TRAVELS
TO THE
CITY OF THE CALIPHS,
ALONG THE SHORES
OF THE
PERSIAN GULF
AND
THE MEDITERRANEAN.

INCLUDING A
VOYAGE TO THE COAST OF ARABIA,

AND A
TOUR ON THE ISLAND OF SOCOTRA.

By J. R. WELLSTED, Esq., F.R.S., F.R.A.S., &c. &c.

AUTHOR OF "TRAVELS IN ARABIA."

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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1840.

CHAPTER VI.

Maude's group of Islets—Pearl Fishery—Mode of obtaining the Pearls—Their probable value—Commerce of Bahrain—Advantages of position—Surveying Vessels—Fresh water obtained from beneath the salt.

OUR course the first few days lay along that extensive bank which girds the greater portion of the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf; coral reefs, nearly on a level with the water, occasionally rear themselves, but in general the depth varies from five to fifteen fathoms. Here from a very early period has been carried on the most extensive fishery for pearls in the world. Those which are procured are also, I believe, of the very finest quality, the largest, and the most valued. This single article of commerce produces the means of subsistence for nearly the whole population of the Arabian shore of this sea. The pearl oysters are found more or less along the whole of the Arabian coast.

The right of fishing is common to all the gulf, but those who engage most extensively

PEARL FISHERY.

in the trade are the inhabitants of the pirate coast and the island of Bahrain. Custom has assigned limits to both, boats belonging to the former seldom proceeding beyond, or to the northward of, Halool, while those fitted out by the inhabitants of Bahrain prosecute their labours between that island and the port of Katif. "Such as are fished (says Major Wilson) in the sea near the islands Kharak and Borgo, contain pearls which are said to be of superior colour and description, from being formed of eight layers or folds, whilst others have only five: but the water is too deep to make fishing for them either very profitable or easy there; besides, the entire monopoly of the fishery is in the hands of the Sheik of Bushire, who seems to consider these islands as his immediate property." The Bahrain boats, again, being in its immediate vicinity, return when laden to their own port for the purpose of opening their oysters, while those from the pirates' coast proceed, for a similar purpose, to the several islands with which the lower part of the coast is studded. Not less than three thousand boats are employed during the season, and we had occasion to thread our way through fleets of two or three hundred. All were briskly engaged, as the weather,

calm, sultry, and dense, by keeping the water free from agitation and clear, was particularly favourable.

I again quote from Major Wilson's most interesting paper. "The fishing-season is divided into two portions, the one called the short and cold, the other the long and hot; what is called the short or cold fishery is common everywhere. In the cooler weather, of the month of June diving is practised along the coast in shallow water; and it is not until the intensely hot months of July, August, and half of September, that the Bharain banks above mentioned are much frequented. The water on them is deeper (about seven fathoms), and the divers are much inconvenienced when that element is cold; indeed they can do little when it is not as warm as the air, and it frequently becomes even more so in the hottest months of the summer above-mentioned."

The value of the whole pearl fishery in the Persian Gulf may be estimated in round numbers at nearly half a million (sterling) annually. The use of pearls, however, seems somewhat on the decline. By the ancients they appear to have been more valued than by the moderns. I again quote from Colonel Wilson. "I have not admitted in the above estimate much more

than *one-sixth* of the amount some native merchants have stated it to be, as a good deal seemed to be matter of guess or opinion, and it is difficult to get at facts; my own estimate is in some measure formed on the estimated profits of the small boats. But even the sum which I have estimated is an enormous annual value for an article found in other parts of the world as well as here, and which is never used, in its best and most valuable state, as anything else than an ornament. A considerable quantity of the seed pearls is used throughout Asia in the composition of majoons or electuaries, to form which all kinds of precious stones are occasionally mixed, after being pounded, — excepting indeed diamonds, which are considered (from being so hard) as utterly indigestible. The majoon in which there is a large quantity of pearls is much sought for, and valued on account of its supposed stimulating and restorative qualities. But I presume that pearls are nothing more than sulphate of lime; and that Cleopatra's draught was a luxury only in the imagination.

"The Bharain pearl fishing-boats are reckoned to amount to about fifteen hundred; and the trade is in the hands of merchants there, some

118

PEARL FISHERY.

of whom possess a considerable capital. They bear hard on the producers, or fishers, and the man who makes most fearful exertions in diving hardly has food to eat. The merchant advances some money to the fisherman at cent. per cent. and a portion of dates, rice, and other necessary articles, all at the supplier's own price; he also lets a boat to them, for which he gets one share of the gross profits of all that is fished; and, finally, he purchases the pearls nearly at his own price, for the unhappy fishermen are generally in his debt, and therefore at his mercy.

"The following may be reckoned the common mode of proceeding:—Five ghowass or 'divers,' and five syebor or 'pullers up,' agree to take a boat together: the capitalist may probably already have lent these ten men about two hundred and fifty crowns to support their families during the former part of the year; perhaps they were unfortunate in the fishery of last year, and gained little.

"It is supposed they may gain in the current year what the capitalist, in his generosity, may value and receive for one thousand German crowns, which is considered fair success, perhaps above the common, for a season. The division would be as follows:—

PEARL FISHERY.

119

Total value acquired,—German crowns	1000
Deduct, first, one-eleventh to the capitalist for the boat ..	90
	<hr/>
Secondly, 250 crowns, advanced generally in food, &c.	250
	<hr/>
Thirdly, 100 per cent. on 250 crowns advanced.....	250
	<hr/>
Fourthly, 5 crowns from each fisherman, paid as a } tax to the sheik, or chief of the island..... }	50
	<hr/>
Balance.....	360

to be divided among the ten fishermen, leaving thirty-six German crowns to each.

"If the fishermen be unlucky, or the season be bad, they may not, as is sometimes the case, realize the sum expended, and must then irretrievably get in debt, becoming thereby forever at the mercy of the rapacious capitalist; others, again, may be fortunate in getting a large draught of valuable pearls, and thus rise into capitalists themselves. Occasionally, the oysters are brought on shore before being opened, and sold as a gambling venture; but they are generally opened at sea, and the pearls taken out. The largest shells are preserved; many are from six to nine inches in diameter, and are valuable on account of the mother-of-pearl with which they are lined. The oyster itself is

never eaten even in a country where food is so scarce.

"It is not always on the spot where the article is produced that it is easiest to be procured, or, when so, to be had cheapest, or of the best quality. In some places engagements of a nature something similar to those mentioned above, are made; and the produce is thus forestalled, generally for a foreign market, before it is actually acquired. Individuals who are not merchants are always made to pay very dearly for the liberty of selecting things of the first quality, as taking them away diminishes the general merchantable estimation of produce; and men who deal in the rough and wholesale will not, without a considerable bribe, thus reduce the value of their goods below the common level. This may account for more being demanded from individuals making selections for fine pearls here than they probably could be bought for in London. Indifferent and bad pearls are abundant and cheap; and they are used in great profusion in embroidering both the dresses of women and men in Persia. A blue velvet upper garment, tastefully embroidered in pearls, has a magnificent appearance. But, respecting the larger and more valuable pearls, what would pass

current among eastern nations as good and suitably arranged, as to shape, size, and water, would be rejected in Europe as intolerably mixed and utterly ill-assorted. There is the same difference in the estimation of flaws and the 'water' in stones and jewels. But, indeed, want of precision, and an indistinctness both in the perception of ideas and their delivery, is more apparent among Asiatics in general than Europeans. Individuals of the eastern and western quarters of the world might all mean to speak the truth, but how differently composed would the description of anything by a Persian, an Arab, or an Indian be, from that of an Englishman!"

When a boat arrives at a spot considered from the nature of the bottom as likely to prove favourable, the boat is anchored, and the crew divided into two portions; one remains in the boat to receive the oysters, and haul up the divers, the others strip naked, and jump into the sea. A small basket, capable of holding from eight to ten oysters, is then handed to them, and suspended to their left arm; the nostrils are then closed with a piece of elastic horn, the diver places his foot on a stone attached to a cord, inhales a long breath, and upon rising his right arm as a signal, the rope

is immediately let go, and he sinks to the bottom. After collecting as many as are within his reach, he jerks the line, and is drawn at once to the surface. Forty seconds is the average, and one minute and thirty-five seconds the ultimatum which they can remain below. They now cling for a few minutes to ropes suspended for that purpose over the sides of the vessel, and renew their exertions until tired, when they exchange places with those in the boat, and so on alternately, until their cargo is completed. Unopened the oysters are valued at two dollars the hundred; say upon an average they bring five to the surface, that would be at the rate of about a penny for each descent. Little enough for such a laborious and unhealthy employment did they obtain the whole, but they are fortunate if, after the rapacious demands of their masters are satisfied, they get a third. No one receives any definite wages, but are paid in certain shares, dependent on their skill as divers, or other causes. Sharks they appear to hold in little dread; but the saw-fish was much feared, and instances were related to me of men who had been completely cut in two by these monsters. To protect themselves from the blubber which floats about in some places, and if it comes in

contact with them stings very severely, they envelope themselves in white dresses, and have when floating about in the water, with the sun glistening on them, a singular appearance.

There are several modes of opening the shell, but most commonly it is done with a clasp-knife, and the pearl is found embedded in the muscular portion of the fish, where it is attached to the shell. The shells are also sometimes piled up on shore, where the heat of the sun decomposes the fish, and the pearls are at once obtained.

The sheikhs levy a tax from three to five dollars on each boat, according to its size. The value of the whole produce of the season on the principal bank is estimated at forty lacs of dollars, or about eighty thousand pounds, of which it is computed the Hindoo merchants purchase and transmit two-thirds to India, while the remaining portion finds its way into Persia and Arabia.

Five days after quitting Ras el Khaimah we sighted a cluster of islets called Maudes' group. In size, appearance, and formation, they closely resembled each other. They apparently owe their origin to volcanic agency, for they abound in sulphur, gypsum, antimony, and iron. From seaward they present an extraordinary appear-

ance. Seir Benias, for instance, exhibits a group of rugged peaks, varying in colour; some are black, others green, grey or brown, or of a pure white. I was then slightly unwell, and fearful of increasing my illness by exposure, or I would otherwise have gladly availed myself of the opportunity our touching there afforded me of examining its structure; I must, therefore, content myself with recommending it as well worthy the attention of some future traveller.

A beautiful lagoon in this island extends to nearly its centre. It is perfectly land-locked, and as the channel is narrow, the water within was smooth as that in a mill-pond. Boats resort here in great numbers during the fisheries, and the margin of the harbour is thickly studded with heaps of shells. During the time the crews remain, the masts and sails are converted into tents. The fare of these poor fisherman is very miserable: dates, such fish as they may be able to catch, and water. To such, while cruising amidst them in the ship, our small presents of bread or rice formed a welcome addition. The next object of interest which we approached was the low sandy cape, Ras Rekkan, which, with the contiguous district, is inhabited by a fierce and warlike race of Bedowins; we did

not in consequence care to land there, but made the best of our way to that island, Bahrain, which presents the greenest spot in "Oman's green sea." The map which accompanies this work is taken from the recent elaborate survey instituted by the East-India Company; it reflects the highest honour on the officers engaged in its construction, and I am proud of having the happiness of giving in these pages their names. Until 1764 we had no chart of the Persian Gulf. Nearchus was probably amidst the first Europeans who traversed its waters. Benjamin of Tudela, in 1292, speaks of it; but it was not until the illustrious Niebuhr visited it that we possessed a chart. The extraordinary accuracy of that remarkable man is as conspicuous in this as it is in the several other branches of human knowledge to which he turned his attention during his stay in the East. Lieut. Macluer, one of the most correct of modern hydrographers, and of whom but too little is known, furnished us with a map and memoir of these interesting regions.

After the fall of Ras el Kymah, it was discovered that the pirates had escaped our cruisers by running into the several ports with which the Arabian coast is indented, and the liberal government of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphin-

126

SURVEY OF

stone at once saw the advantage that would accrue from laying open these haunts. In June 1821, two vessels were selected for this purpose, the *Discovery* and *Psyche*, and I give the names of the officers attached to either.

Discovery.

Lieut. J. M. Guy	...	Commanding.
Robert Cogan	...	First Lieutenant.
W. E. Rogers	...	Second ditto.
W. L. Clements	...	Third ditto.
Lieut. M. Houghton	...	Draughtsman.
Mr. J. Anderson	...	Assistant Surgeon.
E. B. Squires	...	Midshipman.
Thomas Mullion	...	ditto.
H. H. Whitelock	...	ditto.

Psyche.

Lieut. G. B. Brucks	...	Commanding.
J. H. Rouband	...	First Lieutenant.
W. M. Lowe	...	Second ditto.
W. Spry	...	Assistant Surgeon.
Geo. Pilcher	...	Midshipman.
Thos. Boyer	...	ditto.
T. E. Rogers	...	ditto.

In eighteen brief years what a sad harvest death hath reaped in this then goodly list!

Our geographers have conferred the name of

PERSIAN GULF.

127

Bahrain in that part of Arabia which lies opposite to the island which is the Tiara of Ptolemy and Icharia of Strabo; repeated mention is made of it by the earliest authorities, and the Portuguese, when they possessed themselves of stations in the Persian Gulf, did not overlook it.

The time is fast approaching when more attention will again be directed towards it. Possessing a fertile soil, abundantly watered by numerous rills, and susceptible of the highest cultivation, we observe a spot, like the oasis of the desert, placed amidst burning and boundless solitudes. Its harbours are good, though difficult of approach: If ever stations must be occupied by the British in the Persian Gulf, let them be Bahrain and Kahrak. I have a great respect for the Portuguese in their selection of stations of importance.

Bahrain is at present occupied by a population of about 5,000 souls; it has already been noticed that the fishery for pearls forms the principal source of their employment and their mode of subsistence, and they otherwise carry on a considerable commercial intercourse with other ports in the Persian Gulf. The principal town, styled Manama, is situated at the northern extremity of the island, which is about twenty miles in length, is narrow and

risers to a hilly ridge throughout the greatest portion of its length.*

It cannot have escaped the attention of those who have turned their inquiries and observations towards these interesting regions, that the Arabian geographers, and those following their example of a more recent date, have laid down a river flowing from the interior, and discharging its waters on the coast opposite the island of Bahrain.

Whether search was made for this by the surveying vessels, and whether it be not one of those numerous streams which, as in other parts of Arabia, have but an ephemeral existence, being merely flooded during the rains and subsiding immediately afterwards, I know not. Captain Sadler, again, in his memorable journey across the Arabian continent, makes no mention of it, nor does it appear in the survey charts. I yet am unwilling to wholly put aside the authority of the Arabian geographical writers, the more so that fresh water is perceived to abound in this district, and there is a curious phenomenon connected with this subject which deserves attention; it is, that in the vicinity of Bahrain

* As I propose giving all the latitudes and longitudes in a tabular form of the various places mentioned in the volumes, in the Appendix, I forbear to interrupt the course of the narrative by their insertion in the text.

fresh water is found beneath the salt; that the inhabitants use that water, and that ships and boats which visit the island are very generally filled up with it. Their mode of obtaining this is simple, and characteristic of the people. A diver descends with an empty skin, places its mouth over the spot whence the fresh water gushes, ties the string, when it is filled, and permits the skin to rise to the surface. At high tide these springs are covered with twelve feet water, and I have no doubt, if search were made for them, that springs of a similar nature would be found in other parts of the world.

1.05
The second Gulf Survey,
1857-1860

(40)

ART. VII.—*Memoir on Bahreyn.* By Lieutenant R. W. WHIST, H.M.I.N.

[Read before the Society, November 21st, 1861.]

IN presenting the accompanying copy of a "Survey of Bahreyn Harbour, and the Khaur-el-Bab," it would seem advisable to describe the circumstances under which it was conducted, with a view of accounting for its apparent incompleteness and unfinished state.

I would therefore bring to notice that it was conducted whilst stationed in H.M.'s Steamer *Mahi*, I.N., to cruise between Bahreyn and Demam, to watch the movements of the Chiefs of those places; and to report any acts of aggression on either side. In carrying out this duty I had an opportunity of examining a channel called the Khaur-el-Bab, between the Fasht-el-Yarrom and the Khaur-fasht, as also of testing the correctness of the present chart of Bahreyn, as supplied to the vessels on the station.

This channel, the Khaur-el-Bab, it would appear from Lieutenant Constable's report, published in 1856, was known to the surveyors of the Gulf, as also to the officers of the squadron some years since; but no record of it appears, nor is it recognised, or exhibited in the existing chart of Bahreyn Harbour; the Fasht-el-Yarrom being made to connect with the shore "dry at low water."

The passage through the Khaur-el-Bab, now proved to be available for navigation from the fact of H.M.'s Steamer *Semiramis*, I.N., with the vessels of the Persian Gulf Squadron in tow, having passed through in 1859, had been, as yet, withheld from the use of the Government vessels, I understand, by the jealousy of the Sheykh of Bahreyn, who had directed the pilots to report it unsafe and impracticable. It is of considerable importance, however, lying as it does, in a direct line between Bahreyn and Katiff, between which places there is constant traffic; and it is available in all weathers, and at all seasons of the year. I have beat through against strong north winds under reduced sail in H.M.'s

MEMOIR ON BAHREYN.

41

H.M. Ship *Mahi*, I.N., and any sloop of war could do the same. It is moreover a saving of twenty miles upon the usual route round the head of the Yarrom; the latter being forty-five miles from Bahreyn to Katiff, and the former twenty-five miles from anchorage to anchorage, with the advantage of smooth water. To render the passage to Demam complete, however, a dangerous reef, lying to the westward of the Khaur-fasht, called the Chaschús, apparently *steep to*, should be examined and defined, as also the Neywah on the northern side of the passage.

When in tow of the *Semiramis* in the *Mahi*, as above, we passed in one cast from $2\frac{1}{2}$ fms. to $7\frac{1}{2}$ fms., this was on the northern edge of the Chaschús reef. The coast line, &c. from Demam to Tanhora, is far from correct, but I regret to say I am not in a position to furnish any amended plan of it from want of means. A place over which I was directed to keep a surveillance, called Sennabis, of the Boo-Felassur, is not shown in the "Chart of El Katiff," and is situated, when properly projected, on a reef shown as covered at high water. Lieutenant Constable in his memoir apologises for this plan of "El Katiff." These remarks have been simply advanced from the fact of its connection with the Khaur-el-Bab, as also that of its being far the most troublesome portion of the Gulf; continually demanding the presence of a vessel of the squadron to ensure order, and prevent disturbance.

Whilst pursuing the examination of the Khaur-el-Bab, I took the opportunity, as it presented itself, of testing the correctness of the Chart of Bahreyn Harbour, at present in use; and I found that, although it was sufficient to give some idea of the place, it was considerably out in detail.

The chart now presented is constructed on the plane scale, one inch to 2,000 yards, and has been plotted with every possible attention to accuracy. In addition to the soundings in the harbour, I have been able to furnish some idea of the country inland, the result of a trip that I made to Ruffar, and Jibbul Dukhan, the most elevated ground on the island of Bahreyn, on the summit of which I have erected a pyramid at the site of my station.

Altogether, the chart professes to be little more than a guide to a more minute and perfect survey on some future occasion, and it is as such, alone, that I venture to lay it before the public.

By a carefully-measured base, the true bearing of the Sheykh's house, at Manama (through which I have drawn the True meridian) from the highest pinnacle of the Jellahat al Bahreyn, or Portuguese

MEMOIR ON BAHREYN.

42

fort, was found to be S. $88^{\circ} 02' 30''$, E. distant 5,902 yards. The natives call this fort by several names,—Jellahat al Feringi, Jellahat Jibbleen, and Jellahat al Bahreyn, being the site of the ancient town, when Manama was only a fishing village. There is no record of the age of this fort, but it is very ancient and extensive, and there are characters in relief on the outside of some of the Bastions. On inspection, however, we found that these were of late date, probably stones originally belonging to some other building, used to repair the fort, as the characters appeared to be Arabic. In the centre of the fort, is a deep and well-built well, with only a little brackish water at the bottom, and the natives say that there is, or was, at one time, an underground communication between the fort and Gasseyr (light-house rock). This rock bears evident signs of once having been the site of some building, but the water is very shoal in its vicinity, nor could I trace anything to justify the appellation of the Portuguese Harbour.

Close to the eastward of the fort is the village of Karabad, and between this and Manama, are the villages of Sennabis and Naim.

The configuration of the island to the southward, as exhibited in the printed chart, I take to be a mere conjecture; and I was told that any vessel could sail round the island, where she would find in some places as much as 60 fms. water, and if so, by far the deepest portion of the Gulf.

The armed pinnacle of the *Falkland*, when stationed there, made the circuit of the island as guard-boat, but no report was made of the capacity of the channels.

Sheykh Ali Bin Khalifa told me he would undertake to conduct the *Semiramis* round the island, and, I believe, it was once contemplated by her commander, although circumstances prevented it being carried into effect.

The road from Manama to Jibbul Dukhan leads through rich date plantations and gardens, in the direction of the Minarets, passing by which, you cross a backwater more or less fordable according to time of tide, and after proceeding about half a mile further through date gardens you emerge upon an open space, at first consisting of tumuli or mounds (probably the site of a large village or town), but gradually subsiding to a level plain, in some places swampy, till you come to a change in the character of the island. Ascending by a rocky path between steep cliffs 40 or 50 feet high, you now find yourself upon elevated ground, barren, and so stony, that none but the horses of the

MEMOIR ON BAHREYN.

43

country could be expected to proceed. The road continues in a gradual ascent till you arrive at the fort of Ruffar. Here, descending again into a vast crater surrounded on all sides by cliffs, the road leads for five miles over uneven ground of rocky formation to Jibbul Dookhan or Dukhan, a mass of rock standing almost alone in the centre of the crater. The surface of the soil between Ruffar and Jibbul Dukhan is strewed in some places with round stones, very much like what I have heard called "potato-stone" from its similarity to that vegetable. On breaking these, I found them hollow, having their concave side covered with beautiful crystallized spar. The outside being coated with a kind of lichen, gave the ground at a distance quite a green appearance. I am extremely sorry that I did not bring away some specimens, as I think they would have proved of geological interest. From the summit of Jibbul Dukhan I could discern nothing in the direction of Ras-el-Blur (or the Land's End) but a barren sandy plain, with a frontage of cliffy land between it and the sea; but I was told that the island of Zuknonyyeh (Zucnone of the chart) to the S.W. is visible on a clear day. I was enabled from this station and Ruffar to fix the villages of Zellag and Mahamir, and thus determine the breadth of the island between those places. There are some inferior elevations between Jibbul Dukhan and Ruffar, but I was unable, from want of means, to ascertain any heights above the sea level. Jibbul Dukhan is visible some distance off the port, and is a good mark for entering the harbour.

Ruffar is the sanitarium of Bahreyn, and is reported to be extremely healthy. In the village of Heneniyyeh, in the plain beneath the fort, is a very deep well, the water of which is considered to be the best on the island. It differs from that of Manama; the latter, the natives say, is light, whilst the former is heavy—terms either synonymous with hard and soft, or serving to express the different specific gravity. The younger portion of the Sheykh's families live at Ruffar where they are put to school, and learn military exercises, and, as we were informed, are kept out of mischief.

The fresh water springs in the vicinity of the island, from which it would appear to have been called ("Bahreyn," sea-springs), are worthy of notice; they are for the most part below the level of the sea, and are situated on the reefs fronting the shore, whilst some are always submerged.

At Saiyhee, a small rocky islet to the westward of Psoteen village, there is a spring of fresh water which bubbles up into a basin in its

MEMOIR ON BAHREYN.

44

centre; at high water, during the prevalence of a N.W. the sea washes into the basin or reservoir and taints it; but at other times, the water thus collected, is perfectly fresh. Proceeding to the north-east we come to two springs, on the reef between the Islet of Khasaefi and the shore: these are only exposed at low water; further east again, are two more throwing jets through the rocky reef extending off the village of Gallili, called Kashash, once protected by a tower or fort built on the reef, and called Yredi. Fresh water springs were also reported on Boo-Shaheen Islet, to the southward of this, but I had not opportunity of visiting them.

Near Maharrag fort is a spring with the walls of a fort or guard-house, still standing, close to it. It is called Boo-mahur; and the water, which is quite warm, is obtained by means of a bamboo with a hose attached to it. This spring is always covered at all times of tide.

There is another spring on the Khaur-fasht, having three feet over it at low water spring-tides, from which I obtained seven hundred (700) gallons of water in one day to fill up the vessel under my command.

Having procured a bûm or boom (a large flat-bottomed boat for cargo), with a large wooden tank in it, at Bahreyn, I proceeded in the *Mahi* with it in tow to the Khaur-fasht, where I anchored within five hundred yards of the spring. I next got a large copper funnel, and after securing a pump hose to the neck of it, I placed it, inverted, over the spring, and blocked up all other means of escape with swabs. By this means the water was forced up through the hose into new canvas bags, with which I filled the tank in the bûm. I tried also a spirit pump shipped on to the neck of the funnel, which answered extremely well, till the tide rising obliged me to have recourse to the former expedient. The water I procured was perfectly fresh, and all pronounced it to be far better than that supplied to the vessel at Bahreyn.

This spring is situated $6\frac{1}{2}$ or 6.25 miles from the nearest land. Portuguese fort and Marwaddi, dry sand in one, form a transit over the position of the spring, as also centre of Jibbul Dukhan on with a pyramidal top of trees (which I called "transit tree"), but it is very difficult to find at high water if the sea surface is troubled at all.

I was told the following story in explanation of the numerous fresh water springs on and around the Island of Bahreyn. My informant commenced by telling me, that there were, at one time, no less than six hundred and sixty-six villages or towns on the island—and then proceeded to account for the springs as follows:—

MEMOIR ON BAHREYN.

45

"Once upon a time there was only one spring on the Island, which was situated not far from the present site of the Minarets; that a besieging army coming up from the S.W. proposed, previous to attacking the place with arms, to block up the spring, and thus cut off the supply of water from the inhabitants. In this they had hardly succeeded, when the water burst out in all the other springs now known, on and about the Island; and they point out a Masjid built, as they say, on the mound formed by the filling up of the original spring."

I landed several times on the Fasht-el-Yarrom to erect a flag as a mark for sounding the channel, and placed it on a rocky patch which was supposed by officers, who have previously reported its existence, to be the remains of a fort; but I could see no traces of anything like a building, although the natives say, that there was not only a fort, but that two (2) date trees grew there at one time; and they affirm that there is also a fresh-water spring in the vicinity. It is known by the name of Jellahat-el-Yarrom, and bears from the Portuguese Fort, N. 9°, W. 12° (true, i.e. not magnetic), distant 23,283 yards. The nearest approach to it is under Ras-el-S'lah, forming the northern side of the western entrance to the Khaur-el-Bab. Before leaving the station, I built a pyramid on the rocky patch, six feet above the level of high water mark.

I was unable to find any mark for entering the Khaur-el-Bab from the S.E., the pilot in beating from Bahreyn, invariably beat past the entrance—looking out for the Portuguese Fort coming in transit with Jibbul Dukhan, the vessel being then on the edge of the Yarrom: he then bore up about south, and rounded, what he called, the Jah'doom, being guided, as far as I could see, entirely by the soundings.

The ground north of the Portuguese Fort is very foul, with overfalls, and the pilots never borrow on that side of the harbour on that account: they call it all Leyah, from the rocky patch that is dry at low water, of that name.

As I have been in and out of Bahreyn Harbour several times, I feel authorised, from my experience, to make the following remarks:—Pseteen High Tree in transit with the western extreme of Jibbul Dukhan, or Gallali Tower south (or on with a clump of date trees to the south called Zimnee), appears to clear all dangers to the eastward of the Yarrom. This edge, as reported by Lieut. Constable, is very badly defined, and is dangerous in making the Port in thick weather, as it is almost out of sight of land.

MEMOIR ON BAHREYN.

46

The angle subtended by two objects, set on a sextant, is, though very seldom employed, frequently of more value in keeping a vessel out of danger, than hand-bearings; and thus Gallali Tower and Pseteen High Tree subtending an angle of 25°, seems to clear all foul ground off Semahi (or Arad Bluff) with this angle on, and Pseteen Tree south, you may steer S.W. by W. till Jibbul Dukhan comes on with the Minarets, when steer so as to keep them in one (or nearly south) till Saiyhee Islet comes on with Pseteen High Tree, then steer S. by E., looking out for the extreme of the rocky reef called Zirwán, which forms the northern boundary of the inner anchorage, till Saiyhee is seen opening out from Deyah Bluff (or the N.W. extreme of Maharrag Island), when haul in S.E. for the Sheykh's house at Manama, and anchor in from 3 to 2½ fms. low water spring tides, as convenient. This is only applicable to vessels of light draught; heavier vessels would, obviously, have to remain outside Ras Zirwán, in the outer anchorage.

Bahreyn Harbour is a most difficult place to make in hazy weather, as the land being quite low, nothing is seen of it till shoal soundings are obtained, which are useless as a guide to the ship's position. The tide, too, runs strong off the mouth of the harbour about east and west.

These things considered, it seems best to make the harbour open from the N.E., and to that end, in coming from Bushire, to keep on the Persian Coast till abreast the Mutaáf (or Berdistan bank), and then stretch over to the Arab side. By this means you avoid a rocky patch with 3 fms. on it lying 50 miles north of Bahreyn in the direct line to Bushire, and make the harbour with the reefs equidistant on both sides.

The currents in the centre of the Gulf are very uncertain in direction, and strong at times. On one occasion in H. M.'s Steamer *Semiramis*, I. N., we were steering from Bushire direct to Bahreyn, and made the head of the Fasht-el-Yarrom several miles to the westward of the direct line. I attribute this deviation from the course entirely to a strong N.W. set or current. This would be a most dangerous place to ground on, miles away from any assistance, and exposed to the whole fury of a N.W.

A survey of the Island of Bahreyn, and Dohat Selwah to the south, would be interesting; and as the present delineation of the Island and coast has been acknowledged to be little more than an "eye sketch," it would present almost a new field to those engaged in it. I doubt very much whether the inhabitants of that part of the Gulf would be found

MEMOIR ON BAHREYN.

47

very friendly, and should certainly suggest that the vessel so employed should either be fully equipped for service, or accompanied by a man-of-war.

Regretting that I am unable to give any statistical account of Bahrein and its inhabitants, social, and political economy, &c., and trusting that the object of my feeble attempt to advance the cause of general, not to say scientific, information in the foregoing description may be appreciated with every apology for its shortcomings.

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INCLUDING

THE GULF OF 'OMMAN.

COMPILED BY

CAPTAIN C. G. CONSTABLE and LIEUTENANT A. W. STIFFE,
of H.M. late INDIAN NAVY.

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112 ARABIAN COAST; RAS REKKEN TO JEZÍRET BÚBÍYÁN. [CH. VIII.]

BAHRE'IN ISLAND (formerly called *Awal*) is about 27 miles in length north and south, by 10 in breadth. Towards the centre, there is some slightly elevated rocky table land; and, 12 miles from the north end, is a small mass of volcanic hills called *Jebel Dukhán*, about 400 feet high, visible 21 miles, and forming in a square lump. The shores of the island are low, and along the north end is a belt, 2 or 3 miles wide, of very fertile land, with abundant fresh water springs, and covered with date groves, &c. The principal town, called *Manámeh*, is at the north-east corner; and is the capital of the chief of the great *Uttúbí* tribe. The total population of the islands is estimated by Captain *Kemball*,* at 50,000. Excepting the northern portion, great part of the island is barren, but there many villages in different parts.

MANÁMEH, a large town on the north-east point of the island, with perhaps 8,000 inhabitants, is built along the shore for about three-quarters of a mile; the houses are mostly poor; the only conspicuous building being the *Sheik's* house, which is a high semi-fortified building near the west end of the town, on which the flag is shown: close to the east of it is a small minaret, only seen when in the inner anchorage. The north-east point of the town, forming the left extreme, is called *Ras Rómán*: half a mile south of this, is a clump of dates behind the town standing on a little rising ground.

The landing at the town, though better than at any other part of the island, is inconvenient, except at high water; the shore reef being very shelving, boats cannot come within a quarter of a mile of the beach at low water. Donkeys are always brought down to assist persons

* Lately Political Resident in the Persian gulf.

CHAP. VIII.]

BAHRE'IN ISLAND.

113

landing and to unload goods, &c. The following supplies are procurable: *Water*, in plenty, and of good quality; if you have no water casks, see that the large wooden tank it is brought off in, is clean; bullocks, sheep, and poultry, vegetables and fruit, Arab bread, flour, rice, &c., and other articles for use on board ship, except biscuit, spirits, and salt meat; fire-wood, but not for steam purposes; tank timber for repairs, but very dear; no ironwork. A *baghalah's* mast might be got, as a substitute for a broken spar, of heavy wood (*peon*).

The chief is very friendly to the English government, who support him against the aggressions of the *Wahebbí* Amír. There is a British agent, who is an Arab; and many *Banyans* are settled here. The inhabitants of this town, of *Maharag* and *al Hed*, are chiefly employed in the pearl fishery, to which altogether 400 boats are sent from these islands; but there is a large agricultural population. Owing to the numerous springs of water on the north part of the island, which are carefully employed in irrigation, it is very fertile; and the verdure, so unusual in this country, has a very pleasing effect. There are great numbers of fruit trees, as citrons, limes, &c.; and very fine date plantations; much lucerne is grown for forage. The island produces quantities of dates, which are exported to other parts of Arabia, and India. The other exports are: pearls, a few of the finest horses in the world, and some remarkably fine asses, to India and *Maskat*. Cotton sail cloth for *baghalahs* is made here of very good quality, and exported to *Koweit*, *Basrah*, and to India. The only other manufactures are: coarse cloth for turbans, &c., and mats made of the date leaf, of fine texture.

Some trade is carried on with India, many fine *baghalahs* belonging to the port. They have 200 vessels from 20 to 300 tons, besides the smaller ones. The *Sheikh* has some fine war vessels, chiefly *Batíls*, which are very fast sailers; his large *baghalah*, the *Duniyah*, which is now employed in trade, mounted 10 guns. The imports are: Rice, timber, and other materials for ship-building, and piece goods, &c. from India; and coffee from the Red Sea. Near the ruined mosque, with the two minarets, are the ruins of a considerable town, much better built than the present one, called *Beled al Jedím* (the old town); there are also some well built baths over some of the springs. It, therefore, appears to have fallen off in prosperity since earlier times. There are still many villages on the island in different parts; but, according to all accounts, few compared with the number formerly existing. The largest spring on the island issues from a reservoir about 30 feet deep, and 30 yards across, in a stream 6 or 8 feet wide, and 2 feet deep, which will give an idea of the supply of water on the island: it is about one mile S.W. of the minarets.

114 ARABIAN COAST; RAS REKKEN TO JEZÍRET BÚBÍYÁN. [CH. VIII.]

Near the mosque, a fair is held every Friday, for the sale of horses, cattle, fruit, &c., which is frequented by a large number of people.

Portuguese Fort, called by the natives Jiblíah (and other names) is nearly 3 miles, W. $\frac{1}{4}$ N., from the Sheikh's house at Manámeh. The Arabs know nothing of its origin.* It is exceedingly dilapidated, and, within the enceinte, stand the ruins of many large buildings (query, barracks, governor's house, factory, &c.). It stands in a gap in the date trees, 150 yards from the beach, its highest part being about 80 feet above the sea. From seaward, it makes in three principal lumps of light colour; quite shapeless. Nearly 1 mile N.N.W. of the fort, is a small rock above water on the reef, to which Capt. Brucks gave the name of lighthouse rock, from a notion that the Portuguese had one on it.

The whole of the coast between this and Manámeh, which forms a bay, is lined with thick date groves: on the coast, 1 mile from Manámeh, is a fishing village called Nayim.

Nearly equidistant between the fort and town, and 1 mile from the shore, stands a large ruined mosque with two minarets.† These are useful marks for the harbour, being seen over the date trees, until near the inner harbour.

From the Portuguese fort, the coast of the island runs west $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles, and S.W. by W., $2\frac{1}{4}$ more, when it turns to the southward: at the west point, is a tower and little village called Bidíá'. Off the west coast, about 4 miles S.W. of Bidíá' point, is a large island, called Umm an Hasán; it is low, and has two small peaks on it. North of it are two islets; there appears to be no passage between these and Bahreïn island.

The west coast of the island runs, in an average south direction, for 27 miles, according to the chart by Lieuts. Brucks and Rogers, and is little known: about 10 miles south of Bidíá', is a village and fort called Zalák. From the south point of the island, which is called Ras al Bar, the coast turns to north-east and north, and is also almost unknown. About 12 miles from Ras al Bar, are some extensive ruins, called Yaú.

* The chief actually asked us for some information as to who built it, and when it was built, &c. It is similar to the other Portuguese forts in the gulf, viz. a regular bastioned fortification of the 16th century, with moat, &c., embrasures in the parapets, and casemated embrasures in the re-entering angles of the bastions. It was probably built soon after 1521, when the Portuguese made their first expedition against Bahreïn. It has been partly built of the materials of some other building, probably a mosque; as a great number of stones, in the south face, are covered with carvings and inscriptions in the old Arabic, or Cufic (?) character.

† This mosque is quite ruinous, and probably of the date of the Persian conquest of Bahreïn, being a Shiáh mosque, from the name of 'Ali being joined with that of their prophet in the profession of faith, in some inscriptions there. The Persians are, as is well known, all of the Shiáh sect of Mohammadans, while the Arabs and Turks are Súnnís and do not venerate the name of 'Ali.

From Ras Rúmán, the north-east point of the island, the coast runs to south-eastward: about three-quarters of a mile from it, is a low sandy point, with a little fishing village, called Hálat an Namas; beyond which it forms a bay, the south point of which, called Ras al Jasrah, is 2 miles S.E. $\frac{1}{2}$ S. from Ras Rúmán. There is a village, and detached date grove, on this point, and a fresh water spring on the beach, below high water level.

At this point the coast turns to the westward, forming the north side of an extensive, shallow backwater, running west, about 5 miles into the island. On the south side of the entrance, which is $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide, is a large island called Sitrah 4 miles long north and south, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ broad, with only a narrow, shallow khor between its south side and Bahreïn. Its northern half is covered with high date trees, the eastern extreme of which terminates abruptly like a cliff or bluff. There is a village and fort of the same name in the grove, and at the south end of the island is a small fishing village called Mahámeh. Two miles S.W. from Jasrah point is a small island in the backwater about half a mile in extent, and covered with date trees; it is called Nebbí Sáleh. From Sitrah island the coast runs in a south and south-west direction to Ras al Bar.

INTERIOR.—Four miles from the north coast commences some moderately elevated rocky table land (100 to 150 feet), which extends nearly across the island, and for many miles to the southward; it is terminated on all sides by little cliffs. On it, nearly 7 miles S. $\frac{1}{2}$ W., from Manámeh, stand the village and hill fort of Ruf'ah, which has several towers and is seen over the date trees when entering the harbour.

JEHEL DUKHÁN is a small lump of hills of volcanic appearance standing near the centre of the island, about 400 feet high; it is level on top, with jagged outline, and a bluff on each side. Its centre is S. $\frac{3}{4}$ W. nearly 12 miles from Manámeh, and in clear weather it is the first land seen from seaward.

MAHARAG ISLAND lies to north-eastward of Bahreïn, being separated from it by a strait, in one part only a mile in breadth, and nearly all shallow. It consists of a strip of low sand, averaging half a mile in width, and of horse-shoe form, the convex side to the north; it is 3 miles in breadth east and west, and nearly 5 miles long from the north coast to the extreme south-east point. On the south-west point lies the town of Maharag, which is about as large and populous as Manámeh, and is about half a mile in length and breadth. At its south end, on a small low piece of ground, which at high water is separated from the town, stands a square fort with four towers, called Maharag; and a quarter of a mile E.S.E. of this is a fresh water spring under the sea, having always a fathom of salt water

116 ARABIAN COAST; RAS REKKEN TO JEZÍRET RÚBÍYÁN. [CH. VIII.]

over it, from which the town is principally supplied with water; it is called Bú Mahah.*

Around the north end of this island, are four clumps of date trees, which are the first objects seen, when making the place; unless in very clear weather, when Jebel Dukhán will be seen a little before them. They are visible 10 or 11 miles from the deck.

Each of these clumps has a name, and they are useful landmarks in entering the harbour. The western, which shuts in behind the others, when bearing S.W. by S., is called Bisetín, from a little fishing village close to it on the beach. It is 2 miles north from Maharag fort, and has one tree in the middle a little higher than the rest.

Sayeh is a small islet on the shore reef, $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile from the beach, west of this clump. It is about 20 yards across, of light colour, and only a few feet above high water level, and has a spring and basin of fresh water on it, which is quite fresh, except when the sea gets into it at high water springs; at low water the reef round this islet is dry.

On the north side of Maharag island are three clumps, all within the space of a mile. The western, called Ad Dír, has a small village in it, and a little building on a hillock close to eastward of it. The centre, and northernmost, is called Reyah,† and the third clump Samáhi. There are a few huts at each of the two last, and a fine spring of water at Reyah.

Khaseifeh is a little rocky islet on the reef, about 700 yards north of Ad Dír; between it and the shore are three little springs on the reef, uncovered at low tide, from which the village is supplied with water.

Galáleh, a fishing village, with a square tower on a sandy hillock, stands on a point $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles S.E. by E. from Reyah. Three-quarters of a mile N.E. of it is an islet on the reef, with the remains of a building, and two fresh-water springs near it, which is called Irtheh.

From this place the strip of sand forming the island runs south for $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, terminating in a very low sandy point. Zimmí is a small date clump, with a few huts, $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles from Galáleh; just south of this is a very large fishing village, called Al Hed, and half a mile from this last, near the extreme south point, a small village, called Musheir; the tide sometimes overflowing the ground between these two villages. Opposite Hed village is an islet on the reef, a quarter of a mile off shore, with a fresh-water spring on it, called Bú Shahn.

* These submarine springs are characteristic of these islands; several will be described in the sequel: the water is often obtained by merely putting down a hollow bamboo, when the fresh water will rise through it above the surface of the sea. Lieut. Whish, I. N., in 1859 obtained a supply (in shoaler water), by means of a spirit pump.

† This is the clump of trees, called Arad bluff by Capt. Brucks; which name appears inappropriate, as the trees stand on low land, nearly at the water's edge. The meaning was, that the appearance of the trees, from a distance, resembled a bluff hill.

CHAP. VIII.]

BAHREÍN HARBOUR.

117

The centre part of Maharag island, or hollow part of the horseshoe, is overflowed only at high water; and in the middle, East of Maharag town, is an island, three-quarters of a mile in extent, called 'Arad. It has a date grove and a large double fort on it.

The **HARBOUR** of Bahrein is formed by the reefs extending off that island and Maharag, and by a great reef lying to the northward of them, called Fusht al Yárem. The reefs are all flat, and the bottom stony, chiefly of white colour; they generally show well. The fish-weirs on all of them are some guide, except at high water, when they are covered.

The Bahrein island reef extends only a quarter of a mile off opposite Manámeh town, there being a bight in the reef here which enables the native vessels to lie near the town; with the Sheikh's house S.E. $\frac{1}{2}$ E. a point of it projects half a mile from the shore. It increases in extent to the westward, and towards the Portuguese fort is 1 to $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles in breadth; and, north of that fort, foul ground extends 2 miles off, with a boat channel just outside the Lighthouse rock. Part of this detached patch is dry at low water, and is called Leyah; there is a narrow channel leading to the westward, just north of it, with a 2 fathoms flat between it and the Khor al Báb. This channel has not been explored farther to the west; Brucks' chart shows it as ending in a basin, but probably there is a passage through the reefs towards the main. The minarets in one with Rufah fort will keep a vessel just clear of Leyah shoal, and of the 2 fathoms bank north of it. The Khor al Báb is the passage south of the Yárem shoal, and is described at page 121.

Maharag island reef is very extensive, and has a shallow channel through it, on its west side, to the town of Maharag, and to Khor Jalíyeh. The natives give names to different parts of this reef, but there appears to be no general name for the whole. On the east side of Maharag island, according to Brucks' chart, it extends from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 miles off, with soundings decreasing gradually from 6 fathoms at about 1 mile off. N.E. of Galáleh, a point of the reef, called Kashásheh, extends about two miles off, in the direction of Irtheh islet.

RAS KHASEIFEH, is the north-west point of this reef, and the principal danger in entering the harbour, being generally a lee shore, and extending so far from the land. The reef dries off from Maharag island in a north-west direction nearly 2 miles, and, outside this, is an extensive spit, with only $2\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms at $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles distance from the island, the depth on it decreasing towards the dry reef. With Galáleh tower just shutting in behind Samáhi date grove, you are on the pitch of this spit.

From this point the edge of the shoal runs to southward, with 4 to 6 fathoms very near it for $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, to the entrance to Maharag Khor: a

118 ARABIAN COAST; RAS REKKEN TO JEZÍRET BÚBÍYÁN. [CH. VIII.]

mark for the entrance of which, is Sayeh islet, E. by S. $\frac{1}{2}$ S., or in one with the south end of Bisetín village. This Khor runs to south-eastward to Maharag town, but is very shoal, having in some parts only 3 or 4 feet at low water.

On the same bearing of Sayeh, there is a 9 foot patch, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Bisetín; and from this, the edge of the foul ground runs about south to Ras Zarwán. The minarets in one with Jebel Dukhán, lead 800 yards clear to the westward of this danger.

The anchorage for large ships, would be just to south-westward of this patch, in 4 fathoms, with Sayeh on with Bisetín clump; and the minarets seen between Jebel Dukhán and Rufa'h fort.

RAS ZARWÁN is the west point of the reef, which forms the north side of the inner anchorage; its outer tip is $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles N.W. by N. from Manámeh (Sheikh's house). When off the pitch, Sayeh is just touching the north-west extreme of Maharag island. The great body of the reef at this point shows well, but the extreme outer patch, which is detached, and has a little more water on it, is not so clearly seen. There are 3 to $3\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms at low water, in this part of the harbour, which is only half a mile broad. The inner anchorage is round this point, in $2\frac{3}{4}$ to 3 fathoms, just outside the native vessels, rather more than a mile off shore; with a little minaret just open to the left of the Sheikh's house. The edge of the reef runs from Zarwán to S. E. by E. for $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, forming the north side of the inner harbour, which shoals regularly towards the town. The anchorage is close over to the Zarwán side; the southern part of the bay towards Nayim, and the Portuguese fort, being shoal. The whole outer harbour, or belt of deep water between the reefs, is called Saleisel. The bottom is mud and sand, in the inner anchorage, good holding ground; in the outer part, sand and shells. South of a line drawn W. by S. from Maharag north date grove (Reyah), the depths are under three fathoms. N.W. of Ras Khaseifeh, the greatest depth is 4 fathoms: to the southward of this line, the soundings are from 5 to 7 fathoms, shoaling to 3 and 4 close to the reefs, but in places, 7 fathoms are found very near the reefs. Outside that line, in the entrance of the harbour, the soundings are 4 to 5 fathoms.

FUSHT AL YÁREM, the extensive reef forming the shelter to the harbour against the shemál, is only partially explored; its extent in a north-west and north direction, is not satisfactorily determined: the outline delineated on Capt. Brucks' chart is only approximate, it is probably 10 miles broad, by 15 in length north and south. Its north-east point, called Ras Shagháb, is the chief danger to be avoided in making the place, as it is out of sight of land; it is 16 miles N. $\frac{1}{4}$ W. from Reyah date

CHAP. VIII.]

BAHREÍN HARBOUR.

119

trees, and has 4 fathoms close to; 6 fathoms are about a mile off this point to the eastward, and 8 fathoms, 4 miles off.

From it, the edge of the shoal runs to southward for 10 miles, to the south-east point, off which lies a detached patch, least water $2\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms, the outer edge of which bears N. by E., 6 miles, from Reyah date grove; a vessel of light draught might cross this, as it would be a good guide to her position, with regard to the south-east point of the Yárem.

From this south-east point the reef takes a south-west direction for 7 miles, to the south point called Jádúm: this is on the north side of the entrance to the Khor al Báb, and from it the reef has an average direction of N.W. by N. for 9 or 10 miles, as far as the north-west point, and forms the east side of that passage. The north edge is only approximately determined.

The Yárem is chiefly of white sand, or soft white stone; and on the northern edge there are many dark patches of rock on it. It is dry in parts at low water; some of the rocks on the north part uncover at half tide. The whole reef generally shows well, especially with the sun behind you.

TIDES.—The tides on the pearl bank, north of the Yárem shoal, set about east and west, and influence a ship's course across the gulf, often considerably. Along the east side of that shoal, they set north and south, and follow the bend of the harbour, setting into and out of it; the flood also sets to south-eastward, between Maharag and Bahreín islands, and to north-westward through the Khor al Báb. It sets to the southward, outside Maharag island. Its velocity in the harbour is from one to two knots. High water on full and change is at $5\frac{1}{2}$ hours; rise and fall 7 feet. The amount of the rise, and the depths of the water, are dependent to a certain extent on the wind, whether a north-wester or a south-easter.

DIRECTIONS.—When bound to Bahreín from the northward, (Bú-shehr, &c.,) if a large vessel, she would have to avoid Rennie shoal*. A departure had best be taken from Jebel Dreng, which should bear about N.E., in 20 to 30 fathoms water; from which position, a S.S.W. course will take her well clear of that shoal, and, according to the tide, she would strike either the Bú Amámah or Bú Athámah pearl bank. If drawing less than 15 feet, she may steer a direct course for these banks from Bú-shehr outer roads.

If she shoal suddenly from 35 fathoms to 12, and perhaps 6 on the pearl bank, deepening again when over it to 20 and 25, she has passed over the eastern or Bú Athámah bank; but if she shoal gradually to 20, then quickly to 9 or 8, afterwards deepening only to 12 or 13, she has struck

* See page 125, least water 17 feet.

120 ARABIAN COAST; RAS REKKEN TO JEZÍRET DÚBÍYÁN. [CH. VIII]

the Bú Amámah, and must then steer South, so as not to sight Maharag island on a bearing to the southward of S.S.W. To the east south-eastward of the two pearl banks mentioned above, there is a space of 30 or 40 miles, east and west, on the edge of the pearl bank, to the eastward of the meridian of 51° , with overfalls of from 9 to 20 fathoms, called Abú Kharáb.

The soundings, after deepening over the pearl bank, shoal again soon to 8 and 7 fathoms, and she may get a cast of 5, on the little bank shown on the chart, in which case she is sure of her position.

A good look out should be kept from aloft; the edge of the Yárem will probably be seen, by the pale green water, especially in the morning.*

The date trees on Maharag, Jebel Dukhán, and Ruf'ah fort will be sighted nearly at the same time if the weather be clear.

For a large vessel: centre of Dukhán on with Samáhi, the eastern of the three clumps first seen, is a good leading mark for clearing the detached $2\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms patch off the south-east point of the Yárem; and she must keep this mark on (or the trees bearing S.S.W.) until she is sure of being to the southward of that patch.

A small vessel might run over this patch by keeping Dukhán on with Bisetín trees, the westernmost clump on Maharag, hauling up to south-westward as soon as she deepened over it.

Entering the Harbour.—The winds being north-westerly during the greater portion of the year, are generally fair for running in: in the morning a vessel might have to work in against the land wind. In the morning it is advisable to hug the Yárem side, as the Maharag reef would not be seen under the sun; in the afternoon the reverse is the case.

It would not be advisable for a vessel with a north-westerly wind to stand down towards Maharag on the S. by W. $\frac{1}{4}$ W. course after being clear of the south-east point of the Yárem, as she might not be able to weather Ras Khaseifeh. There is no cross bearing to tell when you are past the south-east corner of the Yárem: the distance off Maharag, if the edge of the Yárem cannot be seen from aloft, must be the guide, or when Bisetín grove and Galáleh tower, the right and left hand objects visible on Maharag, subtend an angle of not less than 19° , you must be South of the detached patch. You may then haul up to S.W. by W. $\frac{1}{4}$ W. or W.S.W. until the two minarets are in one with Jebel Dukhán, when you are in the

* These directions are thus given, as the place has often to be made before the morning sights, and the tides are apt to set a vessel either to eastward, or westward. In the former case, the north-east point of the Yárem would be a danger; in the latter, she might make the Dibal shoal (a set of 9 miles either way would be sufficient for this). If attention be paid to the soundings, as given above, her position can hardly be a matter of doubt.

CHAP. VIII.]

KHOR AL BÁB.

121

fairway and may steer for them: as soon as Galáleh tower shuts in behind Reyah grove you are past the most projecting part of Ras Khaseifeh, the north-west spit off Maharag island. A ship drawing more than 15 or 16 feet, should anchor with Sayeh rocky islet on with Bisetín clump in $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 fathoms, and 3 miles from the town. It is more convenient for a small vessel to go into the inner anchorage, where she will be only a mile from the town; to do so; when Bisetín clump bears East, stand S. by E., looking out for the Zarwán point of the reef, which will be well seen from aloft; when past it, or, when Sayeh islet opens out clear to the north of Maharag island, and the Sheikh's house bears S.E. $\frac{1}{2}$ S., haul in for the native boats, and anchor a little outside them, close over to the Zarwán side, in $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 fathoms.

The minarets will have been lost sight of from the deck, behind the trees, before reaching Zarwán, perhaps from aloft they might be kept in sight.

In working out of the inner anchorage, which will generally have to be done, unless any land wind there may be early in the morning be taken advantage of, very short tacks must be made till past Ras Zarwán, there being less than half a mile of clear channel to work in. The west side of Maharag reef, south of Ras Khaseifeh, is steep-to, 6 fathoms, in some parts, being close to its edge; the eye must be the chief guide. After passing Zarwán, the minarets on with Ruf'ah fort, is a good tacking mark on the west side of the harbour, till past the Jádúm point of the Yárem shoal.

Between the south side of Maharag and the north-east side of Bahrein island is an inlet, or Khor, from half to one mile wide, with soundings of 3 to 6 fathoms, which runs close up to Maharag town, and is much used by native vessels; the approaches have not been examined, and it has never been used by European vessels. The shallow Maharag creek, already mentioned, joins this with Bahrein harbour; but large native vessels have to go round outside Maharag island. The eye must be the guide, attempting to enter this south-east harbour, as it has been called, until a survey has been made. The natives call it Khor Jalíyeh. Its entrance is round the point of the reef, which extends 4 miles to south-eastward from Al Hed village on Maharag island.

KHOR AL BÁB is the name given to the passage south of the Fusht al Yárem, leading from Bahrein to Katif. It has been partly examined by Lieut. Whish, I. N.; pilots can be obtained in Bahrein to take a vessel drawing 16 feet water through. The entrance to it is on the west side of Bahrein harbour, round the Jádúm, or south point of the Yárem; when in the entrance, the Portuguese fort is in one with Jebel Dukhán,

122 ARABIAN COAST; RAS REKKEN TO JEZÍRET BÚBÍYÁN. [CH. VIII.]

and Reyah date trees bear E. by S. The pilots always get a shoal cast on the south end of the Jádún, so as to be sure which side they are on, and then bear up to south-westward into the Khor. The direction of the Khor is N.W. by N., and the average breadth a mile, with soundings of $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 fathoms.

Three miles within the entrance is a branch of the Khor to westward, on the reef, on the south side of which, is a small sand-bank, hardly covered at high water, which always has flocks of birds on it, called Marwádi. On the north side of this branch channel is a reef called Khor-fusht, which has several sand-banks on it, and a remarkable spring of *fresh water* on its southern edge, which has always 2 or 3 feet on it at low water. It is difficult to find, except at low water, when the sea is smooth. A transit mark for it is the Portuguese fort in one with the highest part of Marwádi sand.*

The Khor-fusht reef, on its east side, towards the Khor al Báb is very steep-to, but shows plainly, while you shoal more gradually on the Yárem side. On the Yárem reef, about 2 miles from its western edge, is a rock or islet, dry at high water, $11\frac{1}{2}$ miles N. $\frac{3}{4}$ W. from the Portuguese fort. It is called J'ilahat, and tradition says there was once a fort on it, of which, however, there are now no traces. When this bears N.E. by E. you are clear to northward of the Khor-fusht. This rock and the Marwádi sand are useful marks in beating through the Khor.

The best channel then lies between the shore reef, extending off the point south of Katif, called Ras Chawáchab (page 112), the Chaschús sand, near the outer edge of which is some guide to its position, and a detached shoal, called Najweh, with a dry sand-bank on it, about 7 miles S.E. of Ras Tanúreh. There is a channel also to the northward of this last shoal, between it and the Yárem, but the other is generally preferred by the Arabs, being more sheltered, as well as more direct.

A projecting point of the shore reef, about 7 miles south of Ras Tanúreh, is called Ras al Khalf, and has a fresh water spring on it, under the sea. The passage between it and Najweh is between 2 and 3 miles wide, with $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 6 fathoms. The Chaschús sand is nearly 8 miles from the shore, so that little is seen of the coast in working up.

From Ras Chawáchab the coast runs to N.W. towards Katíf, 10 miles below which place are a number of small rocky hills, visible about 9 miles, which are called Maráchibat Sadún, from their resembling a number of baghalahs hauled up.

* H. M. Schooner *Mahi*, I. N., lay here sheltered from all winds, and filled up with water by means of a pipe and hose which conveyed the water through the sea into the boat, the vessel lying within a quarter of a mile of the spring.

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS

1.06

The General Treaty with Britain, 1820;
British policy towards Bahrain,
1820-1823;
Bahraini relations with Persia and Oman

Treaties and Undertakings, etc., in force between the British Government and the Rulers of Bahrain, 1820—1914

[Note.—In the event of doubt hereafter arising as to the precise interpretation of any portion of the English, Arabic text of one or other of the Treaty stipulations, the English text shall be considered decisive.]

No. 1.

TRANSLATION OF THE PRELIMINARY TREATY WITH THE SHAIKHS OF BAHRAIN, 1820.

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE!

Know all men there hath come into the presence of General Sir William Grant Keir the Saied Abdool Jalil, Vakool on the part of the Shaikhs Sulaiman bin Ahmed and Abdulla bin Ahmed, and there have passed between the General and the said Abdool Jalil, on the part of the abovenamed, the following stipulations:—

ARTICLE 1.

That the Shaikhs shall not permit from henceforth, in Bahrain or its dependences, the sale of any commodities which have been procured by means of plunder and piracy, nor allow their people to sell anything of any kind whatsoever to such persons as may be engaged in the practice of plunder; and if any of their people shall act contrary hereto, it shall be equivalent to an act of piracy on the part of such individuals.

ARTICLE 2.

That they shall deliver up all the Indian prisoners who may be in their possession.

ARTICLE 3.

The Shaikhs Sulaiman bin Ahmed and Abdulla bin Ahmed shall be admitted to the terms of the general treaty with the friendly Arabs. End of the articles.

Issued at Shargah in triplicate on Saturday, the twentieth of the month of Raboool-Thony, in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the fifth of February one thousand eight hundred and twenty.

W. G. KEIR, *Major-General.*

The above articles accepted by me in quality of Vakool of the Shaikh named above.

(Sd.) SAEED ABDOOL BIN SAEED YAS AL TABATABAI.

No. 2.

TRANSLATION OF THE GENERAL TREATY WITH THE ARAB TRIBES OF THE PERSIAN GULF, 1820.

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE!

Praise be to God, who hath ordained peace to be a blessing to his creatures. There is established a lasting peace between the British Government and the Arab tribes, who are parties to this contract, on the following conditions:—

ARTICLE 1.

There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy by land and sea on the part of the Arabs, who are parties to this contract, for ever.

ARTICLE 2.

If any individual of the people of the Arabs contracting shall attack any that pass by land or sea of any nation whatsoever, in the way of plunder and piracy and not of acknowledged war, he shall be accounted an enemy of all mankind and shall be held to have forfeited both life and goods. An acknowledged war is that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by government against government; and the killing of men and taking of goods without proclamation, avowal, and the order of a government, is plunder and piracy.

ARTICLE 3.

The friendly (literally the pacified) Arabs shall carry by land and sea a red flag, with or without letters in it, at their option, and this shall be in a border of white, the breadth of the white in the border being equal to the breadth of the red as represented in the margin (the whole forming the flag known in the British Navy by the title of white pierced red), this shall be the flag of the friendly Arabs, and they shall use it and no other.

ARTICLE 4.

The pacified tribes shall all of them continue in their former relations, with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other, and the flag shall be a symbol of this only and of nothing further.

ARTICLE 5.

The vessels of the friendly Arabs shall all of them have in their possession a paper (Register) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the vessel, its length, its breadth, and how many Arabs it holds. And they shall also have in their possession another writing (Port Clearance) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the owner, the name of the Nakhoda, the number of men, the number of arms from whence sailed, at what time, and to what port bound. And if a British or other vessel meet them, they shall produce the Register and the clearance.

ARTICLE 6.

The friendly Arabs, if they choose, shall send an envoy to the British Residency in the Persian Gulf with the necessary accompaniments, and he shall remain there for the transaction of their business with the Residency; and the British Government, if it chooses, shall send an envoy also to them in like manner; and the envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the Chief in the paper (Register) of their vessels, which contains the length of the vessel, its breadth, and tonnage; the signature of the envoy to be renewed every year. Also all such envoys shall be at the expense of their own party.

ARTICLE 7.

If any tribe or others, shall not desist from plunder and piracy, the friendly Arabs shall act against them according to their ability and circumstances, and an arrangement for this purpose shall take place between the

friendly Arabs and the British at the time when such plunder and piracy shall occur.

ARTICLE 8.

The putting men to death after they have given up their arms is an act of piracy and not of acknowledged war; and if any tribe shall put to death any persons, either Muhammedans or others, after they have given up their arms, such tribe shall be held to have broken the peace; and the friendly Arabs shall act against them in conjunction with the British, and, God willing, the war against them shall not cease until the surrender of those who performed the act and of those who ordered it.

ARTICLE 9.

The carrying off of the slaves, men, women, or children from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature.

ARTICLE 10.

The vessels of the friendly Arabs, bearing their flag above described, shall enter into all the British ports and into the ports of the allies of the British so far as they shall be able to effect it; and they shall buy and sell therein, and if any shall attack them the British Government shall take notice of it.

ARTICLE 11.

These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all tribes and persons, who shall hereafter adhere thereto in the same manner as to those who adhere to them at the time present. End of the Articles.

Signed at Bhargah by the Vakool on the part of the Shaikhs Sulciman bin Ahmed and Abdulla bin Ahmed, in his quality of Vakool to the Shaikhs aforesaid, on Saturday, the twentieth of the month of Rubec-oes-Sanee in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the 5th of February 1820.

(Sd.) SYUD ABDOOL JALIL BIN SYUD YAS,

*Vakool of Shaikh Sulciman bin Ahmed and
Shaikh Abdulla bin Ahmed of the family of
Khalifah, Shaikhs of Bahrain.*

Signed at Ras-ool-Khoimeh at the
time of issue by

(Sd.) W. GRANT KEIR, *Major-General.*

(L. S.)

Signed and accepted by Sulciman bin Ahmed, of the house of Khalifah, at Bahrain, on the 9th of Jamadi-ool-Awal in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the 23rd February 1820.

(L. S.)

Signed and accepted by Abdulla bin Ahmed of the house of Khalifah, at Bahrain, on the 9th of Jamadi-ool-Awal in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the twenty-third of February 1820.

(L. S.)

المعاهدات والمنعقدة فيما بين حاكم البحرين والدولة

البحرية القيصرية الانكليزية

١٨٢٠ — ١٩١٤ ع

١٢٣٥ — ١٣٣٢ هـ

للملاحظة

إذا بعد هذا حصل الاشتباه في معنى بعبارة أى جزء من نص
الشرايط والمعاهدات كان الانكليزية او عربياً فالنص الانكليزي
مرتبك به للتوضيح ذلك قطعاً

No. 1.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

اعلموا كل الناس قد حضر عند السردار احمد رال سر راليم كرديت خير السوء بعد الجليل
الركيل من طرف الشيوخين سليمان بن احمد و عبد الله بن احمد و صار بين السردار و بين السيد
بعد الجليل من طرف المذكورين هذه الشروط -

الشرط الأول - ان يردن الشيوخ في كل الأوقات في البحرين والمعلقين عليه يتابع من
الحال الذي حصله بالذهب والغارات و لا يردن قرومهم شيئاً في كل الذهب والغارات من كل جالس و
ان كان من قرومهم يفعلون من ذلك فهذا كمثل الذهب والغارات -

الشرط الثاني - ان يسلموا الا سواه من الهارب جديهم ان كان في ايديهم شيئاً -

الشرط الثالث - فيقبلون الشيوخين سليمان بن احمد و عبد الله بن احمد شروط الصلح
الدائم كما اجارها العرب المصلحون جديهم - ثم الشروط - و ان تحرير القول في الماركة بثلاثة نسخ
في تاريخ يوم السبت عشرين من شهر ربيع الثاني سنة ١٢٣٥ الهجرية ما يكون خمس وثلاثين
بعد ألف -

خط السردار و خاتمه




W. GRANT KBIR,
Major-General.

فرشع سلمان بن احمد آل خليفة
في ٩ جمادى اول سنة ١٢٣٥ في البحرين
و قبلوا ذلك في ظاهرة يوم الاربعاء



بسم الله قد قبلت هذه الشروط المذكورة في
هذه الزفة بحسب ركناتي من الشيوخين الدومي
الزوما امته و ان لا تقدر الى الله تعالى السود
عبد الجليل بن السيد يسر العباد طهالي



٢

No. 2.

معاهدة العمومية مع الاقوام العرب في خليج فارس في سنة ١٨٢٠ ع

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله الذي جعل الصلح خيراً للنام و بعد قد صار الصلح الدائم بين دولة سرکار الانكليز
و بين الطوائف العربية المشروطين على هذه الشروط -

الشرط الأول - ان يزال الذهب والغارات في البر والبحر من طرف العرب المشروطين في
كل الأوقات -

الشرط الثاني - ان تعرض احد من قوم العرب المشروطين على المتدربين في البر والبحر
من كاتبة الناس بالذهب والغارات بلا حرب معروضة فهو عد و لكافة الناس فليس له الا ما كان على حاله
ولا ماله و الحرب المعروضة هو الذي منتهى به مدين مأمورية من دولة الى دولة و قتل الناس و اخذ
المال بغير مصادرة و تبدين و امر دولة فهو الذهب والغارات -



الشرط الثالث - ان العرب المصلحين لهم في البر والبحر علم
لهم فيه حرب او بلا حرب على مظلومهم و هو في كفة ايض عرض الأبيض
الذي في الكفة يعادل عرض الأحرار كما هو مقرر في العاشية و ان هذا هو
علم العرب المصلحين فيستعملون به و لا يستعملون بغيره -

الشرط الرابع - ان الطوائف المصلحين كانهم على حالة الأول الا انهم صار الصلح بينهم و
بين دولة سرکار الانكليز و ان لا يحارب بعضهم بعضاً و العلم هو الشاهد على ذلك فليس هو شاهد
على غيره -

الشرط الخامس - ان مركب العرب المصلحين كلهم بايديهم قرطاس مشروم بخط اميرهم
فيه اسم المركب و طوله و عرضه و كم يعمل من كاره و بايديهم ايضاً مكتوب آخر مشروم بخط اميرهم
فيه اسم صاحب المركب و اسم اللخدة و عدد الرجال و عدد السلاح و من اين سار و في اي وقت و
الى اي بندر يخرجه فان تعرضوا لمركب من الانكليز او غورهم يعرضون عليه القرطاس و المكتوب -

الشرط السادس - ان العرب المصلحين ان كان مرادهم يرسلون رسوة الى سرکار الانكليز في
بحر الفارس و معه الذي يحتاج اليه فيجلس مع السرکار حتى يقضي غرضهم منه و سرکار الانكليز
ان كان مراده يرسل رسوة اليه عندهم كذلك و الرسول ياتي خطه الى خط اميرهم في قرطاس
مراكيبهم المذكور الذي فيه طول المركب و عرضه و كم يعمل من كاره و يبدئي خط الرسول بتجدد في
كل سقة و ايضاً كل من الرسولين يخرج على قومه -

الشرط السابع - ان كل طائفة او غيرهم لا يزالون من الذهب والغارات فالعرب المصلحين
يقومون عليهم على قدر حالهم و يصور بين العرب المصلحين و بين الانكليز كلام في ذلك في وقت
توقيع ذلك الذهب والغارات -

الشرط الثامن - ان قتل الناس بعد تسليم السلاح فهو من الغارات و لا من العرب

المعروف و ان كان طائفة يقتل الناس مسلمين او غيره بعد تسليم السلاح فهو قد اخاف الصلح فان
العرب المصالحين مع الانكليز يقرمون عليهم و ان شاء الله تعالى فلا يزال عليهم الحرب الا بعد تسليم
من فعل بذلك و حكم به -

الشرط التاسع - ان ذهب الرقيق الرجال و النساء و الاولاد في سواحل السودان او غيره
و حملهم في المراكب فهو من الذهب و الغارات فالعرب المصالحين لا يفعلون من ذلك شيئاً -

الشرط العاشر - ان مراكب العرب المصالحين الحاملة عثمانيين المذكور يدخلون في كل
بنادر دولة سركار الانكليز و في بنادر زبنتهم على قدرهم يشتررون و يبيعون فيها و ان كان احد تعرض
لهم نذلك على سركار الانكليز -

الشرط الحادي عشر - ان هذا الشرط المذكورة فهي على جميع الطوائف و الناس يقبلونها
في المستقبل كما قبلوها في الحين - تم الشرط - و ان تعذر القول في راس الخيمة بثلاثة نسخ في
تاريخ ظهر يوم السبت الثامن و عشرين من شهر ربيع الأول في سنة ١٢٣٥ الهجرية مايقون خمس و
ثلاثين بعد الالف و رسمه المشروطون في الأماكن و التاريخ المذكورة ذيلاً فرسمه في راس الخيمة
في تاريخ تعذر القول -

خفا السردار بودة و خاتمه

(Sd.) W. GRANT KEIR,
Major-General.

* * * * *

بسم الله قد كتبه بيده السيد عبد الجليل بن السيد حسن الركيل عن الشيخ سليمان بن
احمد و الشيخ عبد الله بن احمد آل خليفة شقيقي البحرين -
فرسمه عبد الله بن احمد آل خليفة في ٩ جماد الأول سنة ١٢٣٥ في البحرين و قبل ذلك
في ظهيرة الأربعاء -

عبد الله بن
احمد آل خليفة

فرسمه سليمان بن احمد آل خليفة في ٩ جماد الأول سنة ١٢٣٥ في البحرين و قبل ذلك
في ظهيرة يوم الأربعاء -

سليمان بن احمد
آل خليفة

Bahrain affairs in connection with the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, 1819-1820.

When in 1819 an expedition was despatched from Bombay against the piratical stronghold of Rās-al-Khaimah, the policy of the British Government in regard to Bahrain was defined as one of complete abstention from interference between rival claimants to possession; and it was resolved to inform the 'Atbi Shaikh that, so long as he restrained his subjects from piracy, he would reap the advantages of a friendly neutrality on the part of Britain, whereas, should a piratical spirit manifest itself in Bahrain, the same measures of coercion would be applied to the 'Utūb as to the Qawāsim. The conclusion with the Shaikh of "an engagement similar to that negotiated by Mr. Bruce in the year 1816," which would assure the 'Utūb of the benevolence of British intentions, was also contemplated by Government. From the general line of action thus marked out there seems to have been no deviation.

British policy of neutrality in regard to Bahrain.

Designs of
Masqat and
Persia on
Bahrain,
1820.

The idea of transferring Bahrain to Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, which had at first been entertained, was thus definitely set aside; but the Saiyid himself did not neglect to make use of his temporary close connection with the British at Rās-al-Khaimah for the purpose of advancing his interests in Bahrain. The crippling of their allies, the Qawāsim, was a severe blow to the 'Utūb of Bahrain, who moreover suspected that the ruler of Masqat was encouraged and supported in his designs by the British Government; and so impressed were the Persians with the probability of the Saiyid's success on this occasion that at the beginning of 1820 the Government of Fārs, who had recently rather hung back in the matter, began to beg him to convey their troops to Bahrain; and the Prince Governor of Shirāz, when these applications failed, actually addressed himself to the commander of the British expedition and requested the loan of four or five transports, — a demand which, needless to say, was refused. An active share was taken in the Persian preparations by the 'Atbi freebooter Rahmah-bin-Jābir, formerly of Khor Hassān in Qatar, who was now domiciled at Dammām in Hasa.

Submission
of the 'Utūb
of Bahrain to
the Saiyid of
Masqat,
1820.

When, early in January 1820, Saiyid Sa'id parted from Sir W. Grant Keir at Rās-al-Khaimah, it was believed that he would immediately attack Bahrain without depending on any except his own resources, and this he may have intended to do; but the Āl Khalifah, now thoroughly alarmed, anticipated action on his part by making full submission through an agent whom they sent to Masqat. The terms arranged were that the 'Utūb of Bahrain should pay an annual tribute of \$30,000 to His Highness, while he should release certain 'Atbi Shaikhs whom he had detained and restore some Bahraini vessels and other property which he had taken at sea on their way from India. Both parties appear to have stipulated for a guarantee of this arrangement by the British Government, but none was apparently, obtained; later, however, an instalment of \$12,000 seems to have been actually remitted by the 'Utūb to Masqat on account of the promised tribute; and as to the fact of the tribute having been promised, at least, there can be no doubt whatever.

Direct
British
dealings with
Bahrain,
January
1820.

Some ten Qāsimi craft which were liable to destruction by the British armament at Rās-al-Khaimah having taken refuge in Bahrain, Captain Loch was despatched from Rās-al-Khaimah with H.M.S. "Eden" and H.M.S. "Curlew" to demand their surrender. This on the 17th of January 1820 he obtained, as also an agreement by the Shaikh not to admit any more boats of the same character into his port until

authorised to do so by the British authorities. The agreement, it is obvious, was merely temporary, and it must have been meant to facilitate the destruction of piratical craft which was then proceeding upon the whole Pirate Coast.

On the 5th of February 1820 a Preliminary Treaty of Peace, binding Salmān-bin-Ahmad and 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, Shaikhs of Bahrain, to prevent the sale of plundered goods, likewise the supply of necessaries to pirates, at places in their dominions and to deliver up all Indian prisoners, was executed at Shārah by Saiyid 'Abdul Jalil, a Wakil representing the Shaikhs.

Finally, as guaranteed to them in this Preliminary Treaty, the Shaikhs were admitted to the benefits of the General Treaty of Peace. It was signed by their agent at Shārah on the same day as the Preliminary Treaty, and by the Shaikhs themselves in Bahrain on the 23rd of February 1820.

Preliminary
Treaty of
Peace, 5th
February
1820.

General
Treaty
Peace, 23rd
of February
1820.

(III) DESIGNS OF PERSIA AND MASKAT ON BAHREIN.

227. After reporting the facts detailed above, Sir William Grant Koir added :—
Volume 52—49 of 1820-1821, page 169.

27. I am inclined to believe that the Persian Government have long been desirous of obtaining possession of the Island of Bahrein under an impression of its great riches and resources, which are considered to arise principally from the pearl fishery.

28. His Highness the Imam of Maskat informs me that he had repeatedly urged that Government to undertake a joint expedition for the purpose of placing him in possession of this island, and that he had agreed to supply ships and vessels for the purpose of transporting their united armies across the Gulf. His Highness was solicited about two months ago by the Prince of Shiraz to prepare his ships, but he replied that he was then engaged with the British Government in the suppression of piracy, and that his ships consequently could not be spared. The Imam might have given his reply from having been disappointed by the Persian Government for the two last seasons when the promised army had not been equipped, yet I still think that the army now said to be marching towards the coast has been moved under an expectation that the Imam will be induced to transport it to Bahrein; at all events this will be the ostensible and alleged reason of the movement, although the real causes of it may be the jealousy excited by the knowledge of His Highness's desire to repossess himself of this island, and the proximity of a British army with which His Highness is in strict co-operation.

29. By the messenger above mentioned the Imam has received a second application for his ships; to this he has replied that if the Prince of Shiraz would pledge on oath not again to deceive him respecting the promised army, and likewise to reimburse his expenses, he will proceed accordingly to wherever the army may be assembled.

30. The Imam has begged to know whether I see any objections to the employment of his ships in the conveyance of the Persian army, but I have declined to give any direct reply to this question, under the plea that my instructions do not relate to this point.

31. It may possibly have occurred to His Highness the Imam that the present is a favourable moment for making an independent attack on Bahrein, as although he might not be able to induce the British Government to join with him in this undertaking, he would at least enjoy the advantages arising from a British force being in the Gulf, a circumstance that would prevent the Bahreinise from being joined by allies who might otherwise assist them, although now overawed by the intimate alliance known to subsist betwixt His Highness and the British Government.

32. In the 8th paragraph of your letter of the 27th of October the Island of Bahrein is mentioned as one of the places where property obtained piratically was disposed of. Subsequent information on this head has tended to confirm the belief that it was even the principal channel through which the pirates were unable to convert into money the valuable merchandize which they captured.

33. Information having reached Captain Bruce that ten piratical vessels had taken refuge at this island, His Majesty's ships *Eden* and *Cutis* and the Honourable Company's cruiser vessel were despatched by Captain Collier three days ago for the purpose of demanding the surrender of these boats.

34. The Army of His Highness the Imamud of Maskat alluded to in my despatch of the 10th ultimo, arrived two days after the fall of Ras-ul-Khima, but as its presence had become unnecessary from the termination of our military operations before this place previous to its arrival, and as the strongest religious and other prejudices existed betwixt it and the inhabitants of this neighbourhood which precluded all hope of the minds of the people becoming settled and reconciled to what had occurred, whilst this Army should remain, I requested that His Highness would direct its return to his own territories beyond the mountains, a short distance from hence, and this movement was made accordingly.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY IN THE GULF: PROPOSED BRITISH SETTLEMENT IN THE GULF.

REMOVAL OF THE BRITISH DETACHMENT FROM RAS-UL-KHIMA TO THE ISLAND OF KISHM, 1820.

(1) (1) QUESTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY IN THE GULF.
(2) QUESTION OF REMOVING OUR RESIDENCY FROM BUSHIRE AND PROPOSED BRITISH SETTLEMENT IN THE GULF.

235. The attention of the Government having been directed to a consideration of the ultimate arrangements that it might be necessary to make for the purpose of maintaining the security of the navigation of the Persian Gulf on the termination of the expedition, they were desirous of availing themselves of the professional experience of Sir William Keir, and addressed him therefore the following communication on the 28th October 1819 :—

"The attention of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council having been directed to a consideration of the ulterior arrangement which it may be necessary to form for the purpose of maintaining the security of the navigation of the Gulf, on the termination of the present expedition, is desirous of availing himself of your professional experience in the decision of the important question.

The Governor in Council is satisfied that the object thus contemplated cannot, from the distracted state in which the Gulf has so long continued, arising out of the decline of the influence of those authorities which formerly exercised a control over it and of the ascendancy of the Power whose avowed views have been the prosecution of piracy, be attained without the interposition of the British Government in a more active degree than it has hitherto been our policy to adopt.

As a measure the most effectually conducive to the permanent suppression of piracy on the Persian Gulf, the occupation by the British Government of a central and commanding situation appears to be indispensable; nor is the Governor in Council aware of a more eligible station than the Island of Kishm for that purpose, upon which, however, your opinion is desired.

The next object for consideration is the formation of an establishment in the most economical scale, under a prospect of deriving from the customs of the port a revenue sufficient for its support, which under the arrangement the trade would experience from the British protection might be expected.

The transfer of the Residency from Bushire to the new station would supply all that appears to be essential to the political branch of the establishment, and the maintenance of the same number of cruisers and the presence of one of His Majesty's ships of war as have been for some time back kept in the Gulf, would furnish a maritime force without any enhancement of the expense, which has been hitherto increased for the security of its navigation.

The factory was originally established at Bushire to promote the vend of British goods in the interior of Persia by large consignments from Bombay. The more successful mode however in which the vend has been promoted within these few years back by periodical sale at the Residency has entirely superseded the necessity for continuing a commercial factory at Bushire, while whatever political advantages may be connected with our possessing an establishment in the Persian dominions, independently of that which is maintained by His Majesty's Government at Tehran for the protection of the commercial interest of this country and for preserving the political relations which have for so long a period subsisted between the Indian and the Persian Governments, could be secured more effectually probably at such an Island as Kishm as at Bushire.

The only additional expense there to which the British Government would be exposed by the transfer of the Bushire Residency to a more commanding situation in the Gulf would arise only of the military establishment which it would be necessary to maintain either at Kishm or any other station which you may prefer. Your opinion is therefore desired on the extent of force it may be necessary to keep in the Gulf, in the formation of which you will not fail to bear in mind that our security will principally depend, the more especially if an island be selected for the new establishment upon our maritime force.

The Governor in Council is also desirous of receiving your opinions upon the practicability of increasing the requisite control in the Gulf of Persia by the establishment merely of a factory in the Island of Kishm or any other more central station upon the same scale as exists at Bushire and under the participation of such privileges in the imports and exports of merchandise in British bottoms and of a share of the customs as may be necessary to compensate us in some degree for the expense we shall incur in the maintenance of a maritime force in the Gulf, in preference to the occupation of the whole of that or of any other island in full sovereignty.

The Governor in Council is also anxious to receive such suggestions as you may have to offer for the promulgation of a code of maritime regulations to be observed by the different tribes in the Gulf to enable the British cruisers to discriminate the one from the other, imposing restrictions in the equipment of their boats, and an obligation in them to admit our cruisers into their different ports and to search all vessels for the purpose of guarding against any of them being equipped for warlike purposes; and how far in your opinion the different petty States may be induced to acquiesce in such an arrangement under a clear understanding that our object is limited to the suppression of piracy and to re-establishment of a force and secure commercial intercourse between the different parts in the Gulf and those of India.

It is understood that the Island of Kishm, as well as Angar which is contiguous to it, belongs in full sovereignty to the Imam of Maskat and should the reports that may be received from you and the other persons to whom the consideration of this important subject has been confided be favourable to the measure now suggested, the necessary negotiation will be opened for obtaining possession of the spot that may be fixed upon for forming the establishment."

235A. The report of Sir William Grant Koir, dated 1st April 1820, on the points raised by the Bombay Government is a very interesting one and is quoted at length below:—

Volume 31—47 of 1820-1831, page 91.

The intention of removing the British factory from Bushire expected in your letter of the 28th of October last, induces me most respectfully to submit to the Honorable the Governor in Council a few considerations which have occurred to me after visiting that place.

2. It appears that on the removal of the British factory from Gomberoou to Bushire in the year 1764, the last mentioned place was an insignificant fishing village, and that it commenced to rise rapidly to its present state of prosperity from the period of that removal; it may, therefore, be fairly presumed that the presence of the British Factory by affording protection, and inspiring confidence, is the sole occasion of the flourishing condition of Bushire; for we may look in vain for any other adequate cause either in its internal Government, or in the Government of Persia to which it owes allegiance.

3. The British Government has, I understand, derived important advantages from the establishment of a considerable import and export trade to and from Bushire; in deriving these advantages it has induced many respectable merchants to settle at the place, and to remove to it property to a considerable amount, which occasioned the opening of an extensive trade with the interior of Persia by a new route. All this evinces a most gratifying faith in British protection, and a confidence has doubtless arisen that it will not be withdrawn without warning, and affording time for securing or removing without any considerable loss, valuable property that is risked under a pledge which may reasonably be implied, where benefits are reciprocal between a Government and individuals, who, by certain circumstances, controlled by that Government, have been induced to hazard their persons and effects in the territory of a State that is little aware of the advantages to be derived from affording protection to commerce, and security to property of all descriptions.

4. The Government are, I presume, possessed of the means of ascertaining readily whether the views now taken be correct; if they be, we may infer that much advantage would be derived, by affording time and opportunity for a trade established under British auspices, to take a new and natural course before removing the protection of a factory, under which it grew up. The establishment of a British settlement in the Gulf of Persia will naturally attract this trade, whilst that of Bushire will in probability decline, from the removal of affluent individuals with their property to our more enlightened Government, which will be calculated to diffuse commercial benefits by many new sources.

5. These considerations induce me respectfully to recommend that the factory at Bushire may not be removed before the general trade to that place shall have fallen naturally into the course it will in all probability take, soon after the establishment of a British settlement in the Gulf of Persia.

6. Having received an intimation from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at the Court of Persia that he conceived addresses from me "to the Shah, and Sudr Azam, would be productive of a good effect," I trust that the Governor in Council will approve of my having transmitted through Mr. Willock the communications of which the accompanying are drafts, I forward likewise a copy of my letter to Mr. Willock on this occasion.

7. Whilst at Bushire I received from His Royal Highness the Prince of Shiraz a communication of which I forward a translation as well as a draft of my reply. As connected with these letters I also transmit the translation of a communication from Hamn bin Jauher; to this I have not made any reply as I have not been favoured by the receipt of any instructions since the reference made respecting that person in the 14th paragraph of my despatch of the 25th of February.

8. The accompanying is a translation of a letter from His Highness the Imam of Maskat; a translation of his proposed agreement with the Utubis of Bahrein alluded to in his letter is also transmitted, as well as a copy of my reply to His Highness.

9. I now beg to refer to the letter from the Imam which accompanied my despatch of the 24th of February as well as to the remarks in the 15th, 16th and 17th paragraphs of that despatch. The difference in the tone of His Highness's communication now forwarded, and the profession of his great desire "to act in strict conformity to my wishes" was probably occasioned by his distrusting, not without reason certainly, the professions of the Prince of Shiraz respecting His Royal Highness's army being about to aid in the Bahrein expedition. The preparations for this expedition have, for these last two or three years, been made use of by the Prince of Shiraz, as an excuse for levying exactions of a most oppressive nature from many of the Sheikhs and other inhabitants of the Persian coast of the Gulf, by which much distress has been occasioned and the minds of all kept in a most harassing state of alarm and doubt; this has interrupted all the industrious pursuits that under due encouragement would tend materially to maintain the peace of the Gulf. It is, therefore, much to be desired that some decided steps should be taken to set the conflicting claims against the Utubis of Bahrein permanently at rest.

10. By the latest accounts received the day before I left Bushire, the Prince of Shiraz had left the sea coast, and was on his return to Shiraz, having, I understood, intimated that he had abandoned all intention of proceeding this year against Bahrein. The Imam of Maskat, who had reached the Island of Kishm with his ships and boats, in conformity to his agreement with the Prince, will thus again have been deceived by His Royal Highness, who appears to have a mean opinion of the Imam's penetration and judgment, and I understand that the Shiraz Government calculates upon deceiving the Imam at all times when it may be convenient for it to do so. The Imam will probably return to Maskat without being able to effect anything decisive against the Bahrein Government; this will, I trust, afford time for urging the mediation contemplated in the Honorable the Governor's letter of the 15th of December to Mr. Willock.

11. As connected with this subject I transmit a translation of a communication made to the Sheikhs of Bahrein according to the spirit of the despatch of the Governor in Council to the Governor-General, dated the 15th of December, and I beg leave to state that the ratification of these Sheikhs has been received to the preliminary treaty mentioned in the 14th paragraph of my despatch of the 7th of February, as having been entered into by their Vakils. Their ratification of the "General Treaty with the Arab tribes" extended to them at the same time has also been received.

12. I now transmit one of the original copies of the "General Treaty" having the autograph signatures of the different Chieftains. As the Chieftains of Imam and Am-ul-Guyyn appeared to enjoy a certain degree of independence of Sultan bin Sagger, I conceived that advantage might be derived from associating them by name in the General Treaty, and this was done accordingly.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

UNAUTHORIZED AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BY MR. BRUCE
WITH THE PRINCE OF SHIRAZ, SEPTEMBER 1822.

287. Mr. Bruce reported in his letter No. 35, dated 3rd September 1822, his proceedings in concluding an agreement with the Prince of Shiraz as regards Bahrain and other matters:—

Volume 90 of 1822.

No. 35, dated Shiraz Dagb Jaun Numah, the 3rd September 1822.

From—CAPTAIN W. BRUCE, Resident at Bushire,

To—THE HON'BLE MOUNTBATTEN ELPHINSTONE, President and Governor in Council, Bombay.

In reference to my address to the Honourable Board through the Chief Secretary, under date 6th ultimo, in this Department, No. 32, I have the honour to acquaint you that His Royal Highness fixed on the 8th ultimo for me to meet the Minister, Zikae Khan. I accordingly complied, when the communication referred to was made me in the presence of Mirza Banker Aubie, the Sheikh of Bushire, and two other Khans, Aga Baba Khan and Mirza Muhomed Ali Kafirakee. We discussed the subject, when certain stipulations were agreed to, and which the Minister informed me His Royal Highness had the permission of the Shah to say would be approved of and confirmed a Court when made known, and he requested I would therefore transmit them for your Hon'ble Board's consideration and approval as tending to cement the ties of amity and good understanding.

2. That he would in a few days draw them out in writing and have two copies transcribed, each of which we were to sign with the translation annexed: one Mirza Banker was to take up to Tehran to be laid before the Shah for his confirmation and approval, and the other I was to transmit to your Honourable Board.

3. The copies were finished and signed by each of us on the 30th ultimo, and last night Mirza Banker Aubie set off for Teheran with one of them; the other I have now the honour to transmit for the information of your Honourable Board, and shall be happy to learn it may meet their approbation.

4. With regard to a cruiser being furnished from the station at Bassadore should the Persian Government require it, the stipulations I have made for her to be supplied with provisions and necessities if detained beyond 40 days nearly amounts to the same as if she was not furnished, for the imbecility and tardiness of this Government in all their measures, with the very limited means they possess of meeting an expense of the kind, will always operate so as to forego the service of a vessel rather than incur the charge.

5. His Royal Highness has, I believe, made up his mind to fit out an expedition this winter against Bahrain, and if he should not meet with many obstacles in procuring tonnage for the embarkation of the troops, I have little doubt but what he will put it to the test; and in the event of his doing so, I think it more than probable he will take the island without much opposition. The Sheikh of Bushire has pledged himself to furnish his ships and buggalows for this service, which, if he performs, the other ports will readily supply such vessels as they possess.

6. But His Royal Highness builds more upon carrying his wishes about Bahrain in overtures which he thinks the Beni Attaboe Sheikhs will make to him after he gets down on the coast, and which he will readily accept if they tend at all to place the island as subordinate to his authority, however limited that may be, rather than risk the attempt by force.

7. The ostensible reason of the Prince being more urgent for the expedition taking place so soon is to avoid being called up to Court this winter, which he certainly will, unless he can occupy himself on some expedition of the kind that will require his personal attention with the principal officers of his Court; while at the same time the charges attending an armament necessary for a service of the kind will be a State charge, and afford reasons sufficient for any default that may arise in the regular remittances to the Royal Treasury; whereas, if he should proceed to Court, his expenses and the necessary presents required would amount to something very considerable, and be entirely out of his own privy purse.

8. The Island of Bahrain hovering again under the authority of Persia will tend more to the tranquillity of the Arabian side of the Gulf than almost any other act, and will at once do away the constant petty acts of aggression and retaliation existing between the different branches of the Beni Attaboe Arabs, particularly so between Abdella bin Ahmed and Rahma bin Jauba, both of whom the Honourable Board would learn from Colonel Kennet had lately

been with him, and who found it nearly impossible to make up the difference existing between them; indeed, so much so, that Rahma bin Jauba had gone down to Maskat to lay his case before the Imaum and Abdella bin Ahmed had returned to Bahrain.

9. His Royal Highness, after the signing of the engagements now transmitted for the consideration of Government, sent me, as a mark of honour and respect, a horse, sword, shawl jubba; at the same time sent me word that an officer would attend me down to Bassadore charged with a similar mark of respect for Colonel Kennet, that the tribes in the lower part of the Gulf may know the amicable footing existing and the respect His Royal Highness entertains for the British force.

10. The Minister, Zikae Khan, and his son, Kair-collah Khan, have also sent a horse each in a present, and previous to my leaving this I shall make suitable returns to whoever it may be necessary, and shall send His Royal Highness an appropriate present on my return to Bushire, not having any articles by me just now that will answer for that purpose.

11. The Prince having gone out to the Chemisafah on a hunting excursion for some time, I deemed it a mark of respect due to wait on him there, and accordingly did so on the 31st ultimo, accompanied by Lieutenant Hart of the Pioneers, to pay my respects and take my leave previous to my quitting this city. He was much gratified at the attention, and very politely asked us to stay a few days in his camp, from which I excused myself as being anxious to arrange matters for proceeding down to Bassadore. He informed me he had directed Sadook Khan, Failee, to attend me on the way down and until I should arrive at Bushire, but desired I would not leave Shiraz for eight or ten days, to allow the weather to become a little cooler, which would check the epidemic cholera, which prevailed in the route of the southern ports.

12. I returned here from His Royal Highness's camp yesterday, and purpose leaving this on my way to Bassadore about the 15th instant, and hope to be there by the end of the month, when I shall have the honour to forward plan of my route down, which Lieutenant Hart, who accompanies me, has undertaken to keep and draw out.

13. I shall be most happy to learn that my compliance with His Royal Highness's wishes in coming up to Shiraz and my conduct during my stay here may meet the approbation of Government, who, I trust, will sanction and approve of the presents I must necessarily make, and to which every due attention to economy shall be paid.

14. The horses which I have received shall be disposed of on my arrival at Bassadore, as it would have a bad appearance if I was to do so here, and the sword and shawl jubba I shall retain at the disposal of Government.

288. The following letter was addressed by the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Captain W. Bruce, Resident at Bushire, No. 1491, dated the 1st November 1822:—

You have been already apprised by my letters dated the 8th August and 23rd of September of the Governor in Council's disapprobation of your journey to Shiraz.

2. I am now directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated September 3rd, and to communicate to you the observations and instructions which it has suggested.

3. The Governor in Council directs me to express his surprise that you should have entered on a negotiation with the Prince at Shiraz which was never contemplated by Government, and for which you were neither furnished with instructions nor with powers. He observes that the treaty which has been the result of those negotiations is not only unauthorized, but entirely inconsistent with the views of Government and with the obligations of the public faith.

4. The treaty grounds your supposed mission on errors of the British Government, which have never been admitted, and on which the Governor in Council is still unconvinced.

5. It admits the claim of the King of Persia to Kishm contrary to all history, to the protections of His Highness the Imaum of Maskat, and to the repeated declarations of this Government. It thereby admits the occupation of that island without the King of Persia's consent to have been an unjust aggression, and it agrees to admit a Persian force into Kishm, and to make over to the Persians the island which we received from the Imaum.

6. It acknowledges the King of Persia's title to Bahrain, of which there is not the least proof and which the British Government cannot assert without injuring the pretensions of the Imaum and the Attaboos. It promises our aid against every power possessed of an island in the Gulf, and expressly against the Attaboos, to whom we are bound by a treaty of friendship, and with whose conduct we have every reason to be satisfied.

7. It cancels, as an encroachment on Persia, the part of Sir W. Keir's treaty, by which the Attaboos are bound to carry the flag of friendly Arabs; it places our voluntary payment to the sufferers at Linga on the footing of a concession to Persia; and it makes the appointment of a Resident at Bushire a point of negotiation with the Prince of Shiraz.

8. The effect of this treaty would be to compromise the dignity of the British Government, and to overturn every part of the policy which it has adopted in relation to the power of the Persian Gulf.

9. The Governor in Council has, therefore, been obliged to disavow the treaty in the most explicit terms; and the more clearly to mark his disapprobation of the whole proceeding

He has been pleased to remove you from your appointment of Resident at Bushire and to direct you to return to Bombay, delivering over charge of the factory at Bushire to the Surgeon at the Residency, and of all instructions relating to the general politics of the Gulf to Lieutenant-Colonel Kennett.

289. The following is the draft of a letter, a Persian translation of which was signed and addressed by the Governor of Bombay to His Royal Highness Hossein Ali Mirza, the Prince Regent of Persia:—

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Royal Highness's letter, and am most sensible of the friendly feelings and grateful for the sentiments of regard with which you are pleased to honour me. The allusions in your Royal Highness's letter to negotiations with Captain Bruce have since been explained by a treaty forwarded by that gentleman.

It is a subject of much concern to this Government to find that Captain Bruce has thus exceeded his powers, and I, therefore, lose no time in apprising Your Royal Highness of the mistake into which that gentleman has fallen.

It is proper to explain clearly to your Royal Highness that Captain Bruce had been merely directed to return to his duty at Bushire, and had received no authority to proceed to Shiraz, and no powers or credentials to enter on any negotiation whatever with your Royal Highness; the treaty which he has concluded is, therefore, his own act, and not that of this Government. I accordingly disavow it, and desire it to be considered exactly as if it had never been written.

After this declaration it is unnecessary to discuss the articles of the treaty. It appears necessary, however, for me to remark that it is not the intention of this Government to take any part in the claims of the several powers and States of the Persian Gulf further than may be necessary to prevent a renewal of piracy. With respect to the flag said to have been granted to the Attabees, the fact is, that by the treaty concluded by Sir W. G. Keit with all the Arab Chiefs in the Gulf, it is agreed that, for the purpose of distinguishing the pirates from those who abstain from piracy, the latter should carry a white square within a red flag; this being the case, there can be nothing in the flag to give offence to Persia, as there is not the smallest connection between it and the British flag, nor the smallest pretension to superiority on the part of the British Government.

With regard to Kishm, I had long since applied to the Most Noble the Governor-General for his consent for the recall of the detachment, and having now obtained it, the troops have already been ordered to return, and the island to be made over to the Imam of Maskat, from whom it was received by the British Government; but in doing so, this Government is actuated by considerations of its own convenience: and with respect to the claims of the Government of Persia on that island, they have not as yet been proved.

The embarrassment Captain Bruce's mistake must lead to is much regretted by this Government, but I beg leave to assure you that my respect for your Royal Highness and my wish to preserve the friendly relations between the British and Persian Governments undiminished. I trust, therefore, that Your Royal Highness will not allow any distrust to enter your mind on account of this unauthorized and unforeseen proceeding of Captain Bruce.

I beg leave to apprise Your Royal Highness that that officer has been recalled to India, and that another gentleman will be appointed to succeed him, who will make it his business to cultivate and improve the existing friendship.

Your Royal Highness's correspondence will at all times be a source of much gratification and any commissions you may have in the quarter shall be promptly executed.

290. *Translation of an Agreement proposed by His Royal Highness Hossein Ali Mirza through his Minister Zeki Khan and discussed between him and William Bruce, Esq., Resident of Bushire, on 8th August 1822.*

PREAMBLE.

As the arrangement and settlement of the affairs of subjects are entrusted to Kings and their Governors, and the prosperity of the States depends upon the unanimity and friendship existing between Governors of adjoining Provinces for this purpose, the States of Great Britain and Persia entered into terms of amity and good understanding, that the subjects of each and their forces might enjoy tranquillity and prosperity, the Governors of Provinces adjacent had maintained this appearance and had rested satisfied without actually fulfilling them. Two years previous to this it became necessary to suppress the piratical acts committed by the Joasmis (?) for which purpose troops arrived from India in the Gulf of Persia and a few acts were committed by them erroneously which did not accord with the good understanding existing with this State, in consequence of which His Royal Highness Hossein Ali Mirza deemed it advisable for the good of his Government to make known

these acts of misunderstanding to the Government appertaining nearest to his own that they might be aware of what had occurred, that some explanation might be offered for His Royal Highness to act upon, and for this reason deputed Mirza Bungbir, Military Secretary, to proceed to Bombay at the time that the Hon'ble Mount Stuart Elphinstone was Governor of it and of its dependencies, and he came to an explanation with the Hon'ble the Governor who showed every wish and inclination to preserve the good understanding and for which purpose deputed Captain Bruce as the Hon'ble Campaign's Resident to Bushire as the Government Agent. After his arrival, His Royal Highness directed his attendance and on the 8th of August 1822 or 20th Zilkad, 1237 Hijree, at Shiraz, came to an amicable decision and understanding with Mahomed Zaki Khan, Sirdar and Minister of Persia, the following engagements being agreed upon:—

1st.—That the Vakils of the two States enter into friendly discussions and explanations tending to cement the ties of amity and good understanding between the Governors of the adjacent countries.

2nd.—The Island of Bahrain which has always been subordinate to the Province of Fars and its possessors, the Beni Attabi Arabs who have of late been unruly and disobedient and had applied to the Commanding Officer of the British forces of a distinguishing flag. This flag, if it has been granted to be withdrawn, and no assistance to be rendered to be Beni Attabi Arabs, hereafter.

3rd.—That such losses as the inhabitants of Linkay and Charrack may have suffered by mistake in the destruction of their vessels, to be restored in kind, if forthcoming, if not, made good in money by the Government Vakil.

4th.—With regard to Captain Bruce's residing at Bushire, as the Government of Persia had applied for his removal and another officer to be appointed, supposing him to have committed acts contrary to the good understanding between the States, which he having cleared up to the satisfaction of his own Government while Mirza Bungbir was present and shown every inclination to forward the interests of the two *Sirkars*, the Government deemed it advisable to re-nominate him to his former duties, and His Royal Highness, being equally convinced, has preferred him being re-appointed to any other officer, and requested it accordingly.

5th.—The British forces who had taken a position in an island on the coast of Persia and who had been requested to withdraw. As the Hon'ble the Governor of Bombay has expressed a wish for their being allowed to remain for a time for the sake of appearances and benefit derived thereby. In consequence His Royal Highness deemed it advisable for the safety and tranquillity of the Gulf, and to preserve the intercourse free and uninterrupted, has complied for the term of five years and until a naval equipment sufficient for the purpose can be gradually collected on the following conditions:—

1st.—That if previous to the five years His Royal Highness should have collected a naval force sufficient to ensure the tranquillity of the Gulf and will pledge himself to that effect, the British forces to withdraw on the assurance and pledge being given.

2nd.—That if the British forces should be considered too great, with a view to economy, they are to be reduced and an equivalent force to be furnished by His Royal Highness under the orders of an officer to encamp on the island and to attend to their wishes and desires.

3rd.—The British and Persian forces to take positions on any island on the coast of Persia, the climate of which

may be found to be the best and which His Royal Highness may nominate and deem advisable.

4th.—Should His Royal Highness during the period the British troops are stationed in the Gulf require the services of one or two cruisers from the station to proceed to any of the islands or ports of Persia, they are to be furnished, and particularly so on the present occasions when an expedition is in contemplation against Bahrain to reduce it to obedience, His Royal Highness promising after the service may be over to dismiss the vessels with proper honour and respect. Should the vessels be required beyond the period of 40 days, provisions and necessaries to be supplied by His Royal Highness, in failure of which the vessels are at liberty to return.

5th.—Such vessels and stores as His Royal Highness may require, to be at liberty to purchase them in any of the ports of India without molestation from the Government.

The Vakils of the two Governments who now exchange engagements agree to present them to their respective Governments for their consideration and approbation, and for the guidance of each other in case of change of Governors.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

REMOVAL OF MR. BRUCE AND APPOINTMENT OF LIEUTENANT MACLEOD AS RESIDENT AT BUSHIRE. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEW RESIDENT AS TO THE BRITISH POLICY IN THE GULF—NOVEMBER 1822.

291. After the recent unauthorized proceedings of Mr. Bruce, especially in connection with the treaty concluded by him with the Shiraz Government, Government had, as we have seen, to remove him from the Residency and appointed in his place *Lieutenant John MacLeod*, who had been employed in various capacities in the recent expeditions on the Gulf. The instructions issued to him by the Bombay Government as to the line of policy to be followed by him on their letter No. 1684, dated 12th November 1822, is an important document and printed therefore at length below :—

The Honourable the Governor in Council having been under the necessity of removing Captain Bruce from the situation of Resident at Bushire, for the reasons stated in the enclosed copy of a correspondence with that officer, has been pleased to select you to succeed Captain Bruce under the designation of Resident in the Gulf of Persia.

2. In furnishing you with the necessary instructions for the regulation of your conduct, it is necessary to premise that they embrace two objects; one, immediate, arising out of the effect to be apprehended from Captain Bruce's unauthorized proceedings, and the other of a permanent nature connected with your office of Resident and the maintenance of the policy which it has been determined to pursue with the view of keeping down piracy in the Persian Gulf.

3. The powers whose reliance on our good faith are likely to be shaken and their alarms excited, by the agreement entered into by Captain Bruce, are the Imam of Maskat and the Uttubi tribe of Arabs in general, and especially the Shaikh of Bahrain, an island which it has been an object equally with Persia and the State of Maskat to reduce and annex to its sovereignty, whilst a considerable degree of jealousy in establishing an ascendancy over the Persian Gulf has long subsisted between those two Powers.

4. The effect of Captain Bruce's proceedings is calculated to impress the Imam of Maskat and the Shaikh of Bahrain with an apprehension that, instead of observing a perfect neutrality in the Gulf, and limiting our interference to a control of all measures likely to lead to a renewal of piracy founded on Major-General Sir William Kier's tratics, we have thrown our whole influence in the scale in favor of Persia in support of its general views of supremacy over every island and possession in the Gulf of Persia.

5. The enclosed letters from the Honourable the Governor to the Imam of Maskat and the Shaikh of Bahrain are intended to remove any doubts or apprehensions which the conduct of Captain Bruce may have excited in that respect, it will be your duty to enforce on the conviction of those Chiefs the assurances contained in those letters; and of the determination of the British Government strictly to adhere to the line of policy it has observed in its relations towards the different powers in the Gulf, unaffected, in the slightest degree, by Captain Bruce's agreement which having been unauthorized and disavowed has of course no existence.

6. You will also explain to them that our views are not at all changed by withdrawing our troops from Kishm which is to be restored to the Imam of Maskat as the power with whose permission we occupied it.

7. The Governor in Council anticipates your experiencing a greater degree of difficulty in removing the dissatisfaction of the Prince of Sepirax in the disavowal of an agreement so decidedly favourable to Persia than you will meet with in reconciling the Imam of Maskat and the Shaikh of Bahrain to the integrity of our views.

8. Should you find His Royal Highness at all disappointed at our disavowal of Captain Bruce's agency on this occasion, you will express your regret that His Royal Highness did not demand from that officer his authority for proposing an agreement so much at variance with our policy before he directed his minister to enter into the negotiation. You will refer to the whole tenor of our communications to the Persian Government and of our conduct since the occupation of Kishm and our negotiations with the Arab States for proof that the permanent suppression of piracy, and the conservation of the peace of the Gulf by the friendly interposition of our power and influence, has been alone the ruling principle of that

policy. You will explain that it is our determination to persevere in that policy notwithstanding the removal of our troops from Kishm, which has been restored to the Imam of Maskat under whose sanction we occupied it; and that the pretensions to its sovereignty remain precisely in the same state as at the period when that sanction was granted.

9. The enclosed copy of a Minute by the Honourable the Governor and of the letters addressed to His Majesty's Envoy at Tehran and to Captain Bruce will make you fully acquainted with the circumstances connected with the claim to the value of some boats belonging to the Persian ports of Linga and Charrack which were captured by His Majesty's Navy in the last expedition on the ground of their being connected with the Joassmee pirates.

10. You will perceive the determination of the Governor in Council long since formed to compensate the owners; you will proceed to give effect to that determination in the mode already prescribed without any reference to the stipulation contained in Captain Bruce's agreement for that purpose, and in direct communication with the sufferers: should you experience any difficulty on the subject which a reference to the Envoy at Tehran may not remove, you will apply for further instructions to the Governor in Council.

11. With respect to the nature of your permanent local functions at Bushire they are exclusively of a commercial character to protect the British trade against the exaction of higher rates of duty than have been fixed by the Government of Persia, and all merchant ships belonging to subjects of the British Government trading to the port of Bushire and all British subjects residing or trading under the protection of the British flag in the lawful prosecution of their commercial dealings.

12. Our relations with the Imam of Maskat, where we have a native Agent, are best explained by the enclosed copy of an agreement negotiated with that State in 1798 by the late Mahomed Ali Khan and subsequently confirmed with Sir John Malcolm in 1800. It is also necessary to put you in possession of the correspondence between the Imam of Maskat and the Bombay Government and recently between His Highness and Captain Moreoby of His Majesty's Ship Mendi respecting the abolition of the slave trade carried on by foreign European Powers.

13. I also enclose the copy of a correspondence with the Imam regarding the terms on which the Chiefs of the Beni Boo Ali Arabs have been permitted to return to Arabia, as the British Government is in some respect answerable for their personal safety.

14. There is nothing in our relations with Maskat that requires any special instruction, except the renewal on your part of an assurance that His Highness will continue to observe that friendly connection with the British Government which has hitherto proved reciprocally advantageous to the two States. It will, however, be essential that you should advise the Imam of Maskat, in whatever countenance or protection he may afford to Ramah bin Jauber, who was formerly Chief of Khore Hussein and notorious for his former depredations, if not on the British at least on other traders, to guard against his renewing his former courses or disturbing the tranquillity of the Gulf.

Hussan bin Rahmah, Chief of Hatt and Faisa, late of Busul-Khyma, Rasib bin Ahmed, Chief of Jassat at Kannaah, Shakhboud, Chief of Abu Dhabiy, Hussan bin Ali, Chief of Zuh, Mahomed bin Haza bin Jaal, Sheikh of Dubey-Zaud bin Seyf, uncle of Sheikh Mahomed Sultan bin Saggur, Chief of Shargah, Seid Abdul Jalil bin Seid Yas-vokool of Shuis Solymann bin Ahmed and Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed of the family of Khalifa Sheikh of Bahrain Rasheed bin Hamid, Chief of Eymar, Abdullah bin Rashid, Chief of Uman-ul-Kootayn.

15. It is necessary that you should have a personal interview with those Chiefs with the view of conciliating and confirming them in the disposition they have hitherto manifested to conform to their engagements: you will explain to them that a confidence in the continuance of that disposition has led us to withdraw our troops from Kishm which was from the first a temporary arrangement, that a squadron of cruisers will still be maintained in the Gulf to preserve its tranquillity, which will occasionally visit their ports to uphold the friendly intercourse that has been carried on since the conclusion of those treaties, and that you will yourself occasionally visit them with similar views.

17. You will hereafter be furnished with copy of the instructions under which the maritime control over the piratical ports is to be conducted on the removal of the force from Kishm. They will be sufficiently full and explicit and supersede the necessity for any further orders on this branch of your duty; you will, however, concert with Lieutenant-Colonel Kennett the best means of furnishing the Arab vessels with the flags and papers prescribed by the general treaty, and communicate the result to the Arab Chiefs concerned in their observance. They should be granted or renewed either by yourself or under your authority by the Officer Commanding the squadron whichever may prove the most convenient to the Arab traders: you will in fact consider and suggest the most effectual mode for enforcing the provisions of those treaties now that the control has been transferred from Kishm to Bushire. Should it be necessary to carry on offensive operations against any Chief who may show

disposition to recur to piracy, they must be confined to the destruction of the boats and on no account be carried on on shore.

18. Those treaties you will observe are limited to the petty States in the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf. As the Government of Persia has pledged itself to be answerable for the conduct of the Chiefs on the Persian side, your vigilance and those of the Commanding Officers of cruisers must therefore be constantly exercised in observing their proceedings and should any piratical acts be committed by any boats or vessels belonging or resorting to those ports or should they adopt any measures directly tending to the revival of piracy, you will, on the fact, being fully established, represent the circumstance to the Government of Fars (to which all the possessions of Persia, including Bushire in the Persian Gulf, are immediately subordinate) and demand reparation, and should your representation lead to no satisfactory result, you will forward your proceedings to the British Envoy at Tehran and to the Governor in Council.

19. It is desirable that you should suggest a plan for securing authentic intelligence of the proceedings of the several Chiefs on the coast and a ready communication with them should they appear of a questionable character. You will adopt the plan at once if not attended with much expense. The mode in which the piratical Chiefs purchase their boats or materials for constructing them and the sources whence they are supplied with arms and ammunition for their equipment, it is also desirable to ascertain.

20. With the political affairs of Persia, with its disputes with the Imam of Maskat or the different Powers in the Gulf, or the hostilities of these with each other unconnected with piracy, the Resident has no concern whatever, you will therefore maintain on the occurrence of any such disputes or national warfare the strictest neutrality.

21. The Governor in Council is desirous that you should make yourself fully acquainted with the constitution of the different petty States into which both sides of the Persian Gulf are divided, the nature of their relation to each other or their subordination to any higher authority, either as tributaries or dependent branches of the sovereign State including the several islands in the Gulf, ascertaining and reporting any changes that may occur in the Chiefs either by death or otherwise, and the characters of their successors or any principality affecting its original relation with or dependence on another State; affording in fact a succinct history of each as events may arise.

22. Your personal salary has been fixed at rupees twelve hundred per mensem. Rs800 per mensem for a table and Rs600 for office establishment and house-rent including boats, crews and Rs150 contingencies exclusive of presents, the average amount of which for the last four or five years you will ascertain and limit your expenditure on that account accordingly. On your quitting your station to visit the different ports in the Gulf or proceeding on duty to Shiraz which may be necessary with the view of executing those instructions, you will draw rupees five hundred (Rs500) per mensem as additional salary until your return. Your expenses by land or to the Commander of cruisers on which you may embark, being a separate charge. Should you have occasion to proceed to Shiraz in the execution of these instructions, you will report the circumstances to the Envoy at Tehran and be guided by any suggestions he may offer on the occasion.

23. The Superintendent of the Marine has been directed to furnish you with a suitable accommodation in my vessel under orders for the Gulf. You should proceed direct to Kishm or to Maskat in the first instance and regulate your measures according as you may ascertain to be the effect of Captain Bruce's negotiations, should they not have been promulgated nor any alarm been excited in the Gulf by a knowledge of the terms, it would be advisable that you should repair to Bushire and receive charge of the Residency and after entering into the prescribed explanation with the Prince of Shiraz in disavowing the agreement, carry into effect the other part of these instructions having relation to Maskat, Bahrain, and the Arab States which are parties to Sir William Keir's treaty.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

AFFAIRS OF THE PERSIAN GULF: LIEUTENANT MACLEOD'S REPORT, 1823.

297. The following report of Lieutenant Macleod, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, is frequently quoted, and is perhaps the most exhaustive and interesting account of the state of Arab Tribes about the close of the first quarter of the 19th century (No. 8, dated 27th February 1823):—

I have the honour to report my proceedings during my visit to the Arabian ports of the Gulf for which I left Basadore on the 12th January 1823.

2. On reaching Ramz I found that the Sheikh of that place who signed the treaty with Sir Williams Grant Keir has been deposed through the influence of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur and succeeded by a young man named Muhomed bin Abdul Rahman, whose father had formerly been Sheikh, until superseded by the late Sheikh Hussain bin Ali, who is now at Sharga. The young man excused himself from visiting me on board the ship, but sent his head man to whom I fully explained the purposes of my visit, and the arrangements which were to be made as directed in my instructions. He expressed his master's determination to abide by the treaty, and his readiness to comply with any measures which we might think fit to adopt in fulfilment of its engagement.

3. Ras-ul-Khima is entirely subject to Sultan bin Suggur, whose brother Sheikh Mahomed has been placed by him in charge of the Government. The former Sheikh Mossin bin Rama also resides there. The inhabitants, who have returned to the place, have established themselves on the beach, on the east side of the black-water, opposite to the former town, the whole of which remains in ruins, and deserted. The new town consists of good many huts built of reeds, with only one or two houses of mud. The creek still serves as a harbour for their boats.

4. As the Sheikh's people were very anxious to impress us with the idea that the whole coast from Ramas to Sharga was entirely subject to Sultan bin Suggur, I thought it necessary to explain that although this might be the case, yet that each Chief, whether dependent or otherwise, must hold himself answerable for the vessels belonging to his own port.

5. After visiting the town and receiving every assurance of the most friendly disposition, on the part of Sultan bin Suggur and his brother, I returned on board and proceeded to Jezirat-ul-Humra.

6. Sheikh Quezob bin Ahmed or Jezirat-ul-Humra is dead and has been succeeded by Sheikh Muhzin bin Abdul Rahman Suggur: the Sheikh himself was absent at Mascot, but his son Mahomed bin Muhzin came on board. He acknowledged most fully the general obligation of the treaty, but seemed very ignorant of its particular conditions, since he admitted that although he had two boats in trading voyages, neither of them had either pass or colours; and he seemed quite unconscious of the impropriety of this neglect, or the danger to which his vessels were exposed. On my explaining the purpose of my visit, he promised faithfully to abide by his engagements, and furnished both of his vessels for registry. He acknowledged generally the supremacy of Sultan bin Suggur, but declared that he considered himself fully amenable to us for all his actions in respect to his treaty with the English Government.

7. The Sheikh of Unal Guwyn, Abdulla bin Rashed, is the same who signed the treaty. He brought a copy of it with him, and assured me that he would not fail to abide by it; he acknowledged the supremacy of Sultan bin Suggur, in the same manner as the Sheikh of Jezirat-ul-Humra, and at the same time asserted his own responsibility for the vessels of his port.

8. On approaching Ejman, which is the next port, I received a message from the Sheikh Rashid bin Humid entreating my interference to protect him from the attacks of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur, who he alleged had collected the tribe of Beni-yas to assist in overpowering him. Next day the Sheikh himself came off, and repeated to me in the most earnest manner his complaints of the aggressions of Sultan. He represented that his only offence was his alliance with the Imam of Mascot, who is at enmity with Sultan, that he had never been in any shape subject to that Chief, and never would submit to his authority; that Sultan had committed various acts of aggressions against him even at sea, which his regard for the treaty with us alone prevented him from retaliating upon him.

9. I told him although it was our anxious wish to prevent hostilities, yet that we could not desire any one to refrain from defending himself when attacked, that we had nothing to do with their quarrel, so long as they did not disturb the peace of the sea, but that such

was the risk that these disorders would lead to the revival of piracy, that I would enquire into the subject, and endeavour to induce Sultan bin Suggur to desist, if I found him the aggressor; and that at all events I should use every effort to put a stop to aggressions at sea if possible. The Sheikh promised to abide strictly by all our arrangements in respect to the treaty, and returned to the shore.

10. I was anxious to see as much of Sultan Suggur as possible, and therefore proceeded to land at once at Sharga, accompanied by Captain Faithfull and the other Commanders of the cruisers. The Sheikh received us very well, gave us a house and a tent, and supplied us with everything we required during our stay of two days on shore.

11. This Chief is certainly by far the most powerful and ablest of all the Sheikhs from Ramas to Bahrain. He entered at great length on the subject of the treaty, and urged strongly his supremacy over all the other Chiefs of the coast, which he alleged had been confirmed by Sir William Grant Keir by a special agreement which he produced. This paper proved to be the preliminary treaty, by which the Sultan engaged to deliver up the towns, guns and vessels at the port of Sharga, Imam, Unal Guwyn and their dependencies. As the Sheikh quoted this as a confirmation by our Government of his rights over all those ports, and of his obligation of responsibility for their conduct and observance of the treaty, I told him that it did not appear to me to confer or confirm any right whatever, but merely to acknowledge the state of things as it stood at the time of the agreement.

12. He next adduced, in proof of his positive rights over the ports, and particularly in justification of his present proceedings against Rashid bin Humid, a letter from the Chiefs, said to be a duplicate of one addressed by them to the Hon'ble the Governor last year, in answer I presume to a printed circular to the parties to the treaty which was transmitted to Kishm from the office of Country Correspondence on the 24th July 1821. I cannot discover whether this letter ever was actually sent to Bombay or not; and Colonel Kennott does not seem to have been aware of its contents; but the duplicate which I examined had every appearance of authenticity and bore the seals of the Chiefs. I have the honour to enclose a copy and translation of it for the information of Government.

13. I informed him that we did not in any way deny his right over any one who was himself willing to obey him and would consider him as the superior of all who acknowledged him, that we had nothing to do with his dispute for supremacy, but must in such cases look to every one to answer for himself, and that particularly, as far as regarded the stipulation respecting vessels, it was indispensable that each Sheikh, whether subordinate or not, should himself be held responsible for his own port, since references to him on these points would be most inconvenient, and could not be admitted, although they might be acquiesced, and promised to give instructions accordingly.

14. Sultan bin Suggur expressed great anxiety to be allowed to erect some defences towards the land side of the town to repel the Bedouins, who he said took advantage of the defenceless state of the place to come and attack it during the pearl fishing season, when all the men are at sea, and no one left but the women and children. He said he had no wish to erect any work towards the sea, or within gun shot of the shore, and that although he had surrounded his guns and towers to be destroyed by Sir William Grant Keir, yet he had not bound himself not to erect other defences. I told him that under the orders of Government I did not feel myself at liberty to authorize his erecting any works so near the beach as he desired, but that further inland he might build what he pleased, that it was true there was no express stipulation in the treaty against rebuilding their fortifications, but that it was the evident intention and spirit of our proceedings and agreements to prevent it, and that I believed the Sheikhs had themselves acknowledged this right on our part. I however promised to represent the case to Government and obtain orders.

15. The Sheikh next stated that the Imam of Mascot and he were already at hostilities on land, and asked how he was to act in the event of the Imam's attacking his vessels. I replied that I hoped the Imam would not commit any aggression, that I would advise His Highness not to endanger the tranquillity of the Gulf by such proceedings, and that if the Imam should take any of his vessels which were peaceably trading under our Register, I would remonstrate with His Highness and endeavour, if possible, to procure redress. That although we had no right to interfere in their quarrels or wars, or even to prevent them from prosecuting just hostilities at sea, and still less to forbid any one to defend himself from aggression, provided those hostilities did not lead to piracy, yet that we could not in any way countenance them, and must strongly dissuade all parties from them. I explained that our Registers were granted for purposes of peace, not of war, and would not protect any suspicious vessels, and that as in such cases it was hardly possible for our cruisers to distinguish between vessels intended for lawful war and those whose intentions were piratical, armed boats would often be inevitably exposed to suspicion and even danger, and at any rate to the risk of trouble and detention.

16. On my enquiring respecting his quarrel with Rashid bin Humid Sultan denied all his accusations and complained loudly against him, that after submitting, and solemnly acknowledging his supremacy, he had now thrown off his allegiance, and was stirring up all his enemies against him in concert with the Imam of Mascot; that Rashid had always been most hostile to the English as well as to himself. He declared that he had no intentions against him further than to bring him back to his former engagements which he had broken, and asserted his right to do so according to the paper which I had seen. Under this

circumstance I could only repeat my former interferences to avoid extremities, and compromise the dispute, which I fear will be of little avail.

17. During a very long discussion on the subject of the treaty generally, the Sultan quoted the last clause of the tenth article of the treaty, as binding us to protect vessels sailing under its stipulation; and to recover any which might be captured from the parties of the treaty by others. I replied that I did not consider the obligation as going quite so far, but that I would interfere, as far as I could, to prevent unlawful molestation from power which were not parties to the treaty, and that I would obtain further instructions from Government for my guidance on this head.

18. The Sheikh concluded by assurance of his friendly disposition towards the British Government, his entire acquiescence in the present arrangements, and his determination to abide by the treaty, and by any directions we might give respecting its fulfilment.

19. I have been rather particular in detailing my communication with this Chief; because it not only shows the views which he took of the subject, but those which formed the basis of my communication generally with all the other Chiefs, in addition to the points adverted to in my instructions. Sheikh Sultan was, however, the only one who seemed capable of entering fully into the subject, the rest are very inferior in every respect.

20. The Chiefs of Dubey and Abuthabi, who were at a short distance inland from Sharga, both visited me at that place: I did not therefore think it necessary to proceed myself to their ports.

21. These Sheikhs are both of the Beni Yas tribe, of whom Sheikh Thannun of Abuthabi is the superior. Sheikh Zaid bin Sayf of Dubey is the same who signed the treaty, to which both promised entire compliance. Sheikh Thannun has fully established his power to the exclusion of his father Sheikh Shakbut, and his brother Sheikh Mahomed; the former is said to have submitted to his son, the latter is with another branch of the tribe in the interior.

22. On my enquiring respecting Sonidan bin Zal, who is particularly mentioned in Colonel Rennett's letter to you of the 6th ultimo, No. 42, Sheikh Thannun stated that he was his subject, and was somewhere amongst the islands between that place and Abuthabi; that he has got no fixed place of abode; but that he would be answerable for his conduct, and would, if I pleased, recall him either to Abu-habi or Dubey and fix him there under his own eye. I thought that this would be a very desirable arrangement under the suspicious circumstances of this person, and as the proposal was publicly made in the presence of Sultan bin Saggur and the Sheikh of Dubey, I requested Sheikh Thannun to write to Sonidan, and gave him also at his desire a letter to that Chief desiring him to obey the orders of his Sheikh, in addition to which I took a duplicate of Thannun's letter for Sonidan, in case I should fail in with him, but in this hope I was disappointed.

23. At Sharga Captain Faithfull completed his arrangements for the stationing of the cruising vessels, and the renewal of the registry. As they are entirely consonant to the suggestions offered in my letter to him of the 10th July, and have doubtless been reported by him to the Superintendent of Marine, it is not necessary that I should trouble Government with the detail in this place. I have however to solicit the sanction of Government for the occasional hire of native boats by the cruiser, which the senior officer deems necessary for landing at times and places when the ship's boats could not land, and also for avoiding the risk of the ship's boats being left on shore, when the ships themselves are blown to sea.

24. We then proceeded through the islands to Bidas, which we found is subject to Bahrain, and governed by a Sheikh named Babur bin Intran of the tribe of Abu-omina, all the other Sheikhs having quitted the place. The people seemed to know very little of the conditions of the treaty, and had neither flag nor register, excepting for one boat, which had been procured through the Sheikh of Bahrain. However, they furnished lists of the rest of their boats for registry, and promised to abide by the treaty, which I explained; but as they are entirely subject to Bahrain, I did not think it necessary to enter very minutely on the subject.

25. On the 27th of January we reached Bahrain and landed at the town of Manama; we had two interviews with Sheikh Abdulla bin Ahmed, who, though the younger brother, is the manager of all affairs; we also visited the elder brother Sheikh Sulaiman at Kuffa where he resides. We stayed several days and were treated with hospitality.

26. In addition to these points of my instructions which were particularly referred to Bahrain, I fully explained to Sheikh Abdulla bin Ahmed the arrangements that had been made for cruising off the pirate ports, that the conduct of himself and his subjects had been such as to render such measures of precaution unnecessary in regard to his ports, but that one ship would occasionally visit the island; and that an officer would be sent for the purpose of revising the registers, and would bring them to me or the senior officer for signature. I called his attention to the necessity of observing the strictest conformity to the orders of the treaty, as well at Bahrain as at his other subordinate ports, and particularly at Bidas, where its conditions did not seem to be known. He promised that they should be most carefully observed, wherever his power extended, adding that Bidas was the only port from which trading vessels sailed.

27. My chief difficulty was respecting the dispute with Rama bin Jahir and I am sorry to say that my endeavours to effect an adjustment have hitherto been of no avail. This affair however will form the subject of a future letter.

28. The Sheikh informed me that a Battile belonging to one of his subjects had been captured by His Majesty's ship *Sophia* in consequence of having seized a boat from Bushire in Bussora river, on account of a claim which the owner of the Battile had against the Sheikh of Bushire. He declared his entire disavowal and disapprobation of the act and justified himself by saying that he had expressly warned the owner of the boat not to retaliate on any Bushire vessels which he might meet with. I informed him that until I was made fully acquainted with the circumstances, I could not judge of the merits of the case, but that every Sheikh must be answerable for the acts of his subjects, and that if he could not punish them, we must. The Sheikh assented to this, promised to punish the offenders and expressed much anxiety in endeavouring to excuse himself from blame. It was not until my return to this place that I found the Battile had been carried to Bombay, under circumstances which I have already explained to Government.

29. The Sheikh made great complaints against the Imaum of Mascat, who he said had not only violated his engagements with him, but had abetted Rama bin Jahir in his unprovoked aggression on his people, although it was only at the Imaum's entreaty that he had admitted that Chief, who was the ancient enemy of his family, to terms of peace. He at the same time professed the utmost contempt for the Imaum as well as for the Sheikh of Bushire, and the Persians in general as enemies; and declared that the Utubis were both able and willing to revenge themselves on the whole of them, but for their peaceable engagements with us.

30. Observing that the Sheikh seemed to consider the adoption of the pacificated flag as implying a nearer and more dependent relation with our Government than it really does, I took occasion to explain to him that it was the Arab, not the British flag; but those tribes who were parties to the treaty with us had agreed to distinguish themselves by wearing round the red flag a border of white, which is alone emblematic of peace, in token of their relinquishment of piracy.

31. Both the Sheikhs were profuse in their assurances of attachment to our Government and promised to abide by their amicable engagements; indeed, the whole of the Sheikhs of the coasts professed their determination to avoid every act which would be an infringement of their present friendship with the English. I made small presents to them all, with which they seemed gratified.

32. On our voyage back to Bushire, I took the opportunity of violent and continued contrary winds to visit Congoon, and reached this place on the 10th February.

33. Having thus detailed my proceedings in execution of the orders of Government, I beg leave to offer for your consideration some further particulars respecting the state of the Gulf, and the condition of its Chiefs.

General state of the Gulf.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

GOVERNOR'S ADVICE TO THE IMAM OF MASKAT AND THE
SHEIKH OF BAHREIN AS REGARDS THE FORMER'S
CLAIM FOR TRIBUTE—1822.

307. This claim of the Imam of Maskat to tribute from Bahrain was one over which the maritime peace of the Persian Gulf was constantly disturbed. Whatever was the origin of the Imam's claim, it appears from Major-General Sir William Keir's letters of April 1st and May 1st, 1820, that the Utubis had formally engaged to pay it, and it was their infringement of that agreement that had led to disputes. The policy of the British Government at this time was only to put a stop to *piracies* in the Gulf, and not to interfere with legitimate maritime warfare between the Arab States. We therefore confined ourselves to merely advising belligerents to restrain their ardour for war causing disturbance of maritime peace. Such advice was tendered by Mr. Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, to the Imam of Maskat and the Sheikh of Bahrain, and his letters on the subject are quoted below :—

Letter from the Honorable Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, to His Highness the Imam of Muskat, dated 19th August 1822.

It was formerly the intention of this Government that Captain Bruce should endeavour to mediate and accommodate the differences regarding the tribute between Your Highnesses and the Ootobees of Buhrein, but circumstances having prevented that gentleman's performing the duty, I am induced to communicate my sentiments to both parties as the common friend of both and as one greatly interested (on account of the British Government) in the preservation of the tranquillity of the Persian Gulf.

My advice to Your Highness is this, if the tribute from Bahrain be one which has been paid annually without dispute and without interruption to Your Highness and your ancestors for a long succession of years it is well; you are entitled to continue to demand it. The Ootobees will probably not long continue to withhold a tribute which has been always paid, and if they do so, Your Highness is entitled to coerce them and retain your undoubted inheritance. But if on the other hand the tribute be of recent establishment, or if it has been liable to great interruptions, and be still considered by the Ootobees as a matter in dispute, I would advise Your Highness to give up the pursuit of it, because even if you should succeed in establishing it, you will not do so without a war, and if a war once commence depredations will be renewed, people will leave commercial pursuits for those of plunder, the old depredations in the Gulf will be renewed, and in addition to the injuries to mankind in general Your Highness will yourself suffer losses more than the tribute will make up for. The effect of a disturbance is to throw things into confusion; many not openly engaged will plunder underhand and the war will soon be not with the Ootobees but with all the tribes in the Gulf. Such is my advice relating to the Ootobees.

Letter from the Honorable Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, to Abdoolah Bin Uhmud of the race of Khaleefu, the Sheikh of Buhrein, dated 19th August 1822.

In my former letter I referred you to Mr. Bruce for a settlement of your disputes with the Imam of Muskat, but that gentleman not having had an opportunity of enquiring regarding them, I now write to His Highness and to you on the subject. If your tribute to the Imam be a matter of established right I would by all means recommend your paying it, a sin the first place it is just to give every man his own, and secondly because war is an evil to all people, but especially to those engaged in commerce; because if war begins, confusion increases, fresh powers join from various motives, piracy is renewed and commerce is interrupted. If, on the other hand, the Imam's claim on you be altogether unjust and unfounded, it is to be hoped that he will listen to reason and be induced to forego it.

1.07

Peace agreement between Shaikh
'Abdullah b. Ahmad of Bahrain and
Rahmah b. Jabir of Khaur Hasan,
February 1824

Bombay *20th April 1824 No 17.*

From the Resident on the
(Persian Gulf) dated 7th February with
enclosure —

Sir,

I have the satisfaction to
report that the feud between the Sheikh
of Bahrein and Akhmed bin Jaber
has at length been brought to an amicable
termination and I do myself the honor
to enclose a copy of the agreement entered
into by both parties under our mediation.

On my first arrival
found Akhmed bin Akhmed extremely averse
to any compromise and the numerous
objections that have been brought forward
on both sides during the progress of this
arrangement have detained me here some
days beyond the period originally fixed for
my departure. — I trust however the result
will justify my perseverance in the attain-
ment of an object so important to the tran-
-quillity of the maritime states in the
Gulf, although it would have been more
satisfactory had the seeds of future distur-
-bances been entirely removed by the

Resident
the Resident
by that the
Akmed bin
of Bahrein
has been brought
to an amicable
termination
of the agreement
entered into by both
parties under the
mediation of Akhmed
bin Akhmed
of Bahrein —

Y.

Bombay Castle — 28th April 1824

unconditional pardon of the Tribes mentioned in the 2nd article of the agreement.

3. The people there alleged to use a branch of the Mullauba Tribe and till lately resided on this Island, but in consequence of some disagreement and the investigation as it is suspected of Bahrein. They fled from Bahrein to the number of 150 men and committed the outrages which gave rise to the late quarrel in which they took refuge at Dammam and have continued at that place till the present moment — Their treachery and ingratitude have doubled, merited the severest chastisement, but every motive of humanity and policy induced me to intercede for them with Alkhalifa bin Ahmed, and I have accordingly used my utmost endeavours to procure full forgiveness of their offences. In this however I have not succeeded to the extent of my wishes but have been assured by the Shah that it is far from his intention to reduce them to extremities and that on their making due submission

Bombay Castle — 28th April 1824

acknowledging their faults, he will accept of the atonement prescribed by the Laws and receive them and their families again under his protection.

4. I have given directions that the Boat which has been so long detained at Bushire shall be immediately returned to Rubma bin Jubel and felt persuaded that both parties are well satisfied with the arrangement that has been made, and will continue to live on terms of friendship with each other, but there is every reason to hope that the beneficial effects of this reconciliation will not be confined to this quarter alone. The other Tribes on the coast may be expected to profit by so good an example and we may calculate on greater facility in adjusting differences of minor importance hereafter, from the success which has attended our mediation in the present Instance.

I have the honor to be
 Signed by B. G. Stammers
 Resident in the
 Gulf of Persia
 7th February 1824.

Bombay Castle — 28th April 1824.

Articles of agreement entered into between
Shahid Abdulla ben Ahmed and Ra-
hman Jauber —

1. There shall be peace
for ever between Shahid Abdulla ben Ahmed
and Rahman Jauber and their
respective tribes families and connections on
the following terms.

2. Rahman Jauber
engages to withdraw his protection from
the tribe (also termed) who were the
aggressors in the outrage which caused
the misunderstanding between the two
parties and Shahid Abdulla ben Ahmed
has full permission to revenge himself
on those people for the blood spilt on that
occasion —

3. Rahman Jauber
likewise engages to restore the five Boats
taken at that time with the whole of their
stores and cargoes or an equivalent in
money should it be found impracticable
at this distant period, to return the
boats in the same condition they were
in at the time of capture —

4. Rahman Jauber

Bombay Castle — 28th April 1824.

promises to give up the whole of the cargo
of the Boat Maffey which was captured
at Bahrain and to produce a certificate
from the owners of the Boat that he has
received full indemnification for the losses
sustained on that occasion —

5. The people of Bahrain
shall be at liberty to proceed to Dammam
to identify the boats that may have formerly
belonged to them and to bring away
all that they can prove to have been
originally their property —

6. Rahman Jauber
binds himself his relations and tribe to
obtain in future from all acts of aggression
or insult against Shahid Abdulla ben
Ahmed and the people of Bahrain, to
consider them as brothers and to assist
them against all the enemies.

Signed of Abdulla ben Ahmed

Bartholomew

7th February 1824

Signed of Rahman Jauber

Exchanged in my presence

(Signed) E. G. Thomas

Resident in the Gulf of Persia

Raff

2269
Bombay Castle — 28. April 1824. A.D.
 Reply to, and acknowledgement
 to *Bahrein* —
Respectful
 Reply to, satisfaction
 expressed at the
 termination of the long
 standing dispute between
 the Shaikh of Bahrein
 & Rahmah bin Jaubir —
 Have the honor to acknow-
 ledge the receipt of your letter of the 7. Ethir
 last reporting the termination of the long
 feud between the Shaikh of Bahrein and
 Rahmah bin Jaubir, and enclosing copy of
 the agreement entered into by both parties
 under the mediation of the British Govern-
 ment, and to express the great satisfaction
 of the Governor in Council at the termina-
 tion of a dispute which threatened to pro-
 duce a disturbance of the tranquillity
 of the Gulf.
 I am also directed to
 remark that the reconciliation of so able
 men a quarrel is a satisfactory proof of
 your success in securing the confidence &
 respect of the parties.
 Have the honor to be
Bombay Castle Signed of Mrs. Newnham
 27. April 1824. Chief Secretary
 From the Secretary to
 the Supreme Government dated 26. April 1824.
 with enclosure —

Articles of Agreement entered into, under the Mediation of the British Government, between SHAIKH ABDOOLLA bin AHMED, Chief of Bahrein, and RAHMAH bin JAUBIR. — Dated 7th February 1824.

ARTICLE I.

There shall be peace for ever between Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed and Rahmah bin Jaubir, and their respective tribes, families, and connexions, on the following terms.

ARTICLE II.

Rahmah bin Jaubir engages to withdraw his protection from the tribe Abou Soomet, which were the aggressors in the outrage which caused the misunderstanding between the two parties, and Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed has full permission to revenge himself on those people for the blood spilt on that occasion.

ARTICLE III.

Rahmah bin Jaubir likewise engages to restore the five boats taken at that time, with the whole of their stores and cargoes; or an equivalent in money, should it be found impracticable at this distant period to return the boats in the same condition they were in at the time of capture.

ARTICLE IV.

Rahmah bin Jaubir promises to give up the whole of the cargo of the boat *Nassery*, which was captured at Bahrein, and to produce a certificate from the owner of the boat that he has received full indemnification for the losses sustained on that occasion.

ARTICLE V.

The people of Bahrein shall be at liberty to proceed to Damaun, to identify the boats that may have formerly belonged to them, and to bring away all that they can prove to have been originally their property.

ARTICLE VI.

Rahmah bin Jaubir binds himself, his relations, and tribe, to abstain in future from all acts of aggression or insult against Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and the people of Bahrein, to consider them as brothers, and to assist them against all enemies.

(Signed) ABDOOLLA bin AHMED,
 RAHMAH bin JAUBIR.

Bahrein, 7th February 1824.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged in my presence.

(Signed) E. G. STANNUS, C.B.,
 Resident in the Gulf of Persia.

SKETCH OF THE PROCEEDINGS

(FROM 1809 TO 1818)

OF

RAHMAH BIN JAUBIR,

CHIEF OF KHOR HASSAN;

PREPARED BY

MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,

MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY:

WITH

CONTINUATION TO THE PERIOD OF THAT CHIEF'S
DEATH, IN 1826;

AND ALSO A

BRIEF SKETCH OF THE PROCEEDINGS

(DOWN TO THE YEAR 1831)

OF

SHAIKH BUSHEER BIN RAHMAH,

SON AND SUCCESSOR OF THE ABOVE CHIEF;

BY

LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL,

ASSISTANT RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

KHOR HASSAN.

KHOR HASSAN is situated on the Arabian Coast, and held by Jaubir, of the Yalahimah Tribe of Uttoobees. The Sketch of the Uttoobees* affords information of this, the maritime branch of the tribe, up to the date of their reduction of Bahrein.

The four sons of Jaubir having been dissatisfied with their portion of the rewards distributed on that occasion, left the island in disgust, and the survivor and his tribe have continued to prosecute the mode of life in which their ancestors had been bred.

After the death of their father,† these brothers took up their residence for some time at Bushire and Karrack, after which they returned to Khor Hassan, and betook themselves to piracy, in the course of which occupation Rahmah obtained the ascendancy. Abdoolla, the elder brother, resorted to Muskat, and sought the protection of the Imaum, soliciting his interference and assistance to enable him to recover possession of Khor Hassan from his brother; in which he does not appear to have succeeded, but died at Muskat.

The armament that proceeded against the pirates in 1809 did not attack Khor Hassan, since, notwithstanding the ferocity of the character of Rahmah bin Jaubir, the surviving brother, and the apprehensions entertained that he would prosecute piracy, he had always respected the British pass and colours. An additional motive for avoiding the attack was a knowledge that he had entered into a strict connection with the Wahabee power, which it was the policy of the British Government not to offend. The Chief of Khor Hassan pirated for himself, and chiefly against the Persians, in revenge for some injuries sustained at Bushire.

Subsequently to the attack of Ras-ool-Khyma, Rahmah bin Jaubir, who had been joined by some piratical boats that had escaped from the intermediate ports between it and Khor Hassan, having put to sea, fell in with a large fleet of loaded boats belonging to Bahrein and Zobara,

* Page 362 *et seq.* of this Selection.

† The third brother, Rahmah, died at Khor Hassan; Abdoolla, the eldest, at Muskat; and Shaheer was killed by his brother Abdoolla.

eighteen of which he captured. He captured also a ship, and several Dows and small craft belonging to Muskat, Bushire, Congoon, &c., and, with very few exceptions, put the crews to death. Apprehensions were generally entertained that, if measures were not pursued to reduce his growing strength, the whole of the Gulf would, as soon as our cruisers quitted the station, be reinfested with his spoliators.

In the month of May 1811 Rahmah bin Jaubir again put to sea, on a cruising expedition, accompanied by a fleet of boats belonging to the Joasme Tribe called Ejman, that inhabited the coast to the northward of Ras-ool-Khyma, which escaped without suffering any injury from the late expedition.

A desperate action was fought between Rahmah's fleet and the Uttoobees of Bahrein, in which the latter were victorious.

Some captures having been made in the Gulf, and remonstrances sent to the Wahabee, and the Chiefs of Ras-ool-Khyma and Khor Hassan, Rahmah bin Jaubir, in a letter dated the 27th of October, detailed the circumstances attending the capture of a Buggalow from Bussora with horses on board, belonging to the Honorable East India Company, of which he was not aware, but as soon as he found they were British property, he engaged boats to convey them to Bombay, where they all arrived in safety.

On the 26th of October 1816 Mr. Bruce reported that the famous Piratical Chieftain Rahmah bin Jaubir, with all his boats, and tribe, consisting of about five hundred families, had arrived at Bushire, and the Governor, Shaikh Mahomed, had received them, and allotted them a particular quarter of the town to reside in, on condition of being friends with his friends, and enemies with his enemies; that he possessed two very large Buggalows, a large Buteel, and several small Buggarahs. He gave out that he intended leaving off his predatory life, and to employ his boats on mercantile concerns,—at all events as long as he resided at Bushire. Mr. Bruce thought he would be on peaceable terms with most of the ports of the Gulf, as the Bushire Government was so with them.

The Imaum was anxious for Rahmah bin Jaubir to have accompanied him to Muskat, and offered him any of his ports to settle in; but his late defeat had shown such a want of foresight and judgment that he had lost his character much in the estimation of the Arab Tribes: Rahmah was therefore afraid to put himself so much in his power. He would not have left his former abode if he could have avoided it; but the Wahabee Chief, Abdoolla bin Saood, was so incensed against him for having taken part with the Imaum of Muskat, that he directed his property and family to be seized, and brought up to Deriah, and it was with great difficulty he was able to get them from Khor Hassan.

Rahmah bin Jaubir, after his arrival at Bushire, paid the Resident a visit, and renewed his professions of friendship towards the British Government, and requested the Resident to say that he should be happy to attend to any wishes Government might have towards checking the depredations of the Joasmees.

Mr. Bruce having communicated to Rahmah bin Jaubir the friendly disposition towards him of the British Government, he expressed himself highly flattered:

A. D. 1817. he had just returned from a successful cruise to the southward of Bahrein, against the Joasmees boats, which frequented that island for supplies of dates, rice, &c. in return principally for the property of the Surat ships. He intercepted twelve boats laden with supplies proceeding to Ras-ool-Khyma, four of which he sank, after taking out their cargoes; four others he broke up for the want of men to man them, and four he brought to Bushire. He intended, after landing the property which he had brought to that place, to proceed again to the southward, to cruise between the piratical ports and Bahrein.

In 1818 Rahmah bin Jaubir proceeded to, and landed with some guns at Kateef, which he battered, in concert with Ibrahim Pacha, and commenced to rebuild his old fort at Demaum, which the Wahabees had blown up in July 1816, to which, when finished, he intended to remove from Bushire, with his family and adherents.

CONTINUATION OF THE PRECEDING TO THE YEAR 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL.

Mr. Warden's Sketches conclude in 1818, by stating that Rahmah bin Jaubir had commenced the rebuilding of his fort at Demaum,* which had been destroyed by the Uttoobees in 1816.

From the period above mentioned the records of the Bushire Residency make no mention of this notorious person

A. D. 1819. till July 1819, when he is stated to have been at Kateef at the time Captain Sadlier landed there on his mission to Ibrahim Pacha, and that he rendered that officer every assistance, piloting the *Vestal* cruiser himself into the harbour.

* A fort on a small island opposite Bahrein, and close to Kateef.

In January 1820, an intimation from the Resident at Bushire was conveyed to Rahmah bin Jaubir, that his vessels were not to be permitted to leave Kateef to cruise against the people of Bahrein, unless acting with an authorised State in regular warfare, and that if they did so he would be punished by the British Government. The next month Rahmah came over to Bushire with three vessels, in order to co-operate in a projected expedition against Bahrein by the Prince of Shiraz. Orders at this time had been issued by Sir W. G. Keir for the destruction of all the vessels belonging to this chief, but as he was at the time of the receipt actually in the service of the Regent of Fars, it was judged expedient to suspend their execution until a further reference could be made. Rahmah sailed for Tharee on the 10th February, to join His Royal Highness the Prince of Shiraz, but on the way down, his large Buggalow was wrecked on the Verdistan Shoal, and it was with great difficulty he and his people escaped with their lives.

On the 13th April Rahmah bin Jaubir came over to Bushire, and on his waiting on the Resident, he was requested to become a member to the General Treaty, which he refused, under the plea of his being then a servant of the Persian Government. This statement being confirmed by the Shaikh of Bushire, and as the latter engaged to be responsible for his peaceable conduct in future, the excuse was admitted.

Notwithstanding these promises, Rahmah still continued his aggressions upon the trade of Bahrein, and in the pearl fishing season of 1821 he captured seven boats belonging to that island, and killed twenty men, which induced the Uttoobee Chiefs to apply to the British Government on the subject.

The Resident at Bushire was accordingly directed to prefer a remonstrance to the Court of Shiraz against his proceedings, in consequence of which the Persian Government ordered the Shaikh of Bushire to call on him to account for his conduct, and likewise to detain his son and family as hostages for his future good behaviour; but Rahmah having in the mean time left Bushire, and placed himself under the protection of the Imaum, this injunction was attended with no results.

In the commencement of the year 1822 this chief and Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, of Bahrein, waited upon the Acting Political Agent in Kishm, for the purpose of adjusting their differences; but both parties were so unreasonable in their demands that the attempt failed altogether, and Shaikh Rahmah bin Jaubir proceeded to Muskat, to lay his case before the Imaum.

About November 1822 Rahmah bin Jaubir returned to Bushire, and at the same time a communication was received from His Highness the

526

KHOR HASSAN.

Imaum, stating that so little reliance was to be placed upon his word, that he had determined to have nothing more to do with him, and therefore would not be answerable for his actions.

The removal of the British troops from Kishm appears to have afforded this restless character much pleasure, and he is reported to have publicly expressed his joy at having, as he conceived, the field thus opened for the renewal of his former system of depredation. At this time, although both old and blind, he still retained his original violence of disposition, as well as his inveterate hatred to the Uttoobee Chief, for the purpose of gratifying which, and prosecuting his aggressions upon Bahrein, he left Bushire, and took up his residence in Demaum.

In February 1824 the Resident at Bushire succeeded in effecting a reconciliation between the Uttoobees and Shaikh Rahmah bin Jaubir, and articles of agreement

were exchanged between them, by which the latter agreed to withdraw his protection from the Aboosematc Tribe, which had formerly taken refuge in Demaum from Bahrein. After paying a visit to Muskat, Rahmah returned to Demaum, and employed himself in devising plans for the recovery of a tribute formerly levied on the people of Kateef, who had lately withheld payment. In spite of his reduced resources and advanced age, his spirit still continued unsubdued, and about June 1824 he made an application to the Resident to be permitted to revenge himself upon the Shaikh of Bushire, who had received orders from the Shiraz Government to detain the family of his son, and treat him as a rebel, in consequence of his having made up his quarrel with the Uttoobees. At the interposition of the Resident, however, his son's family was permitted to return to Demaum. The pressure of his pecuniary difficulties appears to have been somewhat relieved about this time by the successful result of his blockade of Kateef.

In the beginning of 1825 Shaikh Rahmah proceeded to Muskat, and soon after applied for, and received permission to assist Shaikh Tahnoon in his war with the Chief of the Joasmees.

About the end of 1825, Rahmah bin Jaubir, on the ground of the non-payment of the tribute he had formerly exacted from the people of Kateef (as a species of blackmail to save their vessels from being plundered by him), commenced a series of predatory attacks upon the commerce of that place, paying no attention whatever to the remonstrances made to him upon the subject by the British authority. In consequence, it was at last judged necessary to station two cruisers near Demaum, in order to protect the peaceable traders in the vicinity from Rahmah's aggressions, and at the same time it was intimated to him,

KHOR HASSAN.

527

that if he did not desist from such proceedings, he would be compelled to obedience. The refusal of this chief to attend to any remonstrances appears to have been produced by his belief in the advancing power of the Wahabees, and of their disposition to support him in every measure tending to a renewal of the former system of predatory warfare; more particularly in those which were likely to injure their old enemies the Shaikhs of Lahsa and Kateef (Mahomed and Majid al Ararec, Chiefs of the Beni Khalid Tribe). It was, however, subsequently decided by the British Government, that as long as Rahmah's hostilities were confined to the people of Kateef, we were not to interfere. At the same time, in a reply to a communication sent by him in explanation of his proceedings, he was strongly urged by the British Government to change his conduct.

Shortly before the removal of our cruisers from Demaum, consequent on the decision above alluded to, the misunderstanding so long brewing between Rahmah and Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed broke out into acts of open aggression upon each other, without, however, their carrying on regular hostilities, from which the presence of the British vessels restrained them.

Notwithstanding the hostile nature of the relations subsisting between the Uttoobee Shaikh and Rahmah bin Jaubir, the withdrawing our ships of war from the neighbourhood of Demaum was viewed by both parties with considerable apprehension, neither being prepared for immediate and open hostilities. They both, therefore, applied to the British Resident to proclaim a truce, but as there appeared no disposition on the part of Rahmah to admit the people of Kateef to a participation of the benefits of the proposed arrangement, all further interference was declined, except such as would lead to a general pacification.

In the course of the many desperate actions in which Shaikh Rahmah had been engaged with the people of Bahrein, in consequence of this war, the greater portion of his tribe was by degrees destroyed. About the end of 1826, finding himself much pressed by his enemies, who had invested Demaum, Rahmah proceeded over to Bushire, with the view, if possible, to interest the British authority in his favour, and also to procure an addition to the crew of his Buggalow, which, from the reasons above alluded to, had suffered very materially. In his interview with the Resident, this singular old man (although nearly seventy years of age, totally blind, and covered with wounds) displayed the same haughty and indomitable spirit which had always characterised him, and he expressed equal ferocity and scorn against his Uttoobee enemies. Failing in his design of inducing the Resident to interfere in his behalf, he set sail

from Bushire, with a reinforcement of twenty-five or thirty Beloochees, and proceeded over to Demaum, where he ordered his vessel to fire a salute,—a mark of contempt which so irritated the Bahrein Chiefs, that Ahmed bin Suleman, a nephew of the ruling Shaikh, volunteered to attack him in his own Buggalow. His offer being accepted, he laid himself along side of Shaikh Rahmah's vessel, and a most furious action took place, the struggle being for life or death. The people of the Uttoobes Buggalow, however, suffered so severely from the heavy and well directed fire of the enemy, that she was under the necessity of sheering off in order to recruit her exhausted crew from the other Bahrein vessels in the vicinity. Having procured a reinforcement, and refusing the assistance of the rest of the fleet, Shaikh Ahmed again advanced to the attack, weakened as his crew was in the former combat. Rahmah soon found that he was in no condition to carry on the engagement, and that in a short time he must be taken by boarding, unless he surrendered,—an alternative which was out of the question, considering the atrocious and sanguinary warfare he had so long carried on against Bahrein. Having, therefore, given orders for his vessel to grapple with the enemy, he took his youngest son (a fine boy about eight years old) in his arms, and seizing a lighted match, directed his attendants to lead him down to the magazine. Although acquainted with the determined character of their chief, and of course aware of the inevitable destruction which awaited them, his commands were instantly obeyed, and in a few seconds the sea was covered with the scattered timbers of the exploded vessel, and the miserable remains of Rahmah bin Jaubir and his devoted followers. The explosion set fire to the enemy's Buggalow, which soon afterwards blew up, but not before her commander and crew had been rescued from their impending fate by the other boats of the fleet. Thus ended Rahmah bin Jaubir, for so many years the scourge and terror of this part of the world, and whose death was felt as a blessing in every part of the Gulf. Equally ferocious and determined in all situations, the closing scene of his existence displayed the same stern and indomitable spirit which had characterised him all his life.

Shaikh Busheer bin Rahmah, the son of the above person, being now cut off from all chance of assistance, and all his provisions being consumed, was compelled to surrender Demaum unconditionally. The Bahrein Chief, however, spared his life, and even gave him his liberty. He afterwards proceeded to Muskat, where His Highness the Imaum permitted him to reside, and made him a present of a Buggalow, to enable him to obtain an honest livelihood by commerce.

As a proof of the restless and intriguing spirit of Rahmah bin Jaubir it may be mentioned, that after his death Sultan bin Suggur transmitted

to the political authority a letter which he stated had been addressed to him, in common with the other Arabian Chiefs, by the late Shaikh, just before the termination of his mortal career. The purport of this communication was to set forth that the most positive orders had been sent out to India from the King of England, directing the authorities in that country to withdraw themselves from any further control or superintendence over the Arabs; and he therefore invited him (Sultan) to permit his subjects to pursue their old occupation of appropriating to themselves the property of others. It is needless to add the whole was a gross fabrication on the part of Rahmah, which would probably have never been brought to our notice but for his death.

From this period until 1830, Busheer bin Rahmah continued to reside in Muskat, without any material alteration in his situation.

A. D. 1830.

In 1831, His Highness the Imaum endeavoured to procure his re-establishment in Demaum through the influence of the Wahabee Chief, but the timely submission

A. D. 1831.

of the Uttoobes Shaikh to Toorkey bin Abdoolah oos Saood prevented this arrangement taking place. His Highness, however, succeeded at last in obtaining permission for Shaikh Busheer to erect a fort on Darcen (a place on Tirhoot, opposite Kateef, which becomes an island at high-water). To this place he has now removed his family, and as he has been joined by a great many of the Aboosemate Tribe, who are still bitter enemies of the Uttoobes, there is every reason to apprehend that the re-establishment of this unprincipled character in these quarters will eventually lead to a renewal of the disputes and disturbances which interrupted the tranquillity of the Gulf during the latter part of his father's lifetime.

1.08

Persian aggression; the death of
Shaikh Salman b. Ahmad, 1825

493
 No 6 of 1825

Political Department
 2 July 1825

To,

The Honble the Court of Directors
 For Affairs of the Honble United Com-
 -pany of Merchants of England
 Trading to the East Indies.
 London.

Honble Sirs

Our last letter in

this Department was dated the 22^d of
 June.

Persian Gulph 2

The General reports
 received from the Resident in the Persian
 Gulph since our last General report
 on the state of Affairs in that quarter
 (Letter to the Court 11th January 1824)
 will be found to afford a very satis-
 -factory

9th Consul: 1822
24th December 1822

" 1824
17th March 1824
12th May 1824
2nd June 1824
8th September 1824
20th October 1824

satisfactory view of its general tranquillity and the increase of commercial intercourse among the different Tribes inhabiting its Coast particularly in the Southern part of the Gulph, where nothing has tended to disturb its repose, until the late disputes, which have arisen between the Imam of Muscat & Sultan Bin Sagar regarding the Towers of Bymee which will be hereafter noticed.

3 Among the Quarrels agitating the Northern part of the Gulph, that between Rama Bin Jauber & the Sheikh of Bahra has threatened materially to endanger the peace of that quarter.

but

45

but we are happy to say that through the powerful mediation of the present Resident, Lieutenant Colonel Skinner, it has at length been satisfactorily adjusted.

4 The details of this accommodation are forwarded in the

9th Consul: 1824
28th January 1824
17th March 1824
28th April 1824

Resident's Respatch of the 7th February 1824, and among other Articles of agreement "Rama Bin Jauber" engages to withdraw his protection from the Tribe Abosimate, which were the aggressors in the outrage which caused the misunderstanding between the two parties; and Sheikh Abdo Ben Ahmed has full permission to "revenge himself on those people for the blood spilt on that occasion."

Lieutenant

5

Lieut. Colonel

Stannus in his letter explains that the People here alluded to are a branch of the Altoohee Tribe, and till lately resided at Bahrain; but in consequence of some disagreement, and at the instigation as it is suspected of Rahnma Bin Jauber, they fled from Bahrain to the number of 150 Men and com-

See Lieut. Col. Stannus
Report 12 April 1823

Pol. Consol.
21 May, Vol. 3872

mitted the outrage which gave rise to the late quarrel, after which they took refuge at Hamann and have continued at that place until the period of the reconciliation. Their treachery and ingratitude doubtless merited the severest chastisement according to the Law.

497

latitude of the preceding Article, but every motive of humanity and policy induced Colonel Stannus to intercede for them with the Chief of Bahrain to procure full forgiveness of their offences. In this however the Resident did not succeed, to the extent of his wishes, but was assured by the Sheikh that it was far from his intention to reduce them to extremities, and that on their making due submission and acknowledging their fault, he would accept of the atonement prescribed by the Law, and receive them and their families again under his protection.

Pol. Consol. 1824⁶

8th Sept. Vol. 3980

The Resident in his letter of the 21st June states the approximate

Abosimate fugitives to be still at Asfala
and had lately made another attempt
to deprecate the displeasure of Sheikh
Aboola bin Ahmed, but even said to
have been again unsuccessful although
he (Lieutenant Colonel Stannis) was
not without hopes that their sub-
-missive appeals might ultimately
procure them forgiveness and
readmission among their Althobee
Brothers --

Pol. Consul. 1825-

9th March 1849

13th April 1841

@ 81/

The Residents' expectations however had not been realized so late as the month of March of the present year, when he addressed a further appeal to the Sheikh of Bahrain, who in reply states it to be out of his power to afford

499

afford them security, the Abosimates having killed men belonging to different Tribes, whom it was difficult to appease and who were determined to revenge themselves on the Abosimates whenever opportunity should offer --

82
 During the
 period that Captain Hardy of
 the Marine had charge of the
 Presidency, subsequent to the de-
 parture of the late Resident Mr. Black-
 that

Col. & Consul, 1824.
 7 Jan. Feb. 45

581
 that Officer received a letter from
 the Agent at Shiraz stating it to be
 the intention of His Royal Highness
 the Prince, to attack Bahrein &
 that His Highness had consequent-
 ly dispatched Sheikh Abdul
 Rissool the Sheikh of Bushire to
 Muscat to negotiate with His
 Highness the Imam for cooperation
 & assistance.

83
 Captain Hardy
 consequently took upon himself
 to address a letter to Jecker Khan
 the Minister at Fars stating the
 Sheikh of Bahrein to be a party
 to the Treaty made with the Arab
 Chiefs by Sir William Grant Kerr
 and expressing a hope that His
 Royal

Royal Highness would suspend his intended hostilities against Bahrain until the British Government could be made acquainted with his intentions. Captain Hardy at the same time communicated to the Minister certain observations which had formerly been called forth from us in consequence of a letter from the same Minister to Captain Taithfa but which having reference to that letter alone ought not to have been made the subject of communication on the occasion now adverted to.

84 Being apprehension that this letter of Captain Hardy's might give cause of complaint to the Prince of Shiraz as being

See para 18 of P.B.C.
Despatch 14 January
1824

503

being inconsistent with our profession of neutrality and that it might also have a tendency to renew the jealousy formerly manifested by the King of Persia with regard to our designs on Bahrain, we authorized the Resident to notify to His Royal Highness that Captain Hardy's communication was made without the knowledge of this Government & that it must be ascribed to the circumstance in which Captain Hardy was placed, his knowledge of the views of Government having been necessarily imperfect as he had succeeded unexpectedly to the temporary charge of the Presidency and had received

received no powers or instructions from Bombay. Colonel Stanicus consequent communication to the

Pol^o Consul: 1824.

28 March 1824 Minister is reported in his letter of the 13th March.

85

Captain Hardy

25 Jan'y. 1825

before being relieved by Colonel Stanicus forwarded the Minister reply to his letter, in which the Minister not only claimed for Persia the sovereignty over Bahrein as an historical fact of ancient date, but rested on the Treaty made with Captain Bruce, but subsequently disavowed by the British Government as declaring Bahrein subject to Persia, and that so far from any right on the part of Captain

185

Captain Hardy to reimbursement against the proceedings of Persia he was bound by the Treaty as the senior officer of the Squadron to cooperate in the attack on the part of the British Government.

Pol^o Consul: 1824.

17 March 1825

86

Lieutenant Colonel

Stanicus in his letter of the 17th January notices the return of the Sheikh to Bushire from the visit to Muscat but make no mention of Bahrein as the object of that visit, he observes that the Sheikh had succeeded in the ostensible object as far as regarded the measure & mode of payment of the Tribute for Bandar Abbas & Minow both of which had been settled to the satisfaction of the Persian Government

Government, the Imaum having engaged to pay two thousand Tomans in addition to the Rent which has hitherto been demanded, besides a sum of five hundred Tomans to Reckee Khan the Minister, the former to be paid at Bandar Abbas & the latter at Muscat to whatever persons might be deputed to receive them. It will be remembered that this was also the object of Meerza Bakur's Mission to Muscat in the preceding year but which was frustrated by the Imaum's treatment of that Person as reported in paragraph 28. of our Despatch of the 14th January 1824-
M

587

87.

Pol. Consul: 1824.
8 September 1824

In his letter of the 1st July the President reports that the Government of Sheraz had directed immediate preparations to be made for an Expedition against Bahrain, and had issued particular instructions to the Sheikh of Bushire to provide shipping for its conveyance. The Prince was desirous of superintending the equipment and embarkation of the Force in person, & had signified his intention of visiting Bushire for that purpose in the Month of October. -

88.

A confidential communication to the above effect had been made to the President by Sheikh Abdool Ruzfool Khan, who

who professed to have been actuated solely by a regard for our interests in giving the earliest intimation of this design. He expressed his regret at the revival of the project, & altho' as a subject of Persia he declared himself ready to afford every reasonable assistance in forwarding the Prince's views, he could not avoid perceiving that his very existence depended on retaining possession of his Town, he was willing to furnish vessels & supplies at Congoon, Ashiloo, or any other port on the Coast but could never consent to Bushire being made the place of rendezvous for the Expedition. In the event of

589

See 8th para of Letter
Col^l Stammers letter
of 26th December 1823.

of being reduced to such extremities he had resolved therefore to embark in search of an Asylum with his family & property and trusted that under those unfortunate circumstances he should not meet with any obstruction from the British Squadron in the Gulf.

89 This acknowledgement of his fears regarding our interference at once explained his motives for the disclosure of the meditated attack, and rather lessened the President's confidence in his professions of disinterested attachment. Lieutenant Colonel Stammers returned him thanks however for the communication he had made

made, and expressed his concern for the dangers that threatened him, admitting that the selection of Bushire as the place of embarkation, together with the well known difficulties attending the enterprise itself, afforded strong grounds for suspecting that Mahreïn was merely a secondary object, but that in either case we should observe a strict neutrality. We had neither motive nor inclination to interpose between Persia and her Enemies, & the same considerations would apply to any rupture between him and the Shiraz Government in which the Resident had no authority to interfere.

591

interfere, nor should the Squadron offer any molestation to either party.

90 Lieutenant Colonel Stannus stated that these assurances seemed to remove the Sheikh's most serious apprehensions, but it was probable that he would yet endeavour to avert the storm by large pecuniary sacrifices rather than abandon his Country & Government. His ample means would doubtless enable him thus to effect a temporary compromise - with regard to the threatened invasion it appeared to Lieutenant Colonel Stannus highly improbable that any further progress could be made during the then approaching season beyond

beyond the abortive attempts of former years, and he was extremely doubtful whether the Prince himself had any serious intention of carrying it into execution. These Annual Demonstrations against the Ulema had become a regular & essential part of the policy of the Shiraz Government, as not only holding forth a plea for deductions from the usual remittances to Tehran, but also affording a pretence for extortions from its own Dependencies.

Pol. Consol. 1824
5. May Vol. 2166.
8. Sept. — 13977
20. October " 4253

The President
having proceeded with our permission & the concurrence of His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Tehran

543

Tahran on a visit to Shiraz, where he was received with great distinction & kindness, the subject of the designs against Bahrain became the subject of conversation with the Prince, His Royal Highness introducing the subject.

92 The Prince observed that his determination to attempt the reduction of that Island must be well known to the President & being on the most intimate terms of friendship with the British Government he had no doubt that he should find its representative ready to assist him with advice and even with cooperation if required. To this Lieutenant Colonel Haume

Stannius replied that he had hoped that the communication which had been made to him on the appointment of the late Resident had fully explained the sentiments of the British Government on the subject, alluding to our disavowal of the Treaty made by Captain Shum.

93 The Prince having empowered the Minister to discuss this matter further, the Resident acquiesced & the conversation with His Royal Highness here terminated.

94 In the subsequent conference with the Minister, Zech Khan began by saying that Sheikh Abdool Rasool Khan who had been sent to Muscat to secure the

Cooperation

195

cooperation of the Imam, had succeeded in his negotiation & that the enterprise would accordingly be undertaken in the course of the ensuing season. That the Force was to consist of 2000 Horse and 2000 Foot, & that the Prince would await the result of an Expedition at Shiraz where it was his intention to proceed to superintend the preparations in person, His Royal Highness therefore had commanded him to acquaint the Resident that in consideration of the strict alliance subsisting between Persia & the Indian Government, he expected that he (the Resident) would send directions to the Uttoo bee to strike the

the flag with which we had furnished them, and give them at the same time to understand that they were to expect no assistance from us during the approaching contest, the Resident stated that we assumed no controul over the People of Bahrain nor had ever interfered with their independance. That the Flag to which he alluded had been adopted by the Bahrain Government in Common with several other states in the Gulf as an emblem of Peace, & to denote their having abandoned all political pursuits, That we were under no obligation to protect the People who displayed this Flag
except

397

except from predatory attacks, and that as the Mitoobes themselves were perfectly sensible of this, His Royal Highness might rely on our neutrality with the utmost confidence. Fakh Khan then assured the Resident that from what he had said he felt quite satisfied that we would not render any assistance to the Mitoobes, but that the aid of our Shipping would contribute essentially to the success of the Persian operations, and that the Prince had desired him to express his hope that his Army in case of necessity would experience the full advantage of the strict alliance subsisting between the two States. The Resident observed that

that the Minister must well know this was quite impossible, as the issue of Captain Bruce's treaty and the letter announcing the disapprobation of Government had already most explicitly manifested the line of conduct which we had determined to pursue with regard to Bahrain, That we were on terms of friendship with both parties & could not interfere in behalf of either. This seemed to convince him of the ineffectuality of any further discussion and he ceased to press the subject -

95- He then informed the Resident that the King had intimated his intention in a letter
received

599

received that day of visiting Shiraz, in the course of three Months to ascertain the extent of the injury which the City had sustained by the late Earthquake, which circumstance he feared might prevent the Bahrain expedition from taking effect that

year -
95

Lieutenant Colonel
Mannus continues to observe that notwithstanding the credit which Yafsee Khan, affects to attach to the King's threatened visit it was well known at Shiraz that His Majesty had no serious intention of carrying it into effect, the intimation however had been gladly taken advantage of, as an excuse for
a banding

abandoning a project which it would have been so difficult to execute, and he was fully persuaded that the utmost exertions of the Sheraz Government would be limited to the acquisition of Bushire, which it was supposed to be anxious to seize upon, as a provision for one of the branches of the Royal Family. The Resident had too much confidence in the Amans' sincerity to suspect him of having consented to cooperate against Bahrain, and as by the acknowledgment of Yohannekhan himself there was but little chance of success without foreign aid, it might be presumed.

601

presumed that the Uttoo bees would long remain unmolested by the power of Persia -

apprehended sup-
pose between the
Sheraz Gov^t

Lieutenant Colonel
Stannus on his return to Bushire
reported that Prince Nussiri Ali
Meorza was expected to leave
Sheraz on a tour to Baluchan &
part of the Chah Country that

Pl^o Consul 1825
9. March 1825

announced his intention of
proceeding by the route of Dalah
a village about sixty miles
from Bushire. This movement
caused great alarm to the Sheikh
who was in consequence collecting
resents to conciliate His Royal
Highness who had summoned
the Sheikh to meet him at Dalah
The

98

The Sheikh's

apprehensions again prompted him to enquire of the Resident whether he might still rely on our neutrality in the event of a rupture with the Shiraz Government & Lieut. Colonel Stannus had no hesitation in repeating the assurances of neutrality which he had formerly made as stated in a preceding part of this despatch.

99

Lieutenant Colonel

Stannus stated that in case of his actual seizure or detention it was understood that his uncle Sheikh Mohammed would immediately embark with

603

with the whole of his Family & property for the Island of Kharach, which he seemed confident of being able to maintain against the efforts of the Shiraz Government. Two days before the date of the Resident's despatch Sheikh Mohammed's only son who had been kept as a hostage at Shiraz for several years past had returned to Bushire after being replaced by his Uncle Sheikh Abdool the Younger Brother of Sheikh Abdool Rastool Khan.

The Resident's letter of the 12th March reports that Wajid Ali Meerza had returned to Shiraz from his Tour in the neighbourhood

(2^d Consol: 1825:
13. April 1850
vide 1851/

neighbourhood of Bushire after
an interview with Sheikh Abd
Rasool Khan in which the Khan
had treated him with distinction
I added several districts
to his Government, but the
Sheikh had succeeded in averting
the danger which threatened
him, entirely by the amount
of his Presents which were
supposed to have exceeded
a lac of Rupees in value.

Ag. 10/1

Ag. 10/1

Ag. 10/1

Ag. 10/1

Ag. 10/1

Ag. 10/1

Ag. 10/1

Ag. 10/1

Ag. 10/1

Ag. Mahomed
Shooshtari & Agent of the Imam
of Muscat residing at Bushire
made known to us in February
last that he had received a letter
from the Imam, informing
him

605

Secret Council: 1825.
Ag. 10/1

him of the death of Solyman Bin Ath-
med one of the two reigning Sheikhs of
Bahrain, & stating that his Sons & their
Uncles were divided against each other,
that the Sons had sought to solicit the
aid of the Imam in establishing
themselves in the power of their late
Father & that His Highness was dis-
posed to assist them against his
Uncles. That His Highness proposed
to have the Peace of the Gulf for his
object in siding with the Sons & had
desired his Agent to obtain our consent
to his acting in concert with them,
noticing at the same time that he
should make no reply to the Message
from the Sons until he should
receive our answer.

Ag.

102

Ata & Mahomed
 Moostree was informed that if no
 other Power interfered in the Family
 Quarrels of the Bahrein Chief we
 should strongly advise the Imamm
 to forbear likewise. That if any
 other power did interfere we should
 still recommend caution, because
 if any other Chief was opposed to the
 Imamm and was invited, he would
 collect all his Vassals the Persians
 which would involve the Imamm
 in a ruinous War & throw the whole
 of the Gulf into a state of hostile-
 ties -

103

We further ex-
 plained to Ata & Mahomed that
 we could only offer advice for
 the

607

the Imamm's consideration, and as
 long as no body else interfered our
 advice was decidedly against the
 Imamm's doing so. That in an oppo-
 site case our advice must be given
 with more reserve because in a
 question so nearly touching the
 Imamm's interests he must be best
 Judge of the necessity of his interference.

104. The Agent subse-
 quently explained that His Highness
 designed not only to aid the Sons
 of the late Sheikh, but to endeavor
 to surprise and seize on the Island
 on his own account. Our President
 therefore addressed a letter to the
 Imamm corresponding with the
 terms of our communication to
 his

Pol^o Council 1825
 4 May 28.
 Vide 281/

his Agent I was happy to learn
from His Highness's reply, that he had
followed our advice & relinquished
for the time all intentions of a
hostile nature against Bahrain.
105.

Lieutenant Colonel

Pol. & Consul. 1825.

13. & 14. April 1844.

W. S. 1844

Stammes in his letter of the 10th March
speaking of the death of Sheikh
Soliman, states, that he had been
succeeded in his property & political
influence by his Eldest Son Sheikh
Khalifa who resides near Riffa.
Shares the net revenues of the
Island in equal proportions with
his Uncle Sheikh Abdoola. The
latter however was still considered
to possess the executive authority
& conducted all the public business
although

609

although the concurrence of Sheikh
Khalifa was necessary to every act
of the Government.

1.09

Renewed hostilities with
Rahmah b. Jabir, 1825-1826;
Bahraini victory, December 1826

Bombay Castle 11th January 1826 (Jan 2nd 1295)
" 24/25

12/2/25
Persian Gulf
From the Persian Gulf
dated the 12th of Jumada ul Awwal
Shir
I am, Sir, to inform you that I have received from the Persian Gulf a letter from the Persian Gulf dated the 12th of Jumada ul Awwal, which contains the following information: The Persian Gulf is now in a state of great excitement, and the British Government is expected to send a large force to the Persian Gulf to maintain the peace. I am, Sir, to inform you that I have received from the Persian Gulf a letter from the Persian Gulf dated the 12th of Jumada ul Awwal, which contains the following information: The Persian Gulf is now in a state of great excitement, and the British Government is expected to send a large force to the Persian Gulf to maintain the peace.

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Bombay Castle 11. January 1826. Gen. 24. 24. 6. 2

not for the sea coast in order to confer with me personally on the subject of their grievances. I found however that they were still at Laysa from whence I could scarcely expect an answer to my letter in eight days, ten days, and therefore resolved to remove at (Bahrain) till the expiration of this period.

3. With this respect I have been to my communications and not for any encouragement. I have, however, pointed out to him by letter the inevitable consequences of his perseverance in this present line of conduct and offered to receive any moderate proposal that might enable me to make him a more amiable and useful man. With regard to his claim which he asserts in his letter to Government of the rights, as in my own mind, I fully enter of his rights. I thought it desirable to take advantage of the superior information furnished at Bahrain to enquire more minutely into its origin, on this subject I have obtained the opinion of Sheikh Mahomed bin Ahmed and the verbal memorandum from that Chieftain will I trust sufficiently demonstrate the groundless nature of these pretensions.

Bombay Castle 11. January 1826. Gen. 24. 24. 6. 2

4. The enclosed copies of the correspondence which has been passing and subsisting may be the most interesting part of this letter. I found out the necessity for such measures the objects of (Bahrain) were not only to give some satisfaction to him but to give some satisfaction to the British Government. The interests of this Government have changed materially since the receipt of the communications from Laysa. The British Government alluded to by a statement that Bahrain was a British possession in the enclosed letter and his rejection of the same was not only unjustifiable but also a violation of the terms of the Grant of the British Government. It is clearly manifest that the nature of the objection of his old friends and the confidence with which he looked forward to a renewal of the system which prevailed during the period of their former ascendancy. He is now the only person who dared to justify the charges of his neighbours against him without the slightest notice or shadow of regret, and there can be no security for his not extending the limits of his degradations and attracting the gaze of any other tribe who may happen to become adjacent to him. His force is at present

Bombay Castle 11th January 1826 2nd M^o 2nd 5th

contemplated. But Sir James was not inclined to
allow the Government to be distressed from all
hands of the Govt. and a letter was not addressed
to him. It was only a letter of condolence and
sympathy. It is evident that the Government
kind to try to give the smell of former irregularities.
For that reason Sir James is of the opinion
that some serious measures should be taken
and that to give a day to the Government and
allow the removal of these men to be decided
which Sir James is inclined to do.

5. The Government of Bahrain
has been inclined to his interests from mistake
on hand of the difference between him and a strict ob-
servance of the Treaty and I have fully explained
to Sir the Director in respect to the present
of some difference in the Treaty and I have fully
from our side that Sir James is inclined to
to injury or offend him; that Sir James would
only tend to encourage the system which it was
the general object to abolish, and that I think
he would in future consider himself justified in
having recourse to arms, whenever it became evident
that his honor or safety would be compromised
by a longer forbearance. I think that Sir James

Bombay Castle 11th January 1826 2nd M^o 2nd 5th

compliance with the established law. Sir James
would doubtless give information of his intention
to commence hostilities whenever he should be
compelled to have recourse to arms. I should
on deliberation, but I should think I should
do all I could in order to prevent him in any
thing such a course. Sir James is of the opinion
in influence of the British Government could
attend to the present case. I should think
very much inclined to give Sir James
Jaber to render and others sufficient security
for the future, but that in the event of
finding him obstinate, I should be inclined to
neglect of his Treaty, his past conduct
compel him to desert from his friends and
neighbours.

6. Withholding the
proceedings which Sir James has
received, and the Governor of Bahrain has
given me of his only being deterred from
sending them out of regard to Sir James.
I should suspect that he will not forget
matters, but quietly await the course of events
and regulate his conduct in the new and
Government, some be disposed to do his best
against Sir James. It is not to come to any plan

Bombay Castle 11 January 1826 2nd 2nd 2nd

As there with the same for Jaber has been always
compliance and is not in the enclosed letter
from Ambassador Sir Corbett, as forwarding from
the 'wiltshire of the Arab' character. But I believe
this performance may rather be imputed to an
exhibition of 'wiltshire' him, with the thing
fancy which Corbett Sir Jaber is afraid even
that he will be in any way. The 'wiltshire' is
and with the most urgent and anxious for his de-
struction it is probable that he will only come
forward as an authority in any attack which
may be directed against his 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'.
The 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' are 'wiltshire' at the distance
well disposed to make sure of 'wiltshire' in their
power on the shore with which the 'wiltshire' of
Daman is said to be nearly committed at low-
water; on this subject however I have been unable
to obtain any certain information; and cannot
not omit so favorable an opportunity to remark
that whatever may be the decision of Government
on this present question, a copy of the 'wiltshire' of
that dangerous quarter of the 'wiltshire' which
is not almost continuous, would prove of the
greatest utility to the 'wiltshire' on this station.

My request to Captain
Walker of which the enclosed is a copy and which
appears

Bombay Castle 11 January 1826 2nd 2nd 2nd

As a copy of the letter to Government
appears which I have to send to the 'wiltshire' with
their 'wiltshire' - Captain 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
'wiltshire' of few copies 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
of my letter, with an 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
suggestion, to the effect that 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
I have annexed any 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
request to me 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
he shall be considered to have 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
to 'wiltshire' and 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
opportunities may occur of 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
them.

8 I have sent of this letter to
enclose a letter from 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
'wiltshire' of the 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
the 'wiltshire' to be.

Respectfully
11th November 1825. Sir J. Walker
Major Genl. Thomas
Colonel Walker

1825.

Transcription of a letter from 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
Annual Abstract of 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire' 'wiltshire'
and 4th 1826 or 1827. To Lieutenant
Colonel C. G. Thomas C. B. Walker.
A.B.

I have to inform you that

Bombay Castle 11th January 1826 From W. H. W. H. W.

has occurred in this quarter, respecting the conduct of the
Jahid. His conduct in the before said case is not very
- I mean to give you very general with him, which
was decided with your satisfaction. In fact, he saw
that you were determined to make him correct
himself - at that time he came to me and desired
only that I should give him some money to be used
for his journey home. I gave him 1000 Rs. and he went
home. The good point for him. He returned to me
and that the friends of the - is, he returned and
alleged that his friends of the - had given him
something. This was good and another
one of his friends said that they were not
on hand - He then begged me to write to the
thinks give him some thing - I did and signed
them to do so - They answered that he had had
nothing among them and, because he had lost
all good disposition that they would not give
him any thing more. In fact, we were obliged
should send my own money - I sent a letter to them
they give few thousand Rs. of Rs. which
were delivered to him - He then wrote to me
"may God give you every good - You have never
informed me from first to last and I have
to writing that you will never see any thing in
my conduct that that is right." - After

Bombay Castle 11th January 1826 From W. H. W. H. W.

After some time I heard
that the British had been in the
of the British and that he was in the
the British and that he was in the
given me the money to be used
- I then wrote to him and told him
that I had given him 1000 Rs. and he
went home. The good point for him.
He returned to me and that the
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to writing that you will never see any thing in
my conduct that that is right." - After

True Translation

W. H. W. H. W.

Transcription of previous document

No 24125 From the Resident in the Persian Gulf
dated the 12th November with enclosure -

Sir,

I do myself the honor to acquaint you that I yesterday returned to Bushire from the Southern Coast, and have to announce with regret, the total failure of my endeavours to deter Rahma bin Jabir from the further prosecution of his unprovoked aggressions on his neighbours for the protection of whom I have been compelled to station two Cruizers off Daman till the receipt of instructions on the subject from the Honorable the Governor in Council.

2. In my Dispatch No. 43 in this Department, I had the honor briefly to report that the improper conduct of this Chieftain demanded my presence at Katiffe, and I accordingly proceeded in that direction in the full confidence that a firm remonstrance would have the effect of restraining his violence till I could obtain some slight concession in his favour from the Katiffe Government, which I calculated on their agreeing to, for the sake of permanent security under our mediation. With this impression I took the earliest opportunity after my arrival at Bahrein to address letters of which the enclosed are Copies, to Mahomed bin Erraher and Rahma bin Jabir, acquainting them of the motive of my visit, and entreating them to accept of my good offices in settling their differences - Previous to my leaving Bushire I had dispatched intimation to the former Chieftain, of my intended visit to Kattiffe and fully expected that either he or his brother Sheikh Majeed who professes nearly equal authority in the Government, would have set out for the Sea Coast in order to confer with me personally on the

subject of their grievances - I found however that they were still at Lassa from whence I could scarcely look for an answer to my letters in less than four days, and therefore resolved to remain at Bahrein till the expiration of that period.

3. Altho' the reply of Rama bin Jabir to my communication was not of a very encouraging description, I again pointed out to him by letter the inevitable consequences of a perseverance in his present line of conduct, and offered to receive any moderate proposal that might enable me to mediate between him and Katiffe on a basis of justice and mutual convenience. With regard to the claim which he asserts in his letter, to Government of that Country, altho' in my own mind perfectly satisfied of its nullity I thought it desirable to take advantage of the superior information procurable at Bahrein to enquire more minutely into its origin, on this subject therefore I requested the opinion of Sheikh Mahomed bin Ahmed and the enclosed memorandum from that Chieftain will I trust sufficiently demonstrate the groundless nature of these pretensions.

4. The enclosed Copies of the correspondence which passed during my subsequent stay in the neighbourhood of Katiffe seem to point out the necessity for restraining the excesses of Rahma bin Jabir, and if possible compelling him to give security for his future good conduct. The prospects of this adventurer have changed materially since the receipt of the communication from Toorkey the Wahabee Chief, alluded to by Mahomed bin Erraher, and Abdoola bin Ahmed in the enclosures Nos. 1 & 2, and his rejoicings on that event added to his unjustifiable attacks on the Kattiffe and Grain Boats which immediately succeeded it, clearly manifest his reliance on the protection of his old friends, and the confidence with which he looks forward to a

renewal of the System which prevailed during the period of their former ascendancy - He is now the only person who dares to justify the seizure of his neighbour's vessels without the slightest notice or shadow of right, and there can be no security for his not extending the limits of his depredations and attacking the boats of any other Tribe who may happen to become obnoxious to him. His force is at present contemptible but his proceedings are calculated to attract the unprincipled and discontented from all parts of the Gulf, and altho' I do not apprehend that there is any Chieftain at present disposed to follow his example, it is evident that it must tend to keep alive the seeds of former irregularities. For these reasons I take the liberty to offer my decided opinion that some active measures should be quickly adopted to put a stop to his predatory career, and prevent the revival of those more extended disorders which their remaining unnoticed may probably give rise to.

5. The Government of Bahrein has hitherto submitted to his insults from mistaken notions of the deference due to us and to a strict observance of the Treaty but I have fully explained to Sheikh Abdoola our respect for the free agency of every Chieftain in the Gulf, and that it is far from our wish that any state should tamely submit to injury or oppression; that such lenity would only tend to encourage the system which it was the general object to abolish, and that I trusted he would in future consider himself justified in having recourse to arms, whenever it became evident that his honor or safety would be compromised by a longer forbearance. I added, that in compliance with the

established custom he would doubtless give intimation of his intention to commence hostilities whenever he should be compelled to have recourse to so unpleasant an alternative, but I assured him I should at all times be ready to assist him in averting such a calamity as far as the mediation or influence of the British Government could extend. In the present case I promised to use my utmost endeavours to bring Rahma bin Jabir to reason and obtain sufficient security for the future, but that in the event of finding him obstinate, I should be under the necessity of blockading his port and thus compel him to desist from plundering his neighbours.

6. Notwithstanding the provocations which Sheikh Abdoola has received, and the assurances which he has given me of his only being deterred from resenting them out of regard to the Treaty I should suspect that he will not precipitate matters, but quietly await the course of events and regulate his conduct by the view which Government may be disposed to take of the business. His reluctance to come to another rupture with Rama bin Jabir has been always conspicuous and is noticed in the enclosed letters from Mahomed bin Erraher, as proceeding from the mildness of the Arab character, but I believe this forbearance may rather be imputed to an apprehension of embroiling himself with a strong party which Rahma bin Jabir appears ever still to maintain among the Uttobee Tribe, and altho' most urgent and anxious for his destruction it is probable that he will only come forward as our auxiliary in any attack which may be directed against his refractory Kinsman. The

Katiffe people are helpless at sea but are well disposed to render every assistance in their power on the shore with which the Island of Daman is said to be nearly connected at low-water, on this subject however I have been unable to obtain any certain information, and I must not omit so favourable an opportunity to remark, that whatever may be the decision of Government on the present question, a Copy of the late survey of that dangerous quarter of the Gulph, which is yet almost unknown, would prove of the greatest utility to the Cruizers on this station.

7. My requisition to Captain Walker, of which the enclosed is a Copy, will I trust afford a clear explanation to Government of the System which I mean to adopt till honored with their instructions. Captain Walker's orders to the Senior officer correspond entirely with the purport of my letter, with an additional clause, at my suggestion, to this effect that should Rahma bin Jabir have committed any excesses at Sea subsequent to my departure from the Bay of Katiffe, he shall be considered to have subjected himself to punishment and his boats seized whenever an opportunity may occur of taking possession of them.

8. I do myself the honor to enclose a letter from Rahma bin Jabir to the address of the Hon'ble the Governor, and have the honor to be,

Bushire Residency) Sirs,
12th November 1825) Signed E G Stannus

Resident in the Gulf.

No. 1.

Translation of a Letter from Abdulla bin Ahmed Sheikh of Bahrein, dated Rubeeal Awal 4th 1241 or 19th October 1825.

To Lieutenant Colonel E.G. Stannus C.B., Resident.

A.C.

I have to inform you what has occurred in this quarter respecting Rahma bin Jabir. His conduct both before and now is not unknown to you, nor my quarrel with him which was decided with your mediation when he saw that you were determined to make him come to terms. At that time he came to me and desired only that I should forgive him as he wished protection only from God and me, and you well know the good I did for him. He afterwards told me that the family of Errei-ir Mahomed and Majid Sheikhs of Kateef and Lahsa had formerly given him something - this was good and in the way of friendship - but that now they were not on terms. He then begged me to intercede with them to give him something. I sent and requested them to do so. They answered that Rahma had nothing among them, and, because he had lost all good disposition that they would not give him any thing except for my sake, and that I should send my own man. I sent a person to whom they give four thousand bags of Dates, which were delivered to Rahma. He then wrote to me "May God give you every good. You have never neglected me from first to last and I take God to witness that you will never see any thing in my conduct but that is right."

After some time when he saw that Toorkee Son of Saood Wahabee was master of Nadjd and that he wrote to Rahma that he was his companion and on his side, and that he would govern on Sea as in the days of Saood. When Rahma heard this he laid his promises aside, forgot all good actions and became the friend of Toorkee - he hoisted his Flag fired Guns and rejoiced. He then made war on the family of Errei-ir and seized two of their Boats, which were coming from Bushire, and their cargoes, and killed several of their crews. He also prevented my boats from going to Kateef - between my people and that of Kateef there is much Trade. I also have Date trees there. His conduct towards my Boats is bad - he strikes the men destroys the things in the boats, and takes from them by force Dates so that people cannot exist.

We place this affair first in God's hands and then in your's because you desired me to inform you of every disturbance in this quarter - this has occurred here - of every you desire - give me information.

True Translation

Signed E.G. Stannus

Resident

1824
 Bombay Castle 24th January 1824

Resident's Office 1st Party
 From the Resident

in the Persian Gulf dated the 16th
 December 1823

1824
 Persian Gulf
 From the Resident
 Reporting Rahmah
 has been to some
 extent of his own
 will and a Bahari
 Pargah in an
 action off the coast
 of the Gulf

Account have been
 this day received of a decisive action
 between Rahmah b. Jabir and a
 Bahari. Rahmah has been victorious and has
 after an heroic defence subjected his
 antagonists and involved both parties in
 utter destruction. The particulars of
 this desperate engagement are various
 related but the following details lay
 the result of a complete and decisive
 victory.

Bombay Castle 24th January 1827. Contd.

different written and verbal statements may be considered as the most authentic - his account of the interesting event which was a great personal business. -
 2. Bahman bin Saud having by his violent and unjust aggressions seized the charts of Bahrain, and thrown into a close alliance with him, sailed from Dammam in a large and well appointed Barge, he invited assistance from his friends on different parts of the Gulf, leaving his eldest son Rasheed with a sufficient garrison to man the Fort during his absence. During his progress in search of assistance, Rasheed landed at Bushra and after fruitless attempts to engage the Command in his general proceeded to Muscat, where he remained some time and encountered a powerful storm and he interfered in behalf of the family, but finding this determined he to insist on his exorbitant demands on Rasheed and resorted to writing the highest concessions for the same.

17540
 Bombay Castle 24th January 1827. Contd.

inquiries with which he had treated the subjects of Shiraz should be abandoned. I declined all further interference, and in a few days afterwards he sailed for Dammam breathing defiance against his enemies. - Altho the Arabian was blockaded by the British fleet it appears that he succeeded in raising his garrison and returning safe on board his Boat, where he was received with a salute by his followers. - The decisive indication of his presence excited the instant attention of the opposite party, one of whose boats commanded by Shiraz should be a Submarine, the Stephens of Shiraz also proceeded to attack him. A desperate struggle ensued till Shiraz should be having lost nearly the whole of his crew by the fire of Mahomed's boat & retired for reinforcements. - These were speedily furnished by the other vessels of the fleet which were directed by Shiraz should be to keep from the conflict, while he returned, after meeting the Commodore's reinforcements.

Bombay Castle 24th January 1827/1260

to meet his brave antagonists - the a fight commenced with fury, but Hamah perceiving that his people were rapidly being overpowered, he ordered the remainder of his army, armed orders to gratify with his opponents, and after a short time a young man was his with a letter from the Magistrate, which was immediately delivered, informing him that he should be allowed to return to his home and return to his family, and the same time to the Bahraini boat without fear of towards a vessel of his folk, which returned and a group of his followers immediately appeared the escape to the other side of the island, but only one person was sent out of Bahrain Bay, and it is supposed that in the course of the action 500 men must have perished.

Bashir still remained with the Port of Dammam, but it is impossible that he can long withstand the force that has been brought against him, destined, and

Bombay Castle 24th January 1827/1260

he now is of all hope of a settlement, and deprived of the advantage of that enthusiasm which the momentary spirit of his father had inspired into all his followers - State Bahama, the peace of the Gulf could never be considered secure, and in possible and unprovoked Bashir afforded a character to the war which character was under, evidence of a declaration of war against the Mercantile State, and he felt him have evaded all responsibility, and invited the means of their practical persecutions, still emboldened by success and revenge, is intolerant and insolent, and thus ultimately views a long and arduous element. The work which I have to the honor to communicate in this Dispatch has remained these apprehensions and encourage the hope of a continuance of tranquillity.

Bashir's Residency, I have to
The 24th December 1826, I have to
1826, I have to

Transcription of previous document

From the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated the 14th
December / No. 85 /

Sir,

Accounts have been this day received of a decisive action between Rama been Jaber and a Baherine Baglow, in which the former after an heroic defence set fire to his Magazine and involved both vessels in utter destruction. The particulars of this desperate engagement are variously related but the following details being the result of a careful comparison of different written and verbal statements, may be considered as the most authentic account of this interesting event which has as yet reached Bushire.

2 Rahma been Jauber having by his violent and unjust aggressions united the shaiks of Bahrine and Katiffe into a close alliance against him, sailed from Daman in a large and well appointed Baglow, to implore succour from his friends on different parts of the Gulf, leaving his eldest son Bashire with a sufficient garrison to maintain the Fort during his absence. During his progress in search of assistance Rahma touched at Kishm and after fruitless attempts to engage the Imaum in his quarrel proceeded to Bushire, where he remained some time and endeavoured to prevail upon me to interfere on behalf of his family, but finding him determined to persist in his exorbitant demands on Katiffe and averse to making the slightest concessions for the wanton indignities with which he had treated the subjects of Shaik Abdoola been Ahmed, I declined all further interference, and in a few days afterwards he sailed for Daman breathing defiance against his enemies. Altho the harbour was blockaded by the Bahrine fleet it appears that he succeeded in visiting his garrison and returning safe on board his Boat,

where he was received with a salute by his followers. This decisive indication of his presence excited the instant attention of the opposite party, one of whose boats Commanded by Shaik Ahmed been Sulerman, the Nephew of Shaik Abdoola proceeded to attack him. A desperate struggle ensued till Shaik Ahmed having lost nearly the whole of his crew by the fire of Rahma's boat retired for reinforcements. These were speedily furnished by the other vessels of the fleet which were directed by Shaik Ahmed to keep aloof from the conflict, while he returned after making this chivalrous arrangement to meet his brave antagonist. The fight recommenced with fury, but Ramah perceiving that his people were rapidly falling around him, mustered the remainder of the Crew, issued orders to grapple with his opponents, and after embracing his young son was led with a lighted torch to the Magazine, which immediately exploded, blowing his Baglow to atoms and setting fire at the same time to the Bahrine boat, which soon afterwards shared a similar fate. Shaik Ahmed and a few of his followers fortunately effected his escape to the other boats of the Squadron but only one person was saved out of Rahma's Baglow, and it is supposed that in the course of the action 300 men must have perished.

3 Bashire still held out in the Fort of Daman, but it is impossible that he can long withstand the force that has been brought against him, destitute, as he now is, of all hope of assistance, and deprived of the advantage of that enthusiasm which the undaunted Spirit of his Father had infused into all his followers. While Rahma lived the peace of the Gulf could never be considered secure, and his restless unprincipled habits afforded a dangerous example to other unsettled characters who under pretence of a declaration of war against the mercantile State might like him have evaded all responsibility and rivalled the enormity of their piratical predecessors, till emboldened by

success and impunity to intercept our trade, and thus ultimately incur a long merited chastisement. The event which I have the honor to communicate in this Despatch has removed these apprehensions and encourages the hope of a continuance of tranquillity.

Bushire Residency)	I have etc.
14th December 1826)	Sigd. E.G. Stannus
		Residt. in the Pn. Gulf

1.10
The war with Muscat, 1828-1829

Translation of a letter from the Agent at Bahrein to the Resident in the British Gulf dated 16 Feb 1829 8

Al. I beg to acquaint you that I have already sent these letters with Kater to your address, one of which I enclose a copy from Muscat by the same route. These letters will convey to you the full particulars of every thing that has taken place.

On the 27th the British Fleet arrived off the coast of Bahrein on the 27th October and a small boat belonging to the ship being driven on shore by the violence of the wind was seized by the Bedouins and ten or twelve persons detained. On the next day, detached ships appeared but were scattered by a severe gale. On the 31st the whole of the Fleet entered Bahrein and cast anchor off the shore outside the Khir of Killa. Which Whaler's two schooners immediately proceeded, with a party of troops and two boats opposite to the British ships... while another party under the command of a British officer, was sent to support the British on the 3rd day he was met by the Bahrein chief, from that place and took up a position near Horah to the eastward of Muscat. On the 4th day the ships of the British appeared the Khir of Killa and two boats and a British officer entered. On the 5th day the British received a communication from one of the British Boats, at Muscat, in his own boat, bringing a letter from the chief of Killa, stating, for which he begged him to be sent, that the British name is also known, is said to have arrived - the purpose of the letter seems to have been that influenced by a regard for both sides and desirous of preventing the opinion of British, he was anxious that arrangements should be made, to avoid this - the written answer was returned to this was a verbal reply, that they thought all the evil the British were not rest with them but with those who had commenced it. The British to be told to be told to be told, and to be told to be told. On the 5th day, detached two boats and two British towards Killa, the place where the British anchor, and near which the large British belonging to the British were stationed, as soon as they perceived the British they swept by view of the British the Bahrein Fleet and cast anchor in the Khir of Killa. The same day, two boats, with a number of British and smaller boats, left the vicinity of Killa and placed themselves opposite the British of the British. The British landed on the night and took possession of it. On the 10th day, after a short time, a fire from the British of Killa, which was returned by the British of

The British ship had accompanied the ships, then commenced firing upon the town of
 Amman from the sea, but being out of shot she came nearer, one ball struck
 the town but only did no one. After this she ceased her commotion. The day was
 the beginning and ending of the fighting. After 12 o'clock a number of boats commenced
 landing troops from the ships, under Phipps and they say. At this time Sheikh Abdul
 with his 1000 men with the other chiefs with their forces, were on the ground. As soon
 as they heard of the landing they left the town and took up a position opposite to
 the British troops were not able to land when the a few of the British were shot
 on both sides and the two sides had nearly reached each other when Sheikh Abdul
 Casab, chief of the land, then and compelling them to give way, broke and defeated
 them, having done this they began to cut them up. At 4.00 had not landed from the
 boats when he perceived his troops wanted when which he returned. The reports
 on the early state that they had thrown them 500 killed but the correct number is
 only 200 - a great number however were drowned when broken down from floating
 up, and a very large quantity of arms have been recovered from the water. The ship
 the British was defeated while the British troops only lost four men and seven
 horses. Killed and one horse carried away. The position the defeat took place.
 The British ships sailed and proceeded to Barroochah where they anchored being
 laden with food and two boats and a boat which had 1000 men. There were some small
 cotton for the people of by Abdul the British then who got the boat off on the
 11th and carried her into Muscat. On the night of the 11th the British people continued
 to set fire to the great which was still on shore, but the British chief carried off every
 thing that was not burnt. He took some ammunition and eight pieces of cannon.
 His great intention that great number of Amman people have been put to rest.
 many of whom he saw on the ground. It is said that more than 500 were killed and
 drowned. Some reports mention that 1000 British in killed others that he is
 still alive. The two ships and boats that were anchored off Barroochah, weighed
 and joined the 11th at 10.00. This day the 11th the British people are
 still anchored near Barroochah. On the night of the 11th two men landed from the
 British ship Muscat with one of them a few more ally but did a defeat and after

Amman, and the other which belong to the British, from whom they brought a letter
 to the British people. The purpose of which was that he should go to Al-Bosla to be at
 the sea of the sea and make peace with the British in which case British
 Muscat would land and give a new section. The British chief on reply said
 that he could have nothing to do with a letter from the British, but that if the
 British would write him self the affair might be settled. I think of the British was
 to ask that a person should be sent from Amman, a mediator that Sheikh Abdul
 would be peace. After the British had retreated the British sent and destroyed
 the British ship which began at 4.00. The British had nearly injured British cutting
 down every state. There had 1000 persons have been recovered from the
 sea, and that Sheikh Abdul has written to the British of Muscat and to you

Transcription of previous document

Translation of a letter from Assoo the Agent at Bahrein to the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 16 Nov 1828

AC I beg to acquaint you that I have already sent these letters via Kateef to your address in one of which I enclosed a communication from Muscat by that route. These letters will convey to you the full particulars of every thing that has taken place.

His Highness the Imam's fleet arrived off the coast of Guttur on the 27 October and a small boat belonging to Luft being driven on shore by the violence of the wind was seized by the Boo Guwarah tribe and her crew of nine persons detained. On that same day Sued Saed's ships appeared but much scattered by a severe gale. On the 31 ult. the whole of the fleet entered Bahrein and cast anchor off Sutra outside the Khor of Killa. Shaikh Khuleefa bin Sooliman immediately proceeded with a body of troops and took post opposite H.H. vessels while another party under the command of Abdoolah bin Ahmed's son was sent to support him. On the 3rd day he marched by the Bahrein Chief's orders from that place and took up a position near Horah to the eastward of Manamah. In four days the ships of the Imam () the Khor of Killa and two Grabs with 11 Buglas entered. On the 4th inst. Ally Naim a commander of one of the Imam's Buglas landed at Muharag in his own boat bringing a letter from the Chief of Mukla Shuhur for Shaikh Abdoolah bin Ahmed. This chief whose name is Abdoolrub is said to have arrived - the purport of the communication seems to have been that influenced by a regard for both sides and desirous of preventing the effusion of blood he was anxious that arrangements should be made to avoid this - no written answer was returned to this but a verbal reply that the blame for all the evil that might arise did not rest with them but with those who had commenced it, adding "if you wish to land do so and do what is proper".

On the 5 Sued Saed detached two Grabs and two Buglas towards Killa the place where the cruisers anchor and near which the large vessels belonging to Shaikh Abdoolah were stationed. As soon as they perceived the Grabs they weighed by order of the Bahrein shaikh and cast anchor on the Khor of Fasht. The same day two Grabs with a number of Buglas and smaller vessels left the vicinity of Killa and having placed themselves opposite the Fort of Sutra the troops landed in the night and took possession of it. On the 9 inst. one of the Grabs opened fire upon the Fort of Hallah which was returned. The Bugla of Bushire () had accompanied the Grabs then commenced firing upon the Town of Manama from Muzrasa but being out of shot she came nearer and fired one ball which reached the town but injured no one - after this she ceased her cannonade. This day was the beginning and ending of the fighting. After 12 o'clock a number of

boats commenced landing troops from the vessels near Jaffir and Kuz Kuz. At this time Shaikh Abdoolah and Shaikh Khuleefa with the other chiefs and their forces were in Manama. As soon as they heard of the landing they left the town and took up a position opposite. The Imam's troops were not all landed when a fire of matchlocks was opened on both sides and the two bodies had nearly reached each other when Shaikh Abdoolah's cavalry charged Saed Sued's men and compelling them to give way broke and defeated them. Having done this they began to cut them up. H.H. had not landed from his boat when he perceived his troops routed upon which he returned. The reports in the city state that they had more than 500 killed but the correct number is only 200. A great number however were drowned whose bodies have been floating up and a very large quantity of arms have been recovered from the water. In short the Imam was defeated while the Bahrein Troops only lost four men and four horses killed and one horse carried away. The instant the defeat took place the Imam's ships weighed and proceeded to Boorhumah where they anchored leaving behind a grab of two masts and a Bugla which had stranded. These were immediately taken possession of by Abdoolah bin Ahmed's men who got the Bugla off on the 11th and carried her into Muharag. On the night of the 15th the Imam's people continued to set fire to the grab which was still on shore but the Bahrein chief carried off everything that was not burnt, her copper, stores, ammunition and eight pieces of cannon.

It is quite certain that great numbers of drowned people have been picked up many of whom had no wound. It is said that more than 500 men were killed and drowned. Some reports mention that Shaikh Tahnoon is killed others that he is still alive. The two grabs and Buglas that were anchored off Mazoola weighed and joined H.H. fleet on the 11th. This day the 16th Nov. the Imam's vessels are still anchored near Boorhumah. On the night of the 6 two men landed from the Imam's ships in Muharag, one of them a free man Ally bin Saud a dependant of the Imam and the other a slave belonging to Bin Mushary from whom they brought a letter to Sued Abdool Julleel the purport of which was that he should go to Abdoolah bin Ahmed and see if he had any wish to make peace with the Imam in which case he (bin Mushary) could land and open a negotiation. The Bahrein Chief in reply said he could have nothing to do with a letter from Bin Mushary but that if the Imam would write himself the affair might be settled. I think if the Imam was to ask that or send a person as a mediator that Shaikh Abdoolah is inclined for peace.

After the Imam had retreated the Shaikh sent and destroyed the fort of Sutra which however H.H. troops had greatly injured besides cutting down many date trees. I hear that 1000 weapons have been recovered from the sea and that Shaikh Abdoolah has written to the Shaikh of Bushire and to you.

29

Translation of a letter from the Agent at Thagiah to
Major Wilson dated 28 Nov 1828.

Al. With respect to the news of David's death and the People of Bahrain
I beg to acquaint you that before this the Utterances arising in regard
under which I have been forgiven sent a Boat to B. which is a certain
has appeared among you in here. On the 22 Nov this boat returned. The

30

following are the particulars of David's proceedings against Bahrain as given
from the sailors and a letter as supposed to have been sent from the
Chief of the place. It appears that on the arrival of the Fleet and Forces of B.
and their Squadron off the River of Kulla they attempted to enter it, but
were unable in consequence of the Utterances being blocked up with stones.
Some time previously the British remained here 6 days until the Baniyas
and other Maritime People had removed the stones when he entered with
his boat and Fleet, and landing a portion of his Troop, took possession
of the Fort of Suthra on the 4th Inst - & continued there 5 days without
being molested in any way by the Utterances. On the 7th he intended to
attack Musannah. He eight being ^{two} commanded by David's death with the
people of Muscat and the left by Jahoon with the Baniyas. Before
however the time had come a party of the Bahraini Mohammedans and the soldiers
then stationed attacked the B. Troop, and the Baniyas and a number immediately
fled towards the shore to embark in their boats. The Baniyas
pursued and captured them. The B. also collected the left of the Fleet and
the 350 Mulla and an considerable number of men, for they were
principally sailors people and unable to swim. The boats of the
Baniyas were in shore and when some came near to embark they took
their arms and thrust them over the board and forced them into
the sea. David's boat was wounded in the side of the foot as he was
swimming off, which was done by one of the Baniyas who was swimming
his boat in the water. After swimming a long way for boat a man of
Bahrain of the National tribe with a plank to his assistance by which
he kept off until they reached the boats of the Fleet - a two boats captured
a. B. and three boats were destroyed. & B. having permitted the B. and
the Baniyas to open a fire upon the Troop. The day of the Fleet on attempting
to shoot out they both were grounded and could not be got off in any way. They
therefore burnt the B. and left the B. in the sea. Nearly all the Troop but this
is after the B. had collected and of his people, he captured the

38
 I was unable to go. Therefore sent it with a few lines to Khaleefa bin Dammethan with a request for it to be forwarded as quickly as possible to his answer. I enclose. In a former report I stated that Subhan bin Fajir had commenced rebuilding the ruined Fort of Khor on site of the assistance made by Khaleefa bin Dammethan. When Subhan arrived at Abulhasan he assisted and I rather think will provide himself to Abulhasan. After the receipt of the Banna letter and by Subhan bin Khumers to Subhan bin Suggur the latter proposed a communication to Subhan bin Suggur who called him to him and sent it to his brother Salih with instructions to dispatch a boat with it to Bahrain which he did on the 30th ult. The general report is that the Banna has permitted Subhan bin Suggur to reside in Bahrain himself and the Chief of Bahrain I reported before that Subhan bin Khumers and Subhan bin Suggur had requested Subhan to visit Khor in order to increase to make up their ground for accordingly proceeded there but finding it arrange matters returned on the 28th ult. Subhan bin Khumers of Bahrain and Subhan bin Khumers arrived at Ras al Khaymah with an application to him for assistance and support, which Subhan bin Khumers could not afford. Subhan bin Khumers remained till the 3rd inst. but being unable to obtain the desired help left his departure for Khor. The greatest confusion is produced by the Banna going about on foot of 10 and plundering all they meet and taking their property. - Moreover and moreover bin Khumers are still in confusion. I send my letters now in duplicate as on consequence of the strong season they are liable to be lost. Enclosed are the copies of the letters I have sent.
 Subhan bin Khumers on the above copies of letters to Subhan bin Khumers and Khaleefa bin Dammethan with his answer to the latter.

Transcription of previous document

Translation of a letter from the Agent at Shargah to Major Wilson dated 28 Nov 1828.

A.C. With respect to the news of Sued Saed and the people of Bahrein I beg to acquaint you that before this the Uttoobees residing in Shargah under Shaik Sooltan bin Suggur sent a boat to Bahrein to ascertain how affairs were going on there. On the 22 Nov this boat returned. The following are the particulars of Sued Saed's proceedings against Bahrein as gathered from the sailors and a letter addressed to Shaik Saleh bin Suggur from the Chief of that place. It appears that on the arrival of the fleet and forces of H. H. and Shaik Tahnoon off the Khor of Killa they attempted to enter it, but were unable in consequence of the Uttoobees had blocked it up with stones sometime previously. The Imam remained there 6 days until the Buniyas and other Maritime People had removed the stones when he entered with his boats and fleet and landing a portion of his troops took possession of the Fort of Suttra on the 4th inst. H. H. continued there 5 days without being molested in any way by the Uttoobees. On the 7th he intended to attack Manama. The right wing was commanded by Sued Saed with the people of Muscat and the left by Tahnoon with the Buniyas. Before however the two bodies met a part of the Bahrain Horsemen and Matchlock men attacked H. H. troops and the Buniyas and a number immediately fled towards the shore to embark in their boats. The Horsemen pursued and aprised them. Shaik Abdoolla states the loss of Sued Saed to be 350 killed and an unknown number drowned, for they were principally inland people and unable to swim. The boats of the Buniyas were onshore and whoever came near them to embark they took their arms and struck them over the heads and forced them into the sea. Sued Saed was wounded in the sole of the foot as he was swimming off which was done by one of the Buniyas Tribe throwing away his spear in the water. After swimming a long way God sent a man of Batina of the Matariah tribe with a plank to his

assistance by which he kept up until they reached the boats. Of his Fleet a two masted vessel a Bugla and three boats were destroyed, H.H. having permitted the ship and a Bugla to open fire upon the Troops. The day of the defeat on attempting to sail out they both ran aground and could not be got off in any way. They therefore burnt the Brig and left the Bugla.

Nearly all the troops lost their arms. After the Imam had collected such of his people as had escaped the drowning and slaughter, and sailing out of the Khor of Killa, he anchored off Joosub Boo Rahmah and desired Tahnoon to return the arms which the Buniyas had taken the day of the defeat. He accordingly restored 70 Matchlocks, 60 swords and 20 daggers. Assoo sent me a letter on the boat for Muscat which I have despatched. On the 26th Salmin Khumees arrived and reported H.H. departure for Muscat on the 21 with his Fleet and Tahnoon's arrival at Aboothabee. The Buniyas have lost 50 or 70 men besides the wounded. H.H. sent two letters by Salmin bin Khumees one for Shaik Sooltan and one for his brother Salih. I am however ignorant of their purports which I will communicate as soon as I can find it out. Shaik Sooltan is now in Ras el Khymah and Shaik Salih in Shargah. You must excuse this letter as it is written at night but God willing I will send you information of all the events at length like this communication both original and duplicate.

Translation of a letter from Moollah Houssein Agent at Shargah dated 4 Decr 1828

AC I have the honor to inform you that on the 1 inst a man belonging to Shaik Tahnoon's troops who was present during the whole affair at Bahrein arrived here and reported that after the defeat sustained by the Imam H.H. directed his Fleet to weigh and proceed from the Khor of Killa to Juseeb bin Ruhmah where he remained a day to consult and advise upon future measures with regard to the capture of Bahrein. While in this place he received a letter from Muscat informing him

that Mombassa was in a disturbed state and begging him either to proceed in person or to send an army with the utmost possible speed. This intelligence gave H.H. much concern and he determined upon instantly returning to Muscat without attempting to make any arrangements or settlement with his men. To this however Shaik Tahnoon would not consent as the whole of the subsistence of the Beniyas depends upon Bahrein and if they were cut off from keeping up an intercourse with that place it would lead to their ruin. It was therefore settled that one of the Imam's principal men should proceed to Shaik Abdoolla and endeavour to make peace between them upon the condition that the Bahrein Chief should continue the payment of the annual sum formerly given. The Agents on the part of the Imam were Abdoolla bin Mushary and Ally bin Saood and those on the side of the Bahrein Shaik were Abdool Rahman bin Rashid and another man. They all met in a place called Hud. They were however unable to come to any adjustment and H.H. the Imam sailed away with his Fleet on 21 Nov 1828 on his return to Muscat. At the same time Shaik Tahnoon returned to Aboothabee with his People. On his arrival he learned that his territories had been plundered by Shaik Rashid bin Humeed's tribe the Unaeems. Upon which he despatched orders to the Beduins under his control to assemble together at appointed places and directed that none of the inhabitants of Debaye should be permitted to leave the place for either trading or fishing.

I mentioned in a former letter my intention of proceeding to Debaye to deliver your letter for Shaik Tahnoon but being attacked by the opthalmia I was unable to go. I therefore sent it with a few lines to Khaleefa bin Dumeethan with a request for it to be forwarded as speedily as possible. His answer I now enclose. In a former report I stated that Sulmin bin Nassir had commenced rebuilding the ruined Fort of Derah in spite of the remonstrance made by Khuleefa bin Dumeethan. Upon Tahnoon's arrival at Aboothabee he desisted and I rather

think will proceed himself to Aboothabee. After the receipt of the Imam's letter sent by Sulmin bin Khumees to Sooltan bin Suggur the latter prepared a communication to Shaik Abdoolah bin Ahmed and sent it to his brother Salih with instructions to despatch a boat with it to Bahrein which he did on the 30th ult. The general report is that the Imam has permitted Shaik Sooltan to negotiate a peace between himself and the Chief of Bahrein. I reported before that Rashid bin Humud and Ahmed bin Suroor Boo Shamis had requested Sooltan to visit Zuet in order to endeavour to make up their quarrel. He accordingly proceeded there but failing to arrange matters returned. On the 30 ult. Ally bin Ahmed a cousin of Rashid bin Humud arrived at Ras el'Khymah with an application to bin Suggur for assistance and support which the Shaik could not afford. Ally bin Ahmed remained till the 3 inst. but being unable to obtain the desired help took his departure for Zuet. The greatest confusion is produced by the Beduins going about in parties of 10 and plundering all they meet whether friend or foe. Udwee and Mooslim bin Rashid's crew are still in confinement. I send my letters now in duplicate in consequence of the stormy season they are liable to be lost. Enclosed are the copies of the letters I have sent.

Post Department 10/7/1

William Brownham Esq

Chief Secretary to the Govt

Bombay

Sir

I do myself the honor to lay before the Honble the Governor in Council the accompanying Correspondence and Papers, respecting certain Proceedings of the Fleet of Abdoolah bin Ahmed the Chief of Bahrein during a late Cruise which was unusually undertaken against the State of the Highness of the Imam of Muscat.

2. These documents together with the notes I have made in their margins, and the following observations will I trust enable the Honble the Governor in Council to form a true judgment respecting the nature of the foregoing occurrences.

3. A vessel called Durwid the property of a person named Sued Mohamed, and belonging to place called Muskat, which is situated on the Coast of Hydrabad, came at Bombay in the month of Offish or May last, and there took on board a Cargo and Passengers for various places. Intending it is said first to touch at Muskat, next to come to Bushire, and then to proceed to Bahrein.

4. This vessel having left Bombay, fell in with the Bahrein Fleet under the personal command of the Chief of that place off Ras el Khud. The Fleet closed on the Muskat vessel, and harling demanded from whence she came, and that she should immediately lower her sail. Whilst this was in the act of being done, six or three Matchlocks were said in the confusion, and fight, to have been discharged by the Muskat Boat, and immediately she was boarded on all sides by the Bahrein Fleet. About 12 of the crew of the vessel thus boarded were killed, and 15 or 16 wounded; among the former was Sued Mohamed himself.

Post 17/5/1
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the owner. The vessel being thus captured some of the chief of Bahrain men were placed on board, and the whole fleet proceeded to that part of the coast of Muscat which is near the entrance of the Persian Gulf.

5. Off a place called Kish Mahamud, two ships belonging to the Imam of Muscat appeared and commenced an action with the Bahrain fleet. At this time all the valuable articles of the cargo of the trovat captured were transferred into those of Bahrain, and when only a little rice in bulk remained a hole was thrust in her bottom and she was sunk. The crew was landed on the coast of Muscat. The Bahrain fleet having escaped from the ships of the Imam of Muscat reached that island on the 11th June.

6. I have mentioned these circumstances first in point of order, from their belonging to the most important occurrence, but it likewise appears that the Bahrain fleet fell in, also off Ras al Khid, with an enemy, or an all enemy, and likewise to belong to Muscat. From this vessel a quantity of cotton, flour, fish and a large amount of butter, but it was afterwards permitted to proceed on its voyage.

7. It is most material to observe that the chief of Bahrain has never proclaimed or avowed that a war existed between him and Muscat which he is bound to do, previous to proceeding to hostilities by the General Treaty concluded by Sir William R. Grant with the Arabian States, and to which Treaty the chief of Bahrain acceded by his own signature on the 28 February 1820.

8. It will likewise be observed that there was a Bahrain merchant on board the largest of the Muscat vessels and that he had with him cargo, also for Bahrain. This is a strong indication that there was not even a suspicion that a quarrel existed between Bahrain and Muscat as the chief of Bahrain appears.

9. These facts have satisfied my mind perfectly that the objectionable acts of the chief of Bahrain above represented are most clearly punishable, and as such I have considered it my official duty to call him to account for them.

10. My object has been to proceed in my demands for restitution with moderation and caution, but in the most direct manner within however keeping within the bounds to which I was entitled to go when exceeding them, and not advancing one step or taking one step for which I had not the strongest reasons and the clearest right and justice.

11. My first letter to the Bahrain chief was founded on the accompanying extract of a letter from the Agent at Bahrain, and is, as it will be observed, somewhat in the nature of a protest, as I had not when it was written — information sufficiently detailed to enable me to make specific claims. The chief's reply to this letter, now forwarded, appears in no way satisfactory.

vide Agent's letter
No 14.

vide Article 2 of Gen Treaty
May 6. 1820.

vide Agent's letter No 14
and statement No 13.

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discussing the Agent's letter however which enclosed it furnished, as will be observed, some additional particulars.

12. The Government Ship Bonares having reached this place on the 8th ult. I resolved to send her to Bahrain with further communications. Accordingly addressed the accompanying letter to Capt. Haynes, who waited for Bahrain on the 13th ult. conveying the annexed letter for the chief, which I will be observed is more peremptory and enters more into particulars than I had the means of doing in my first.

13. On Captain Haynes's return, he made the annexed general report of his proceedings, and brought the accompanying letter from the Bahrain chief and our Agent there.

14. It will be observed that none of the things demanded were then sent, although there were strong symptoms that the demand was seriously made.

15. A further step therefore became necessary carrying with it an additional proof that I was disposed to push matters with further understanding, resolved to make the best display in my power and to try the effect of forwarding two vessels, as it seems important that every one aware should be resolved to comply to obviate the necessity of again employing force in support of that moral ascendancy which has so effectively served my purposes for years.

16. In the maintenance of these views I sent the Bonares back to Bahrain accompanied by the Schooner H. M. S. Another vessel of this nature is of much marketable force, but they are both known to be Government vessels and as such carry respect along with them. On this occasion I directed the accompanying letter to Capt. Haynes of the Bonares.

17. It will be observed that I first protested, then I sent a formal vessel to convey a letter that was delivered by the naval Agent, lastly I sent two vessels, and the 1st Native Assistant of the Resident is to deliver the annexed more peremptory letter. I proposed an inferior Agent on this occasion that I might have the means at my disposal of procuring an effect in making demands which thus gradually rise, and put on a more positive shape as information is accumulated. I wish to attract the attention of the Government to the accompanying instructions which were given to the Native Assistant in writing.

18. In connection with the subject, and under discussion I beg leave to...

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forward a paper of information which I have obtained from a person who was on board the large merchant vessel, when it was captured.

14. On the 18th instant the British returned to this place and Captain Rogers made a very satisfactory report of his proceedings, of which the accompanying is an extract.

15/

20. The Native Agent brought back the enclosed answer from the Chief of Bahrain.

21. It will doubtless be very gratifying to the Government to be the means of restoring a much property to its owners, while the ultimate conception of the Bahraini Chief makes ultimate proceedings an object of infinitely less importance than if he had contentedly persisted in retaining the entire fruits of his piratical proceedings. Besides the property now brought ashore which may perhaps be valued at Rs. 10,000, the Native Agent reports the means of procuring restitution of property to a considerable amount belonging to Bahrain Merchants who do not desire to seek it from the Chief when conquered, the Utterba Head, as before was caused to be delivered up to a relation who resides at Bahrain of Sa'id Mohammed the owner of the merchant vessel, the two Hameys (dhow women) and the slave mentioned in my 2nd letter to the Chief.

22. I propose distributing the property brought here to its different owners, whenever they can produce a reasonable proof of what may belong to them, in the mean time I have directed it to be placed in a store room in the Bazaar but I fear there will be great difficulties in distinguishing property the marks having been obliterated, the boxes broken and the bags torn and changed.

23. Our whole policy in this Gulf, having for the last nine years been directed against Piratical proceedings, & have abstained from making the Bahraini Chief's conduct would in my humble opinion have been to abandon that policy which has cost us such very great pecuniary sacrifices and by thus creating in the minds of the people of these unenlightened parts a belief that their proceedings were no longer to be controlled, we should incur the hazard of being forced before long, we make to assert our supremacy by a powerful effort, that under these circumstances could be made without great cost and much in intermediate loss of character.

24. But although there is a present danger which we cannot afford even with our high character to temporize still there are various degrees in which any system of policy may be suspended, and I now beg to submit the orders of the Government respecting the length it may be pleased to go in the present occasion.

25. I am not prepared to affirm that our existing satisfied only with what we have now forced from the Chief of Bahrain would not impose upon us the necessity of us long giving a stronger proof of our strength.

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but I believe, that our demonstrations and the success attending upon them in the present occasion will produce a conviction that we have not abandoned our views of maintaining the suppression of Piracy. If this Gulf had not been essentially unsettled by the late wars the conviction might certainly have been made to answer all purposes, whether it shall also in its present state and for the consideration of the Government.

26. From what I can learn I believe that the property given up by the Chief of Bahrain is all that could be expected within any future demands must therefore be answered in money which probably increases considerably the difficulties of recovering, and in some measure may alter the view of the question, for any amount now forced from the Chief of Bahrain in hard cash would probably not be paid from his own Treasury but taken by him from the west coast of his subject the Bahrainis, the conquered race, in the way of contribution, as it is not probable that the Utterba Tribe the conquerors could be made even by their Chief to contribute any cash.

27. Still if there should arise any claims of British subjects in the cases under discussion, they might terminate with perfect justice be enforced since the question would be, whether our own subjects, or the subjects of the delinquents should suffer, but the Government may choose to adopt at any particular point in pushing measures dictated by views of future policy, and from which others promise benefit, when these measures may only shift the burden of sufferings from the subjects of one foreign State to those of another. In such a case we surely might compare ourselves with every right to the extent of interference the Government may think necessary to support our own views.

28. From the want of perfect information I have been forced as will be observed to confine my demands in some measure to such portions of the cargoes of the merchant vessels as was forthcoming. I have no means on which I could found an estimate either of the total value of the cargoes, or of the value of the vessel which was destroyed. I must therefore depend on whatever information may be sent from Bombay in this important point. The information I presume could be obtained from

and the British at the
time when such a
plan was being
discussed.

which in case might be attended with many serious evils - however the spirit
of the article should unquestionably entitle us to call upon those who have signed
the Treaty to abstain from all friendly intercourse with Bahrein after what
has occurred until we may obtain satisfaction and this is the greatest length
to which I should feel inclined to go to wards demanding co-operation on the
Government's behalf as to order otherwise

I trust that I have now fulfilled the object which had in
view and which was to make the British Government in Council fully acquainted
with all the information I have been able to acquire, accompanied by occasional
illustrations and specimens, that he may be enabled to judge with a knowledge
both of the justice and necessity of an appeal to force on the present occasion
should the Chief of Bahrein persist in refusing what may be deemed a proper
arrangement for his Princes and consequent breach of Treaty.

Yours &c.

(Signed) D. Wilson
Rtd.

Placed under the
British 13th Aug 1829.

for "H.M. 13th Aug 1829"

N^o 1 to 15: Enclosures intended into enclosed letter sent. Oct 13. 1829.
306.

Political Dept N^o 80. / 1829.

To

William Newnham Esq.

Chief Secy to the Gov^r

Bombay.

For

I have the honor in continuation of my despatch N^o 58, dated 8th
July last in this department to communicate to you for the information of the British
the Governor in Council my subsequent proceedings connected with negotiations for
peace between the Kingdom of Muscat and the Chief of Bahrein with whom
I have in which I repeat to say that I have not been successful.

With a view to show distinctly the efforts which have been made
to bring about so desirable an object I transmit the accompanying documents and
shall proceed to make the following observations on them.

201.

N^o 1 is a letter from the Chief of Bahrein in reply to a communication
made for a second time by me, that both parties should return to the relations in
which they stood before the war. It will be perceived that all such proposals
are somewhat scornfully rejected.

N^o 2 is my answer, maintaining the same sentiments I had ex-
pressed at the commencement of the negotiation.

N^o 3 is a letter from me to H. H. the Imam communicating the
substance of the answer received from the Bahrein Chief and expressing that
H. H. should not consider what I had done in this affair as an impediment
to his opening negotiations through any other means, now or for any other descrip-
tion of cause better suited to his interests.

N^o 4 is a letter from H. H. the Imam addressed to N^o 5, which had
been previously communicated by a confidential Agent by name Hajee Abdul Amree
who arrived here on the 23rd ultimo. The last letter I will be observed contains
three proposals, some one of which H. H. seems to hope might be obtained for him
but which my first correspondence with the Chief of Bahrein will have shown
to be out of the question. The proposals are in substance first that the Chief of
Bahrein should continue to pay the former tribute or secondly he should pay the
the expenses of the expedition sent last year to attack him and which further these
expenses have been estimated by the Imam at 70,000 of revenue. Lastly that
both sides should give up interfering with trading but if the Imam has the
power to attack Bahrein he should do so if he chose, or vice versa if the
Bahrein Chief was so inclined, that is to say either might do it peace when
convenient or attack the other when he might not be expected it will be seen
from the text of my conference with the Imam signed what I thought of these
proposals.

N^o 6 is a note of what passed when Hajee Abdul Amree showed his
drafts to me, and showing that the ground on which any further mediation was
interposed could disabily on the wishes and interests of H. H. the Imam and
not alone by any means, on the desire of the British Government for peace although
that desire may remain extremely strong from a thorough conviction and experience
of the evils likely to arise out of the continuance of the war & of the matter
in the clearest light I requested that Hajee Abdul Amree would write a
letter in the form of N^o 7 stating that it was H. H. the Imam's wish and intention
that proposals to negotiate a peace should be made by me to the Chief of
Bahrein on the terms set forth in N^o 8, viz. first "There shall be peace between

Enclosure N^o 1
my despatch N^o 58

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"between the two parties with their several allies and no claims for money on either side second The alliance shall bind the parties not to assist the enemies of each other but shall not bind them to assist each other"

8. I regret much to observe that the Chief of Bahrain reply to H. H. does not accept the offer made in my letter to mediate the peace, he says "I cannot feel secure from infection unless some one like you were to become the mediator of good will between the whole or that when one of us should offend his neighbour improperly and without cause you should turn the infarcts and offences back on this condition we consent to peace" to consent to become such a mediator would clearly be to make the British Government the guarantee of the Peace and the Chief of Bahrain himself used that word in speaking to our Agent at that place, as in like manner did the former Ambassador when he added to him when the letter was put into his hands, for present

9. Affairs having reached this point I have addressed H. H. to the Chief of Bahrain and will transmit it by the first opportunity, I express my regret at his want of perception of his own interests and consider that the British Government will never so far enter into the interest concerns of other states as to guarantee any peace, but that if peace be concluded by any mediation whatsoever the British Government would be highly displeased with whoever might by breaking it become an aggressor.

10. H. H. is a little to H. H. the Imam transmitted by the present infarct boat and which communicates my proceedings in the affairs between H. H. and the Chief of Bahrain and their allies and I express my regret at having failed in my attempts to negotiate a peace but justify and have careful I have been of H. H.'s interests and that I consider my having made all the proposals to the Chief of Bahrain on my own name and as from myself that I have kept the ground perfectly clear for H. H. to negotiate through other means or for any other description of terms which he may deem more suitable.

11. I cannot help regretting although it is now said, that H. H. when he sent up his Frigate and confidential relation as reported in my dispatch of 12. date 19 January last did not at that time distinctly intimate that his interests required peace. Instead of so doing his relation made use of the general and friendly expressions that the Imam would immediately fulfil whatever the Government presented and to which I could only answer that the Government although most anxious to see peace restored, would not interfere in the war, or hinder any positive line of conduct that might form want of due information on our part, my regret that H. H. understood, a mode of proceeding far from the wish of the Government, had a hint then been given that H. H. interests would have been several times of injured I should certainly have made an appeal to

10. I am sorry to hear that the Imam should be given to me although the first step H. H. pursued was to order his Agent in Bombay to ask the British Government advice respecting the preparation of a second expedition against Bahrain. H. H. Highness was well aware that the sanction and approbation of the Government would not be given to such a proceeding and that my objections offered to mediate would be the consequence of such an appeal, but possibly H. H. Highness having so long delayed to make known his real wishes and interests is to be lamented for I fear that although the Chief of Bahrain might probably have consented to terms more favorable to the Imam these those subsequent events have enabled me to perceive I can hardly feel a doubt that the Bahrain Chief would still have insisted upon our guarantee to any peace mediated by us, unless he were more clearly which he has never been since the Imam last year failed in his attempt on that point. On the contrary a series of small events but unduly on the part of H. H. have tended greatly to inflame the pride of the Bahrain Chief and destroy the credit of the Imam. First there was H. H. Highness' most unaccountable pretence at Bahrain, then two of his frigates had an action with one of the Bahrain vessels, Boulay, and allowed her to escape, and then two frigates failed in doing anything decisive against the Bahrain Fleet of small and great vessels, whilst they cannot advise for a short time off H. H. Muscat. In account of these occurrences the pride of the Bahrain Chief is nearly beyond all bounds and it will require a great effort on the part of the Imam to recover the same degree of respect and ascendancy he formerly possessed in this Gulf.

12. Although it appears to me extremely advisable and indeed necessary to save the pride and credit of such an ally as the Imam whenever it may be possible, whilst negotiating with other states, it does not appear necessary to offer to think that the sacrifices now required by H. H. interests to obtain a peace would be made in consequence of our wishes and recommendations. It will therefore be observed that I was particularly in wanting an acknowledgment of the Imam from H. H. confidential Agent, whilst I have invariably addressed myself to ease appearances by making all the communications and proposals to the Bahrain Chief in my own name.

13. The only subject on which it now remains for me to offer any observations is that of the guarantee, both parties are disposed at the present time for but particularly the Chief of Bahrain, who it will be observed has constantly pressed it upon me. I cannot discourse from any communication made to me by the Government that I should be authorized to guarantee any peace.

whenever it seems to require stronger than I have done, the displeasure of the Govt would testify towards whom might by hearing a peace become an obligation. On the contrary the spirit of my instructions is adverse to guarantees and pledges. I may think nor can I presume to recommend the adoption of such a measure as likely to produce any permanent good, even with the conviction which I feel of the evils that have arisen and may still arise from a continuance of the war.

14. Restrictions of finances have been given to all parties that the British Government was determined not to interfere in any action, and it was long as finances were not committed, whilst their appearance was not hidden and it was thought that our desire for peace was so great that we might easily be induced to interfere. Frequent complaints and appeals were made to me accompanied by threats of an immediate recourse to arms, if I did not obtain redress, but a steady adherence to the same line of conduct has produced no effect, and no indication from any chief who has been engaged in hostilities, that they are all now eager for peace, and convinced of the advantage of making such a may be permanent, it is for this now that our interference is desired since it is seen that we cannot be made use of either to support ambition or obtain unreasonable demands from a state that the peace might be broken, still however our system must always suffer and the accomplishment of our desires retarded by war.

15. I cannot form any conjectures as to what the Bahraini proceeding will be after he may receive my letter announcing that I consider myself have failed entirely in the negotiations with Bahrain the independence of the island he has sent up here, has prevented me from having much communication with him but from the description of person he seems to be, he probably is not much in H. H.'s confidence. He is supposed that the affairs of the coast of Arabia give H. H. much great uneasiness from the report that he took place some months ago at Basmah, which it will be recalled was occupied by us for a time.

Res. Pa. 7th /
Bahrain 3rd / 1829

Shaw, he is
I signed, D. Wilson
Res.

Enclosures Nos 1 to 5 inclusive are ordered in Page of Vol Bth of
Bahrain letter

Enclosure No 6.

Notes of a conference with Hajee Abdul Kader a confidential Agent of H. H. the Imam of Muscat respecting negotiations for peace between the Chief of Bahrain and his Majesty. 23 August 1829.

63

Hajee Abdul Kader a confidential messenger from H. H. the Imam of Muscat arrived this day and came to the Residency bringing a letter which acquainted him respecting the affairs between Bahrain and Muscat.

The Hajee commenced his discourse by saying that as the Government has expressed a desire to see peace restored between the Imam and the Chief of Bahrain H. H. was prepared to do anything that would meet its wishes and therefore had sent him to say that whatever I thought necessary and proper to do in the matter of the peace H. H. would forthwith confirm. I answered that although the Govt was no doubt most desirous that all the states connected with it by friendly relations should be at peace with each other, still it never by any means went the length of insisting H. H. to sacrifice his real interests even to bring about so desirable an object as that, that it had always advised H. H. himself not to attack Bahrain, and that what had happened when he did so and since, showed the soundness of the advice. The war between Muscat and Bahrain had given us very great cause for lamentation, particularly in the affairs of the Muscat people, but still H. H. was the best judge of his own affairs, and he knew on which he should now make peace. I added it was obvious that in war many things occur for which there is no possible remedy, and that although punishment could be inflicted when peace may be committed, and certain things occurred for the greatest evil of all, the killing of men there was no redress, no retribution. In the Muscat affair some of the property had been recovered but nothing could restore to life the dead, to return the bones of one of the people and the rest of the people who had been killed, still since the messenger fully concerned in all this, and then passed to the proposed peace in the letter from H. H. the Imam to me which he observed, were first that the former tribute should be paid, or secondly, that the expenses of the expedition should be paid or thirdly, that there should be peace between the two and at last, but that the chiefs should go and attack each other by land if they liked, the Imam's letter, I observe this does not, it will be observed, confine the war to the land only, but about since took little view of it. In answer to the two first proposals I read extracts of letters from Bahrain, but about the Chief of Bahrain stating that on no consideration would he consent to pay a single farthing, as to the third proposal it seemed to me impossible to be accomplished in the first place, Bahrain is an island and in case of either attacking or being attacked the worst sort of war must ensue.

by any, would either party allow the other to prepare an expedition without interruption and actually land before it made any attempt towards defeating it. the thing was not to be suffered moreover who was to be the judge between the two states of what was legitimate war, and how could justice be distinguished that I had no others whom I could in any way guarantee a judgment on by any power, that our being the contestants and judges between them was therefore out of the question for myself. The Peshwa engaged in this reasoning and admitted that the course proposed was not compatible with these views. The three proposals, being thus disposed of, the Peshwa observed that he wished to know what I desired or thought advisable. I replied that it was not for me to make any proposals, but that Abdulla bin Ahmed had written in reply to my letter to him that the only thing he would consent to do, was to make peace with the party having any claim on the other, and that he would not make a defensive and offensive alliance with H. H. and that even to these terms the British Government must be the guarantor, that I replied to him and I decided that the British Government must be the guarantor of my peace, in consequence of which Abdulla had said both to our agents, and my Native Assistant who had given over this, that he considered we had with them something from the affairs and that it must now rest in either his, or the hands of the British Government. The Peshwa then said that the British would make peace, on these terms. I again recalled to his mind that we could in no way guarantee them that doubtless we should be most unwilling, although we could not guarantee to see any peace which we had any hand in negotiating, but that I thought right to declare to both parties that they might understand what our views were. The Peshwa again consented, and asked me if I would make a communication to Bahrein on the subject. I said yes, provided he would write me a letter stating it to be H. H. wish that I should propose a peace on the footing of neither party having claims on the other, he then said that he would make the communication in writing that I wished. I asked the Peshwa what he conceived the view of the Chief of Bahrein were, he said that he conceived that he was very desirous of being at peace, and that H. H. was also very desirous of the same, in reply to his proposing for my opinions of what it was best for the British to do, I said that I could give no opinion entirely ignorant of H. H. interests as I was, and most desirous that he should not in any way injure himself on our account, the Peshwa admitted freely that H. H. interests required peace.

Enclosure No 7

Translation of note from Hajee Abdulla bin Ahmed Agent from H. H. the Imam to Major Wilson dated 24 Aug. 1829. AC

65
AC.

I have seen and perused the letter addressed by you to Sheikh Abdulla bin Ahmed. The two conditions which you propose will as the basis of peace between H. H. the Imam of Muscat and the Chief of Bahrein are advisable for his highness, and it is to his advantage also that the suffering of the poor warring people should be removed. The first condition is there shall be peace between the two parties with their several allies and no claims for money on either side. Second. This alliance shall bind the parties not to assist the enemies of each other but shall not bind them to assist each other.

Enclosure No 8.

Letter to Sheikh Abdulla bin Ahmed from Major Wilson Res' on the 8. Sept. dated 24 August 1829.

AC. It appears to me possible that H. H. the Imam of Muscat might be induced to listen to proposals for the accommodation of the differences which now exist between him and you on the following basis.

First. There shall be peace between the two parties with their several allies and no claims for money on either side.

Second. This alliance shall bind the parties not to assist the enemies of each other but shall not bind them to assist each other.

I wish you to let me know distinctly whether I am authorized on your part to say that you agree to peace being restored on the basis of these two Articles provided H. H. the Imam of Muscat will consent to the same.

I have already told you that the British Government will never guarantee any treaty whatsoever but if a peace be made it will not see it broken by either party without infinite regret, and despite some hints that party which may be the aggressor.

Enclosure No 9

Translation

Translation of a letter from Shaikh Abdulla bin Ahmed to Major Wilson, Red' dated 29 August 1829 or 1st Septr

A.C. Your letter dated the 23rd Septr has been received, with respect to what you mention touching the peace with said Shaikh, we are not desirous of good will which we love neither are we desirous of weakness, but the collection of it is more as like that which is not concealed from you, for he cannot remain quiet even although without any cause whatever and when he is unconquered yet has no necessary or important affair on hand such as the removal of Bahrain, he will answer a letter to you similar to that which he wrote you last year, and tell you, that he is not right with Abdulla bin Ahmed and come up himself in the way of his communication without reason or cause. At the time therefore when all my affairs in property and ships are settled and all my people who are subject to me are engaged in journey, I cannot find time from my affairs to send me to you there to become the mediator of good will between the whole, so that when one of us should offend his neighbour imperfectly and without cause you should turn the offender and offender back: on this condition we consent to peace, every one in his own place, but if you do not wish to become the mediator of good will between the whole we are not secure from this then as an confidence can be placed on his words or engagements, when no mediator tells yourself is between.

Enclosure No 10

Letter from Major Wilson to Shaikh Abdulla bin Ahmed, Chief of Bahrain 4th Sept. 1829.

A.C. Your letter dated 29th Aug 1829 has been received. Having so repeatedly and so very decidedly told you that it was not the practice of the British Government to interfere in the interior concerns of any other states or to guarantee any peace made by them, I did not expect you would have so far lost sight of your own interests as to send the answer above acknowledged which does not authorize me to make the proposal for peace which I offered from myself to communicate and mediate between you and H.H. the Imam.

I said in my last letter and now repeat the same sentiments that the British Government will never guarantee any treaty whatsoever but if a peace be concluded through any means or mediation whatever they may be, it will not be that peace broken by either party without infinite regret and displeasure towards that party which may be the aggressor.

Enclosure.

Enclosure No 11

Letter from Major Wilson to H.H. the Imam of Muscat dated 4th Sept 1829

A.C. Your Highness confidential messenger Hajee Abdul Kader having after a very long voyage reached this place on the 23rd M.H. and delivered to me your H. communication of 22nd July attested by your letter of the 1st August. I immediately had a long confidential and interesting conference with him respecting your wishes and views, and he doubtless will communicate to you Highness how thoroughly and carefully we discussed the three projects noticed in your communication of the 22nd July with the view of taking the best measures for your Highness's interests.

On the following day the respectable Hajee and myself again conferred as I felt every reason of distinctly understanding your Highness's wishes which it was my duty to make my guess in communication with Bahrain respecting the affair of Ruas.

My letters of the 4th July and the 15th of the same month will have made H. fully acquainted with my proceedings. I trust that H. will not feel to recognise the feelings of sincere interest and anxiety to meet H. views which have been my guess throughout this affair.

I now beg to forward the copy of a letter which I dispatched by an express boat to Abdulla bin Ahmed subsequent to my conference with the respectable Hajee Abdul Kader. It will have reached H. and he said to me respecting this letter, and that I put it into his hands previous to its being dispatched.

I adjin to the above mentioned letter a copy of the answer recd to it three days ago but I was prevented from communicating it to the respectable Hajee Kader earlier than yesterday by the severe indisposition of that worthy personage.

No opportunity of again communicating to Bahrain since the receipt of the answer, has occurred but I shall take advantage of the first good one that may offer to make a communication to Abdulla bin Ahmed on substance as follows:

It will be apparent to your Highness that during the whole of these negotiations which I have done my utmost to bring to a favourable conclusion I have ever retained my determination to keep the ground for

4 over No 10

negotiation entirely ~~refuse~~ free for your Highness by trusting upon myself to make the whole of the proposals in my own name. If it is aware of the nature that have prompted me to do this and I can only regret that I have personally been so unsuccessful. but as I have before shown what has been done by me will not in any way interfere with what your Highness may deem advantageous for yourself in this affair or be any impediment to your opening or negotiations through any other channel for any other description of terms which may be suitable to your Highness' interests.

Transcription of previous document

Pol Department No 71

To

William Newnham Esq
Chief Secretary to the Govt.
Bombay

Sir

I do myself the honor to lay before the Honble the Governor in Council the accompanying correspondence and papers, respecting certain proceedings of the Fleet of Abdoollah bin Ahmed the Chief of Bahrein during a late cruise which was avowedly undertaken against the state of His Highness the Imam of Muscat.

2. These documents together with the notes I have made in their margins and the following observations will I trust enable the Honble the Governor in Council to form a true judgement respecting the nature of these disagreeable occurrences.

3. A vessel called "Durwelsh" the property of a person named Sued Mahomed and belonging to a place called Mirbat which is situated on the coast of Hydramant was at Bombay in the month of April or May last and there took on board a cargo and passengers for various places - intending it is said first to touch at Muskat, next to come to Bushire, and then to proceed to Bahrein.

4. This vessel having left Bombay, fell in with the Bahrein Fleet under the personal command of the chief of that place off Rasil Hud. The fleet closed on the Mirbat vessel and hailing demanded from whence she came, and that she should immediately lower her sail. Whilst this was in the act of being done, two or three matchlocks are said in the confusion, and fright, to have been discharged by the Mirbat Boat and immediately she was boarded on all sides by the Bahrein Fleet. About 12 of the crew of the vessel thus boarded were put to death and 10 or 12 wounded - among the former was Sued Mahomed himself the owner. The vessel being thus captured some of the Chief of Bahrein's men were placed on board, and the whole fleet proceeded to that part of the coast of Mikran which is near the entrance of the Persian Gulf.

5. Off a place called Kohe Mabarruk two ships belonging to the Imam of Muscat appeared and commenced an action with the Bahrein Fleet. About this time all the valuable articles of the cargo of the Mirbat vessel were transhipped into those of Bahrein, and when only a little rice in bulk remained a hole was knocked in her bottom and she was sunk. The crew was landed on the coast of Mikran. The Bahrein Fleet having escaped from the ships of H.H. the Imam of Muscat reached that Island on the 11th June.

6. I have mentioned these circumstances first in point of order from their belonging to the most important occurrence, but it likewise appears that the Bahrein Fleet fell in, also off Rasil Hud, with an aweesy (or small vessel) said likewise to belong to Mirbat. From this vessel a quantity of cotton, ghee, fish and drugs were taken, but it was afterwards permitted to proceed on its voyage.

7. It is most material to observe that the Chief of Bahrein has never "proclaimed or avowed" that a war existed between him and Mirbat which he is bound to do, previous to proceeding to hostilities by the General Treaty concluded by Sir William Kur Grant with the Arabian States and to which Treaty the Chief of Bahrein acceded by his own signature on the 20th February 1820.

8. It will likewise be observed that there was a Bahrain merchant on board the largest of the Mirbat vessels and that he had with him cargo also for Bahrain. This is a strong indication that there was not even a suspicion that a quarrel existed between Bahrain and Mirbat as the Chief of Bahrain affirms.

9. These facts have satisfied my mind perfectly that the objectionable acts of the Chief of Bahrain above represented are most clearly piratical, and as such I have considered it my special duty to call him to account for them.

10. My object has been to proceed in my demands for restitution with moderation and caution but in the most direct manner rather however keeping within the bounds to which I was entitled to go than exceeding them, and not advancing one assertion or taking one step for which I had not the strongest reasons and the clearest right and justice.

11. My first letter to the Bahrain Chief was founded on the accompanying extract of a letter from the Agent at Bahrain, and is, as it will be observed, somewhat in the nature of a protest, as I had not when it was written information sufficiently detailed to enable me to make specific claims. The Chief's reply to this letter now forwarded appears in no way satisfactory. The Agent's letter however which enclosed it furnishes, as will be observed, some additional particulars.

12. The Government Ship Benares having reached this place on the 8th ult. I resolved to send her to Bahrain with further communications. I accordingly addressed the accompanying letter to Captain Haynes, who sailed for Bahrain on the 12th ult. conveying the annexed letter for the Chief which it will be observed is more peremptory and enters more into particulars than I had the means of doing in my first.

13. On Captain Haynes's return, he made the annexed general report of his proceedings, and brought the accompanying letters from the Bahrain Chief and our Agent there.

14. It will be observed that none of the things demanded were then sent, although there were strong symptoms that the demand was seriously made.

15. A further step therefore became necessary carrying with it additional proofs that I was disposed to push matters still further and I accordingly resolved to make the best display in my power and to try the effect of sending two vessels, as it seemed important that every measure should be resorted to likely to obviate the necessity of again employing force in support of that moral ascendancy which has so effectually served our purposes for years.

16. In the maintenance of these views I sent the Benares back to Bahrain accompanied by the schooner, Fly. Neither vessel it is true is of much warlike force, but they are both known to be Government vessels and as such carry respect along with them. On this occasion I addressed the accompanying letter to Capt Haynes of the Benares.

17. It will be observed that I first protested, then sent a Govmt vessel to convey a letter that was delivered by the usual agent, lastly I sent two Govmt vessels and the 1st native assistant of this Residency to deliver the annexed more peremptory letter. I preferred an inferior agent on this occasion that I might husband the means at my disposal of producing an effect in making demands which thus gradually rise and put on a more positive shape as information is accumulated. I beg to elicit the attention of the Government to the accompanying instructions which were given to the native assistant in writing.

18. As connected with the subjects now under discussion I beg leave to forward a paper of information which I have obtained from a person who was on board the large Mirbat vessel, when it was captured.

19. On the 10th instant the Benares returned to this place and Captain Haynes made a very satisfactory report of his proceedings of which the accompanying is an extract.

20. The native assistant brought back the enclosed answer from the Shaik of Bahrain.

21. It will doubtless be very gratifying to the Government to be the means of restoring so much property to its real owners, whilst the well timed concession of the Bahrain Chief makes ultimate proceedings an object of infinitely less importance than if he had contumaciously persisted in retaining the entire fruits of his piratical proceedings. Besides the property now brought and which may perhaps be valued at Persian Rs 8300. The native assistant was the means of procuring restitution of property to a considerable amount belonging to Bahrain merchants who had not dared to ask it from the chief their conqueror, the Uttoobee Shaik. He likewise caused to be delivered up to a relation who resides at Bahrain of Sued Mahomed the owner of the Mirbat vessel, the two Kunsez (slave women) and the slave mentioned in my 2nd letter to the Chief.

22. I purpose distributing the property brought here to its different owners, whenever they can produce a reasonable proof of what may belong to them. In the meantime I have directed it to be placed in a store room in this town but I fear there will be great difficulties in distinguishing property, the marks having been obliterated, the boxes broken and the bags torn and changed.

23. Our whole policy in this Gulf having for this last nine years been directed against piratical proceedings, to have abstained from noticing the Bahrain Chiefs conduct, would in my humble opinion have been to abandon that policy which has cost us such very great pecuniary sacrifices and by thus creating in the mind of the people of these uncivilized countries a belief that their proceedings were no longer to be controled, we should incur the hazard of being forced before long once more to assert our supremacy by a powerful effort that under few circumstances could be made without great cost and much intermediate loss of character.

24. But although there is certainly a point beyond which we cannot afford even with our high character to temporize still there are various degrees in which any system of policy may be supported and I now beg to solicit the orders of the Government respecting the lengths it may be pleased to go on the present occasion.

25. I am not prepared to affirm that our reacting satisfied only with what we have now forced from the Chief of Bahrain would not impose upon us the necessity of ere long giving a stronger proof of our strength but I believe that our demonstrations, and the success attending upon them in the present occasion will produce a conviction that we have not abandoned our views of maintaining the suppression of piracy. If this Gulf has not been considerably unsettled by the late wars this conviction might certainly have been made to answer all our purposes, whether it shall also in its present state will be for the consideration of the Government.

26. From what I can learn I believe that the property given up by the Shaik of Bahrain is all that could be expected in kind, any future demands must therefore be answered in money which probably increases considerably the difficulties of recovering and in some measure may alter the view of the question, for any amount now

forced from the Chief of Bahrein in hard cash would probably not be paid from his own Treasury but taken by him from the weakest of his subjects, the Bahreiny's, the conquered race, in the way of contributions, as it is not probable that the Uttoobee Tribe, the conquerors, could be made even by their Chief to contribute any cash.

27. Still if there should arise any claims of British subjects in the cases under discussion, they might I conceive with perfect justice be enforced since the question would be, whether our own subjects, or the subjects of the delinquent, should suffer, but the Government may choose to stop at any particular point in pushing measures dictated by views of liberal policy, and from which other powers benefit, when these measures may only shift the burden of sufferings from the subjects of one foreign State to those of another. In such a case we surely might confine ourselves with every right to the extent of interference the Government may think necessary to support our own views.

28. From the want of perfect information I have been forced as will be observed to confine my demands in some measure to such portions of the cargoes of the Mirbat vessel as was forthcoming. I have no means on which I could found an estimate either of the total value of the cargoes or of the value of the vessel which was destroyed. I must therefore depend on whatever information may be sent from Bombay on these important points. This information I presume could be obtained from the custom house.

29. I now take the liberty most respectfully to express an opinion that the final determination of the Government should be communicated in a letter from the Honble the Governor to the Chief of Bahrein, and should any further demands be made, I conceive there should be in this Gulf and at my disposal the means of immediately enforcing them, particularly as the Chief of Bahrein seems to have acquired considerably higher ideas of his own consequence and strength since the late occurrence between him and His Highness the Imam of Muscat. In the meantime I purpose informing the chief that his having so far complied with the demands made upon him, obviates my being obliged in conformity to my orders to proceed against him forthwith, and that I have therefore made a reference to the Government to ascertain the total amount it may be pleased to demand which will be communicated hereafter.

30. The easiest means in our power of enforcement seems to be that of blockading the Island or rather one end of it where the town of Manamah and island of Mohurray are situated. The object of this blockade might extend only to stopping all commercial intercourse with other places.

31. To effect this blockade three efficient sloops of war would probably be necessary, aided from time to time by the Commodore's vessel from Bussadore and the Fly Schooner from hence if required. I speak of course with due deference on this subject from not being a Naval Officer. The probable No of large vessels belonging to Bahrein are as follows:

12 large vessels the property of the Chief Shaik Abdooliah bin Ahmud
and the other Shaiks his relations amounting in all about 50
guns

21 large Merchant vessels now in Bahrein

500 common fishing and cargo boats

1500 pearl fishing boats

32. The Government is aware that the Naval system of relief adopted for this Gulf admits of the means of increasing the number of vessels in it by the detention of those which may be dispatched monthly from Bombay under the routine operation of the system it would take three months to accumulate three disposable vessels but it will be for the Government to determine whether the requisite force should accumulate or be sent at once from Bombay, the objection to the accumulation is the long time it would require which would occasion an apparent delay or hesitation in bringing matters to a close.

33. I have as yet mentioned only the blockading of Bahrein, and I trust and believe that this measure would obtain the desired objects in case of the mere appearance of the vessels not doing so. But it may unfortunately be necessary to resort to and consequently we should be prepared for still more severe measures, the rigour of which most unfortunately could not I fear be confined to the Chief of Bahrein himself. I allude to the destruction by burning or otherwise of the vessels belonging to that place, an enterprise which I consider perfectly practicable by naval means, the only ones of course which I have contemplated. If this measure of destroying the vessels could be confined to those of the Shaikk and his relations, there would be much greater advantage in carrying it into effect without extending it to others but when once recourse is had to fire under such circumstances, who can say to what it would extend. The Government should understand likewise that it is not by any means improbable that the town of Manamah would also be burnt in destroying the vessels hauled up there.

34. Under these circumstances and with this information it will remain for the Government to determine whether our general policy and the avowed principle of the suppression of piracy require that we should proceed in spite of the disadvantages and probable sufferings above pointed out. At all events, I conceive that it is against the Uttoobee Tribe our proceedings should be directed as far as we can discriminate. The enormities practised by it towards the original inhabitants of Bahrein far exceed what I have ever heard of tyranny in any other part of the world.

35. Should the destruction of the Bahrein vessels be determined on after the trial and failure of the blockade of the Island, which as I have before observed, I can hardly suppose, I conceive that the addition to the Squadron of a small vessel to throw carcass shells and lockits would be most necessary.

36. I beg to suggest likewise that I should be furnished with a map of Bahrein upon a large scale, and that a copy of the same should be sent to the Senior Marine Officer in the Gulf.

37. The 7th Article of the General Treaty with the Arab Tribes entitles us to call upon those who have acceded to it for their cooperation in punishing those who may commit breaches of it in the way of plunder and piracy, but it is obvious that in many cases, our attempting to engage these tribes in war might be attended with many serious evils. However the spirit of this Article would unquestionably entitle us to call upon those who have signed the Treaty to abstain from all friendly intercourse with Bahrein after what has occurred until we may obtain satisfaction and this is the greatest length to which I should feel inclined to go towards demanding cooperation unless the Government be pleased to order otherwise.

38. I trust that I have now fulfilled the object which I had in view and which was to make the Honble the Governor in Council fully acquainted with all the information I have been able to acquire accompanied by occasional illustrations and agreements, that he may be enabled to judge with advantage both of the justice and

necessity of an appeal to force on the present occasion should the Chief of Bahrein persist in refusing what may be deemed a proper atonement for his piracies and consequent breach of treaty.

I have etc etc
(Signed) D. Wilson
Rest.

Residency in the P. Gulf
Bushire 13th Aug 1829

No 1 to 15 Enclosures entered into bulward Letter Book. Vol 13 of
1829 Page 306.

Political Dept No 80 of 1829

To
William Newnham Esq.
Chief Secy to the Govt.
Bombay.

Sir

I have the honor in continuation of my dispatch No 54 dated 6 July last in this department to communicate to you for the information of the Honble the Governor in Council my subsequent proceedings connected with negotiations for Peace between His Highness the Imam of Muscat and the Chief of Bahrein with their allies in which I regret to say that I have not been successful.

2. With a view to show distinctly the efforts which have been made to bring about so desirable an object I transmit the accompanying documents and shall proceed to make the following observations on them.

3. No 1 is a letter from the Chief of Bahrein in reply to a communication made for a second time by me, that both parties should return to the relations in which they stood before the war. It will be perceived that all such proposals are somewhat scornfully rejected.

4. No 2 is my answer maintaining the same sentiments I had expressed at the commencement of the negotiation.

5. No 3 is a letter from me to H.H. the Imam communicating the substance of the answer received from the Bahrein Chief and my wish that H.H. should not consider what I had done in this affair as an impediment to his opening negotiations through any other means nearer or for any other description of terms better suited to his interests.

6. No 4 is a letter from H.H. the Imam alluding to No 5 which had been previously transmitted by a confidential Agent by name Hajie Abdool Ameer, who arrived here on the 23rd ultim. This last letter it will be observed contains three proposals, some one of which H.H. seems to hope might be obtained for him but which my prior correspondence with the Chief of Bahrain will have shown to be out of the question. The proposals are in substance, first that the Chief of Bahrain should continue to pay the former tribute or secondly he should pay the expenses of the expedition sent last year to attack him but which failed. These expenses have been reckoned by the Imam at 70,000 German Crowns or lastly that both sides should give up interfering with traders but if the Imam had the power to attack Bahrein he should do so if he chose or vice versa if the Bahrein Chief was so inclined. That is to say either might be at peace when convenient or attack the other when he might not be expected. It will be seen from the note of my conference with the Imam's Agent what I thought of these proposals.

7. No 6 is a note of what passed when Hajie Abdool Ameer opened his mission to me and assuring that the grounds on which my further mediation was interposed rested distinctly on the wishes and interests of H.H. the Imam and not alone by any means on the desire of the British Government for peace, although that desire may remain extremely strong from a thorough conviction and experience of the evils likely to rise out of the continuance of the war. To put this matter in the clearest light, I requested that Hajie Abdool Ameer would write a letter in the tone of No 7 stating that it was H.H. the Imam's wish and interest that proposals to mediate a peace should be made by me to the Chief of Bahrein on the terms set forth in No 8 viz First "There shall be peace between the two parties with their several allies and no claims for money on either side."

Second "The alliance shall bind the parties not to assist the enemies of each other but shall not bind them to assist each other."

8. I regret much to observe that the Chief of Bahrain's reply, No 9, does not accept the offer made in my letter to mediate the peace. He says "I cannot feel secure from infraction unless someone like you were to become the mediator of goodness between the whole so that when one of us should assess his neighbour improperly and without cause you should turn the infractor and assessor back on this condition." "We consent to peace". To consent to become such a mediator would clearly be to make the British Government the guarantee of the Peace and the Chief of Bahrain himself used that word in speaking to our Agent at that place, as in like manner did the Imam's messenger, Hajie Abdool Ameer, when the letter was put into his hands for perusal.

9. Affairs having reached this point I have addressed No 10 to the Chief of Bahrain and will transmit it by the first opportunity. It expresses my regret at his want of perception of his own interests and reiterates that the British Government will never so far enter into the interior concerns of other states as to guarantee any peace, but that if peace be concluded by any mediator whatsoever the British Government would be highly displeased with whoever might, by breaking it, become an aggressor.

10. No 11 is a letter to H.H. the Imam transmitted by the present express boat and which communicates any proceedings in the affairs between H.H. and the Chief of Bahrain and their allies and expresses my regret at having failed in my exertions to negotiate a peace but points out how careful I have been of H.H.'s interests and that I conceive my having made all the proposals to the Chief of Bahrain in my own name, and as from myself that I have kept the ground perfectly clear for H.H. to negotiate, through other means or for any other description of terms which he may deem more suitable.

11. I cannot help regretting, although it is now vain, that H.H. when he sent up his Frigate and confidential relation, as reported in my dispatch No 12 dated 19 January last, did not at that time distinctly intimate that his interests required peace. Instead of so doing his relation made use of the general and friendly expressions that the Imam would immediately fulfil whatever the Government prescribed and to which I could only answer that the Government, although most anxious to see peace restored, would not interfere in the war or prescribe any positive line of conduct that might from want of due information on our part injure greatly H.H. interests, a mode of proceeding far from the wishes of the Government, had a hint then been given that H.H. interests would have been served instead of injured I should certainly have made an effort to bring about a peace, but pride forbade that the hint should be given to me, although the next step H.H. pursued was to order his Agent in Bombay to ask the Honble the Governor's advice respecting the preparation of a second expedition against Bahrain. H. Highness was well aware that the sanction and approbation of the Government would not be given to such a proceeding and that my strenuous effort to mediate would be the consequence of such an appeal, but hopefully H. Highness having so long delayed to make known his real wishes and interests is the less to be lamented for I fear that although the Chief of Bahrain might probably have consented to terms more favorable to the Imam than those subsequent events have enabled me to propose, I can hardly feel a doubt that the Bahrain Chief would still have insisted upon our guarantee to any peace mediated by us unless he were in extremely which he has never been since the Imam last year failed in his attempt on that Island. On the contrary a series of small events but unlucky on the part of H.H. have tended greatly to inflame the pride of the Bahrain Chief and depress the credit of the Imam. First there was H. Highness's most unaccountable failure at Bahrain, then two of his

frigates had an action with one of the Bahrein Merchants Buglas, and allowed her to escape and then two Frigates failed in doing anything decisive against the Bahrein Fleet of small and great vessels which they cannonaded for a short time off Koh Marburuk. On account of these occurrences, the pride of the Bahrain Chief is nearly beyond all bounds and it will require a great effort on the part of the Imam to recover the same degree of weight and ascendancy he formerly possessed in this Gulf.

12. Although it appears to me extremely advisable and indeed incumbent to save the pride and credit of such an ally as the Imam wherever it may be possible, whilst negotiating with other states, it does not appear necessary to affect to think that the sacrifices now required by H.H. interests to obtain a peace would be made in consequence of our wishes and recommendations. It will therefore be observed that I was particular in exacting an acknowledgement of this in No. 7 from H.H.'s confidential Agent, whilst I have invariably interposed myself to save appearances by making all the communications and proposals to the Bahrein Chief in my own name.

13. The only subject on which it now remains for me to offer any observation is that of the guarantee both parties are disposed at this moment to wish for, but particularly the Chief of Bahrain who it will be observed has constantly pressed it upon me. I cannot discover from any communication made to me by the Government that I should be authorised to guarantee any peace whatsoever or even to express stronger than I have done, the displeasure the Govt. would testify towards whoever might by breaking a peace become an aggressor. On the contrary the spirit of my instructions is adverse to guarantees and pledges of every kind nor can I presume to recommend the adoption of such a measure as likely to produce any permanent good, even with the conviction which I feel of the evils that have arisen and may still arise from a continuance of the war.

14. Reiterated assurances have been given to all parties that the British Government was determined not to interfere in any acknowledged wars so long as piracies were not committed. Whilst these assurances were not believed and it was thought that our desire for peace was so great that we might easily be induced to interfere, frequent complaints and appeals were made to me accompanied by threats of an immediate recourse to arms if I did not obtain redress, but a steady adherence to the same line of conduct has produced confessions or indications from every Chief who has been engaged in hostilities that they are all now eager for peace, and convinced of the advantage of making such as may be permanent. It is for this now that our interference is solicited since it is seen that we cannot be made use of either to support ambition or obtain unreasonable demands from a dread that the peace might be broken. Still however our system must always suffer and the accomplishments of our views be retarded by wars.

15. I cannot form any conjectures as to what the Imam's proceedings will be after he may receive my letter announcing that I consider myself to have failed entirely in the negotiations with Bahrain. The indisposition of the Agent he has sent up here has prevented me from having much communication with him but from the description of person he seems to be, he probably is not much in H.H.'s confidence. It is supposed that the affairs of the coast of Africa give H. Highness great uneasiness from the revolts that took place some months ago at Mombassa, which it will be recollected was occupied by us for a time.

I have etc etc
(Signed) D. Wilson
Res.

Res. Per. Gulf
Bushire 5 Sept 1829

Enclosures Nos 1 to 5 inclusive are entered on Page of Vol 13 of outward letters.

Enclosure No 6.

Notes of a conference with Hajie Abdool Ameer, a Confidential Agent of H.H. the Imam of Muscat, respecting negotiations for Peace between the Chief of Bahrein and His Highness, 23 August 1829.

Hajie Abdool Ameer, a confidential messenger from H.H. the Imam of Muscat, arrived this day and came to the Residency bringing a letter which accredited him respecting the affairs between Bahrein and Muscat.

The Hajie commenced his mission by saying that as the Governr. had expressed so great a desire to see peace restored between the Imam and the Chief of Bahrein, H.H. was prepared to do anything that would meet its wishes and therefore had sent him to say that whatever I thought necessary and proper to do in the matter of the peace H.H. would forthwith confirm. I answered that although the Govt was no doubt most desirous that all the states connected with it by friendly relations should be at peace with each other, still it never by any means went the length of wishing H.H. to sacrifice his real interests, even to bring about so desirable an object as that, that it had always advised H. Highness not to attack Bahrein, and that what had happened when he did so and since showed the soundness of the advice. The war between Muscat and Bahrein had given us very great cause of lamentation - particularly in the affair of the Mirbat vessels but still H.H. was the best judge of his own affairs and the terms on which he should now make peace. I added it was obvious that in War many things occur for which there is no possible remedy and that although punishment could be inflicted when piracy may be committed and certain things recovered for the greatest evil of all, the killing of men, there was no remedy, no restitution. In the Mirbat affair some of the property had been recovered but nothing could restore to life Sued Mahomed, the owner of one of the vessels and the rest of the people who had been killed. Abdool Ameer, the messenger, fully concurred in all this and then passed to the proposal made in the letter from H.H. the Imam to me which he observed were: first, that the former tribute should be paid, or secondly, that the expenses of the expedition should be paid or thirdly that there should be peace between the traders at sea, but that the chiefs should go and attack each other by land if they liked. The Imam's letter, enclosure No 5, does not it will be observed confine the war to the land only, but Abdool Ameer took that view of it. In answer to the two first proposals I read extracts of letters from Abdool bin Ahmed, the Chief of Bahrein, stating that on no consideration would he consent to pay a single farthing, as to the third proposal it seemed to me impossible to be accomplished. In the first place Bahrein is an island and in case - either of attacking or being attacked, the overt act of war must commence by sea, would either party allow the other to prepare an expedition without interruption and actually to land before it made any attempt towards defeating it. The thing was not to be supposed. Moreover who was to be the judge between the two states of what was legitimate war, and how could piracy be distinguished, that I had no orders whatever nor could I in any way guarantee a peace made by any power, that our being the contrilurers and judges between them was therefore improbable. The messenger concurred in this reasoning and admitted that the course proposed was not compatible with these views. The three proposals, being thus disposed of, the messenger observed that he wished to know what I desired or thought advisable. I replied that it was not for me to make any proposals but that Abdool bin Ahmed had written in reply to my letters to him that the only thing he would consent to do was to make peace, neither party having any claims on the other, and that he would not make a defensive and offensive alliance with H.H. and that even to these terms the British Governr. must be the guarantee, that I had replied to this most decidedly that the British Government never would be the guarantee of any peace, in

consequence of which Abdool bin Ahmed had said both to our Agent and my Native Assistant, who had gone over there, that he considered we had withdrawn ourselves from the affair and that it must now end in either his or the Imam's destruction. The Messenger then said that the Imam would make peace on these terms. I again recalled to his mind that we could in no way guarantee them, that doubtless we should be most unwilling, although we could not guarantee to see any peace which we had any hand in negotiating, broken. This I thought right to declare to both parties that they might understand what our views were. The Messenger again concurred, and asked me if I would make a communication to Bahrein on the subject. I said yes, provided he would write me a letter stating it to be H.H.'s wish that I should propose a peace on the footing of neither party having claims on the other. He then said that he would make the communication in writing that I wished. I asked the Messenger what he conceived the views of the Chief of Bahrein were. He said that he conceived that he was very desirous of being at peace and that H.H. was also very desirous of the same. In reply to his pressing for my opinions of what it was best for the Imam to do, I said that I could give no opinion utterly ignorant of H.H.'s interests as I was, and most desirous that he should in no way injure himself on our account. The Messenger admitted freely that H.H. interests required peace.

Enclosure No 7

Translation of a Note from Hajie Abdool Ameer, Agent from H.H. the Imam, to Major Wilson dated 24 Aug 1829.

AC I have seen and perused the letter addressed by you to Shaik Abdulla bin Ahmed. The two conditions which you propose in it as the basis of peace between H.H. the Imam of Muscat and the Shaikh of Bahrein are advisable for His Highness and it is to his advantage also that the sufferings of the poor trading people should be removed. The first condition is: There shall be peace between the two parties with their several allies and no claims for money on either side. Second. This alliance shall bind the parties not to assist the enemies of each other but shall not bind them to assist each other.

Enclosure No 8

Letter to Shaik Abdool bin Ahmed from Major Wilson, Resd. in the P. Gulf, dated 24 August 1829

AC It appears to me possible that H.H. the Imam of Muscat might be induced to listen to proposals for the accommodation of the differences which now exist between him and you on the following basis:

First

There shall be peace between the two parties with their several allies and no claims for money on either side.

Second

This alliance shall bind the parties not to assist the enemies of each other but shall not bind them to assist each other.

I wish you to let me know distinctly whether I am authorised on your part to say that you agree to peace being restored on the basis of these two Articles provided H.H. the Imam of Muscat will consent to the same.

I have already told you that the British Government will never guarantee any Treaty whatsoever but if a peace be made it will not see it broken by either party without infinite regret and displeasure towards that party which may be the aggressor.

Enclosure No 9

Translation of a letter from Shaikh Abdoolah bin Ahmed to Major Wilson, Resd. dated 29 August 1829 or 2nd Suffer

AC Your letter dated the 22nd Suffer has been received with respect to what you mention touching the peace with Sued Said. We are not disinclined to goodness which we love. Neither are we desirous of weakness, but the situation as it is now is like that which is not concealed from you for he cannot remain quiet even although without any cause whatever and when he is unembarrassed and has no necessary or important affair in hand such as the Suwahil or Bussoraft excepting that at Bahrain, he will add up a letter to you similar to that which he wrote you last year and tell you that he is not right with Abdoola bin Ahmed and came up himself in the very traces of his communication without reason or known cause. At the time therefore when all my affairs in property and ships are scattered and all my people whether Arabs or Bedouins subject to me are engaged in journeys, I cannot feel secure from infraction unless someone like you were to become the mediator of goodness between the whole, so that when one of us should aggress his neighbour improperly and without cause, you should turn the infractor and aggressor back. On this condition we consent to peace, every one in his own place, but if you do not wish to become the mediator of goodness between the whole, we are not secure from this man as no confidence can be placed in his words or engagements when no mediator like yourself is between.

Enclosure No 10

Letter from Major Wilson to Shaikh Abdoola bin Ahmed, Chief of Bahrain, 4 Sept 1829.

AC Your letter dated 29 Aug (27 Suffer) has been received.

Having so repeatedly and so very decidedly told you that it was not the practise of the British Government to enter into the interior concerns of any other states or to guarantee any peace made by them, I did not expect you would have so far lost sight of your own interests as to send the answer above acknowledged which does not authorise me to make the proposal for peace which I offered from myself to communicate and mediate between you and H.H. the Imam.

I said in my last letter and now repeat the same sentiments that the British Government will never guarantee any treaty whatsoever but if a peace be concluded through any means or mediation whatever they may be, it will not see that peace broken by either party without infinite regret and displeasure towards that party which may be the aggressor.

Enclosure No 11

Letter from Major Wilson to H.H. the Imam of Muscat dated 4 Sept 1829.

AC Your Highness' confidential messenger, Hajle Abdool Ameer, having after a very long voyage reached this place on the 23rd Ult and delivered to me Your H. communication of 22nd July alluded to in your letter of the 1 August, I immediately had a long confidential and interesting conference with him respecting your wishes and views and he doubtless will communicate to Your Highness how thoroughly and carefully we discussed the three proposals noticed in your communication of the 22nd July with the view of taking the best measure for Your Highness' interests.

On the following day the respectable Hajle and myself again conferred as I felt so very desirous of distinctly understanding Your Highness' wishes which it was my duty to make my guide in communicating with Bahrein respecting the affair of peace.

My letters of the 4th July and the 18th of the same month will have made Y.H. fully acquainted with my proceedings. I trust that Y.H. will not fail to recognise the feelings of sincere interest and anxiety to meet Y.H.'s views which have been my guide throughout this affair.

I now beg to forward the copy of a letter which I despatched by an express boat to Abdullah bin Ahmed subsequent to my conferences with the respectable Hajle Abdool Ameer. He will have detailed to Your H. what he said to me respecting this letter, and that I put it into his hands previous to its being dispatched.

I subjoin to the above mentioned letter a copy of the answer recd. to it three days ago but I was prevented from communicating it to the respectable Hajle Ameer earlier than yesterday by the severe indisposition of that worthy personage.

No opportunity of again communicating to Bahrein since the receipt of the answer has occurred but I shall take advantage of the first good one that may offer, to make a communication to Abdoola bin Ahmed in substance as follows:

Have so etc. etc. (vide No 10).

It will be apparent to Your Highness that during the whole of these negotiations which I have done my utmost to bring to a favourable conclusion, it has been my studied determination to keep the ground for negotiation entirely free for Your Highness by taking upon myself to make the whole of the proposals in my own name. Y.H. is aware of the motives that have prompted me to do this and I can only regret that I have personally been so unsuccessful but as I have before observed what has been done by me will not in any way interfere with what Your Highness may deem advantageous for yourself in this affair or be any impediment to your opening negotiations through any other channel for any other description of terms which may be suitable to Your Highness' interests.

Sequel of these events, 1828-1829.

Reference by
the Shaikh
of Bahrain
to the
British
Political
Resident,
December
1828.

Immediately after the departure of the hostile fleet Shaikh 'Abdullah wrote to Colonel D. Wilson, the Political Resident at Bushahr, to complain of the conduct of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in joining in the attack upon Bahrain: he appealed to the fourth Article of the General Treaty of Peace, by which both himself and Shaikh Tahnūn were bound, and in which it was stated that "the pacificated tribes should not fight with each other." In reply the Resident explained the meaning of the clause to be that the signatories should not fight with each other in a *piratical manner*, but only in the way of open and declared war.

Naval war
between the
'Utūb of
Bahrain and
the Saiyid of
'Oman,
1829.

Having learned that to engage in regular hostilities was not contrary to the Treaty of 1820, the Shaikhs of Bahrain resolved to carry war into the enemy's waters and equipped for the purpose a fleet of seven large vessels, to meet which two frigates were sent to sea by Saiyid Sa'id. The 'Abi fleet sailed on the 21st of March 1829 under the personal command of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad.

The war-ships from Masqat shortly fell in with a Bahrain vessel from India, the "Saiyār," which they first tried to intimidate by long range fire and then to board; but, finding the 'Atbi crew prepared to receive them with combustibles, they sheered off again and continued the action

with their guns. The "Saiyār" made her escape during the night and eventually reached Bahrain with little damage, except to her cargo.

Meanwhile the 'Atbi squadron, after attacking on their way down the Gulf a large Baghlah belonging to the Shaikh of 'Asala, by which they were beaten off after an encounter lasting several hours, found an easier prey in a vessel from Murbāt, which they seized at sea in the neighbourhood of Masqat. On the way home with their prize they found themselves intercepted by the two Masqat frigates near Kūh Mubārak, upon which they took the Murbāt vessel into shoal water, and, placing her between themselves and the enemy, proceeded to transfer her cargo to their own holds; darkness then coming on, they scuttled and sunk her, and by altering their course contrived to escape with their booty to Bahrain.

Case of a
Murbāt
vessel taken
by the 'Utūb.

Murbāt, situated far off on the south coast of Arabia, was not at this time a dependency of Masqat, and the treatment by the 'Utūb of the vessel belonging to that port which they captured was consequently piracy. The Resident immediately sent an ultimatum, in which restoration of the plundered cargo was demanded, to Bahrain by two vessels of war; and so effectual was this measure that property worth Rs. 8,000 was delivered up, besides which some of the goods consigned to persons in Bahrain were handed over to the owners. A balance remained for which it was proposed that the Shaikh of Bahrain should be compelled to pay compensation in cash; but the consideration that "it would be necessary to blockade the port with four ships of war, and perhaps to destroy the shipping by means of shells and congrue rockets, for which latter purpose a small vessel would be required" was considered serious and led to a decision that no further action should be taken.

In the meantime, in response to hints thrown out by Saiyid Sa'id, who professed to be fitting out another expedition against Bahrain, the Government of Bombay had in April 1829 instructed Colonel Wilson, the Resident at Bushahr, to offer his services as a mediator. The Saiyid, who was in reality anxious to proceed to Zanzibar, and who cannot but have been aware of the favourable disposition of the British authorities towards himself, accepted the proposal with great readiness; but the victorious 'Utūb found means to bring the proceedings to a standstill by insisting that the British Government should undertake full responsibility for enforcing the observance of any treaty that might be arranged. To this condition, though the Saiyid was anxious that it should be conceded, the British Resident steadfastly refused to accede; and, after some months of unavailing effort, he declared his intervention at an end. Partly, it would seem, to punish the Shaikhs of Bahrain for their

Conclusion
of peace
between the
'Atbi Shaikhs
and the
Saiyid of
'Oman, 2nd
December
1829.

856

obstinacy, a British cruiser ordinarily stationed on the pearl banks for the maintenance of order there was withdrawn during the season 1820.

By the apparent indifference of the British authorities Shaikh 'Abdullah was brought to a more reasonable frame of mind; and at length, on the 2nd of December 1820, by the intermediacy of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Nāsir of Būshehr, a peace was concluded between the belligerents. The principal conditions were that tribute should not in future be paid by Bahrain to Masqat, and that neither ruler should henceforward interfere in the affairs of the other; but a verbal agreement was added by which the parties bound themselves to aid one another in case of an attack upon either by a third party. Shaikh Tahūdīn of Abu Dhabi was admitted to the benefits of this peace; but the rebellious Āl Bū Samait of Bahrain were, on the demand of the 'Athī Shaikh, specifically excluded.

1.11

Relations between the Shaikhs of
Bahrain and the Wahhabis,
1830-1836

General history from the peace with the Saiyid of 'Omān to the arrival of the Egyptians in Hasa, 1830-1838.

A little later commanding influence was re-established in Hasa, where the power of the Central Arabian dynasty had for a time been in abeyance, by the Wahhābi Amir Turki-bin-Sa'ūd; and effects of this change upon the position of the Shaikhs of Bahrain were instantly perceptible.

Submission of the Shaikhs of Bahrain to the Wahhābi Amir, 1830-1831.

At the end of 1830 the Wahhābis presented the Shaikhs with a demand for payment of Zakāt and of compensation to the amount of \$40,000 on account of horses left under the charge of Shaikh 'Abdullah by the Wahhābis many years before, and for cession of the fort of Dammām upon the coast of Hasa; at Dammām they proposed to locate Bashīr, a son of Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the former deadly enemy of the 'Utūb of Bahrain. The Shaikhs of Bahrain endeavoured to obtain the intervention of the British authorities in their favour; but, failing in this and having reason to fear a combination between the Wahhābis and Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, they sent a near relation to treat on their behalf at Riyādh. In the end it was settled that the supremacy of the Amir should be acknowledged, and that Zakāt should be paid; but the transfer of Dammām appears to have been waived by the Wahhābis in consideration of the 'Utūb having made their submission. The Amir in return undertook to protect Bahrain against external aggression but their intentions were distrusted by the Shaikhs, chiefly on account of their

unfriendly conduct in locating Bashir-bin-Rahmah on Tārūt Island opposite to the town of Qatif, where he was joined by a majority of the Āl Bū Samait, the constant allies of his father and the inveterate foes of the 'Atbi rulers of Bahrain.

In 1833 Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain was encouraged by the departure to Masqat of Bashir-bin-Rahmah, who soon found his position on Tārūt untenable in consequence of the enmity of the people of Qatif, to throw off his allegiance to the Wahhābis. As the Shaikh had been careful, before venturing on a complete rupture of relations, to assure himself of the neutrality of the Saiyid of 'Omān, and as he was supported by the Arab tribes of the mainland, especially the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid who immediately began at his instigation to harass the Wahhābis in Hasa, the ruler of the Riyādh was unable to make any effective rejoinder. In 1834 Shaikh 'Abdullah assumed the offensive and blockaded the Wahhābi ports of Qatif and 'Oqair. The assassination of the Wahhābi Amir a little later, by his nephew Mashāri, was generally attributed to the machinations of the Bahrain Shaikh, who celebrated the event with firing of guns and other demonstrations of joy, and who immediately profited by it to obtain possession, not without some expenditure in bribes, of the Island of Tārūt opposite to the town of Qatif. In 1835, on the failure of an attempt by the new-Amir, Faisal-bin-Turki, to recover Tārūt, Shaikh 'Abdullah resumed the blockade of Qatif and 'Oqair, which he had suspended, and began to plunder the shipping of both places.

In 1833, at the time of his breach with the Wahhābis, Shaikh 'Abdullah with his sons Mubārak and Nāsir had for some time been residing in Qatar to watch the proceedings of the enemy; but he seems thereafter to have returned to Bahrain. By the death of his nephew and colleague Shaikh Khalifah-bin-Salmān, which occurred on the 31st of May 1834, Shaikh 'Abdullah soon afterwards became sole ruler of Bahrain; but so headstrong and impatient of his authority did his near relations, including his sons, now become, and so corrupt was his partiality, so undue his leniency and so excessive his general misgovernment when left to himself, that the internal affairs of the Shaikhdom soon began to wear a most serious aspect.

In 1835 the people of Huwailah in Qatar revolted against him and entered into a correspondence with the Wahhābis; one of his sons rebelled in concert with the Huwailah insurgents and began, with the assistance of some hundreds of Wahhābis, to commit depredations upon the sea-borne commerce of Bahrain; and another son named Ahmad, after

Supremacy of the Wahhābi Amir repudiated by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1833-1835.

Domestic affairs of the Āl Khalifah family, 1833-1835.

Rebellion in Qatar, 1835.

committing some irregularities at sea for which he readily afforded satisfaction on its being demanded by the British political authorities, made his way from Qatar to Masqat with the avowed intention of obtaining support against his father from Saiyid Sa'īd. The latter, however, instead of complying with the wishes of Ahmad, sent his own son Saiyid Hilāl to compose the differences among the Āl Khalifah chiefs; and an agreement, more fully noticed in the history of Qatar,* was arranged by his efforts; but it was almost immediately violated by the partisans of Shaikh 'Abdullah, who induced the Āl Bū Kuwārah to attack the inhabitants of Huwailah,—an act for which the Shaikh refused to make any reparation. This last affair led to the secession of 'Isa-bin-Tarīf, the principal man of Huwailah, who at first took refuge with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān, and whose later proceedings will claim notice further on.

About the middle of the year 1836 Shaikh 'Abdullah, alarmed by symptoms of an intention on the part of the Government of Shirāz to revise, possibly with support from the Saiyid of 'Omān, the Persian claim to sovereignty over Bahrain, took steps for a reconciliation with the Wahhābi Amir. Faisal-bin-Turki, to whose subjects in Hasa much inconvenience had been caused by the Bahraini blockade of the Hasa coast, and whom the Egyptians had now begun to press hard upon his western frontier, received the overtures favourably, and a settlement was speedily arranged. The Shaikh undertook to pay a nominal tribute of \$2,000 a year to the Amir; the Amir in return promised to supply troops for the defence of Bahrain against attacks from without, and to refrain from calling on the Shaikh for marine transport in case of his deciding on an expedition against Masqat by sea; and intercourse between Bahrain and the ports of Qatif and 'Oqair was re-opened.

Meanwhile, however, the lot of the Shaikh's subjects in Bahrain was growing, from day to day, less endurable; and the islands were being rapidly depopulated by emigration. The towns were in a state of ruin and decay, and house rents had fallen to one-eighth of what they had been only a few years before. Six sons of the Shaikh pretended to exercise separate and independent power, and their attention was chiefly devoted to extracting money from merchants and other men of means. The ordinary subject in Bahrain had no acknowledged rights; his domestic animals, even, were frequently seized on pretext of *corvée* and were not returned. The result was a general exodus of the inhabitants to every quarter of the Persian Gulf.

Rapprochement between the Wahhābis and the Utūb, 1836.

Internal affairs of Bahrain, 1836-38.

* *Vide* page 704 *ante*.

1.12

Rebellion of Al bin 'Ali and
Al Bu 'Ainain, 1835-1839;
the Egyptian advance into
eastern Arabia, 1837-1839

1793 of 1838

To

J. P. Willoughby Esq.

Secretary to Government

Bombay

Sir,

Enclosed I have the honor to forward for the information of the Honble the Governor in Council the accompanying translation of a letter from Shaikh Abdallah bin Ahmed chief of Bahrein in reply to a communication from me pointing out the only terms upon which Osa bin Turay, Sultan bin Subamah and their followers, would consent to any sort of arrangement with him. It will be observed from the tenor of the Abdallah's reply answer that he takes no notice of the proposals made through me, but complains of me affording permission for a resort to hostilities contrary to the General Treaty negotiated with the pacific Arabs by Sir Wm Grant Dyer. The inconsistency of these remonstrances of the Shaikh will

be.

be sufficiently apparent when it is recollected, that altho' by my exertions the al-i-ally had been restrained for the last ^{3 or 4} years from reviving the inquiries they had sustained from the hands of the Bahraini Chief, the renewed agitation of the subject was originated by the latter, who, as reported in my letter No 33 in this Department dated the 9th June last, sent over his Nazim Hajir Porsahab to request my sanction to his forthwith proceeding to compel the return of his fugitive dependents by force of arms on which occasion all my endeavours to point out the impolicy of such an attempt and the certainty of Bahrain becoming involved in hostilities with Abolthathir if it were persisted in were unavailing - The Sheikh would appear to imagine that he was to be at liberty to adopt hostile measures against the al-i-ally while the members of that unfortunate Tribe were to be restrained from taking any steps for their own safety and protection.

The

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This enclosed copy of the reply sent by me to Sheikh Abolthathir his Honour's letter, will exhibit to the Honourable the Council the construction I have put upon the articles of the General Treaty, referred to by the Bahraini Sheikh. I am now daily expecting the arrival of the Heads of the al-i-ally Tribe, but it is with regret I am obliged to express my conviction that the absolute refusal of the Abolthathir chief to render common justice to his injured dependents takes away every prospect of an amicable adjustment.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Presidency in the Persian Gulf)
(Persian Gulf) (Persian Gulf)

Translations of a letter from Sheikh Abolthathir in answer of Bahrain to the President in the Persian Gulf, dated the 28 Rajab or 18 October 1838.

I have received and understood your letter of the 6th of Rajab and had before written

without to you saying that Kulepa bin
Shahin has no business to interfere between
me and my subjects, agreeably with the Treaty
between the English and Arabs in the 4th
and 7th Articles to which treaty all the
Arabs between Ras-ul-Hayma and Bahrain,
including Abolthadun are parties. If this
Treaty is still in force the case is as I have
stated and if it has been altered I have
never been informed of any such alterations.
If you desire to give the "Paisified" Arabs
permission to go to war with our neighbors
you are powerful and can do so. From your
first answer I hoped that I should have
been able to send my vessels to India and
other places for I am not a disturber of
the peace. There are only two months
remaining during which I can send my
vessels to sea allowing time for them to
return. If it is your intention to let
Kulepa loose at me, it must be as you
please and he will assist me.

True Translation
Signed J. Edmunds
Assistant Resident
Draft

Draft, Letter from Captain J. Edmunds
Resident in the Persian Gulf to Sheikh
Abdullah bin Ahmed Chief of Bahrain
dated 24 October 1838

A C

Your letter dated the 23rd Rajab
has been received and its contents understood.
In respect to what you write regarding
the Al-Idaly it would appear as if you
thought that it afforded me satisfaction
to see the Arabian tribes at war with each
other. Had this been the case I should have
given to Qasim bin Saif the permission
to attack you which he asked for in
October three years ago. You must be well
aware that the wish of the British Govern-
ment is that the inhabitants of the
shores of this sea should follow their
usual pursuits in peace and safety with-
out injury or molestation. When however
open and acknowledged war is declared
between two independent powers the British
Government refrains from interference so
long

long as such hostilities do not degenerate
 into piracy. With respect to the 1st article
 of the General Treaty which you quote its
 meaning is evidently, that the pacified
 Tribes shall not fight with each other
 except in open war, otherwise if this were
 to have been prohibited altogether it would
 never have been explained in the second
 article of the same agreement, what des-
 cription of fighting came under the first
 definition, and what under that of Piracy.
 The second article expressly says that
 acknowledged war is that which is proclaimed
 and avowed and ordered by Government against
 Government. Besides you yourself know
 how often since the date of the Treaty
 hostilities have taken place between the
 different Tribes particularly between the
 Baryas and the Seaduners and also that
 the former joined the Imam of Muscat
 on the occasion of his expedition against
 Bahrain all of which would of course
 have been forbidden had it been

Contrary

Contrary to the existing agreement, as to
 the 1st Article, it alone proves what I said
 that the prohibition extends only to piracy
 and piracy. The fact is, that this affair
 was commenced by yourself, when you
 applied for permission to attack the
 al-i ally, on that occasion I gave the best
 advice in my power to your Highness
 Dushab and pointed out that this would
 inevitably involve you in hostilities with
 the Baryas Shaikh. I did not however
 succeed in making any impression and
 therefore nothing remained for me but to
 request a delay until I could make the
 Baryas acquainted with your intentions
 under the hope that the affair might yet
 be amicably adjusted. You are fully aware
 what pains I have taken in order to make
 up matters between you, but all to no
 purpose I have therefore reluctantly
 been obliged to withdraw myself from
 any further interference under these
 circumstances I cannot see that you have

any grounds of complaint against me. —
Regarding your request for a delay of two months
longer I beg to intimate that His Highness
Sheikh Hamad has not yet arrived here to
visit me according to their promise but whenever
they do so if I find that an amicable adjustment
is not possible I shall endeavour to arrange
that no hostilities take place until the
expiration of the month of Shumayy.

(Signed) J. P. M. M. M.

President in the

Persian Gulf

His Office

(Signed) J. P. M. M. M.

President in the Persian Gulf

25th of 1838.

Th

The President in the Persian Gulf
Bushire

Sir

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt
of your letter dated the 24th inst. forwarding copy
of communication addressed by you to Sheikh
Abdullah bin Ahmed chief of Bahrain and of the reply
returned thereto by that chief and to inform you that
the Honble the Governor in Council requests that you will
pursue in your endeavours to effect an amicable
adjustment of the differences existing between the
parties concerned.
(Signed) J. P. M. M. M.
Bushire 25th 1838

No. 94 of 1838

Political Department

Th

J. P. M. M. M.

Secretary to the Government

Bushire

Sir

With reference to my letter No. 88.
in this Department, under date the 8th of this
month, I have the honor to report, for the
information of the Honble the Governor in Council,
that, on the 17th instant, Sheikh Eva bin Saif,
accompanied by some of the principal individuals
of his tribe, arrived at Bushire from —
Abolthath.

In the interview which took place
with this Chief, shortly after his landing,
I again endeavored to persuade him to
accept the only condition upon which —
Abdullah bin Ahmed, the chief of Bahrain
would consent to the restoration of the
Depots.

refers and property, mainly the retention
of himself and his tribe to that Island.

To this however Shaikh Isa declared they
would all sooner die than consent, as
the Uthbiyah Chief was so completely under
the control of his sons, and nephews that
not the least dependence could be placed
on his promises.

rd
3.

On the 23rd I had another in-
-terview with Isa ben Suray when find-
ing all my efforts for a satisfactory adjust-
ment of the difference between himself & the
Bahraini Chief unavailing, I was under the
reluctant necessity of informing him
both personally and by letter, that I should
withdraw any further attempt to mediate
between them, and that, on the termination
of the month of Ramadhan (18) proximo, both
parties would be at liberty to pursue their
own means for the attainment of what they
considered their own rights, without inter-
ference from us. At the same time agreeing
to

to the instructions of the Government, I
intimated to him, that the restriction line
as laid down by Major Morrison, must be
carefully observed, as instructions would be
issued to the troops of war to take possession
of any of the Boats belonging to the Belliger-
ents, other than those engaged in trade
found Cruising, or fighting, on the Persian
side of the restrictive boundary before advent-
ing to

to
In reporting that a similar
Communication to the above has been made
to Sheikh Abdollah bin Ahmed I would
respectfully suggest the expediency of a
public notification being made of this
approaching hostilities between Abdollah
and Bahrain, in order that our own
subjects may not unknowingly risk their
property, by embarking it on Boats the
refers belonging to either of the contending
parties.

Residence in the 2nd July }
Bahrain 26th July 1838 }
Signed J. H. Russell
Resident in the 2nd July

Aug 5/1838.

Political Department.
J. P. Willoughby Esq.
Secretary to Government

Sir, Bombay

With reference to my letter of yesterday's date reporting the approaching hostilities between Sheikh Osa bin Jari of Abrohatia and Sheikh Abdollah bin Ahmed of Bahrein, I now do myself the honor to forward a copy of my instructions to Commodore Brueke upon the above subject for the information and approval of the Honble the Governor in Council.

I have the honor to be &c
Signed J. H. Russell
President in the P. Gulf

Residency in the P. Gulf
Bahrain 27/8/38
J. P. Brueke Esq.
Commodore of the Squadron of the Indian Navy in the Persian Gulf
Sir,
All my endeavors to effect an

an adjustment of the differences so long subsisting between Sheikh Abdollah bin Ahmed of Bahrein and Sheikh Osa bin Jari of Abrohatia having failed, I have reluctantly been under the necessity of withdrawing my mediation, and leaving the parties above mentioned to settle their dispute by an appeal to arms, after the termination of the Ramzan or 19th December next.

You are doubtless aware that it is considered by the Honble the Governor in Council an important object that the Maritime Wars of the Chiefs on the Arabian Coast should be confined to their own sides of the Gulf, in order that the principal line of the trade between India and the northern Ports of this sea should remain safe, and undisturbed, as far as possible, during a period of hostilities. With this view the Government was pleased to direct that a restrictive limit should be fixed beyond which

which no warlike operations on the part of the Belligerents were to be permitted. This line commences from Cape Muscat down, passes 10 miles to the southward of Bander thir the Islands of Juss Abornai, and thence from this point it is continued within 20 miles seaward of Ras Pexan, through the Islands called Cal Khan and ends at Ceylan in the direction of Kowit.

I have now the honor to request, that instructions may be issued to the commanders of the Vessels of War comprising the Squadron of the Indian Navy serving in the Gulf that, in the event of their falling in with any boats belonging either to Bahrein or Abroothat, arriving under suspicious circumstances beyond the prescribed limits, that they will bring them to, and examine them, should it appear from the absence of any cargo or the nature of the armament or crew, that they are not employed upon a trading

trading voyage, they may be detained and brought into Baseline in order that the case may be more fully investigated.

In deciding upon the above points of course the officer in command of the vessel of War, must exercise his own judgment regarding various circumstances connected with the winds and weather, which might drive the War Boats of the Belligerents beyond the restriction line, without their wilfully intending to — — — — — transgress it. I would also observe, that the Bahrein Buglas trading with India, will of course require to be manned and armed sufficiently for their own protection in case therefore of one of our Cruisers falling in with a vessel of this description the commanding officer, on being satisfied that she is bound from Muscat India &c. &c. for objects of traffic, or on her return from a trading voyage will permit her to proceed to her destination without further

detention

Detention or molestation.

*Res. 4 in the
Persian Gulf
Barkie 28
November 1838*

*I have the honor to be
Signed J. Hume
Resident in the Persian Gulf*

(True copy)

(Signed J. Hume)

Resident in the Persian Gulf

15th 106 of 1838

Political Department

To

J. F. Wellingborough Esquire

Secretary to Government

Bombay

Sir,

With reference to my letter

*15th 98 in this Department under date the
27th ultimo, I have the honor to report for the
information of the Honorable the Governor in
Council, that on the 7th instant Hajee Bro Sahet
the nephew of the Chief of Bahrein arrived
at this port and immediately waited upon
me to deliver the letter from his superior of
which*

which the accompanying is a translation.

*Being much fatigued by his voyage he ex-
cused himself from entering upon the subject
of his Mission at that time, but promised
to visit me the next day for this purpose.*

*2. At the hour appointed the
Hajee and his son made their appearance.
After the usual Compliments I informed
him that I had perused the letter from
his Chief, Sheikh Abdollah ben Ahmed, and
as it contained a reference to a verbal
Communication from his Master, I should
be happy to hear whatever he had to say.*

*In reply Hajee Bro Sahet made a long ram-
bling speech the purport of which was,
that although Sheikh Abdollah was quite
powerful enough to coerce his fugitive subjects,
yet that he was too well aware of the evils
of their not to prefer coming to an amia-
ble arrangement if such could be ef-
fected with honor. I replied that it was
to be regretted, the Bahrein Chief had
not exhibited this Conciliatory spirit
before*

before instead of allowing Mullins to proceed to their present extremity, I wished however to be informed what concessions the Sheik would make to avert the threatened hostilities. The Sheik's answer was that his Chief wished the British Government to offer its guarantee to the effect, that, provided they would consent to return to Bahrain their lawful claims should be settled and their landed property and boats returned to them. I replied that, in the first place, any guarantee from us was out of the question and, in the second, that their return to Bahrain was a condition to which Eva ben Saeef and his followers would never agree. Upon ^{the first being made} the Sheik Boos Sahub said that, to avoid the effusion of blood consequent upon his Master's unwilling consent to satisfying their claims, provided they would leave Aboodhabee and settle on the coast of Guttur. I answered that, at an earlier period, some hopes of such a proposition

proposition being favorably received might have been entertained; but that I feared it was too late, as only a few days remained to the period fixed for the commencement of hostilities. I added however that I was too anxious to avert the distress and misery which I was certain would arise from war not to take advantage of any opening which might offer for an amicable adjustment of differences and therefore of Sheik Boos Sahub was prepared to enter into negotiations for this desirable object, I would take up myself the responsibility of despatching one of the Depots of War with him to Aboodhabee in order to afford the opportunity of his holding a personal communication with ^{the} heads of the Aboodhabee Sheik. This suggestion seemed to give the Sheik much satisfaction, but after a little consideration he said that he could not accept my proposal without first having the authority of Sheikh Abdoolah and receiving from him more complete powers to treat than he at present possessed.

He therefore hoped that it would be in my power to send a cruiser over to Bahrain with instructions to accompany him to Abrothabee should he be able to obtain the consent of his Chief to such an arrangement.

2.

Although I confess that I do not entertain any sanguine hopes that even should Sheikh Abdoolah bin Ahmed be induced to make this advance towards reconciliation with his fugitive subjects that the indispensable condition of quitting Abrothabee will be agreed to by the latter, still, I am most desirous that not the slightest chance of an accommodation should be lost as these hostilities if once begun soon hardly fail eventually to involve all the Maritime Chiefs in the Gulf. Influenced by this consideration, I acceded to the proposal of Hajee Bee Shah and now beg to enclose for the information of the Government a copy of the letter which I have addressed to Commander Bruck upon the occasion.

This

This arrangement having been made, Hajee Bee Shah after referring to that part of the Bahraini Chief's letter which touches upon the subject of the boundary line, proceeded to state that, should his endeavours to avert a war be unfortunately unsuccessful, his Chief would not agree to hostilities being confined within any limits as in point of fact it would be impracticable to maintain them, for every report he said that was circulated would accuse its authors of having made a prize of it beyond the restrictive line, an ascertaining which whether true or false, would of course be met by a denial, while, from the absence of any impartial witnesses, it would be impossible to ascertain the real state of the case. I replied that, in the first place, Sheikh Abdoolah bin Ahmed ought to have offered his objections to the establishment of a boundary line, when the intimation of the proposed arrangement was first communicated to him three years

go that, as in the beginning of 1836, he had
 afforded his Consent in general terms, the
 Government had sanctioned these limits
 being fixed whenever hostilities broke out among
 the Maritime Arabian Chiefs, that I was per-
 fectly well aware of the many difficulties
 attending its maintenance but that of a
 course in all doubtful cases reference would
 be made to the British authority in the Gulf
 who would decide upon each to the best of his
 judgment; that the grand object of the Govern-
 ment was, to keep the Principal haek of the
 Gulf Trade open and free from the interrup-
 tion and annoyance it would be exposed to
 were the warships of the Belligerents to be
 constantly cruising off the Persian Coast, and
 that, considering his subjects employed ten
 times the number of British troops as
 compared with Abrothabee, I had thought
 that the Bahraini Sheik would have viewed
 with satisfaction the establishment of a
 restrictive line, but that if he still continued
 averse.

averse to it, I would make a reference to
 India and receive the further commands
 of the Government upon the subject.

I cannot explain the
 conduct of Sheik Abdoolah throughout
 this affair in any other way than upon
 the supposition that he entertained an ex-
 cessive impression that we were prepared
 to do any thing rather than see hostilities
 break out between himself and Abrothabee;
 and therefore to avoid this alternative, means
 would be taken by us to compel his fugitive
 subjects to return to their allegiance. It is evident
 that he is very unwilling to go to war at
 present, but whether his threat words will stop
 to make such concessions as may overfit or
 remains to be seen. I am inclined to think
 that his objection to the restrictive limit is
 grounded merely in the hope that we would
 rather forbid hostilities on both sides than
 give up for he has every thing to lose and
 nothing to gain by its being discontinued.
 Be this as it may, considering that Sheik
 Abdoolah

Abdullah ben Ahmed is an independent Chief who has upon the whole observed the Conditions of the Treaty entered into with the pacificated Arabs by the British Government more carefully than any other power in the Gulf. I venture to think that it would not be expedient to insist upon his observing the boundary line, should he continue firm in his objections to it, and hostilities actually break out, in this case I shall take upon myself to suspend the execution of the instructions issued to the Squadron regarding the limits laid down, pending the further directions of the Government.

(Residence in the Persian Gulf) I have the honor to be very
Respectfully
1838 Signed J. H. Cornwell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Translation of a letter from Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed of Bahrain to the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 12th of the Month Rabi-ul-Thani A. H. 1254 or 30th November 1838.
I have.

I have received and understood your letter and before this have understood your sentiments regarding my subjects and the affair of Sa bin Jusef and Ben Sulama and the people who are with them, and also as regards the al Bura council of Mukra. These people are all my subjects and I am entitled to taxes from them for the Pearl Fishery, and on other accounts besides. It ought not to be permitted that any one of the pacificated Arab States afford an opportunity to them. My wish is that they should be obliged to return if not peaceably then by force. Their Kuteefa ben Shakoor has given protection to thieving subjects, and you write that it is his intention to return with them as an auxiliary. My own opinion of you is that you will not consent to this, I myself have no desire to do harm because in the 4th Article of the Treaty with the pacificated Arabs, all the tribes from Ras-el-Khymra to Bahrain ought to be at peace and unanimous, and their Treaty with the English

that there shall be no war, I and this
 said Shajir by Hajir / Booshab and those
 God! you will see it. If a new state of things
 is to be introduced, by which the Arabs are
 to war with one another and if it pleases
 you that there should be warfare, you are
 all-powerful, and it must be so. But if there
 is to be still no war, it is impossible that hostilities
 can be confined within the boundary which
 your letter prescribes; for, I fear, that such a
 proceeding would open the door to complaints
 against me being made.

If it is your desire that
 there should be war amongst the Arab tribes then
 let every part of the sea be open to those operations;
 for there is no necessity for a boundary.

I beg you will return
 an answering Hajir Booshab who is proceed-
 ing to wait on you.

Postscript

Regarding Kuteifa
 Hajir Shaboot and bin Tarif whom you have
 permitted

permitted to make war on me, and against
 whom I have permission to wage war, it is
 impossible that the warfare can be confined
 within the boundary you lay down, because it
 is my desire to make open war and retaliate
 on all those who afford aid to this people.
 you will easily understand to whom that
 attitude is likely to give aid to these people; for
 they are all acting under his orders whoever
 does evil to him will evil be returned. I
 and Hajir Booshab to you, and whatever
 he states you must consider as proceeding
 from me.

True Translation

(signed) J. Edmunds

(True Copy) Assistant Resident

(signed) J. Hennell

Resident in the Gulf

To

G. B. Brucke Esq.
 Commodore of the Squadron of the Indian
 Navy in the Persian Gulf.

Sir

Bushire

With reference to my letter

consider dated the 28th September last on the subject of the impending hostilities between the Uthboos, and the Al-e-ally, I have the honor to inform you that the Sheik of Bahrain now seems inclined to avoid the consequences of a war, by entering into an amicable arrangement with Eza bin Tareef, notwithstanding however to this short period intervening previous to the termination of the Truce, the only chance which offers of opening negotiations before a collision takes place appears to be by enabling an accredited agent from the Bahrain Chief to have a personal interview with the heads of the Al-e-ally tribe at Uthboothabee; and this, under present circumstances, can only take place on board one of our vessels of War. Hajee Boshah, the Hajee of the Uthboe Sheikh, who has lately arrived with letters from his Superior, does not however possess the power he possesses sufficiently ample to authorize him to undertake the office without having a further communication with

with Abdulla bin Ahmed. In order therefore as little time as possible may be lost in making a reference I trust you will concur with me in the expediency of despatching one of the vessels of the Squadron under your Command over to Bahrain, in company with Hajee Boshah. In the event of the Uthboe Chief consenting to his Hajee proceeding upon this Mission, I would wish the Officer in Command of the Cruiser selected for the service, to be instructed to convey Hajee Boshah to Uthboothabee and on his arrival off that place to afford every facility for both parties meeting on board the vessel of War for the purpose of entering into negotiations. At the same time I request that he will carefully abstain from giving the slightest pledge or guarantee on the part of the Government, to any arrangement that may be entered into. I should further suggest that the Commanding Officer, previously to leaving Uthboothabee should ascertain distinctly from both parties whether their differences have been amicably adjusted.

or whether they part as enemies. In the former case it will be advisable to obtain an authenticated copy of the agreement which has been entered into. After remaining off Uboothab a sufficient time for the question of Peace or war to be decided, the Cruiser will convey Hajee Boo Shab back to Bahrain, and from thence make the best of her way to rejoin the Head Quarters of the Squadron.

2. Should the Officer in Command of the vessel of War upon his arrival at Bahrain find that Sheik Abdoolah ben Ahmed refuses to follow Hajee Boo Shab to proceed to Uboothab for the purpose above alluded to, I request he may be furnished with instructions to return to this Port direct, with as little delay as the Convenience of the Service will admit.

Resident in the Persian Gulf. I have the honor to be
Dear Sir, (signed) J. Stennell
Bahrain 10 December 1838
Resident of Co.
1. True Copy.
(signed) J. Stennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf
To.

Transcription of previous document

No. 104 of 1838

Political Department

To

I.P. Willoughby Esquire

Secretary to Government

Bombay

Sir,

With reference to my letter No. 95 in this Department under date the 27th Ultimo, I have the honor to report for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council, that on the 9th instant Hajee Boo Saheb the wuzeer of the Chief of Bahrein arrived at this port and immediately waited upon me to deliver the letter from his superior, of which the accompanying is a translation. Being much fatigued by his voyage he excused himself from entering upon the object of his Mission at that time, but promised to visit me the next day for this purpose.

2. At the hour appointed the Hajee and his son made their appearance. After the usual Compliments I informed him that I had perused the letter from his Chief, Sheik Abdoolah ben ahmed, and as it contained a reference to a verbal communication from his Wazeer, I should be happy to hear whatever he had to say. In reply Hajee Boo shab made a long rambling speech the purport of which was that although Sheik Abdoolah was quite powerful enough to coerce his fugitive subjects, yet that he was too well aware of the evils of War not to prefer coming to an amicable arrangement if such could be effected with honor. I replied that it was to be regretted the Bahrein Chief had not exhibited this conciliatory spirit before instead of allowing matters to proceed to their present extremity. I wished however to be informed what concessions the Sheik would make to avoid the threatened hostilities. The Hajee's answer was that his Chief wished the British Government to offer its guarantee to the al-i-ally, that, provided they would consent to return to Bahrein their lawful claims should be settled and their landed

property and boats returned to them. I replied that, in the first place, any guarantee from us was out of the question and, in the second, that their return to Bahrein was a condition to which Esa ben Tareef and his followers would never agree. Upon this objection being made Hajee Boo Sahab said that, to avoid the effusion of blood consequent upon war his Master would even consent to satisfying their claims, provided they would leave Abodhabee and settle on the coast of Gutter. I answered that, at an earlier period, some hopes of such a proposition being favorably received might have been entertained; but that, I feared it was too late, as only a few days remained to the period fixed for the commencement of hostilities. I added however that I was too anxious to avert the distress and misery which I was certain would arise from a war not to take advantage of any opening which might offer for an amicable adjustment of differences, and therefore if Hajee Boo Shab was prepared to enter into negotiations for this desirable object, I would take up myself the responsibility of despatching one of the Vessels of War with him to Aboothabee in order to afford the opportunity of his holding a personal communication with the heads of the al-i-ally Tribe. This Suggestion seemed to give the Hajee much satisfaction, but after a little consideration he said that he could not accept my proposal without first having the authority of Sheikh Abdoolah and receiving from him more ample powers to treat than he at present possessed, he therefore hoped that it would be in my power to send a Cruizer over to Bharein with Instructions to accompany him to Aboothabee should he be able to obtain the consent of his Chief to such an arrangement.

3. Although I confess that I do not entertain any sanguine hopes that even should Sheikh aboothabee ben Amed be induced to make this advance towards a reconciliation with his fugitive subjects that the indispensable condition of quitting Aboothabee will be agreed to by the latter; still, I am most desirous that not the slightest chance of an accommodation

should be lost as these hostilities if once begun can hardly fail eventually to involve all the maritime Chiefs in the Gulf. Influenced by this consideration, I acceded to the proposal of Hajee Boo Shab and now beg to enclose for the information of the Government a Copy of the letter which I have addressed to Commodore Brucks upon the occasion.

4. This arrangement having been made, Hajee boo Shab after referring to that part of the Bahrein Sheik's letter which touches upon the subject of the boundary line proceeded to state that, should his endeavours to avert a war be unfortunately unsuccessful, his Chief could not agree to hostilities being confined within any limits as in point of fact it would be impracticable to maintain them, for every vessel he said that was captured would accuse its captors of having made a prize of it beyond the restrictive line, an ascertain(sic) which whether true or false, would of course be met by a denial, while, from the absence of any impartial witnesses it would be impossible to ascertain the real state of the case. I replied that, in the first place, Sheikh Abdoolah ben Ahmed ought to have offered his objections to the establishment of a restrictive line, when the intimation of the proposed arrangement was first communicated to him three years ago, that, as in the beginning of 1836, he had afforded his consent in general terms, the Government had sanctioned these limits being fixed whenever hostilities broke out among the Maritime Arabian Chiefs, that I was perfectly well aware of the many difficulties attending its maintenance but that of course in all doubtful cases a reference would be made to the British authority in the Gulf who would decide upon each to the best of his judgment, that the grand object of the Government was to keep the Principal track of the Gulf Trade, open and free from the interruption and annoyance it would be exposed to were the war vessels of the Belligerents to be constantly cruizing off the Persian coast. I added that, considering his

subjects employed ten times the number of Boats in traffic as compared with Aboothabee, I had thought that the Bahrein Sheik would have viewed with satisfaction the establishment of a restrictive line, but that if he still continued averse to it, I would make a reference to India and receive the further commands of the Government upon the subject.

5. I cannot explain the conduct of Sheik Abdoollah throughout this affair in any other way than upon the supposition that he entertained an erroneous impression that we were prepared to do any thing rather than see hostilities break out between himself and Aboothabee; and therefore to avoid this alternative, means would be taken by us to compel his fugitive subjects to return to their allegiance. It is evident that he is very unwilling to go to war at present, but whether his Arab pride will stoop to make such concessions as may avert it remains to be seen. I am inclined to think that his opposition to the restrictive limit is offered merely in the hope that we would rather forbid hostilities on both sides than give it, for he has every thing to lose and nothing to gain by its being discontinued. Be this as it may, considering that Sheik Abdoollah ben Ahmed is an independent Chief who has, upon the whole, observed the conditions of the Treaty entered into with the pacificated Arabs by the British Government more carefully than any other power in the Gulf, I venture to think that it would not be expedient to insist upon his observing the boundary line, should he continue firm in his objections to it, and hostilities actually break out. In this case I shall take upon myself to suspend the execution of the instructions issued to the Squadron regarding the limits laid down, pending the further directions of the Government.

Residency in the Pn. Gulf)	I have the honor to be etc.
Bushire 11th December)	Signed S. Hennell
1838)	Resident in the Pn. Gulf

Translation of a letter from Sheik Abdullah ben Ahmed of Bahrein to the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 12th of the month Ramzan A.H. 1256 or 30th November 1838.

I have received and understood your letter and before this have understood your sentiments regarding my subjects and the Affair of Esa bin Tareef and Ben Sulama and the people who are with them, and also as regards the al Boo ainein of Wukra. These people are all my subjects and I am entitled to taxes from them for the Pearl-Fishery and on other accounts besides. It ought not to be permitted that any one of the pacificated Arab States afford an assylum to them. My wish is that they should be obliged to return if not peaceably then by force. Sheik Kuleefa ben Shakboot has given protection to these my subjects, and you write that it is his intention to return with them as an auxiliary. My own opinion of you is that you will not consent to this. I myself have no desire to do harm, because in the 11th Article of the Treaty with the pacificated Arabs all the tribes from Rasel Khyma to Bahrein ought to be at peace and unanimous, and their Treaty with the English is that there shall be no wars. I send this said treaty by Hajee/ Boo Shab/ and Please God! you will see it. If a new state of things is to be introduced by which the Arabs are to war with one another and if it pleases you that there should be warfare, you are all-powerful, and it must be so. But if there is to be War it is impossible that hostilities can be confined within the boundary which your letter prescribes; for, I fear that such a proceeding would open the door to complaints against me being made.

If it is your desire that there should be war amongst the arab Tribes then let every part of the sea be open to their operation, for there is no necessity for a boundary.

I beg you will return an answer by Hajee Booshab who is proceeding to wait on you.

Postscript

Regarding Kuleefa ben Shakboot and bin Tareef whom you have permitted to make war on me, and against whom I have permission to wage war, it is impossible that the warfare can be confined within the boundary you lay down, because it is my desire to make open war and retaliate on all those who afford aid to these people. you will easily understand to whom I allude as likely to give aid to these people; for they are all acting under his orders whoever does evil to him will evil be returned. I send Hajee Booshab to you, and whatever he states you must consider as proceeding from me.

True Translation

/Signed/ T. Edmunds

/True Copy/ Assistant Residt. Pn. Gulf

/Signed/ S. Hennell

Residt. in the Pn. Gulf

To

G.B. Brucks Esquire

Commodore of the Squadron of the Indian
Navy in the Persian Gulf

Sir

Bushire

With reference to my letter under date the 26 November last on the subject of the impending hostilities between the Uttoobees, and the Ali-i-ally, I have the honor to inform you that the Sheik of Bahrein now seems inclined to avoid the consequences of a war, by entering into an amicable arrangement with Esa bin Tareef, adverting however to the short period intervening previous to the termination of the Truce, the only chance which offers of opening negotiations before a collision takes place appears to be by enabling an accredited agent from the Bahrein Chief to have a personal interview with the heads of the Al-i-ally Tribe at Ahboothabee; and this, under present circumstances, can only take place on

board one of our vessels of War. Hajee boo shab, the Wazeer of the Uttoobe sheik/ who has lately arrived with letters from his Superior/ does not however consider the power he possesses sufficiently ample to authorize him to undertake the office without having a further communication with Abdoola bin Ahmed. In order therefore as little time as possible may be lost in making a reference, I trust you will concur with me in the expediency of despatching one of the vessels of the Squadron under your Command over to Bahrein, in company with Hajee boo shab. In the event of the Uttoobee Chief consenting to his Wazeer proceeding upon this Mission, I would wish the Officer in command of the Cruiser selected for the service to be instructed to convey Hajee Boo Shab to Aboothabee, and, on her arrival off that place to afford every facility for both parties meeting on board the vessel of War for the purpose of entering into negotiations. At the same time I request that he will carefully abstain from giving the slightest pledge or guarantee on the part of the Government, to any arrangement that may be entered into. I should further suggest that the Commanding officer, previously to leaving Aboothabee should ascertain distinctly from both parties whether their differences have been amicably adjusted or whether they part as enemies. In the former case it will be advisable to obtain an authenticated Copy of the agreement which has been entered into. After remaining off Aboothabee a sufficient time for the question of Peace or war to be decided, the Cruiser will convey Hajee Boo Shab back to Bahrein, and from thence make the best of her way to rejoin the Head Quarters of the Squadron.

2 Should the Officer in Command of the Vessel of War, upon his arrival at Bahrein, find that Sheik Abdoola ben Ahmed refuses to allow Hajee Boo Shab to proceed to Aboothabee for

the purpose above alluded to, I request he may be furnished with instructions to return to this Port direct, with as little delay as the convenience of the service will admit.

Residcy. in the Pn. Gulf
Bushire 10th December
1838

I have the honor to be etc.

/Signed/ S. Hennell

Resident etc.

/True Copy/

/Signed/ S. Hennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf

N^o 108 of 1838
Political Department
J. P. Milloughby Esq
Secretary to the Government
Bombay

Sir,

With reference to my letter N^o 104 in this Department under date the 11th Instant, I have now the honor to forward for the information of the Governor in Council, the accompanying copy of a letter from the Senior Officer of the Indian Navy in Bushire Roads, enclosing therewith of the Commander of the H. C. Brig of War Tigris of his visit to Basra.

The usual result of this attempt to reopen negotiations of peace between the Lilloobee, and the A. i. ally Tribes, is usually otherwise than had anticipated, and war I fear is inevitable. I am informed that

proceeding

proceeded to Muscat most probably with
the view of procuring assistance from the
Government of that place in the shape of
money, arms, and ammunition.

3^d As which Abdoolah ben
Ahmed in his reply, declining my offer
to dispatch the H. C. S. S. ship of the Tigres
with his flag to observe the ben, does not
allude to the subject of the restrictive limit,
it is not my intention for the present to
suspend the instructions issued to Com-
modore Bache regarding their maintenance.
Residency in the Persian Gulf.
Signed: J. Fennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf
December 1838.

To

Captain J. Fennell

Resident

Gulf of Persia.

Sir

I have the honor to ac-
quaint you of the return of the H. C.
S. S. ship

Brig of the Tigres, and herewith enclose
a copy of Lieutenant Sharpi's report.

I have the honor to be

C. J. Elvie

Chief Roads

under 30th 1838.

Signed: John Croft Shawton

Comd^g Senior Officer

Bushire

To

The Senior Indian Naval Officer
in the Persian Gulf
Bushire Roads.

Sir,

I have the honor to report
the arrival of the East India Company
Brig of the Tigres under my charge
from Bushire on the 18th Instant, at
which place we anchored on the 15th
and were detained until the 17th P. M.
awaiting the return of Bushabi, return
from Core Musrain where he had pro-
ceeded to hold a conference with Shaik
Abdoolah and obtain that Chief's
direction relative to his negotiating with
Esa bin Faraj Hadgee Bushab, on

on board the Honble Company's sloop
 of the *Cook*, and represented the injustice
 which he stated, he had experienced, from
 the Chief of Bahrain in having refused
 to afford him redress for the attack on his
 boat, and the murder of one of his people
 by the *Al Jawah* tribe, and stated that
 finding this was no longer an *amicable*
 affair, and *provisionally* deciding between
 the limits of the Bahrain territory, or
 and its *neighbors*, had left that part and
 taken up their temporary abode at *Saloo*
Wah, that it being impossible for them
 to return to Bahrain, they solicited that
Shah *Abdoolah* would allow them, *invited*
 to join them, and restore all the property
 they had left behind, and that they had
 no other object than to earn subsistence
 in a quiet and peaceable manner as
Moslems, but that in the event of the
 Bahrain Chief refusing to do them this
 act of justice they were desirous to be
 permitted to take their own measures
 for

for the attainment of the redress they
 sought for.

Captain Simmell replied that
 he had no reason to suppose that the
 British Government would object to
 their settling wherever they chose so long
 as they confined themselves strictly to *Man-*
carriage and peaceable pursuits, but that
 they could not seek an asylum with
 a power on terms of friendship and
 amity with *Kutub*, under an idea
 that they would be allowed to carry on a
 system of *Plunder* and aggression
 against the subjects of their former *High-*
ness, continuing their proceedings with the
 pretence of seeking redress for their own
 wrongs.

That officer however promised
 that he would, on his return to Bahrain,
 make enquiries into the affair and that,
 if he found *Shah* *Abdoolah's* statement true,
 he would recommend *Shah* *Abdoolah*
 to afford them settling redress and that

would use all friendly arguments to induce him to do so, but that the British Government would not permit the tranquility of the Gulf to be disturbed.

The Resident observed that if Sheikh Ebn bin Loof is willing to renounce hostilities on the subjects of the Bahrain that the Chief Mulla whose protection they enjoy themselves must necessarily be involved in hostilities with the Uthman Shaikh and there can be no opening to the inclusion and surrender in variously & liberally such as taking of prisoners in these quarters.

Some reports from the Native Agent at Sharjah it appeared that the statement of Ebn bin Loof of the cause of the dispute is incorrect, and that the cause of the quarrel was the seizure and pillage of a ship by the Bahrain Chief, for destroying the vessel before taking her departure, to the Coast of Oman.

Government

Government approved Captain Maxwell's views of this case, and called him to be informed that there was no objection to his endeavouring to effect an accommodation between Shaikh Ebn bin Loof and the Bahrain Chief, though it is undesirable to interfere with the internal discussions which so frequently occur among the Maritime Tribes in the Persian Gulf.

In the 23rd April 1836 the Resident arrived at Bahrain and, on the following day, he had an interview with Hajee Boosha, the Minister of Shaikh Ebn bin Loof, whom that Gentleman explained to the Hajee that his object in visiting Bahrain was to endeavour to settle a reconciliation between his Master and his revolted subjects, and pointed out the expediency of the quarrel being settled in a peaceable manner, otherwise threatening to involve the Bahrain Chief in hostilities with

the same of the principal Chiefs of the Gulf. The Rajah promised to communicate the subject to his Master, and the next day returned with a letter from the Shah of Persia, in which he detailed the particulars of the dispute with Shaik Ebn, and stated his willingness to consent to any arrangement being made between himself and Shaik Ebn upon the basis of either partly making good or settling such claims as might be legally established by the other, but that should this arrangement fail, and Shaik Ebn be permitted to commence operations against his subjects, then he and those who protect him must stand by the consequences.

On the 4th of November 1837, Captain Hornell handed up the translation of a letter from the Chief of Bushkha stating his intention to make common cause with Shaik Ebn bin Jassid and soliciting permission to declare war against Bahrain, to which that officer replied.

replied that he could not grant any permission, but he would submit the application for the consideration of Government.

The letter of the Rajah returned by the Resident was deemed by Government proper, it being impossible to allow Shaik Khatib to remain in war with a Chief who had caused him no injury.

Prince Bavo, the Minister, waited on the Resident on the 8th June 1838, and applied for permission for his Master to use coercive measures against Bushkha in order to compel his fugitive subjects who had deserted to engage in that State to return.

Captain Hornell endeavored by arguments to impress upon the Rajah the impropriety of engaging in war with Bushkha, but he was not satisfied that the honor and interest of his Master required the return of his subjects; that he had no wish to go to war with Bushkha, but that whoever afforded Shaik Ebn protection,

protection must take the consequences.
 The Resident then offered to write to Shaikh 'Esa and the Chief of Abudhabbin, with a recommendation, that to avoid the evil consequences, the former should return to Bahrein, which proposal was readily agreed to by the latter. That is seen however stated that he did not make this proposition with any belief that his recommendation would be accepted by, as both Shaikh 'Esa and the Chief of Abudhabbin are eager for war, but that indeed so with the hopes that by keeping the question open, the chances of collision during the Chaud. Festival might be diminished.

5. Captain Bennett was of opinion that Shaikh 'Esa had not only refused to redress the injuries which his dependants complained of, but had made a formal demand of British sanction to bring them back by force of arms, that, after due warning, he should withdraw from all further interference in the matter.

Enc

5. The Resident's proceedings were approved by Government.
 6. In a letter dated the 26th November last, Captain Bennett wrote to Shaikh 'Esa bin Tameer, accompanied by some of the principal individuals of his Tribe arrived at Bushra on the 19th of the same month, from Abudhabbin, and had an interview with him, on which occasion he again endeavored to persuade him to accept peace, on condition, on which the Chief of Abudhabbin would consent to the restoration of their Tribes and property, namely the return of himself & Tribe to that Island; to this proposal however Shaikh 'Esa declared that he would recommend than consent as no conditions could be placed on which he could promise.

On the 23rd of the same month the Resident had another interview with Shaikh 'Esa bin Tameer, when finding that all his efforts for a satisfactory adjustment

negotiations of the difference between the Chief of Bushra and Shaikh 'Ali to be unavailing, he informed the latter that he would with-
 -hold himself from any further attempt
 to mediate between them, and that on the
 termination of the month of Rabi-ul-Thani
 1280 December 1838, both parties would be
 at liberty to pursue their own course in the
 attainment of what they considered their
 own rights, interests and interests from
 the British Government. That officer
 at the same time informed the Shaikh that
 the restrictions laid down by Major
 Morrison must be carefully observed, as
 Commanders of Turkish Ships would be
 instructed to take possession of any other
 boats belonging to the British Government
 engaged in trade and navigation
 fighting on the Persian side, the re-
 -stricted boundary. A similar commu-
 -nication was made to the Chief of Bushra.

In the 2nd part of this letter
 Captain Hume suggested the expediency
 of

of a public notification being issued re-
 -garding the approaching hostilities
 between Bushra and Abotthabeh, in order
 that British subjects might not unwar-
 -rantly risk their property by embarking
 on board the vessels belonging to
 either of the contending parties -

The Resident with this com-
 -munication dated the 2nd November
 forwards copy of a letter written by him
 to Bushra, Bani, requesting that
 he would issue instructions to the Com-
 -manders of Turkish Ships in the Gulf, in the
 event of their falling in with any boats
 belonging to Bushra or Abotthabeh on
 cruises beyond the prescribed limits
 under suspicious circumstances to
 examine them and if found to be employed
 in any other than trading voyage to
 detain and bring such vessels into Bushra.

On the 11th December 1838
 the Resident reported the arrival at
 Bushra on the 9th of the same month of

Hajir, Mulla Shaikh, and forwarded the translation of a letter from the Chief of Bahrain. The Tugueh called on the Resident the next day and stated that the Bahraini Chief was powerful enough to secure his fugitive subjects, yet he was too well aware of the evils of war not to prefer coming to an amicable settlement which such could be effected with honor. Captain Hurrell replied that it was to be regretted that his Master had not been able to do this. Considering spirit before, instead of allowing matters to proceed to their present extremity, and requested to be informed what concessions the Shaikh would make to avoid the threatened hostilities. The Hajir's answer was that Shaikh al-Mutlaq wished the British Government to offer its guarantee to the Shi'ahs, that provided they consented to return to Bahrain their land and claims should be settled, and their property returned to them. The Resident replied that in the first place any guarantee from

was out of question, and in the second the return to Bahrain was a condition which Shaikh 'Ali and his followers would never agree to; upon which the Hajir said that to avoid the effusion of blood his Master would even consent to shipping their claims, provided they would leave Arabia, and settle on the coast of India. Captain Hurrell informed him that a plan was being made some days of peace, a proposition being invariably received might now have been obtained, but that he feared it was too late, as only a few days remained before the period fixed in the commencement of hostilities and could have been that he was too anxious to avert the distress and misery which would arise from a war, not to take advantage of any opening which might offer, even to amicable adjustment of differences. Captain Hurrell however intimated to the Hajir that if he were prepared to enter into negotiations for this desirable object

Minute by the Honble the Governor dated 25th
January 1839, subscribed to by the Council.

It is much to be regretted that the
the present time, there is the prospect of war
between any of the Masibins and the
Captains General's appears to have done all
that was in his power to prevent it, and his
measures may be entirely successful.

For the security of landing vessels the
collective boundary should be maintained
according to the intention stated in the letter
of 2nd December.

I do not clearly understand the ground
of the inexpediency of even this bound-
ary of the Bahrain and the Council office's
to it. Captain General may be requested
to explain.

It may be well to give notice as
proposed in the letter of 23rd November,
of the approaching hostilities between
Bahrain and Abcoobah.

These

These proceedings should be
communicated to the Governor General

1839. - Signed / James Farish
" J. W. Anderson
" J. A. Dunlop,

Transcription of previous document

No. 108 of 1838

Political Department

To

I. P. Willoughby Esqre.

Secretary to the Government

Bombay

Sir,

With reference to my letter No. 104 in this Department under date the 11th Instant, I have now the honor to forward for the information of the Honble. the Governor in Council, the accompanying copy of a letter from the Senior Officer of the Indian Navy in Bushire Roads, enclosing the report of the Commander of the H.C. Brig of War Tigris of his visit to Bahrein.

2. The unsuccessful result of this attempt to reopen negotiations of peace between the Uttoobee, and the Al-i-Ally Tribes, is hardly otherwise than I had anticipated, and war I fear is inevitable. Esa ben Tareef I am informed has proceeded to Muscat most probably with the view of procuring assistance from the Government of that place in the shape of money, arms, and ammunition.

3. As Sheik Abdoollah ben Ahmed in his reply, declining my offer to despatch the H.C. Brig of War Tigris with his Wuzeer to Aboothabee, does not allude to the subject of the restrictive limits, it is not my intention for the present to suspend the instructions issued to Commodore Brucks regarding their maintenance.

Residency in the
Persian Gulf
Bushire 24th
December 1838.

To

Captain S. Hennell

Resident

Gulf of Persia

I have the honor to be etc.

/Signed/ S. Hennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf

Sir,

I have the honor to acquaint you of the return of the E.I.C. Brig of War Tigris, and herewith enclose a copy of Lieutenant Sharp's report.

C.S. Clive)	I have the honor to be etc.
Bushire Roads)	/Signed/ John Croft Hawkins
December 20th 1838)	Comder. & Senior Officer
		Bushire

To

The Senior Indian Naval Officer
in the Persian Gulf

Bushire Roads.

Sir,

I have the honor to report the arrival of the East India Company's Brig of War Tigris under my charge from Bahrein the 18th Instant, at which place we anchored on the 15th and were detained until the 17th P.M. awaiting Hadgee Bushab's return from Core Hussain where he had proceeded to hold a conference with Shaik Abdoolah and obtain that Chief's direction relative to his negotiating with Esa bin Tareif. Hadgee Bushab, on his return delivered to me the accompanying letter for Captain Hennell, Political Resident, expressing at the same time Shaik Abdoolah's determination not to avail himself of the Tigris's further services under an impression that any terms of conciliation he might be induced to offer to the Aboothabee Chief would be rejected unless enforced or guaranteed by the Political authorities in the Persian Gulf. Accompanying I beg to return two native letters agreeably to messrs. on their Envelopes.

I have the honor to be etc.

East India Company)	/Signed/ Chas. Sharp
Brig of War Tigris)	Lieut. in charge
Bushire Roads)	True Copy
		/Signed/ J.C. Hawkins

True Copies

S. Hennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf

Summary.

It appears from a letter from Captain Hennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 5th April 1836, that, by the instigation of the nephews of Shaik Abdoola been Ahmed the Chief of Bahrein a part of the Al Gowarah Tribe proceeded to Howelah and sank a boat belonging to Shaik Esa been Taruff/ a relation and dependent of Shaik Abdoolah/ and killed one of his people; that the only satisfaction he could obtain from that Chief was a promise that he would take care that such an occurrence did not take place again, and that, dissatisfied with this reply, Shaik Esa, accompanied by Sha Salama and their followers had removed themselves from Bahrein and taken refuge at Aboothabee.

Captain Hennell, in his letter of the 7th April, reported that, on that day Shaik Esa been Tarreef paid him a visit on board the Honble Company's Sloop of War Coote, and represented the injustice which he stated he had experienced from the Chief of Bahrein in having refused to afford him redress for the attack on his boats, and the murder of one of his people by the Al Gowarah Tribe, and stated that, finding there was no longer any security for their lives and property while residing within the limits of the Bahrein Territory, he and his followers had left that Port and taken up their temporary abode at Aboothabee; that it being impossible for them to return to Bahrein, they solicited that Shaik Abdoola would allow their families to join them, and restore all the property they had left behind, and that they had no other object than to earn subsistence in a quiet and peaceable manner as merchants; but that, in the event of the Bahrein Chief refusing to do them this act of justice they were desirous to be permitted to take their own measures for the attainment of the redress they sought for.

Captain Hennell replied that he had no reason to suppose that the British Government would object to their settling wherever they choose so long as they confine themselves strictly to mercantile and peaceable pursuits, but that they could not seek an asylum with a power on terms of friendship and amity with Bahrein, under an idea that they would be allowed to carry on a system of Plunder and aggression against the subjects of their former Chief, covering their proceedings with the pretence of seeking redress for their own wrongs.

That Officer however promised that he would, on his return to Bahrein, make enquiries into the affair and that, if he found Shaik Esa's statement correct, he would recommend Shaik Abdoolah to afford them fitting redress and that he would use all friendly arguments to induce him to do so, but that the British Government would not permit the tranquility of the Gulf to be disturbed.

The Resident observed that, if Sheik Esa bin Tareef is allowed to commence hostilities on the subjects of the Bahrein that the Chief under whose protection they carry them on must necessarily be involved in hostilities with the Uttoobee Shaik, and thus a door be opened to the confusion and disorder invariably attendant on such a state of affairs in these quarters.

From a report from the Native Agent at Shagah it appeared that the statement of Esa ben Tareef of the cause of the dispute is incorrect, and that the onus of the quarrel rests upon himself and followers (and not upon the Bahrein Chief) for destroying Hawella before taking their departure to the Coast of Oman.

Government approved Captain Hennell's views of this case, and caused him to be informed that there was no objection to his endeavoring to effect an accommodation between Shaik Esa and the Bahrein Chief, though it is inadvisable to interfere with the internal dissensions which so frequently occur

among the Maritime Tribes in the Persian Gulf.

On the 25th April 1836 the Resident arrived at Bahrein and, on the following day, he had an interview with Hajee Boosha, the Minister of Shaik Abdoola, when that Gentleman explained to the Hajee that his object in visiting Bahrein was to endeavor to effect a reconciliation between his Master and his revolted subjects, and pointed out the expediency of the quarrel being settled in a peaceable manner, as, otherwise, threatening to involve the Bahrein Chief in hostilities with some of the principal Chiefs of the Gulf. The Hajee promised to communicate the subject to his Master, and the next day returned with a letter from the Shaik of Bahrein, in which he detailed the particulars of the dispute with Shaik Esa, and stated his willingness to consent to any arrangement being made between himself and Shaik Esa upon the basis of either party making good or settling such claims as might be legally established by the other, but that, should this arrangement fail, and Shaik Esa be permitted to commence aggressions upon his subjects, then he and those who protect him must stand by the Consequences.

On the 4th of November 1837 Captain Hennell handed up the Translation of a letter from the Chief of Aboothabee stating his intention to make common cause with Shaik Esa bin Tarreef and soliciting permission to declare war against Bahrein, to which that Officer replied that he could not grant any permission, but he would submit the application for the consideration of Government.

The tenor of the reply returned by the Resident was deemed by Government proper, it being impossible to allow Shaik Kulleefta to make war with a Chief who had caused him no injury.

Hajee Baoo, the Minister, waited on the Resident on the 8th June 1838 and applied for permission for his Master to use coercive measures against Aboothabee in order to compel his fugitive subjects who had sought refuge in that Port to return.

Captain Hennell endeavoured, by arguments, to impress upon the Hajee the impolicy of engaging in a warfare with Aboothabee, but to which he replied that the honor and interest of his Master required the return of his subjects; that he had no wish to go to war with Aboothabee, but that whoever afforded Shaik Esa protection must take the consequences.

The Resident then offered to write to Shaik Esa and the Chief of Aboothabee, with a recommendation, that, to avoid the evil consequences, the former should return to Bahrein, which proposal was readily agreed to by the Hajee. That officer however stated that he did not make this proposition with any belief that his recommendation would be acceded to, as both the Bahrein Chief and Esa bin Tarreef are eager for war, but that he did so with the hope that, by keeping the question open, the chances of Collision during the Pearl Fishery might be diminished.

4. Captain Hennell was of opinion as the Chief of Bahrein had not only refused to redress the injuries which his dependants complained of, but had made a formal demand for British Sanction to bring them back by force of arms, that, after due warning we should withdraw from all further interference in the matter.

5. The Resident's proceedings were approved of by Government.

6. In a further letter dated the 26th November last, Captain Hennell reports that Shaik Esa bin Tarreef accompanied by some of the principal individuals of his Tribe arrived at Bushire on the 19th of the same month from Aboothabee, and had an interview with him; on which occasion he again endeavored to persuade him to accept the only condition upon which the Chief of Bahrein would consent to the restoration of their Vessels and property, namely, the return of himself and Tribe to that Island; to this proposal however Shaik Esa declared

that he would sooner die than consent as no dependence could be placed on Shaik Abdulla's promises.

On the 23rd of the same month the Resident had another interview with Shaik Esa been Tarreef, when, finding that all his efforts for a satisfactory adjustment of the difference between the Chief of Bahrein and Shaik Esa to be unavailing, he informed the latter that he would withdraw himself from any further attempt to mediate between them, and that, on the termination of the month of Ramzan/18th December 1838/ both parties would be at liberty to pursue their own course for the attainment of what they considered their own rights, without any interference from the British Government. That officer at the same time informed the Shaik that the restrictive line as laid down by Major Morrison must be carefully observed, as Commanders of Vessels of War would be instructed to take possession of any other Boats belonging to the Belligerents save those engaged in Trade found Cruizing or fighting on the Persian side of the restricted Boundary. A Similar Communication was made to the Chief of Bahrein.

In the 4th para of this letter Captain Hennell suggests the expediency of a public notification being issued regarding the approaching hostilities between Bahrein and Aboothabee, in order that British subjects might not unknowingly risk their property by embarking it on board the Vessels belonging to either of the contending parties.

The Resident, with his communication dated the 27th November, forwards Copy of a letter written by him to Commodore Brucks requesting that he would issue instructions to the Comrs. of the Vessels of War in the Gulf, in the event of their falling in with any boats belonging to Bahrein or Aboothabee cruizing beyond the prescribed limits under suspicious circumstances, to examine them and if found to be employed upon any other than trading voyage to detain and bring such vessels into Bushire.

On the 11th December 1838 the Resident reported the arrival at Bushire on the 9th of the same month of Hajee Bhoo Shaah, and forwarded the translation of a letter from the Chief of Bahrein. The Wuzeer called on the Resident the next day and stated that the Bahrein Chief was powerful enough to coerce his fugitive subjects, yet he was too well aware of the evils of war not to prefer coming to an amicable settlement if such could be effected with honor. Captain Hennell replied that it was to be regretted that his Master had not exhibited this conciliatory spirit before, instead of allowing matters to proceed to their present extremity and requested to be informed what concession the Shaik would make to avoid the threatened hostilities. The Hajee's answer was that Shaik Abdoola wished the British Government to offer its guarantee to the Al-i-ally that provided they consented to return to Bahrein their lawful claims should be settled, and their property returned to them. The Resident replied that in the first place any guarantee from us was out of question, and in the second their return to Bahrein was a condition which Shaik Esa and his followers would never agree to; upon this the Hajee said that to avoid the effusion of blood his master would even consent to satisfying their claims, provided they would leave Aboothabee, and settle on the coast of Gutter. Captain Hennell informed him that at an earlier period some hopes of such a proposition being favorably received might have been entertained, but that he feared it was too late, as only a few days remained to the period fixed for the commencement of hostilities and added however that he was too anxious to avert the distress and misery which would arise from a war, not to take advantage of any opening which might offer for an amicable adjustment of differences. Captain Hennell however intimated to the Hajee that if he were prepared to enter into negotiations for this desirable object, he would take on himself the responsibility of despatching a vessel of war with the Hajee to Aboothabee,

in order to afford the opportunity of his holding a personal communication with the heads of the Al-i-Ally Tribe. This suggestion seemed to give the Hajee much satisfaction but, after a little consideration, he said he could not accept any proposal without first obtaining the authority of his master, and more ample powers to treat than he possessed, and therefore requested the Resident to send a Cruiser over to Bahrein, with instructions to accompany him to Aboothabee, should he be able to obtain the consent of his Chief to such an arrangement.

Captain Hennell is opinion that the fugitive subjects of Bahrein would not agree to the condition of quitting Aboothabee, but still thinking that not the slightest chance of an accommodation should be lost, as those hostilities if once begun would involve all the Maritime Chiefs in the Gulf, he addressed Commodore Brucks on the subject.

The Hajee objected on the part of his Master that, should war prove inevitable, any restrictive limits should be fixed - Captain Hennell replied that his master should have objected to it at the time Major Morrison fixed it, but he is of opinion that it is not expedient to enforce the observance of the same, should the Bahrein Chief continue to object to it.

On the 24th December Captain Hennell forwarded a report regarding the Honble Company's Brig of War Tigris's visit to Bahrein and stated that the result of the negotiation to effect a settlement between the Bahrein Chief and his subjects has proved unsuccessful and that it is his intention not to suspend the instructions issued by him to Commodore Pepper regarding the maintenance of the restrictive boundary.

25th Feby.

(Signed) I. P. Willoughby

Secretary to Govt.

Minute by the Honble. the Governor dated 25th February 1839, subscribed to by the Boards.

It is much to be regretted that, at the present time, there is the prospect of war between any of the Maritime Arab Tribes. Captain Hennell appears to have done all that was in his power to prevent it, and his measures may be entirely approved.

For the security of trading vessels the restrictive boundary should be maintained according to the intention stated in the letter of 24th December.

I do not clearly understand the ground of the inexpediency of enforcing this boundary if the Bahrein Chief should object to it. Captain Hennell may be requested to explain.

It may be well to give notice, as proposed in the letter of 23rd November, of the approaching hostilities between Bahrein and Aboothabee.

These proceedings should be communicated to the Governor General.

/Signed/ James Farish

th February 1839

" G. W. Anderson

" J. A. Dunlop

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No. 22

To,

Secret Department

J. P. McLoughby Esq.,

Secretary to Government of Bombay

Sir,

Referring to my letter to your address 818 in this department, under date the 15th instant I have the honor to enclose the accompanying report sent in by my Assistant Lieut. Colonel, regarding the state of affairs at Bahrein, and the stations and condition of the Egyptian Forces in Sedjel under His Highness Pasha.

The very full and able manner in which this report has been drawn out, renders it unnecessary to trespass at any length upon the valuable time of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

The tone of conversation adopted by Mr. Edmunds in discussing with Shaikh Abdollah bin Ahmed the unsatisfactory state of affairs between that Chief and His Highness Tarsof.

Details

detailed in his report, was both well
 judged and prudent. It is however to be
 apprehended, that unless the Government
 be prepared to accept the Mithlasee Chiefs
 secret promise of fair and liberal treat-
 ment to his fugitive subjects and to
 guarantee the same to him. Fearing that the
 prospect of a reconciliation being effected
 still remains distant, even if the Ali
 Ally could be persuaded to comply with
 the Shaikh's condition of their settling in
 whatever place he might fix upon the
 coast of Jeddah. I cannot however take
 upon me to recommend the Government
 to place itself in the embarrassing position
 which such a guarantee would probably
 involve, unless it has ulterior views upon
 Bahrain, in which case our giving this
 pledge with the consent of both parties
 would afford us a right of interference
 to any extent our policy might render
 expedient. Should however no such
 views be entertained, it appears to me
 that

that mentioned as the feelings of both
 sides are at present towards each other
 causes of dispute may be expected con-
 stantly to arise and in the event of
 Shaikh Al-Muthalbi him immediately
 upon himself to furnish the Ali Ally
 for any supposed acts of treachery or
 disobedience after their return to Bah-
 ain or location upon the public Coast where
 they would still be comparatively with-
 in his power, we should hardly be able
 to redeem our guarantee without com-
 promising our friendly relations with
 that Chief

4. The intelligence regarding the
 state and position of the Egyptian Army
 in Egypt is so far satisfactory that
 there appears little probability of
 Khorshe Pasha being in sufficient
 force to attempt the conquest of Ba-
 hrein until the arrival of reinforce-
 ments from Medinah, it is therefore
 to be hoped that before they can reach
 the

the East the remonstrances from the British Government against the Highness of Mahomed Ali, establishing himself in the Persian Gulf may have the effect of inducing him to change his views of conquest in this quarter.

5. I have availed myself of the opportunity afforded by Rear Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland visiting Bahrain to forward the communication of which the accompanying is a copy to the address of Khairi Pasha.

Residency P. Gulf, I have the honor to be,
Kharat 10th April (Signed) L. Hennell
1839 } Residency P. Gulf,

To

Captain Hennell.

President in the Persian Gulf,

Sir,

I have the honor to report that agreeably with your instructions I embarked on this vessel on the 15th instant and that on my arrival here on the

(I) 19 the 19th learning that Shakh Abdoola bin Ahmed was absent at Khore Hofain where since the commencement of his troubles and family quarrels at Bhamra he has usually resided. I immediately despatched a boat with a letter inviting him to meet me as soon as possible at this place.

2. On the morning after our arrival I was visited by Sheikh Safer v Hofain son of Sheikh Abdoola, but who as far as I can learn and not possessed of much power or consideration & also by Syed Abdoola Jellul the person who lately wrote to you giving his opinion that the quarrel between the Sherifs of Bhamra and Osman Tarif admitted now of being easily adjusted in the course of conversation Sheikh Safer admitted that the merchants and people of Bhamra were most anxious for a termination of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs the former suffering

ing from the suspension of trade and the latter from want of employment and the increased price of food consequent to the partial blockade which has lately been kept up by Bin Fariq's vessels, and that for his own part he should be rejoiced to see peace established on any terms consistent with his father's honor, with whom alone the matter rested. Asafer also remarked that Bahrain, being pressed on all sides by enemies might be constrained to seek the protection of Egypt, or some other powerful state, but that extreme necessity alone would reconcile them to paying allegiance to the "Troops" - Ayed Abdool Jullul who is a substantial merchant and sensible old man, on friendly terms with, and in some measure admitted into the confidence of Shaikh Abdoola seemed in answer to my questions to be quite at a loss to point out any scheme for re-establishing peace, excepting
by

by the return of bin Fariq and his followers to the territory and obedience of their lawful Chief Shaikh Abdoola or otherwise by the Government assuming the arbitration of the question and forcing the contending parties to abide by its award and on my asking whether the other merchants would consent to be come securely, for the fulfilment of any terms which Shaikh Abdoola might grant to bin Fariq and the Al Ali he answered that the Shaikh would never consent to, nor could such a measure with propriety be resorted to. It appeared to me at the time of his visit that Ayed Abdool Jullul's communication to you had not been made at the instigation of Shaikh Abdoola, and this subsequently proved to be the case as while engaged with the Shaikh, I received a note from him begging that

that I would not make any question of his having interfered His own interest as a merchant being at stake together with his anxiety for the welfare of his chief and country seem sufficiently to account for his desiring place.

3. On the 22^d the boat which I had dispatched three days before having been caught in a storm half way between Bahrain and the mainland returned without having been able to reach Khors Khajum, and as this would probably cause a further delay of three or four days in the arrival of, Shaikh Abdulla, I considered it advisable to take this opportunity of running up to Kutuf for the purpose of delivering your letter for Khashid Pacha and at the

the same time gaining any information regarding the designs and means of that Commander Maassid ing sailed next morning and on the following day anchored six or seven miles from Kutuf and off the islands of Furast which with its surrounding shoals presents a mass approach for any thing but boats impracticable. Suliman bin Lghai and the Shaikh of Kutuf came off to the Brig immediately that he was informed of our arrival, an attention which I was not prepared to expect considering that from the late hour of our arrival he could not reach his home again until after midnight and further that for the last twelve years his port has not been visited by any Government vessel. I found Shaikh Suliman to be a highly intelligent and

and communicative person. and the soon informed me that aware of his inability to offer any effectual opposition he has submitted when first called upon, to leave his Pacha, who in return continued him in the Government of his tribe and country, merely taxing him with the expense of feeding the Troops quartered in the fort of Hutuf. He spoke in praise of the Pacha's moderation especially of his having considerably garrisoned his fort with irregular Maggnabees instead of the Regulars of the Egyptian Army who having no fellow feeling with Arabs are much feared on account of their oppression

and irregularities, especially when removed from the Pacha's personal control, on taking leave Shukr Suliman gave me a pressing invitation to spend the following day with him, on shore, and to partake of a feast which he proposed preparing for the occasion, which I very readily agreed to do. On landing the next morning the Sheik, and the Commander of the Egyptian Troops, in the place Mahomed Hashif by name were waiting to receive the party at the riverside, the latter having sent his house for the accommodation of myself & some of the officers of the vessel, who accompanied me. Nothing could exceed the kind attention of both the Sheik, and the Military Chief who readily answered the questions which I took the opportunity of putting to them during the day, by leading the conversation to the events of the Pacha's Campaigns of the last year. Mahomed Hashiff who has been upwards of five and twenty years in
Mahomed

Mahamed Ali's service, told me that he thought his Master was acting a very unwise part in expending his Money, and Armies in subduing so poor a Country as Arabia, but that having determined on its completion he had no doubt but that success would attend the Egyptian Arms. He spoke of the Reduction of ~~the~~ of the Bagdad Pashalic as a possible event, saying that it was a Country worth having, that it had Rivers &c. if it belonged to Mahamed Ali it would soon be as fine a Country as Egypt which he said being the finest Country in the world. He was anxious to return to, as regards Bagdad I only understood his remarks as founded on his own opinions, or rather as an indication of the hopes entertained by Coorshid Pashas's solicitor, for it is improbable that that person would make known his views to his inferior Officers, or if he did so, Mahomed Rushiff should be incautious enough to converse with ~~the~~

the freedom he used to me.

4. I gave over the letter for Coorshid Pasha into the hands of Shick Suliman who in conjunction with Mahamed Rushiff despatched it by an express Dromedary the same day, they expected it would reach the Pasha's Head Quarters at Sulimnah in the course of seven days.

5. The actual position of the Egyptian Army according to the best information which I have been able to obtain is that and this place is as follows. The Pasha with the whole of the Regulars and Artillery has since the defeat and surrender of Kincer Tyuk fixed his Head Quarters at Sulimnah a Town and Fort at the distance of 200 or 250 Miles from this Coast. The amount of his force cannot exceed 4,000 probably does not amount to more than 3,000 Men including his irregular Muzrabheer ^{and horsemen} Infantry. Al Shikha which is about a third of the way from the Coast to Sulimnah is a post of 300 Men all irregulars

On the Coast the three following places have fallen into the hands of the Pasha; the 1st Kutief 40 Miles North of Bahrein is garrisoned by 120 Mus. all Muggabhees, 20 of whom are Horse, this place possesses a very respectable and spacious fort with plenty of guns mounted, the Citadel is strong having been built by the Portuguese while they held possession of Bahrein and the whole is in good repair but surrounded by dense groves of date trees which rise up close to the walls on three sides, the fourth being washed by sea, Kutief contains 500 houses and at least a like number of fighting men, who would probably be available either to act in conjunction with, or to draw their boats as headquarters for the Egyptian Army. The second is Sobah a good sized place with a fort about 95 Miles from Bahrein and five from Kutief, between the chiefs of Sobah and Kutief an hereditary

and

and bitter feud exists but for the present they are obliged by the Egyptian Pasha to suppress all hostilities, which has by the timely submission of its chief secured the favor of the Pasha, it is not even obliged to receive a garrison of his troops, it is said to contain 4000 fighting men celebrated for their warlike qualities. The 3rd and last place is Agjeir 45 Miles North of the populated part of the Towns of Monawa & Maharag but only 14 Miles from the southern end of the Island of Bahrein. This was during the time of the Mahabee power the part of Hedgah but now merely consists of a certain number and small fort, with very few inhabitants, and still fewer Hadees, it having a garrison of 70 or 80 of Garrisoned Muggabhees, it is however on the most direct route to Shassa and the interior of Hedgah with which some traffic is still carried on by means of Caravans of Camels.

Qumh, and it would appear to be the most desirable point of rendezvous for an Army invading Bahrein from the defenceless end of which as before stated it is only 14 miles removed.

6. Mohamed Kucheff and Shik Lullianaw both agree that Coorhid Pasha does not contemplate, making any onward movement until after the arrival of reinforcement from Mesina when 15,000 Troops are assembled under the command of Suliman Pasha, on whom Coorhid Pasha has made a requisition for 1,000 Cavalry & twice that number of Infantry who would be able by forced marches to join his Camp in 25 days, My informant stated that two objects were in contemplation the one the subjection of a Tribe, I think the Ameer, whose fidelity is not to be depended on, and whose location is to the interior of Kuwait for France, and whose Country would appear to be exactly intervening between the Pasha's present post and Mussoora.

(433) 31

7. Whatever Coorhid Pasha's ulterior views may be, I do not believe that he is at the present moment in a condition to attempt the conquest of Bahrein tho' the want of proper transports does not appear to be an insuperable objection in the way of so enterprising a Commanded as Coorhid, for he could furnish about 30, and shall and so on as many more boats of the small kind used in the Pearl fishery, but capable I should think of containing 30 soldiers and their necessaries each, or in all 1,500 or 1,800 Troops. Considering the shoalness of the distance, & the narrowness of the channel, one end of the Island being 12 the other 14 miles distant & tho' the shoalness of the water, these vessels are not ill adapted for the purpose, but if covered by some species of armed vessels there would be great danger of them being destroyed in the transit by the Bahrein war Boats, which are numerous, & are very

very fine description of vessel, and there is a narrow channel all round the island of sufficient depth for them to take up their positions in. The number of fighting men at D'Behrein cannot be less than 14,000. Nearly all are trained to serve by sea, as well as land, and, who in spite of their present dissensions might be expected to make as stout a resistance as they did a few years ago in beating off the Invasion of Muscat, if actually attacked at their own place. In concluding this subject I have only further to observe that it is not believed that Coorshid Pasha's Army is at all shorted for supplies, save in the article of barley for the horses of which there are 400 in camp.

On returning to this place the day before yesterday finding that Sheikh Ahnalla had arrived two days before

33

I sent the Native Agent to him saying that I was anxious to have an interview with him as soon as possible. On returning to me late in the evening the agent reported that he had found the Sheikh in a most querulous and dissatisfied humour, saying amongst other things that he could not believe the British Government entertained any regard for him or they would never have sanctioned one of his subjects (Bin Sareef) making war and arranging others of his subjects whom he had seduced from their allegiance to make war against their chief - that the President had declined to interfere or assist him with his advice as regarded submitting to, or opposing Egypt, while others (meaning Persia) had shown a friendly disposition towards him and that moreover Koorsheid Pasha had as yet done him no harm and perhaps intended none. In conclusion he said that if I wished to see him he would have a tent pitched and that I might come and ask any questions I wished and which he would briefly answer, but that he would not of his own accord start any topic with me. The above is the substance of the conversation which took place as repeated

to me by the Meerza but it is necessary to observe that it could hardly be considered as a message sent to me, excepting as regards pitching a tent at Alaharag for the interview, and that possibly the Sheikh might not have thought that his complaints would be repeated. In answer to all this I wrote a few lines saying that I had been sent to endeavour to assist the Sheikh in arranging his affairs, that the services of the vessel as well as my own were required elsewhere, and that I begged he would either come to me on board or meet me at the agent's house at Manama (his own place of residence being at Alaharag).

9. The Sheikh having agreed to meet me at the agent's house I landed early yesterday forenoon and was presently joined by him (attended only by his confidential man of business Hajee Broo shah) and during a conversation which lasted between three and four hours I did not experience any ill humour or discourtesy which I had rather anticipated, and on the other hand I could not help admiring his sound sense and strong understanding on all points where his pride, which seems to be excessive did not stand in the way of his applying them. In fact Sheikh Abdoolah seems notwithstanding his great age (between 70 and 80) to retain his vigour of mind and body in full force, and I am inclined to believe what might be inferred from some part of his conversation, that in having allowed his grand nephews

(45) 35

Sheikh Mahomed bin Kaleefa and his brothers to usurp nearly all his power, and to confiscate the property of and oppress his subjects, may be rather attributed to his desire of avoiding the disgrace and scandal of family quarrels, than for the want of energy to repress the evil doers. During the interview it became apparent to me that the Sheikh has imbibed the opinion that the favor of the British Government has not been extended to him in the same degree as is shown to other Chiefs of this Coast but I am in hopes that from the explanations I was able to afford, and from my endeavours to soothe his pride, this erroneous idea is now a great deal shaken.

10. The first and of course principal topic discussed was the affair of Bin Tareef, and on my expressing the hope of being of use to Sheikh Abdoolah in arranging the quarrel he at once answered that Bin Tareef and the Al Ali had fled from his Country without cause and had only themselves

themselves to thank for their misfortunes. as for Bin Tareef himself The Sheikh declared that he originally owed everything he possessed to his bounty, and that having been enriched and exalted by him he had at length revolted because he could not allow of his being his equal - That the Al Ali had refused to pay the taxes due to, or obey their Chief, and that under such circumstances every Arab Ruler possessed a perfect right to resume his gifts and confiscate the goods of his subjects altho perhaps such things were not permitted in English law. As I could not meet Sheikh Abdulla's arguments without contradicting his assertions, which whether correct or not I think - that he himself believes to be so, I told him that it would conduce more to the honor of a person of his reputation and rank to forgive and reclaim these his subjects than to attempt their destruction - That Government was desirous that the affair should be

(436) 37

be settled: and that in addition to this his being threatened by other powerful enemies the hardship entailed on his subjects and the merchants by this warfare which would be greatly aggravated if they were disturbed during the Pearl Fishery season now approaching - the discipline attached to having his vessels taken within sight of his Chief town, and of his subjects being carried into captivity by such a person as Bin Tareef and the danger of this person allying himself with and leading his vessels to Bin Tareef, were all cogent reasons for the reestablishment of peace.

11. The result of my conference as far as regards Bin Tareef was however much more favorable than I anticipated, Sheikh Abdulla having before I left him, but not until after many other things had been explained, finally proposed the following arrangement: - That in case Bin Tareef and those with him were desirous of again submitting

submitting themselves to him, he would in the first place freely and fully forgive all that they had done against him and his subjects. That if they decide on returning to their homes on the Island of Pharur, they shall have their houses, date trees and all other property restored to them to the full extent - That if they do not consent to this Sheikh Abdulla will even permit them to locate themselves at such place as he may fix upon, on the Guttur Coast; but that let them reside at either the one place or the other, they may depend on experiencing full protection and the most generous treatment from him and that he will in the event of any of the other Sheikhs attempting to oppress them, join his own forces to those of the al ali and proceed against such person as if he were his own enemy. That in return for this he should consider himself justified in furnishing any of the al ali guilty of crimes, or who should ally them-

as above

(45) 39

themselves, secretly or openly, with his enemies. To the above terms the Sheikh attaches an important condition, which is that altho' he is willing, if called upon to do so, to give his own personal security to Government (out of consideration to whom he is alone actuated in giving these terms) that all which they were possessed and even more shall be given to the al ali, yet that he can by no means, nor under any difficulties consent to the humiliation of treating with and binding himself to guarantee specific indulgences to his run away subjects; or do more than assure them of his present forgiveness and future protection and bounty from the time that they return to his obedience and Country; for he says that in addition to the disgrace attached to such a concession, it would in the present instance lead to no lasting peace, for that then people would become ungovernably arrogant, instead of peaceable and obedient subjects, were they to

to return to his dominions believing that their lawful Chief had been forced into granting them favorable terms; and that moreover, from this example, both their and others of his subjects would, when suffering from imaginary grievances, in every occasion fly into rebellion. he added in a low tone, "having gained the permission of the British Government to make war against their Shukh". As I thought that the Shukh had in promising so much, conceded much more than he had made up his mind to on coming to meet me, and feeling a perfect conviction that doing so would be useless or worse than useless (which opinion has since been confirmed by that of Syed Abdool Jullul and others) I did not press him further on the subject but replied that altho' it was uncertain whether peace could be brought about on these terms, I was certain that Government would feel gratified by this indication of his desire to meet their wishes

(130) 4/1

wishes and defer to their opinion and advice.

12. During my stay at this place, I have taken advantage of the best means which offered of discovering the nature of the property of which Bin Tareef and others were dispossessed and it appears that it consisted chiefly in their dwelling houses, date plantations, and boats. The two first they can hardly expect remuneration for, especially their houses which are unoccupied, but possibly the Shukh might in lieu thereof be able to grant similar benefits at Qutien should they decide on selling there. With the exception of two Bateels I am told that they succeeded in carrying off all their boats when they fled from Bharein: one of these boats was originally a present to Bin Tareef from Shukh Abdoolloa, who lately gave her to the Chief of Debar. The other, belonging to Bin Sulman, is hauled up on the beach at this place and tho' never used, is nominally in possession.

of Sheikh Mohammed bin Kulefa. As Bin Tareef was a considerable trader his sudden flight from Bahrain may have subjected him to considerable losses, without his enemies Mohammed bin Kulefa and brothers having reaped much profit by the circumstance: but these affairs and accounts - could hardly be arranged without Bin Tareef's returning to Bahrain under the protection of Sheikh Abdulla.

13. As I am unaware how far you would - with the objects of strengthening Bahrain so as to enable her to preserve her independence now endangered by the arms of Egypt - desire to run the risk of future embarrassment by obliging Bin Tareef to cease hostilities on the plea of Sheikh Abdulla being now willing to redress his grievances, which he failing to do might hereafter place Government in the predicament of obliging him to fulfil, even if a guarantee of good treatment be not at once granted

(439) 43

granted in the name of the Government to Bin Tareef. I have not sought any interview with that person who is at present as far as I can learn with all his vessels and people at Abothabee. It further appears to me that after so many ineffectual attempts have been made to settle this affair - in itself a very petty one - it would be unbecoming and inexpedient for any one to be deputed to negotiate with such a person as Bin Tareef, if not possessed of full powers to bring the quarrel by some means or another, to a final conclusion.

It certainly appears that at present there is a better opportunity of effecting this than heretofore, it appearing that Kulefa bin Shakhbort the Bamyas Chief has no intention of making common cause with him, and alone Bin Tareef is quite unequal to cope with even a tenth part of the power which might be sent against him from Bahrain were there any one to direct it.

If

It is also generally reported, and believed that Kuleefa and Bin Tareef are no longer on very friendly terms, the former requiring the latter either to leave his country, or to settle there permanently as a peaceable subject or merchant.

Two circumstances lend probability to this report, the one Bin Tareef's having withdrawn all his vessels from this quarter to Abolhatia; the other the fact of civilities, in the shape of presents interchanged, having lately taken place between the Bahrain and Berrgas Chiefs.

14. I was given to understand that Sheikh Mahomed bin Kuleefa the person to whom all Bin Tareef's wrongs are attributed - for no one blames Sheikh Abdulla excepting for not having restrained his grand nephew who on one occasion by means of a large party of his armed followers - is himself anxious for the
restoration

(44) 45

restoration of order (which as he has many vessels and much property to lose by war seems very probable), and I heard privately last night from Syed Abdool Gulleel, that a meeting had taken place between him and Sheikh Abdulla in the course of the day, and that the latter had exacted a formal promise from Mahomed bin Kuleefa to the effect that he would in future only act in obedience to his commands. In the course of my long conversation with Sheikh Abdulla I alluded to the evils attending his allowing his relations to injure his reputation by their irregular and tyrannical conduct, and altho' he evidently did not like the subject he did not deny the truth of the observation, and afterwards said that my advice for him to return to reside permanently -
at

at his capital, and to assume the charge of his own affairs, was good, and that he contemplated doing so, and would have done so sooner were it not that having enemies in that direction (Bin Tarif and The Bumpas) he thought his residence on the Gulfen Coast was desirable should you be able to prevail on the Al Ali to return to Bharein it might perhaps be well to press the Sheikh on this point, for if he remains at a distance and in seclusion they will be liable again to a renewal of the tyranny of his relations. — I believe there was

originally, no bad feeling between Sheikh Abdolla and Bin Tarif, who are indeed connected by marriage, one of the wives of the former belonging to the latter's family, and the Sheikh being known to a Man of strict honor his subjects would feel security in returning to reside at Bharein were he to agree to take up his residence at that place. In fact so long as Sheikh Abdolla absent himself from Bharein there is little hope of affairs prospering or of that Island being in a condition to defend itself against its enemies. I may add that the very fact of Sheikh Abdolla proposing to allow the Al Ali to settle at Gutter, where they would be hardly be liable to any control, ought to convince them of the sincerity of his intentions.

18 I had a good deal of desultory conversation with Sheikh Abdolla regarding the design of Egypt which was introduced by blaming him that in the absence of any instructions from Govt, you had he granted him to the greatest extent you possibly could do, by the kind of your communications to Khorshid Pasha, the purport of which I made him acquainted with, and on my telling him that at the time of your declining to give him any advice you not having heard directly from Khorshid Pasha rendered it impossible for you to know what

his designs against Bahrain really might be, he seemed to be satisfied. The Sheikh is quite aware of the danger of his position, and really thinks in spite of their fair promises at present, that if the Egyptians once gained a footing in Bahrain he will be treated with little consideration, and notwithstanding the petulant expressions he sometimes indulges in saying that his relations having usurped all his power and prosperity, why should he exert himself for the good of his + Country? I believe that he would readily, when the danger approached make every exertion to prevent the conquest of his country. He seems to think that the Egyptians wish to obtain possession of his island for the purpose of fitting out an expedition against Persia for this purpose Bahrain seems to be exceedingly well calculated for helping even under the present divided Govt, a very numerous fleet of the finest and largest description of Arab Vessels. Some of which belong to the Sheiks who keep them as war vessels and the remainder are, or rather usually are, employed in the Foreign Trade to India and Africa. There are still from 500 to 600 Vessels of various sizes employed in the Pearl Fishing altho' of late years their number is greatly decreased. In fact there is no doubt that Bahrain could at any time furnish transports for even a large Army, and that from its great wealth, fertility, insular situation, and vicinity to the Pearl Banks it would in itself form a valuable appendage to Mahomed Ali.

Ali or any other Government. (49)
 18 On the 1st Abdulla's telling me that he felt great confidence in being able to assist to keep the Egyptians out of his country, at any rate for one year, but that he was very anxious to see whether the British Government would be induced to forbid or prevent the advance of his enemies, I thought this a good opportunity for endeavouring to ascertain whether he was inclined to place himself under the protection of, or become tributary to the British Government, or to consent to their forming a settlement at Bahrain. I should such thing be hereafter attempted, & therefore answered that altho' Government frequently remonstrated against the aggressions of states against those who were connected with it by friendship and commerce, and that therefore they might probably remonstrate against it. Mahomed Ali Pasha's taking Bahrain; yet that as by forbidding his, or any other person's, doing so, they must be prepared to repel the invaders by force, which entailed great expense; and which as they were already put to great cost by gratuitously taking upon themselves the management of the affairs of this desolate Govt would in my opinion hardly be willing to incur, the Sheikh's only answer was that it was true that Govt was generous enough to manage the affairs of the Arab tribes.

higher for the benefit of all, but that for his part he was possessed of nothing worth offering to them. I did not pursue this subject further because it appeared to me that Sheikh Abdulla is not at present in the humor to make any voluntary concessions to us, and because if I had done so, his suspicions might have been excited that we have other views than his own good in pressing on him a peace with Bin Sa'ud. Moreover I doubt not that by your taking a more intimate concern in the arrangement of his affairs, better opportunities will be hereafter presented of renewing this subject, should such a course be wished by Government. In this point of view it might possibly be rather advisable than otherwise, to depart from the usual line of policy by accepting on the part of Govt the secret pledge now proffered by Sheikh Abdulla, to protect Bin Sa'ud and his people, which would at once put an end to their quarrel - and which would hereafter doubtless offer many opportunities of giving advice to the Sheikh and interfering in Bahrain affairs.

(443) 57

17. Sheikh Abdulla assured me that he had not, and did not desire on either side, to connect himself in any way with Egypt; although he had offered to pay them the trifling annual tribute of 3000 Croas, on condition of Mahomed Ali Pasha engaging to protect him against all other external enemies; but that of course this proposal would not be accepted by the Ministry of Egypt. He also promised that if he contemplated hereafter placing himself under the protection of any foreign state, you should have timely notice of his doing so...

18. The Sheikh also slightly mentioned the circumstance of a Mission having been sent to him from Persia, as he said - unasked and unwished for on his part - for that he neither wanted nor would he have any thing to do with Persia, however as I was before fully acquainted with the indifferent reception which this Mission had met with, and not wishing to let it appear that we attach any importance to its proceedings - and in fact they seem to inspire none - I confined my reply to saying

saying that he knew best whether Persia
either could or would afford him any aid.
In his diffinition, this Bushiri Mission
certainly appears to be a most beggarly at-
tempt at imposition and is by all ac-
counts perfectly seen thro' by the Bahrain
people. It consists of a man whose pro-
per occupation is that of Washoda of
a Buzha, and one of the Prince of Shiraz
or rather I believe the Governor of Muscat's
servant who passes himself off as a Khan.
Each of these two individuals claims the
rank of "Elehee" and in order to keep up
appearances the Governor of Bushiri has
lent some fine clothes, a few shawls, dag-
gers &c. as well as a party of his ragged
Musketeers for the occasion. It seems
probable that this Mission has been
got up solely as a speculation, its ori-
ginators expecting a handsome return
for their promises of aid and friendship
in the shape of Pearls, Arab Horses &c.
In this they are likely to be disappoint-
ed as altho' food for the party, and a
small house to reside in has been as-
signed to the "Elehees," they don't appear
to

to have much chance of getting anything
else for the aforesaid Amir Kuleefa and his
Brothers went out to the Country on their
arrival, under the pretence of hunting,
but really to avoid meeting them while
Sheikh Abdulla had no intention of
coming over to Bahrain before any arri-
val probably the latter is very anxious now
for the arrival of these people as he
may make some little use of the cir-
cumstances in persuading Moorshid
Racha that he is supported by powerful
friends...

19. There seems no ground for sup-
posing what at first sight would ap-
pear not improbable, that the simultane-
ous arrival of this Mission and Moor-
shid Racha forces is the effect of a col-
lusion between Persia and Egypt, altho'
they have held no communication and
no one at Bahrain entertains any sus-
picion of their being in connexion. —

20. In conclusion I have only fur-
ther to observe that the result of my in-
quiries into the truth of Ibrahim Pasha's
having plundered other besides Bahrain

Dupond

Bepols, leads me to suppose that he has not been guilty of any such offence, or of any irregularity, whatever excepting his having taken Pharcin yards out of Neutral Bepols he considered as such, and this from the regularity of his conduct in other respects I have no doubt, if illegal that he is not aware of the fact. -

I have the honor to be Sir
Yours &c. Edmunds

Appt. Resident

True Copy/
Signed/ S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf
1839

To, His Excellency
Mhoorshed Pasha
Command. in Chief of the Egyptian Forces
in Wedga

To, With reference to my letter to your Excellency's address under date the 28th February last, I take advantage of the approaching visit to Bahrain of Rear Admiral

Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland R.C.N. (445) 53
Commander in Chief of Her British Majesty's Naval Forces in the East Indies to inform your Excellency that Her British Majesty's Government have intimated to His Highness Mahammed Ally through Colonel Campbell the British Consul General in Egypt that they hope and trust he will upon full consideration abandon any intention of establishing himself in the Persian Gulf because as it has already been declared to him such a scheme on his part could not be received with indifference by the British Government. -

In conveying to your Excellency the assurance of my high esteem and consideration. -

Residency Persian Gulf Barrack. } I have the honor to be Sir
10th April 1839 } Signed/ S. Hennell
Res. in the Pers. Gulf

True Copy/
Signed/ S. Hennell
Res. in the Pers. Gulf

In Bombay Secret Dept. 17/7/1839
 1839.
 Secret (Department)
 Bombay Castle
 No 87 dated 16 July 1839.

Copy of a despatch from
 Resident in the Persian Gulf
 dated Karraek 30. ally
 No. 57 of 1839.

No. 10.

Reporting the arrival at
 Karraek of allahomed Effendi
 the Confidential Agent of
 Kershid Pasha, and enclosing
 translation of a letter brought
 by him from His Excellency
 to the address of the Resident
 regarding the submission of
 Chief of Bahrain together with
 translation of an agreement
 entered into with that Chief
 by allahomed Effendi in behalf
 of Kershid Pasha also found
 copy of a memorandum of an
 interview which he had with
 allahomed Effendi & of his reply
 the communication from Kershid
 Pasha above alluded to.

Recd Overland 7th Oct. 1839

No. 57 of 1839
 Secret (Department)
 To J. P. Willoughby Esquire,
 Secretary to Government.
 Bombay

Sir,
 Please the honor to report for the information
 of the Honorable the Governor in Council, the arrival on the
 27th instant at this Island of allahomed Effendi the Confid-
 ential Agent of Kershid Pasha, with letters from that
 personage to my address.
 The next day about noon allahomed Effendi
 visited me at my Tent, when the conversation took place
 the substance of which is embodied in Enclosure No. 1.
 The announcement conveyed in the latter
 part of the Pasha's letter (the translation of which forms
 Enclosure No. 2) regarding the submission of the Chief of the
 Bahrain, has scarcely caused me great surprise, and were
 it not for some corroborative circumstances mentioned by
 allahomed Effendi, I should be inclined, from the silence of
 the Attachee here and our agent at Bahrain, to discredit
 the statement. In order however to remove all doubts the
 Honorable Company's Ship of War Elise will sail tomorrow
 for that Island, with a communication from me to Sheikh
 Abdulla, requesting to be informed whether the assertion of
 allahomed Effendi in regard to his having become tributary

to the Egyptians be true or not. What motives could possibly have induced the Sheik of Bahrain to acknowledge (if he has really done so) the supremacy of Mohammed Ali by consenting to pay him tribute after the support and encouragement he had received from the British Government to maintain his independence inviolate is beyond my power to explain, unless it be that he considers the engagement entered into rather in the light of an alliance than an admission of subjection to the authority of the Pasha. Enclosure No. 3 is a translation of the Articles agreed upon by Sheik Abdollah and Mahomed Effendi as viceroy of the Egyptian Commander, and though it certainly speaks of services to be performed it contains no expressions like those used in the latter part of the Pasha's letter to me implying that he had become obedient and subject. Although perhaps by this arrangement Sheik Abdollah's real power and authority is not materially compromised, yet it cannot be concealed that the Pasha has gained an important object by it. It is the first and a great step to the establishment of his influence in that quarter, it opens an uninterrupted and free communication between the ports of Hakeef, Ajee and Bahrain which is essential for the prosperity of the commerce of Bedyd and alone all it holds out an example which unless the Pasha's intrigues are checked by our remonstrances will I now much fear be followed by all the other Maritime Chiefs whose hopes of successfully opposing the encroachments of the Egyptians were in a great measure founded upon the bold and open resistance shown to their demands

by the Bahrain Chief, assuming it to be true that Abdollah ben Ahmed has entered into this engagement, he appears to have done so voluntarily, without making any reference to us, and although we have grounds for dissatisfaction in his having concluded such an agreement, after his promise to Captain Edmonds that he would communicate with the Residency before placing himself under the protection of any foreign power, still I apprehend we can hardly insist upon his dissolving it, unless prepared to pledge ourselves to protect him against all the possible consequences.

With reference to the long and desultory discussion in the Pasha's letter to me regarding the claims and designs of the Persians upon Bahrain, I am at a loss to imagine what his object could be in introducing it, as this subject was never alluded to in any of my communications to him. Indeed the object of sending Mahomed Effendi here at all is not very apparent, but as the Pasha could not at the time this person took his departure have received my remonstrance, he may have despatched him for the purpose of learning our real views and intentions with reference to his own proceedings.

In my reply to the Pasha's communication I have deemed it sufficient to repeat in substance the contents of my former letters. I felt some difficulty on the subject of the acceptance of a horse sent to me by His Excellency as a present, but with reference to the arrangement he has made in regard to Bahrain, it appeared to me that

did

As I accept this gift there was a risk of its being generally reported that the extension of his Supremacy over that Island had met with the sanction (and approval) of the British Authorities. I therefore declined receiving any presents, until the arrival of an answer from the Pasha to my last letter, enabled me to judge whether it was his intention to meet the views of our Government or not.

This morning Mahomed Effendi called to take leave of me prior to his departure. The subject of his whole conversation was to prove to me that Khorsid Pasha had not been aware that his proceedings were opposed to the wishes of the British Government. And that my communication of the 29th April would be the first distinct intimation received by him upon the subject as the reply sent by me under charge of Monsieur Anton simply stated that I was not in possession of instructions regarding Bahrain and requested him to suspend operations against that place until the receipt of an answer to the reference made to the Government. The Effendi went on to say, he felt quite certain that Khorsid Pasha the instant he received my remonstrance would cast this another step, but that he would immediately send off my letter to Mahomed Ali Pasha and await further instructions for his future guidance. I might however Mahomed Effendi added place implicit trust in the assurance, that such was the earnest desire

of Mahomed Ali Pasha to maintain the closest and most cordial relations with England, that the possession of the whole world would be nothing in his eyes as compared with the preservation of the friendship of the British Government. Before taking his departure, the Pasha again pressed upon me the acceptance of the horse he had brought. I replied that I was under the necessity of declining, because did I receive this present it would be believed throughout the Gulf that the Pasha's claim upon Bahrain and the arrangement for the payment of an annual tribute by Sheikh Abdulla had been admitted and acquiesced in by the British Government. I therefore, I added, await the Pasha's reply to my remonstrance, which I trusted would be of such a nature as to enable me to cultivate the most friendly relations with him.

The manner of Mahomed Effendi in this second interview was such as to give me a strong impression that Khorsid Pasha really was not at the time he last wrote on the 4th April, aware of the serious light in which his proceedings were viewed by the British Government and that consequently on the receipt of my letter of the 29th April he will suspend his operations in that direction until he can obtain further instructions from Mahomed Ali.

Residency in the Gulf
Karrak 30th May 1839.

I have the honor to be
Signed S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

N^o 1.

Memorandum of an Interview between Mahomed Effendi the Confidential Agent of Khorsid Pasha and Captain Wenne Resident in the Persian Gulf. Karsak 28th May 1839.

About Noon Mahomed Effendi accompanied by Hajee Ahmed my Arabic clerk, waited upon me at my Tent. After the usual compliments, and a profusion of friendly messages from the Pasha Mahomed Effendi produced his letter which having read, I asked him whether he had anything verbal to add to their contents. He replied in the negative but said that as he was fully aware of what the Pasha had written, he was prepared to answer any questions I might have to put. I replied that I had none to ask, but that I thought it right to observe that the advance of Khorsid Pasha in this direction, after the repeated assurances to the contrary given by Mahomed Ali to the representatives of M. R. M. Ministers was to say the least an extraordinary proceeding. That the British Government were exceedingly dissatisfied with the encroachments made by the Egyptian Troops towards the shores of the Persian Gulf, and that I had been ordered to remonstrate strongly against them, which I had done in two letters one of which I had despatched by the way of Kuteif and the other by the route of Howeit. On his asking the purport of these communications I informed him

319

him they were to the effect, that the proceedings of Khorsid Pasha were directly contrary to the understanding subsisting between Mahomed Ali, Pasha and the British Government. And if persisted in might interrupt the friendly relations between the two states. Mahomed Effendi appeared surprised to find the subject taken up in so serious a manner and said that Mahomed Ali had been induced to undertake the war against Isfah with no desire of acquiring territory, or extending his conquests, but that the refusal of that Govt. to assist him in his hostilities with the Ameer, tribe with camels and carriage and his opposing and defeating a body of Egyptian Troops sent against him had forced the Pasha, to punish this contumacy in the manner he had done, and that having taken him prisoner, the occupation of his territory, naturally followed. He (Mahomed Effendi) however was quite sure that neither Mahomed Ali nor Khorsid Pasha would do any thing opposed to the wishes of the English Government, and that they would give up all that had been acquired, rather than the friendship subsisting between Egypt and Great Britain should be diminished. I then referred to the latter part of the Pasha's letter, and asked, what the allusion to the submission of Bahrain, meant. He replied, that that Abdollah bin Ahmed had entered into an agreement to pay Mahomed Ali Pasha the annual sum of 3000 Dollars. I expressed my surprise at this, as I had not heard a word upon the subject. He replied it was quite true.

for that he himself had proceeded to Khawar Hussein and negotiated the Agreement with the Bahraini Chiefs. To any question as to the nature of this agreement, he said that the friends and enemies of the one were to be the friends and enemies of the other, that Shakh Abdulwahhab was to pay the same Zakat as that formerly given to the Mahallas chief, viz. 5000 Givens as per, upon condition that neither his island of Bahrain nor his territories on the Coast of Buthra were to be interfered with in any way by the Pasha. I answered that we could not admit any claim of the Pasha upon Bahrain, but that in the absence of information from the Mahallas Chief or our Agent at that Port, I could give no opinion regarding their arrangement, but that I should repeat the circumstance to my own Government and await their instructions. I then referred to the subject of the maritime chiefs on the Coast of Oman, who I said had been long connected by Treaty with the British Government, which would not see with indifference any attempt to deprive them of their independence. Mahomed Effender replied, that the Pasha would not interfere with the Tribes on the Coast, saying that so doing was opposed to the wish of the British authorities, but that Saad bin Mullaik had been sent from Kutchik to take possession of Buzayee which had formerly been held by Fijaili Troops, and being inland did not come under the same objections as the other Arab Tribes.

in the Gulf. I answered, that I could not possibly see upon what grounds Khorsid Pasha considered himself justified in occupying that district which was closely connected with the Maritime Tribes, and in fact formed the key to their territories. Mahomed Effender replied, that the Inhabitants of that part of Arabia were a wild, uncivilized race always plundering and cutting off the caravans, and closing the roads by their intestine feuds and quarrels, and for this reason the establishment of one power which could control them and preserve peace and tranquillity ought to be considered rather as an advantage than otherwise. That this was the only object of Khorsid Pasha as no profit was to be expected from the possession of poor a country. I replied that I was not authorized to discuss the motives which had led the Pasha to extend his views in that direction, it was sufficient for me to know that his doing so would be contrary to the understanding existing between Mahomed Ali and the British Government, and that for this reason the Pasha should be aware that if he still persevered against our remonstrances, he was incurring the risk of interrupting the friendship of the two states. Mahomed Effender in reply, renounced his assurances that nothing could be further from his Superior's intention than this, on the contrary, that Khorsid Pasha was empowered not to act in this quarter in opposition to the views of England.

Having

Having heard that the Mahomed Effendi intended to
 depart after leaving Haissack, I asked him
 what his objection was in going to that port, he replied
 that it was to convey the Mahomed Effendi of the Hacha
 to Haissack, for allowing him to go for the Egyptian
 army to be transported from there, and to request him
 to furnish the Bedouins with the necessaries of
 life, and to interrupt the transportation of supplies
 to the army.
 (Resident in the Palace)
 No. 2.
 Translation of a letter from His Excellency Mirza
 Asghar Khan to the British Resident in the Persian
 Gulf dated 18th November, or 14th April 1839.
 No. 3. In a fortunate kind and an open
 manner, your Honour has received by the receipt of your friendly
 letter, the contents of which I perfectly understand and
 thank you for the intelligence it conveyed of your
 health, and the comprehension of your communication that
 you were not in possession of instructions regarding
 Bahrain, and that you had addressed a letter to the
 Government on the subject, which you forwarded to me for
 transmission. This was done as you desired. I am
 glad you are under the impression that in having possession of
 Bahrain, my object is not to acquire either money or
 territory, but to convert Mahomed bin Ahmed into
 myself, because otherwise all persons guilty of any
 crime

would be difficult, and naturally secured by himself. I am
 convinced from your letter that in wishing to arrange and settle
 the affairs of these parties, it would be impossible to do
 so from the cause above referred to. Independently
 of this, at the time I was advancing from Medina
 bin Ahmed bin Ahmed, I felt that I was having
 me there, promised obedience, and the more so
 in Mahomed bin Ahmed bin Ahmed, but I was
 will as after the attack, in Dillun, this engagement
 completely broken.

Bahrain is not of such importance
 as to be worth any war, the distinction of
 property is, as much as any other, and I have
 always lived on the mountains. I also felt, in fact, that
 when I took possession of Hadda, I received from
 the British which contained an account of the
 districts in that Province, and those subjects to it.
 Among them I found Bahrain, and therefore it became
 necessary to put forth a claim, and to place a man
 on my behalf there, for the settlement of its affairs
 according to the custom of all Governments. Had I not
 asserted this claim when I knew I had the subject
 to which I was so doing would have been contrary to
 the custom.

As far as I am concerned
 from your reply, you state that the British claim
 that Bahrain is a former dependency of their own.

and intend to take it. God be praised, the histories of
 Persia are extant, and every one is aware of the fact
 that Africa Asia and Europe were all of them formerly
 subjects to the Kings of the Country alone referred to but
 that subsequently a stronger power arose which was vic-
 torious over them and took these quarters from them by
 the sword in consequence of their want of enterprise.
 Their place of residence therefore became fixed in that
 portion of Asia now called Persia and on this they
 are not able to rule properly. If therefore they ever
 recover either by the sword or policy, all that has
 been taken from them and Bahrain alone remains
 should restore it to them without war or opposition
 at the present time they have marched against Mecca
 a place inland and not on the sea, after 12 months
 they have been unable to take it and have
 returned back. Bahrain is now a neighbour of Lahia
 and its dependencies of edaga, and therefore
 before they can capture it there is much to be done.
 as soon as ever they have formed such a design some
 other plan can be formed (Lahia). I do to assure
 you that I have no intention to interfere with
 any other power excepting edaga and its dependencies.
 as the states of England and Egypt are at war and
 a conference has been made to them with respect
 to Bahrain in expectation and whatever orders may
 be issued we will communicate with each other
 regarding

regarding them but in respect to Bahrain they have
 now submitted and are subject to me. This is what was
 necessary for me to represent to you. Should you have
 any commission I shall be happy to execute them.

True translation!

Signed J. W. Russell

President in the P. of Gulf

Translation of an agreement said to be made by Shakh
 Abdoolah bin Ahmed of Bahrain with Mahmud Effendi
 on behalf of Khورشid Pasha dated 22nd Suffer or May
 1839.

I Abdoolah bin Ahmed of the al Khu-
 shida declare that an agreement has been entered into
 between me and Mahmud Effendi the Confidential agent
 and Plenipotentiary of Khورشid Pasha (the Governor of
 these Countries under His Highness Mohammed Ali Pasha
 is follows. That his friends shall be my friends and
 his enemies my enemies that for great favour
 I shall pay him the Subat (or kithes) of Bahrain with 500
 Crowns per annum my share of which on account of
 my service is to be one fourth or 125 the remaining 375
 Crowns to be apportioned over to him by me. I shall
 to act and assist him with whatever belongs to me
 in all affairs where it may be necessary for me
 may be in my power. In return the government of
 Bahrain is to be in my hands or in those of whom
 I shall think fit.

Wahid Sharif appointed as my deputy there, and now
 after recently in respect to my subject on the coast
 of Qatar &c. &c. we are in no way interfering with them besides
 myself. The engagement and promise is made before
 God.

(L.S.) of Abdollah bin Ahmed
 True Translation

Signed S. Hannell

President in the Persian Gulf

N. 6.

His Excellency Khorsheed Pasha.

Commander in Chief of the Egyptian

Forces in the Gulf

I have had the honor to receive your
 letter under date the 18th Moharrum transmitted by the hands
 of your confidential Agent Mohammed Effendee explanatory
 of the grounds upon which the rights and claims of
 His Highness Mohammed Ali on the Island of Bahrain
 are founded.

In reply I have the honor to inform
 your Excellency that it cannot for a moment be admitted
 that Bahrain is a dependency of Kedgah or that His
 Highness Mohammed Ali holds any rights or claims
 to the possession of that Island, on the contrary as
 already intimated in my former letter the proceedings
 of your Excellency with respect to that place and other parts
 and

and districts on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf
 are directly contrary to the understanding existing
 between the Viceroy of Egypt and the British Government
 and it becomes my duty to repeat to your Excellency that
 your paying no attention to the claims on behalf of the
 British Authorities will probably lead to an intensifica-
 tion of the animosity existing between the two States. I again
 beg to express my sincere hope that your Excellency
 will abstain from proceeding so much at variance
 with the views of the British Government.

With respects to the opinions
 expressed by your Excellency regarding the claims and
 hostile views of the Persian Government upon Bahrain,
 I beg to observe that as I have no address allusion
 whatever to this subject in any of my letters to your
 Excellency there is no occasion for me to enter into
 any discussion upon it.

I take the present opportunity of
 thanking your Excellency for the tokens of your good will
 which are sent by Mohammed Effendee, but as the claims
 set forth in your Excellency's letter to me, are opposed to
 the understanding before referred to, as subsisting between
 the Governments of England and Egypt, I have not con-
 sidered myself justified in accepting them, until I have
 from the reply of your Excellency to my communication
 of the 29th April that it is your purpose to attend to
 the

The Remittance contained therein
 Pending in the Persian Gulf
 March 29, May 1839
 Have the honor to be
 Yours truly
 J. Hennell
 Resident in the Persian Gulf
 Three Copies
 J. Hennell
 Acting Chief Clerk

No. 140

Secret Department

From

J. Hennell

To

Resident in the Persian Gulf

L. R. Reid Esquire

Acting Chief Secretary to Govt.

Bombay

Sir

Dated 20th December 1839.

According to my Letter No. 133
 in this Department, under date the 17th Inst.
 and on the subject of the proposed removal
 of Asa bin Jassaf and his followers, from a
 booth at Wukra, I have the honor to report
 for the information of the Honorable the
 Governor in Council, that on the 26th Inst.
 this Chief again visited me, on board the
 ship. His object in seeking another interview
 was, to inform me, that His Highness the
 Imam, had from some reasons, with which
 he was altogether unacquainted, most un-
 expectedly declined acting upon his promise

to

to him, and had moreover refused to send his relations. Stillab bin Mohammed to Abou-
 thaboor to assist the Ali Ally in getting away from that place, as had been arranged - that deprived of the looked for support of their Imam, it was probable, that he would be under the necessity of quitting the Berouas Port, in opposition to the inclinations of Shaikh Feha-
 lisa bin Shaikhoob, who no longer restrained by the influence of His Highness, would not unlikely instigate the Chief of Bahrain to join him in harassing, if not openly attacking the Ali Ally in their new location of Western - that under these circumstances, he (Shaikh Sa), and his followers, could not venture to take up their residence on the Gulfian Coast, unless the British Government would engage to prevent Shaikh Abdoolah bin Ahmed, and the Berouas Chief, from committing any aggressions upon them - I replied to Shaikh Sa, that however desirous I felt to assist him, in consideration of the wrongs he had sustained, and the prudence...

and

and moderation he had displayed through out their trying circumstances, still, I could not give such a promise as he then asked, unless under the special sanction of the Government. On receiving this answer Shaikh Sa said, that this being the case, he and his followers would settle themselves upon the Islands of Ges (or Kinn), off the Persian Coast - the Shaikh of which place, would gladly receive them. I replied, that I saw no objection to this location, which possessed the additional advantage, of being situated within the boundary line laid down by the Government, as the limits of the maritime hostilities of the Arabs, and therefore they need not be under any fear of molestation from either the Shaikh of Bahrain or the Chief of Abou thaboor - I being however at the same time fully understood, that himself and followers, would be equally precluded from committing any aggressions upon either of the two places above referred to.

End.

2nd The burden of their request was to give him a letter to Shakh Ishak bin Shakhbut requesting him to allow the latter to leave a boothab with him, without hindrance or molestation. This I consented to furnish, and moreover intend to exert my influence in favor of Isa and his tribe, whom I can do so without compromising the Government. I consider it highly conducive to our interests to maintain an influence over him, and of paramount importance to prevent the possibility of his determined and energetic character, with such numerous brave and devoted followers, throwing himself into the arms of Khorsheed Pasha, which despair might urge him to do, were no other opening left to him.

3rd The change in the views of the Imam in respect to this chief is very extraordinary after the earnestness and simplicity His Highness displayed in his favor on my first arrival at Muscat. I am myself altogether at a loss to account for it, but

but should it subsequently be in my power to throw any light upon this point I will not fail to bring it to the notice of the honorable the Governor in Council.

Honorable Company } I have the honor to be
 Messrs. Messrs. Messrs. } (Signed) J. H. Russell
 Messrs. Messrs. Messrs. } President in the P. of B.
 24th December 1839

(True copy)

" J. H. Russell
 Secretary to the Government

Transcription of previous document

No 140

Secret Department

From

S. Hennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf

To

L. R. Reid Esquire

Acting Chief Secretary to Govt.

Bombay

Dated 27th December 1839

Sir

Adverting to my letters No 133 in this Department, under date the 17th instant, on the subject of the proposed removal of Esa bin Tareef and his followers from Aboothabee, to Wukra I have the honor to report for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council, that on the 26th instant, this Chief again visited me, on board the Clive. His object in seeking another interview was to inform me that His Highness the Imam had from some reason with which he was altogether unacquainted, most unexpectedly declined acting upon his promises to him, and had moreover refused to send his relation Hillal bin Mahomed to Aboothabee to assist the Alli Ally in getting away from that place, as had been arranged - that deprived of the looked for support of the Imam, it was probable that he would be under the necessity of quitting the Beneyas Port, in opposition to the inclinations of Shaik Khaliefa bin Shakboot, who no longer restrained by the influence of His Highness, would not unlikely instigate the Chief of Bahrein to join him in harrasing, if not openly attacking the Alli Ally in their new location of Wukra - that under these circumstances, he (Shaik Esa), and his followers, could not venture to take up their residence on the Guttur Coast, unless the British Government would engage to prevent Shaik Abdollah bin Ahmed, and the Beneyas Chief, from committing any aggressions upon them. I replied to Shaik Esa that however desirous I felt to assist him, in consideration of the wrongs he had enstained (sustained) and the prudence and moderation he had displayed throughout these trying circumstances, still I could not give such a promise as he then asked, unless under the special sanction of the Government. On receiving this answer Esa bin Sareef said that this being the case, he and his Tribe would settle themselves upon the Island of Ges (or Kum), off the Persian Coast, the Shaik of which place, would gladly receive them.

I replied, that I saw no objection to this location, which possessed the additional advantage of being situated within the boundary line laid down by the Government, as the limits of the maritime hostilities of the Arabs, and therefore they need not be under any fear of molestation from either the Shaik of Bahrein or the Chief of Aboothabee, it being however at the same time fully understood, that himself and followers would be equally precluded from committing any aggressions upon either of the two places above referred to.

2nd Esa bin Sareef then asked me to give him a letter to Shaik Khaliefa bin Shakboot requesting him to allow the Alli Ally to leave Aboothabee without hinderance or molestation. This I consented to furnish, and moreover intend to exert my influence in favor of Esa and his Tribe, whenever I can do so without compromising the Government as I consider it highly conducive to our interest to maintain an influence over him, and of paramount importance to prevent a person of his determined and energetic character, with such numerous brave and devoted followers, throwing himself into the arms of Khorshed Pasha, which dispair might urge him to do, were no other opening left to him.

3rd The change in the views of the Imam in respect to this chief is very extraordinary after the earinessness and anxiety His Highness displayed in his favor on my first arrival at Muscat. I am myself altogether at a loss to account for it, but should it subsequently be in my power to throw any light upon this point I will not fail to bring it to the notice of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

I have the honor to be

(Signed) S. Hennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf

Honorable Companys
Sloop of War Clive Muscat
27th December 1839

(True Copy)

J. P. Willoughby

Secretary to Governor

1.13

Civil war in Bahrain, 1840–1847;
opposition to Shaikh Abdullah b.
Ahmad; deposition, April 1843;
exile and attempts to overthrow
Shaikh Muhammad b. Khalifah,
1843–1847

866

Civil war in Bahrain and expulsion of 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad from the Shaikhship, 1840-1843.

Alienation of the sympathy of the British Government from Shaikh 'Abdullah, 1840.

By his conduct towards Khurshid Pasha the Shaikh of Bahrain was considered to have shown preference for an Egyptian alliance and to have forfeited the friendship of the British Government; the possibility of his being displaced by a more favourably disposed Shaikh was discussed with equanimity by the Secret Committee of the Directors of the East India Company; and the Government of India decided not to hold back the Saiyid of 'Oman, should he again resolve on attempting the conquest of Bahrain. Nevertheless, out of regard for the general maritime peace, 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who with his dependents had migrated from Abu Dhabi to the Island of Qais in 1830 or 1840, was refused permission which he sought to put to sea against the Shaikh of

Bahrain; and this refusal was repeated by the British Resident on a visit to Qais in May 1841. The technical ground of objection was the violation which such hostilities would involve of the Restrictive Line established in 1836. It is possible that the estrangement between the British authorities and Shaikh 'Abdullah rested unfavourably upon the position of the latter in his own Shaikhdom; and it may have even contributed to the troubles that now began.

In 1840, on the retirement of the Egyptians from Hasa, the inhabitants of that province, or some of them, sent one Mushrif to Bahrain to propose to Muhammad-bin-Khalifah-bin-Salmān, grand-nephew of the principal Shaikh of Bahrain, that he should himself assume the Government of Hasa and protect the people from Khālid, the usurping Amīr of the Wahhābis. Objections entertained by Shaikh 'Abdullah to this proposal led to a violent difference of opinion between Shaikh Muhammad and himself, which was temporarily smoothed over by a hollow reconciliation; but a little later, after offering his services to the British Government and soliciting their assistance against his grand-uncle, Shaikh Muhammad left Bahrain for Qatar, where he ingratiated himself with the inhabitants and set on foot a vexatious opposition to his aged relation. The sons of Shaikh 'Abdullah, also, had now provided themselves with retinues of 100 to 300 desperadoes each, and openly defied their father's authority; anarchy and confusion had overspread the whole Shaikhdom; and the trade of Bahrain quickly declined to little more than a half of what it had been only a few years before. In 1842, when Khālid, the ex-Amīr of the Wahhābis, paid a visit to Qatar and Bahrain, Shaikh 'Abdullah and Shaikh Muhammad had apparently exchanged places, for the former was then at Khor Hassān on the mainland and the latter in Bahrain.

Such was the position of affairs when an open conflict was suddenly precipitated by an attempt on the part of Shaikh Muhammad to prevent the marriage of a young girl, belonging to Muharrāq town, with Ahmad, a son of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The old chief came over from Qatar to arrange a settlement; but, having failed in his endeavours, he took up the cause of his son. Both factions then began to enlist fighting men, chiefly Bedouins who poured over from the mainland in the hope of plunder. Muharrāq was the headquarters of Shaikh 'Abdullah, Manāmah that of Shaikh Muhammad, and the possession of a superior marine force enabled Shaikh 'Abdullah to blockade effectually the harbour of his antagonist. Indecisive skirmishes followed, in which Di'ajj, a brother of Shaikh Muhammad, was killed upon the one side, and

Breach
between
Shaikh
'Abdullah
and his
grandnephew
Shaikh
Muhammad,
1840-1842.

Expulsion
of Shaikh
Muhammad
by Shaikh
'Abdullah,
1842.

Muhammad-bin-Muhārak, a grandson of Shaikh 'Abdullah, upon the other. At length, in June 1842, the elder chief completely defeated the younger by attacking him simultaneously on land and sea; Manāmah fell into the hands of Shaikh 'Abdullah; and Shaikh Muhammad, escaping with a few followers to Qatar, proceeded to Hasa and thence to Riyādh to seek aid of the Wahhābis. The town of Manāmah was sacked by the Bedouin auxiliaries of the victor, after which the old Shaikh crossed over to Qatar and gave up Khor Hassān also to partial plunder.

Shaikh 'Abdullah then began to rebuild Zubārāh in Qatar, which had lain during a number of years entirely deserted.

The relations with the Wahhābis of Shaikh 'Abdullah, whose success was more apparent than real, were at this time extremely unfriendly. On the one hand Shāfi', a chief of the Banī Hājir and a relation and staunch adherent of Shaikh 'Abdullah, was detained as a prisoner by the Wahhābi Amīr; and on the other three-fourths of the population of Sailāt, of which place the headman had been arrested by 'Umr-bin-Ufaisan, the Wahhābi Governor of Hasa, had migrated to Bahrain, and a blockade of the Hasa coast was maintained by the navy of Bahrain. These circumstances inclined the Wahhābis to make common cause with Shaikh Muhammad; but for the moment they were unable to afford him material assistance.

At this juncture 'Isa-bin-Tarif, the Āl Bin-'Alī fugitive, and Bashīr-bin-Rahmah visited the British Resident at Bashehr together and requested permission to ally themselves with Shaikh Muhammad and to embark on regular hostilities against Shaikh 'Abdullah. The required sanction, in view of the old Shaikh's unsatisfactory behaviour in 1830 and again in 1842 at the sack of Manāmah, was duly given, on condition that the Restrictive Line should be respected. 'Isa-bin-Tarif, it may be observed, was strongly suspected of having fomented the recent dissensions in Bahrain; while Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, who could contribute 300 or 400 fighting men to the expedition, alleged that he was prevented by Shaikh 'Abdullah from enjoying the produce of his paternal estates near Dammām.

In November 1842 Captain Kemball, the Assistant Resident, was sent to Bahrain to warn Shaikh 'Abdullah of the permission for action granted by the British authorities to the hostile coalition. This communication was received by the Shaikh with consternation, almost with incredulity; he represented that, in the absence of most of his fleet and subjects, he would be unable to cope with his assailants; he hinted that

Strained
relations of
Shaikh
'Abdullah
with the
Wahhābis.

Permission
given to 'Isa-
bin-Tarif and
Bashīr-bin-
Rahmah to
join Shaikh
Muhammad,
and
intimation of
the same to
Shaikh
'Abdullah.

he would be obliged, therefore, to enter into relations with the Wahhābis; and he finally offered to allow Bashir-bin-Rahmah to remove his produce from Dammām, provided that he did not, under this pretext, bring any large vessels into the vicinity. Captain Komhall reported these remarks to the Resident, but no further communication was made at the time to Shaikh 'Abdullah, who afterwards affected to have thought that the allies would be ordered by the Resident to suspend their operations and to have been prejudiced in his defence by this belief.

Meanwhile Shaikh 'Abdullah had opened a correspondence with the Wahhābis and had apparently offered, on condition of the release of Shāfi' of the Bani Hājir, to restore 'Oqair, of which he had somehow become possessed. A little later, whether on these or on other terms, the Wahhābi ruler set Shāfi' at liberty and suggested to the Shaikhs of Bahrain that they should compose their differences; but Shaikh 'Abdullah, who seems to have distrusted the sincerity of the Amir's mediation, replied discourteously, advising him to observe a strict neutrality. In these circumstances the Wahhābis, not unnaturally, reverted to their support of Shaikh Muhammad.

At the beginning of 1843 Shaikh Muhammad made his appearance in Qatar, of which promontory the inhabitants generally were favourable to his cause. He succeeded in occupying a small fort at Murair* before it had been garrisoned by the opposite party, and the troops sent by Shaikh 'Abdullah to hold Murair returned without making any effort for its recovery. From the point of vantage thus secured Shaikh Muhammad at once opened communication with his associates on Qais Island.

In February 1843, alarmed by the arrival of several boats from Qais, Shaikh 'Abdullah wrote to the British authorities requesting them to restrain 'Isa and Bashir; but for various reasons, and partly in consequence of a misapprehension, no reply was vouchsafed to his application.

At length Shaikh Muhammad, from Fuwairat in Qatar where he was now established, despatched a considerable force in five Baghlahs to the eastern coast of Bahrain Island; and a landing was effected at a point opposite Rifa'-ash-Sharqi. Troops sent in haste by Shaikh 'Abdullah under the command of his son Nāsir, however, succeeded in reaching Rifa' before them; and an indecisive combat took place, in which several men were killed and wounded. An attempt to surround the invaders by land and to cut off their retreat by sea seems to have been unsuccessful.

* In the records this place is called "Meezer," but no place with such a name is known, and the reference must apparently be to Qal'at Murair which then stood 1½ miles south-east of Zubarah.

Negotiations
of Shaikh
'Abdullah
with the
Wahhābis.

Active
operations
and expulsion
of Shaikh
'Abdullah
from
Bahrain.
January-
April 1843.

In March or April of 1843 the town of Manāmah passed into the possession of a brother of Shaikh Muhammad, not without the connivance of the inhabitants, who remembered with bitterness the conduct of Shaikh 'Abdullah's Bedouins in the previous year; and shortly afterwards 'Isa bin-'Arif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah arrived in Bahrain with a large force.

In April the allies attacked Muharraq town, the seat of Shaikh 'Abdullah, and obliged him to take refuge in "a small fort, situated at no great distance from the town"—possibly that of Ilalat Abu Māhur—where, finding himself completely invested, he capitulated; and the fort of 'Arād, held by his sons, then also surrendered at discretion. The sons of 'Abdullah taken prisoners at 'Arād remained, with the consent of the victor, in Bahrain; but the Shaikh himself, to whom his captors allowed only one Batil and one Ghunobah for the conveyance of his family, dependents and property, took his departure for Dammām. That place, the sole remnant of his possessions, was now governed by Shaikh 'Abdullah's son Mubārak.

Incidents of the civil war in Bahrain affecting the British Government.

Outrage
committed
at the house
of the
British
Residency
Agent,
1842.

In 1842, on the defeat of Shaikh Muhammad by Shaikh 'Abdullah, the town of Manāmah, as we have seen, fell a prey to the Bedouins of the successful party; and among the goods pillaged were some belonging to British subjects. But a more serious incident arose from the behaviour of the native Agent of the British Residency in Bahrain, a man of "timid and imbecile character." To this individual Shaikh 'Abdullah, in the beginning of the troubles, suggested that he should either remove to Muharraq or go on board a British vessel, then in the harbour, until the crisis was over; but the Agent preferred to stay at Manāmah, and, on the town being attacked, he extended the protection of his house—if not that of the British Government—to the persons and property of a number of people having no claim to it, probably in return for a pecuniary consideration. Among those who took refuge with the Agent were a son and other dependents of a blood-enemy of Shaikh 'Abdullah, one Hamūd of the 'Amair section of the Bani Khālid tribe, and the Shaikh shortly appeared in person to demand, under

871

pain of destruction of the house, its inmates, and all that it contained, the instant surrender of these obnoxious refugees; whereupon the Agent, losing courage, caused them to be thrown from the roof, and they were cut to pieces almost before they had reached the ground. The unwarrantable and impolitic behaviour of the Agent on this occasion was punished with immediate dismissal, and the countenance of the British Government was finally withdrawn from the Shaikh, on whom, however, it was not considered necessary, in the circumstances, to make any express demand for reparation.

In March 1843, after the landing of Shaikh Muhammad's partisans on Bahrain Island, an order was promulgated by Shaikh 'Abdullah, then at Muharraq, that no vessel should anchor near Manāmah town. This regulation having been broken by a Ghunchah which was entitled to use the British flag, and which carried a packet and stores addressed to the British Commodore at Bāsīdu, two boats manned by Bedouin merceparios were sent with an order to the Nākhuda to move over to Muharraq; but these unreliable and dangerous messengers, on reaching the vessel, boarded her, plundered the cargo, including the British packet and stores, and hauled down and tore to pieces the British flag. On behalf of the Shaikh, who denied having ordered or in any way countenanced this outrage, it was urged that the Ghunchah had not shown her colours on entering the harbour; that her use of them was suspected to be a mere ruse; and that the fleet of 'Isa-bin-Tarif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah was at the time momentarily expected. A British war vessel was immediately despatched to Bahrain to make full enquiries; but, before any result had been reached, the expulsion of Shaikh 'Abdullah by his rival rendered further action useless.

About the same time as the last affair, but possibly before it, a Chāruk boat under the Persian flag, into which goods from Bombay consigned to Hindu merchants in Bahrain had just been transhipped, was plundered in the harbour of Manāmah by Bani Hājir and Sulutah Arabs subject to the authority of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The hostilities in Bahrain prevented immediate attention being given to this case, and on the first accession of Shaikh Muhammad to power it was considered inexpedient to press the claim upon him too strongly; but in February of the following year (1844), on the matter being brought to his notice, he submitted without demur to the British demand for compensation.

Piracy in
Manāmah
harbour,
March
1843.

872

MUHAMMAD-BIN-KHALIFAH.

1843-1808.

Continuance of the civil war after the expulsion of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad from Bahrain, 1843-1849.

Interference
of the
Wahhābi
Amir, 1843.

In June 1843, the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah having begun to make raids upon the commerce of the Bahrain Islands from his lair at Dammām, a flotilla was sent by Shaikh Muhammad, 'Isa-bin-Tarif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah which effectually confined his boats to the limits of the Dammām anchorage. The new Wahhābi Amir, Faisal-bin-Turki, whose position at home was still insecure, at first amused himself by playing off each of the Bahrain claimants against the other, and obtained promises of advantage from both; but, in the end, antipathy to the ex-Shaikh determined his attitude. Muhammad, a son of Shaikh 'Abdullah, having sallied out of Dammām to procure boats upon the adjoining coast, was arrested by the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif; and a similar fate befell another son 'Ali, on his arriving from Lingeh to join his father with a small contingent of the Āl Bū Samait tribe.

Intervention
of the Shaikh
of Kuwait,
August 1843.

A disinterested attempt to save the ex-Shaikh by mediation from the worst consequences of his defeat and expulsion was now made by Jābir, Shaikh of Kuwait, who had hitherto refrained from interference. In August 1843, with the approval of the British Resident, Shaikh Jābir proceeded to Bahrain with a fleet of eight large vessels, and was successful in persuading Shaikh Muhammad to invite Shaikh 'Abdullah to a friendly conference; but the former, aware that his restoration to power was not to be expected, declined to appear; nor did he at this time return to live with Shaikh Jābir at Kuwait, as the latter had intended that he should do in case no settlement were arranged.

Appeal by the
ex-Shaikh to
the Shaikhs
of Sharjah
and Dibai;
His first
visit to
Bushahr.

An effort was next made by the sons of the ex-chief, Shaikh 'Abdullah, to interest the rulers of Sharjah and Dibai in their father's cause; and they obtained a promise that, on condition of there being no objection on the part of either the British Government or the Wahhābi Amir, support would be given him at the close of the pearling season. 'Isa-bin-Tarif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah, with a view to neutralising this combination, at once opened communication with the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain; and the latter, 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid,

visited them at Qais Island, where he received a valuable present. In these circumstances, and more especially as it was understood that the Shaikhs of Shārah and Dibai did not desire to be embroiled in the affair, the reply of the British Resident at Būshehr to the ex-chief, who waited on him there, was that, while the British Government were prepared to arbitrate between the parties without themselves guaranteeing a settlement, they could neither intervene to restore Shaikh 'Abdullah to power nor permit the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to be dragged into a dangerous war without advantage to themselves or to the original combatants.

It is probable that, at his visit to Būshehr, Shaikh 'Abdullah hoped to derive some benefit from a correspondence which had already been maintained for several months between himself and Shaikh Salmān, an individual who held no official position in Persia but was a nephew of the Shaikh of Būshehr. The interchange of views appears to have been commenced by Shaikh Salmān, who did not scruple, while Shaikh 'Abdullah was still blockaded in Dammām, to promise him the military assistance of Persia. In October 1843, doubtless with a hope of alarming the British authorities, Shaikh 'Abdullah professed himself ready, if disappointed by the British Government, to throw himself into the arms of Persia; but in reply, he was merely informed that the adherence of Persia to his cause would not be recognised by Britain unless it were open and declared.

After a short sojourn at Būshehr Shaikh 'Abdullah returned to Dammām, whence he had come, but soon afterwards he transferred his residence to Nāband on the Persian coast, and almost simultaneously 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who chafed at the hindrances imposed on his operations by the Restrictive Line, removed his belongings from Qais Island and settled at Dōbah, then called Bida', in Qatar.

About the same time, or probably earlier, 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who was at heart no less an enemy of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah than of his unsuccessful rival, suggested to Saiyid Thuwaini, regent of Masqat, that he should profit by the dissensions of the Āl Khalifah Shaikhs to conquer Bahrain, and volunteered to assist him in the enterprise. Saiyid Thuwaini referred the proposal to his father Saiyid Sa'id, the sovereign of 'Omān, then absent in East Africa; and the result was an application to the British authorities, by whose advice 'Isa-bin-Tarif's proposal was rejected. The principal reasons which influenced the British Government to dissuade Saiyid Sa'id from an invasion of Bahrain were the personal absence of His Highness from the scene; the incapacity of his representative, Saiyid Thuwaini; the probability of offence being

Persian
intrigues,
1843.

Migration of
Shaikh
'Abdullah
from
Dammām to
Nāband and
of 'Isa-bin-
Tarif from
Qais to
Dōbah, 1843.
Attitude
of the
Government
of Masqat
towards
the struggle
between the
Shaikh and
the ex-
Shaikh, 1843.

given to the Wahhābis, which might lead to an invasion by them of 'Omān territory; the excuse which would be afforded to Persia for espousing the cause of the ex-Shaikh; and the veto which had already been placed by the British Government on action by the Shaikhs of Shārah and Dibai.

Second visit
of the ex-
Shaikh to
Būshehr,
December
1843 to
March 1844.

In December 1843 the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, accompanied by six armed vessels, again visited Būshehr with the object of influencing the British political representative in his favour; but he declined to agree to an interview on board a vessel in the harbour, chiefly, it was suspected, because he meant to make use of a visit to the Residency as a screen for a secret meeting with his sympathiser Shaikh Salmān. He proceeded however to press, in writing, a request for British assistance, mainly on the grounds that he had rejected overtures by the Wahhābi Amir which tended to the establishment of Wahhābi influence over Bahrain, and that he was entitled, as a signatory of the General Treaty of Peace, to the naval protection of Great Britain. These arguments, however, were refuted; and the claims of the ex-Shaikh to British aid were disallowed.

A few days after his arrival at Būshehr Shaikh 'Abdullah landed and was received with much distinction by the local authorities, probably under orders from Shirāz; three volleys of musketry were fired in his honour by the Persian regular troops; and he was provided with quarters in a bastion of the fortifications, his followers being at the same time accommodated in tents. His vessels, of which only two now remained, were brought into a backwater and drawn up on shore. It was soon rumoured that Shaikh 'Abdullah had applied to the Persian Government for the loan of 100 mounted men and 500 infantry, and that he had offered, if successful in recovering Bahrain, to repay the expenses of this force, to remit in future a large annual tribute to the Shah, and to leave one of his sons in Persia as a hostage for fulfilment of the contract. For three months Shaikh 'Abdullah lingered at Būshehr, awaiting, but in vain, the acceptance of his proposals by the Persian Government.

In January 1844 the Shaikh, in a correspondence with the British Resident, resorted to the argument that he had been lulled into a false security, while still in possession of Bahrain, by the neglect of the British authorities to reply to certain of his communications,—a contention which was not admitted; and immediately before his departure, probably in March 1844, he had a personal interview with the Resident, at which he again pleaded hard, but unsuccessfully, for the countenance of the British Government. It was clear that the hopes which he had at first placed in the Persian Government had been disappointed.

Meanwhile the position of Shaikh 'Abdullah's sons at Dammām, the last remaining foothold of the family in Arabia, had become precarious. In December 1843 the Wahhābi Amīr offered his services to the contending Shaikhs for the purpose of arranging a reconciliation between them; but his overtures were rejected by the ex-chief. Faisal-bin-Turki then declared war against Shaikh 'Abdullah and began to collect troops, partly for an investment of Dammām by land to supplement blockade by sea, and partly for the punishment of some of the Bedouin tribes in the neighbourhood who had hitherto kept the Dammām garrison, commanded by Mubārak, Nāsir, and another son of Shaikh 'Abdullah, supplied with provisions. Two boats with commissariat and military stores for the defenders of Dammām, despatched by Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait, were captured by the fleet of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah at Dohat Balbūl, whence it had been intended to send the cargoes by canal to Dammām; but the incident, which might otherwise have led to a conflict between Shaikh Jābir and the *de facto* Shaikh of Bahrain, was adjusted by the friendly intervention of the British authorities. In March 1844 the garrison of Dammām, being reduced to great straits for supplies, proposed a capitulation; but their terms were not accepted by the Wahhābi Amīr. Shaikh 'Abdullah, on becoming aware of the critical position of affairs, crossed from Būshehr to the Arabian side of the Gulf and attempted to throw supplies into Dammām, but failed, the boat which he sent being captured by the blockading squadron. A little later the Dammām garrison surrendered to the Wahhābis on condition that their lives should be spared and that they should be allowed to carry away their personal property, and the fort of Dammām was occupied in the name of Faisal-bin-Turki, who thereafter showed little interest in the quarrels of the Al Khalifah Shaikhs. The result must have been disappointing to Bashir-bin-Rahmah, to whom Shaikh Muhammad had promised, as a reward for his services against Shaikh 'Abdullah, the restoration of his paternal possessions.

During the absence of the ex-Shaikh at Būshehr, a Batil, described as belonging to Bahrain but owned apparently by Bashir-bin-Rahmah or one of his family, was unwarrantably seized on the Persian coast, and therefore on the prohibited side of the Restrictive Line, by Shaikh 'Abdullah's dependents at Nāband. A remonstrance having been addressed by the Resident to the ex-Shaikh, the latter wrote to the chief local authority at Nāband asking him to restore the Batil to the owners; but, while this message was in course of transmission by a British vessel, a change of authorities took place at Nāband, and the release of the Batil was refused by the new governor. A lengthy correspondence ensued and redress

Reduction of
Dammām
by the
Wahhābis,
March 1844.

Maritime
irregularity.

was eventually obtained in July 1844, not however until Bashir-bin-Rahmah, now settled like 'Isa-bin-Tarif at Dohat in Qatar, had seized two Nāband Batils by way of retaliation. Bashir, it should be added, immediately gave up those prizes when ordered to do so by the Resident on the ground that the case was already in process of settlement by the British authorities.

Visit of the
ex-Shaikh to
Kuwait, and
his third visit
to Būshehr,
1844.

Shaikh 'Abdullah, on the failure of his attempt to convey supplies to Dammām, was hotly pursued by four Batils detached from the blockading squadron, but he succeeded in making his escape to Kuwait, where for a short time he resided. On the fall of Dammām most of Shaikh 'Abdullah's sons came to Bahrain and were allowed to settle in Muharrag; but Mubārak took refuge with his father's friend Shāfi' among the Bani Hājir; and Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, in violation—so his adversaries alleged—of terms arranged in the presence of the Wahhābi Amīr, refused to allow the ex-Shaikh to return to Bahrain unless as a private individual and on condition that his conduct in the future should be guaranteed by the British Government,—a requirement which the propounder well knew to be impossible. After a short stay at Kuwait, Shaikh 'Abdullah returned southwards and obtained, on the way, an interview with the British Resident at Būshehr; the meeting was held, by request of the ex-chief, at a place on the seashore about three miles from the town. The object of the visitor was clearly to extort help from the British Government by a threat of combining with the Wahhābis and availing himself of their assistance to recover Bahrain; but, as no interest was shown by the Resident in his intentions or affairs, Shaikh 'Abdullah continued on his way and once more took up his residence at Nāband.

Proceedings
of the ex-
Shaikh
during a
residence,
at Nāband,
1844-46.

Soon after his arrival at Nāband, the ex-Shaikh, whose movements greatly alarmed the divers on the pearl banks, proceeded to the Qatar coast with the intention of attacking 'Isa-bin-Tarif at Dohat; but he found that vigilant enemy well prepared, and so sailed on into the home waters of Bahrain. Shaikh Muhammad, learning that his grand-uncle was in the neighbourhood, sent a deputation of merchants to invite him to return to his home; but Shaikh 'Abdullah, after evading compliance by insisting on conditions which he knew could not be accepted, proceeded to Qatif and thence despatched one of his sons on a friendly mission to the Wahhābi Amīr. After this, seizing two small vessels by the way near the Rasht-ad-Dibal, he returned to Nāband. A letter was at once sent by the British Resident to the chief authority at Nāband, requesting him to restrain Shaikh 'Abdullah from such disorderly pro-

ceedings in future; but, though the person addressed, Shaikh Ahmad-bin-Saif by name, received the representation in a proper spirit and apparently apologised to the Shaikh of Bahrain for the mischief already done, he was unable to control the actions of Shaikh 'Abdullah, who shortly after set out on another cruise and captured two more Bahrain vessels. Annoyed by these proceedings, to which the Restrictive Line prevented his making any rejoinder, the Shaikh of Bahrain appealed to the British authorities and sent his brother 'Ali to wait upon the Resident; and the result was an injunction, issued by the central Persian Government at the instance of the British Envoy, directing the Governor-General of Fars to compel Shaikh 'Abdullah to give up the boats he had taken and to prevent him from disturbing the peace of the Gulf. The ex-Shaikh, finding himself unsupported by Persia, gave the Resident a verbal promise to abstain, so long as he should continue to reside in Persia, from aggressions upon Bahrain; but, as he refused to confirm this undertaking in writing, a British war vessel was despatched to Nāband, and he was told to consider himself as having been formally placed under restraint.

Nāband having ceased, under these restrictions, to be a suitable place of residence for him, Shaikh 'Abdullah, in October 1845, informed the Resident of his intention to remove to Qatif. Soon afterwards an unsuccessful attempt was made by him, in conjunction with the Wahhābis, to capture Bahrain, of which the details are given in a later paragraph on the relations of the Shaikh of Bahrain with the Wahhābi power. On the failure of this *coup* Shaikh 'Abdullah once more took refuge at Kuwait.

On becoming aware of these events, the British representative at Būshahr wrote to Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait expressing a hope that he would not allow Shaikh 'Abdullah, while living under his protection, to indulge in depredations upon the trade of Bahrain; and the hint was apparently taken, for the ex-Shaikh, during his stay at Kuwait, remained altogether quiescent. In June 1846 Shaikh 'Abdullah received an invitation from the Governor-General of Fars to return to Būshahr, where it was promised that he should be liberally entertained "until . . . the season for action had arrived"; but in August the ex-chief, who was now well aware both of the duplicity of the Persians and of their inability to assist him, declined their flattering but insincere offer.

In September 1846, probably on account of the restraints to which he was subjected at Kuwait, Shaikh 'Abdullah removed to Hasa, where he settled at first, in the neighbourhood of Dammām; and at the beginning of 1847 he was living, without any followers, on Tārūt Island. During the greater part of his stay in Hasa, as explained further on, war prevailed

Proceedings
of the ex-
Shaikh at
Qatif, 1845.

Proceedings
of the
ex-Shaikh
during a
residence
at Kuwait,
1845-46.

Proceedings
of the ex-
Shaikh
during a
residence
in Hasa,
1846-47.

between the Wahhābis and the Shaikh of Bahrain; but no active part in the hostilities was taken by the ex-chief. It was not until August 1847, when a peace was concluded between the principal belligerents by which the Wahhābi Amir bound himself not to abet Shaikh 'Abdullah in his machinations, that the exile suddenly woke to life, hunched a vessel at Dammām with the supposed intention of proceeding to Qais to intrigue with some discontented 'Utāb there, and was joined by 'Isa-bin-Tarīf of the Āl-Bin-'Alī, whose dislike of Shaikh Muhammad had now overcome his former hatred of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The demand made by the allies upon Shaikh Muhammad was for the restoration of his grand-uncle's vessels and other possessions. The immediate commencement of hostilities at sea was prevented by the arrival in the "Elphinstone" of Commodore Lowe, who required that the regular sanction of the Resident should first be obtained by the parties; but, when this omission had been supplied, the war, which quickly took a turn unfavourable to the ex-chief, began without further delay.

The Restrictive Line was violated, at an early stage of the proceedings, by Shaikh 'Abdullah, who crossed to the Persian coast to obtain reinforcements; and Shaikh Muhammad, on his part, asked that the British Government would either restrain the 'Atbi malcontents settled on Qais or grant him leave to take suitable measures against them. This request of the Shaikh was referred by the Resident to Government; but, before orders could be received from India, the campaign had been brought to an end by a battle fought on land, in which the troops of Bahrain, commanded by Shaikh Muhammad in person, defeated the allies near 'Uwairat in Qatar; 'Isa-bin-Tarīf himself was among the slain. This disaster was the death-blow of Shaikh 'Abdullah's hopes. The orders of the Government of India, at length received, were that an invasion of Bahrain by the allies should be prevented, if necessary, by a British naval force; but the decision was not communicated to Shaikh Muhammad, as it might have led him to neglect precautions for his own defence.

About this time, probably in 1848, 'Abdul Jabbar Khān, the Persian Consul-General at Baghdad, opened a correspondence with both parties. To the ex-Shaikh he wrote assuring him of the active support of the Persian Government, "and begging him to make every preparation for carrying into effect the plans he might have in contemplation,—however momentous, however gigantic,—Persian assistance, full and powerful, would most surely be accorded to him." His letter to Shaikh Muhammad was equally friendly and was apparently intended to blind

Death in
battle of
'Isa-bin-
Tarīf and
final ruin of
the ex-
Shaikh's
fortunes,
1847.

Correspond-
ence of the
Persian
Consul-
General at
Baghdād
with both
parties.

879

and mislead that overweening ruler. Steps taken by the British Resident at Bagdad resulted, however, in the discontinuance of the correspondence, on which the offending Persian functionary pretended that he had entered in ignorance of its impropriety.

The struggle between the chiefs was at length brought to an end by the death of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, apparently in 1849. This event took place at Masqat, in the course of a voyage undertaken by the ex-Shaikh with the object of persuading his former enemy, Saiyid Sa'id, then at Zanzibar, to assist him in recovering his ancestral dominions.

Death of the
ex-Shaikh,
1849.

N^o 410
Bombay Letter 31st January 1849 P^{ost} No. 5

Ex. 175 of 1842

N^o 410 From Lieutenant Colonel H. D. Robinson
Officiating Resident in the Persian Gulf.
To J. P. Willoughby Esq.
Secretary to Government
Bombay.

Related Res. 22nd November 1842

Sir,

I have the honor with reference to my letter N^o 120 dated the 31st ultimo to enclose a copy of a report from my assistant Lieutenant Colonel Lamball of his proceedings at Bahrain.

2^d

In a private communication Lieutenant Lamball informs me that "Abdullah" becom Ahmed still retains all his faculties and is evidently "a shrewd intelligent man." I mention this, as bearing some reference to my remarks respecting his old age, in the 7th paragraph of my letter to the Honorable the Joint Committee of the House of Directors, a copy of which accompanied my letter N^o 95 dated 23rd instant to your address.

3^d

I solicit the instructions of Government

a merit

No. 410. South

Bombay Castle, 31st January 1843. Polt. General: 5.

ment on the subject of the references made to me by Sheikh Abdulloh bin Ahmed, stated by my assistant and they have to remind you of the correspondence noted in the margin respecting the feeling on which Saad bin Tarif occupied the island of Qal'ah, and the nature of our former interference in the quarrel of the Al-His and Al-Mubarrak Tribes.

4th It is evident I think, that if Abdulloh bin Sa'ad the ruler of Qal'ah has any ability, he can hardly fail in now gaining an ascendancy over Bahrain, either by aiding Mohammed bin Khalifa and by force of arms, or by securing him to support Sheikh Abdulloh, under the condition of Sheikh Abdulloh acknowledging his supremacy; a dilemma into which the Sheikh may be driven from his unpopularity at home, and the combined strength of his opponents in war.

Residency Persian Gulf
Buckingham 22nd
November 1842.

I have the honor to be
1 signed W. R. Robertson
Officiating Resident
in the Persian Gulf.

To

Boatman's House
Sailed 27th 55, 18
1843 and 184
1843. Direct
-present

No. 410. South

Bombay Castle, 31st January 1843. Polt. General: 5.

To

The officiating Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honor to report that I arrived here at sunset yesterday evening, having agreeably to your instructions, left Bussorah in this vessel on the morning of the 1st Instant.

2. From Hajee Jussim who immediately came on board I learnt, that Sheikh Abdulloh bin Ahmed was at Mahara / distant about three miles from this anchorage / preferring the night hours at Monamah as a place of conference, to the small cabin of this vessel. I dispatched the Agent in the Sheikh to meet me there. He accordingly came over this morning accompanied by his Hajee Hajee Sa'ad.

After the usual salutations, and having expressed to him the great pleasure you felt at the re-establishment of peace and tranquillity on the island, from the happy termination of the fighting between himself and his relative and dependent Mohammed bin Khalifa, also at the reports you had received

M. 410 Cont.

Bombay Castle 31st January 1843 P.M. Council: 5.

received of the great success of his subjects on the Coast of Oman notwithstanding the length of time they had been deterred from engaging in the Pishan, by reason of the civil war. I told him that other duties having made it requisite for you to despatch me to the Arabian Coast, you had directed me to touch at Bahrain and make him acquainted with the designs of Dair bin Trif and Bushman bin Ranna, bin Jubor who having paid you a visit at Busra had intimated their intention of waging open war against him and giving assistance to Mahomed bin Khalifa who they reported was collecting troops in Adjed under the sanction and with the aid of Abdoollah bin Saoud - an the present Wahabee Ruler -

4. He asked whether your permission had been obtained by the bin above mentioned to proceed with their ships and troops to the opposite Coast, appearing to doubt that such would be granted. I said that he doubtless well knew the rules and policy that had always guided the British Government in their relations with the Arab Sheikh, that no objection

was

J. Martin

M. 410 Cont.

Bombay Castle 31st January 1843 P.M. Council: 5.

was ever made to parties declaring and making open war, secret and sudden attacks, plundering and taking goods etc. without proclamation being considered Piracy, that the Resident had refused or opposed the repeated requests of Dair bin Trif to be permitted thus to make aggression upon him -

5. The Sheikh now said, that the news of such a coalition against him had reached him too late, since most of his vessels and people had left on their trading voyages for Bombay and other places, the remainder being ready to sail, and thus his means of defence gone, and repeatedly and earnestly requested me to communicate to you his hope and wish that you would prohibit Dair and Bushman, his former subjects, the first of whom he had only punished and expelled on his attempting to raise himself an equality, indeed usurp his power, thus making any aggression or sending boats to the assistance of Mahomed bin Khalifa, whereby Wahabee troops could be transported to the island, until the return of his own vessels, when he should have no fear whatever of the result even if the three parties united their forces

S^g 410 Cont.Bombay Castle 31st January 1843 Col. General. 5

force and means, that individually he held the power of either in utter contempt, the two Brani and Busherees as insignificant, and abdicated bin Sa'ud from his own want of means in shipping, but that these being by the coalition placed at his disposal he would from his helpless condition be compelled to yield and make the best possible terms with the victors & his virtually ceding the island to him a proceeding which he fully remarked would be contrary to the wishes of Government and which he hinted (implying I suppose without knowing the cause for this came from the measures before adopted when the Egyptian force were in need) it would not allow. I answered that all he had stated should be made known to you, but that for the present I believe he had no cause for apprehensions since both Brani and Busherees had proceeded on their journey to Bassorah.

On my asking him whether there was no possibility of coming to terms with one party or the other, he answered that no motives should induce him again to become the friend of Ensi

bin

S^g 410 Cont.Bombay Castle 31st January 1843 Col. General. 5

bin Tarif, but that he was at the present times in treaty with Abdulrah bin Sa'ud from whom he had twelve days since written a letter the answer to which he was awaiting / giving him up eight in order to procure the release of Thabit Shafer his relation a cause since given over, which being needed to communication should be re-established with Kuteif, yet that he had no intention to enter into an alliance offensive and defensive as desired by him, with a man in whose faith and word he could place no reliance, who while treating with him, had at the instigation of Mohamed bin Khalifa, actually written to his former enemies Brani and Busherees inviting them to join him against Bahrain.

In answer to my questions he told me that his son at Dammam acting under his authority was keeping up a partial blockade of Kuteif, allowing none to enter without his permission, that he had no objection to Busherees proceeding to either place in small boats to remove his property and goods, but could not allow him to take in any large

England strong force
the East Indians
Kuteif

MS 410 Cont.

Bombay Castle 31st January 1842 Pollbourn: 5

Large Vessels, in other words, place men and means at the disposal of this enemy.

8. To my question whether he had positively heard that Abdullah bin Samayim was collecting Troops he answered he had but whether they were intended to subvert certain districts which had as yet failed to acknowledge his authority, or for what purpose, he knew not did he care, provided you granted his request / conveyed in 5th para / on which point he is most anxious to learn your decision.

9. Having mentioned to the Sheikh the meaning and object of the restrictive line from Hawlool Island etc. to Ras Zoor which both he and his Wazir perfectly remembered, he stated his intention of strictly meeting the wishes of Government on this as on all other points, and took his leave (Abdullah bin Ahmed is I believe the only Chief on the Arabian Coast who has in writing acknowledged the restrictive line which he did in 1838).

10. Abdullah bin Samayim and Ahmed bin Khulafa are said to be at Buzay.

The place / Hamam / appears much cleared; Shuaibazar

Pg 4

MS 410 Cont.

Bombay Castle 31st January 1842 Pollbourn: 5

is beginning to fill but provisions are yet dear - Sheikh misery has been entailed upon the inhabitants / Tellah / by the late fighting. Abdullah bin Ahmed having permitted indeed encouraged the Bedouins, then in his power to rob and plunder the town as soon as it fell into his hands they are therefore by no means well disposed towards him but quite ready and desirous to rise and side with Mahomed bin Khalifa in the event of his making any attempt to regain his lost position or usurp the Sheikh's authority.

11. Hajee Sarsar having informed me that a boat will in all probability leave this for Bushra in four or five days - I take the opportunity of sending this letter.

H. G. Schomaker
Bahrain
4th November 1842.

I have the honor to be
Yours truly
A. D. Kimball
First Resident

True Copy.

Yours truly
H. D. Robertson

Officiating Post. Persian Gulf.

Almudi

No 411

Bombay Castle 31st January 1843 Poll. No. 5

Minute by the Honorable the Governor concurred in by
the Lieutenant the Commander in Chief and the Honorable
Mr. Anderson.

No 411

1. Lieutenant honorable proceedings may
be approved.

2. The officiating Resident should in
reply be referred to the 2^d para. of the Government letter
to his address dated the 27th ultimo, from which the following
is an extract: "with reference to your letter dated the 31st
October last, At 184 I am desired to state that the pro-
spect of War on the Island of Bahrain is much to be
lamented but that as it is the policy of the British Govern-
ment to abstain from all interference with quarrels by land,
you will simply watch the future proceedings of the contend-
ing parties and ensure the observance by all of the
existing maritime engagements."

3. In August 1840 Mr. Macdonald then
in temporary charge of the Residency reported for instructions
in regard to the course he was to adopt in the event of
an expected collision between the Chief of Bahrain and his
grand-nephew, Mohamed bin Khalifa and in reply
that

No 411 Contd.

Bombay Castle 31st January 1843 Poll. No. 5

that Officer was informed that Government was of opinion
that the Chief of Bahrain was not entitled by his
past conduct to any support from the British Govern-
ment; These proceedings having been reported to the
Secret Committee, they in reply in a letter dated the
30th November 1840, to the address of the Government, re-
solved as follows, "we consider in your opinion that
the Chief of Bahrain is not entitled by his past conduct
to any support of the British Government."

4. I do not see any reason for
Government altering its past policy in regard to the
Chief and the same system of non interference should
be continued.

5. The Resident should be so
informed, and these proceedings reported to the Govern-
ment General and to the Honorable the Court of Directors.

J. Signify G. Arthur

" P. Macdonald

" G. W. Anderson

1842/4

No 910 & 911

Dombay Castle 8th March 1843 Polt Consul: 9N^o 143 of 1843From Lieut^{nt} Colonel A. D. Robertson
Off^r Resident in the Persian Gulf.To J. P. Walloughby Esq^r
Secretary to Government.

Bahrain.

Dated Bushire 27th January 1843

Sir,

I have the honor to enclose for the information of Government the substance of four Despatches from Hajee Jassoon giving the news of Bahrain and Adjed up to the 25th Decem^r last:-

2. I have also the honor to enclose the substance of a letter from Reuben Adlam Agent at Muscat giving news up to the 15th of Decem^r last.

No 911 Cont^dDombay Castle 8th March 1843 Polt Consul: 9

last:-

Residence in the Gulf
Bushire 27th January 1843

I have the honor to be

Signed/ H. D. Robertson

Off^r Resident Persian Gulf

Translated Substance of letters to Lieut^{nt} Col^l Robertson from Hajee Jassoon Agent at Bahrain - Town that dated 1st 15th 2nd 3rd January 1843 received 26th January 1843:-

Abdolla bin Soomeyan is at present at Rayang and Amur Khaled at Ghusum. The Arab Tribes are equally divided between them - Abdolla is now endeavoring to conciliate those who remained faithful to him and to prevent their defection to his opponent. He has also sent invitations to return with promises of good treatment to those who fled to Bahrain from Laska and hadif to avoid his reactions Peoples eyes are turned to the conduct of Abdolla Soomeyan and Amur Khaled and await some result:-

From that dated 5th 15th 6th January 1843:-

On the 2nd Instant (5th Decem^r) news arrived from Laska that Mohammed bin Khatifa had reached that place - The day after his arrival there, a letter came from Abdolla bin Soomeyan to

No. 9 11 Cont.

Dombay Castle 8th March 1843 Political Council.

to Sheikh Abdolla bin Ahmed to request him not to take alarm if he should hear that Mahomed bin Khurafa had arrived at Lasha, for that he would soon give him his dismissal. Sheikh Abdolla bin Ahmed replied, that it was not a matter of any consequence that Mahomed should go to Lasha but that if any thing should really go wrong he would look to Soomeyan.

From that dated 16th Zilhaj (17th January 1843)

On the 16th Instanti (15th January) when I was sitting with Sheikh Abdolla bin Ahmed some people happened to come on from Dowsian (near Lasha) - Abdolla bin Ahmed asked them the news of Adjed - They stated that Abdolla bin Soomeyan gave a large present to the Sheriff of Mecca and had written to that personage in reply to his demand for the Guns and Artillery Equipments left by Khorshid Pasha in Adjed that his great desire was to meet the wishes of the Sheriff and obey the mandate of the Sultan but

No. 9 11 Cont.

Dombay Castle 8th March 1843 Pol^l Council.

but that as it would cost a large sum to send these things he was ready to pay the value of them if they were allowed to remain where they were - They also told the Sheikh that Abdolla bin Soomeyan had sent Coffers to Lasha and that ordering the sale of these places of his own Datis and that if they were not purchased there to send them to Bahrain and other places.

From that dated 20th Zilhaj (21st January 1843)

Sheikh Abdolla bin Ahmed has just heard that Mahomed bin Khurafa is getting out an expedition at Lasha for Gubler and that Abdolla bin Soomeyan is secretly assisting him to do so. Spies have been sent off to watch proceedings at Lasha and the intercourse by boats with Bajeir has been suspended.

No 911 Contd

Bombay Castle 8th March 1843 Polt Consul: 9

suspended till authentic news arrives from Lasha - should the news prove true of course the amicable agreement between Sheikh Abdoolah and Abdoolah bin Soomeyan will be disturbed - The people of Gutter and of the Coast of Gutter have sent to Sheikh Abdoolah to declare to him their inability to defend themselves against any attacks of Mohammed bin Khulafa from Lasha whether they said they had heard he had gone - Sheikh Abdoolah is very anxious for accurate news from Lasha. -

True translated substance

Signed H. D. Robertson.

Offy Resident - Persian Gulf.

True Copy

Signed H. D. Robertson,

Offending Resident - Persian Gulf. -

Translated

S. 1894

Bombay Castle 10th May 1843 Polt Consul: 17.

14th of 1843.

1894. From Lieutenant Colonel H. D. Robertson

Offending Resident Persian Gulf

To: J. P. Wroughton Esq

Secretary to Government Bombay

Dated (Buckin) 27th March 1843

Sir,

I have the honor to request you will have the goodness to lay before Government, the enclosed translation of a letter from the Government Agent at Bahrain relating to events on that Island up to the 10th Instant.

Residency in the Persian Gulf (Buckin 27th March 1843.)

I have the honor to acknowledge

(Signed) H. D. Robertson

Offy Resd Persian Gulf

Translation of a letter from Major General, Agent at Bahrain to Lieutenant Colonel H. D. Robertson Offending Resident Persian Gulf dated 10th Instant 1843. -

Ap.

With regard to Mohammed bin Khulafa, and his arrival at Gutter. There is now no doubt that, he with 5000 men came and landed his army opposite to Rofah (5 miles in the interior of Bahrain) -
Abdullah

No. 1894 Contd.

Bombay *Letter* 18th May 1843. [Signature]

Abdullah bin Ahmed, on learning this, was much concerned, and sent his son, Husein, with some men to oppose him who took possession of the fort before the other party could do so. A fight took place there between them, four of him, Khulafat Khan were killed, and 2 of Husein's, and several were wounded on either side. I think Abdullah bin Ahmed immediately sent three battalions against Husein, and gave orders that some men should be sent from Dammam - with whom he might embark in the remaining ships and that his son Abubakar with some force should go by land. That Mahomed bin Khulafat might be surrounded on all sides, both by land and by sea.

It is reported that the people of Guassa have launched their boats, in order to go to assist him to the assistance of Mahomed bin Khulafat.

/ True Translation /

/ Signed / A. B. Kimball

Assistant Resident Persian Gulf

/ True Copy /

/ Signed / A. B. Kimball

Assistant Resident Persian Gulf

No. 1923 Contd.

Bombay *Letter* 18th May 1843. [Signature]

Translation of a letter from Abdulla bin Ahmed Sheikh of Bahrain to Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Robertson, Offg. Resident Persian Gulf dated 18th Suifur 1259 / 2nd March 1843.

It should be known to you, that my subjects, the inhabitants of Guithia landed an Army at Bahrain, and took possession

N^o 1923 Contd.Bombay 18th May 1843. Pagan 19

possession of a place thro' perfidy of the brother
of Mahomed bin Khulefa. By the help of
God. I expelled them thence, and sent three
boats towards Zubarah to punish the people
of Gutter for their conduct. Eas bin Lary
and his people have reached Gutter to the
assistance of Mahomed bin Khulefa, and
the people of that Coast. They in eight boats
met my three boats. A fight was carried
on until their arrival off Julliyah, when they
separated. It is not possible that I should
not otherwise have opposed them. They have
acted contrary to what you told them.

True translation

Signed / A. B. Kemball

Apt. Post. Res^{ty} Gulf.

True Copy

Signed / A. B. Kemball

Apt. Post. Res^{ty} Gulf.

Translation

N^o 1923 Contd.Bombay 18th May 1843. Pagan 19

Translation of a letter from Hajee Jassim,
Agent at Bahrain to Lieutenant Colonel H.
D. Robertson, Officiating Resident Persian Gulf
dated 21st Sup^r 1254/23 March 1843.

M. Your letter dated 15th Instant has
been received. With reference to Sheikh Abdulla
bin Ahmed, he was expecting your answer
with regard to the beds of al-bir al, and
received the same from me. I told him, agree-
able to your order, that there was no other
answer than that given by the officiating
Resident when he met him. On the 17th
Instant the Sheikh himself embarked for
Gutter with 10 boats. On starting he gave
me a letter to your address, which I now
send, and informs me through his brother
Hajee Bushab, that there was no doubt the
boats of the al-bir al had arrived in the
neighbourhood. Their arrival was for the
purpose of opposing / & / him. It is neces-
sary you should inform the Resident if
they

N^o 1923 Contd.

Bombay Castle 18th May 1843. Re: 19.

they oppose me. I will not remain quiet, but without doubt, will fight them. Two days after the departure of Abdulla bin Ahmed & the brothers of Mahomed bin Khulafa ^{Abdulla bin Khulafa appears having resisted} came with loads and foot from Ruseh, and took possession of Manamah, and plundered the place. Towards the end of day, tranquillity was restored - Mahomed bin Khulafa and Elias bin Saruf are expected to arrive at Manamah by sea.

True translation

/ signed/ A. B. Kimball

Appt. Asst. Secy. Gulf

True Copy

/ signed/ A. B. Kimball.

Appt. Asst. Secy. Gulf.

Ry?

E. B. Kimball

N^o 1924 Contd.

Bombay Castle 18th May 1843. Re: 19.

Translation of a letter from Hajie Jassim Agent at Bahrain to Lieutenant Colonel H. D. Robertson Officiating Resident Persian Gulf dated 28th Supur 1257/30th March 1843/

M. This day the al bin alline with Mahomed bin Khulafa, Cai bin Saruf, Bushare bin Rumah, and the inhabitants of Qudhar with boats in number about 90 arrived at Manamah and bin Sulamah with some boats is expected to follow them. They desire to fight with Abdullah bin Ahmed. I wished to send a boat with this letter to you, but by reason of the blockade,

Could

N^o 1925 Contd.

Bombay 15th May 1843. P. 19

for the information of Government copies of translations of a letter and its enclosure this day received from Bahrain.

2. The superior means of Mahomed bin Kabir and Qasim bin Saif, while the Coalition exists, and the extraordinary plans they appear to have adopted, will render any attempts on the part of Abdollah bin Ahmed to recover his island abortive, at least till the return of his ships and men from their trading voyage. But all accounts lead to the conclusion that the time is not far distant when the old and better enmity of Qasim bin Saif, now only somewhat to answer his own views, will be again renewed, when the result may be expected of the restoration of Abdollah bin Ahmed to his chieftainship.

3. With reference to that portion of the Agents letter relating to the plunder of the two boats, it will be seen, that there contained fugitives from Bahrain

against

N^o 1925 Contd.

Bombay 15th May 1843. P. 19

against which island ofen war has been proclaimed; the act cannot therefore be termed piratical; but I shall despatch a letter by the same buccarab about to return, warning the two Chiefs against committing any acts of a piratical nature.

4. As the news transmitted by the agent was important (and for the reasons given by him) I respectfully request the sanction of Government for the disbursement of the amount of the hire of the buccarab.

5. I take this opportunity to mention that the punishment of the delinquents and the restoration of the property plundered from the ^{restoration of the property plundered from the} ~~delinquents~~ and the ^{restoration of the property plundered from the} ~~delinquents~~ at Manamah cannot now be expected, and that I shall await the course of events at Bahrain before again demanding the same.

I have the honor to be
Respectfully,
1843 } Signed / A. P. Pembell.
Asst. Secy. In Charge.

J. P. Pembell

N^o 1925 Conts:Bombay Castle 18th May 1843. P. 10. 11.

Translation of a letter from Hajer Jassim
Agent at Bahrain to Lieutenant Colonel H.
D. Robertson, Officiating Resident Persian Gulf
dated 9th Rabbie. coll. Anul 1259 / 10. April 1843.

M. On the 2nd Instant the force
of the Ab. boats landed at Mahara; and Ab.
-dullah bin Ahmed came, with his flight others.
After one hour's battle the latter was defeated
and the former entered Mahara; for when he
Abdullah bin Ahmed / submitted to the fort where
he remained blockaded for 6 days. They sent
to him to come out that they would spare him.
He did not agree. On the 6th Instant he himself
requested to be allowed to leave with his ships.
They would not agree to give him more than
one butch and one ghoncha - in which he
loaded his property and departed, his sons who
had been blockaded in the fort of Brad (After
Abdullah's leaving) were granted terms and
they came out. They are still in Mahara. -
bin

N^o 1925 Conts:Bombay Castle 18th May 1843. P. 10. 11.

bin Saif has sent 5 Buggarahs to Sulayf
to prevent the arrival of assistance for Ab.
dullah, and to seize whatever may have spoken
him in the sea. People just arrived from that
quarter state, that these boats saw a Buggarah
and a boom (flat bottomed boat) in which men
had fled from Bahrain. They plundered them. -
Thus have also reached that Signis has arrived in
Nadgd, and, it is said, that Bin Saimeyan
has written to his subject the Governor of
Kutuf that if he should hear of Signis arrival
not to be confused, that they were of one side
and that friendship exists between them. The
people of Kutuf, who came with Mohamed
bin Mulefa and Eas bin Saif after plunder-
ing Mahara; desired to return home. They
were not permitted. - Thus annex being, that
as soon as Abdullah should have left the
fort permission would be granted.

Translation of Enclosure to the Above.
18th Rabbie. coll. Anul (13th April / 13. April 1843)
desirous

N^o 1925 Contd.Bombay (Letter 18th May 1843. P. 1925)

desires to send the letter I had written, and
by reason of the disturbances no one being willing
to go - and believing it necessary to send the
same, I hired a Buzgarah for 80 Mervans.
It is reported that Abdulrah bin Ahmed has
arrived at Dammam. Mahomed bin Kuteifa and
his brothers and Bar bin Shuy are at Musannah
and are in doubt as to what orders will be
sent by Government. Yesterday Mubarak
bin Kuteifa arrived in his Duteb. By him they
asked news of the Resident he answered, "I have
none, except that a ship has gone to Ras-
sore. I know not with what object. News
have reached that the Monasiv have plun-
dered Guttur since the Inhabitants were
absent. All being with Mahomed bin Ku-
teifa. When they heard of the plunder of their
Country they asked for leave to depart."
It was granted and they have gone - Now
none are left in Bahrain except the
followers

P. 1925

by 8/12/43

N^o 1925 Contd.Bombay (Letter 18th May 1843. P. 1925)

followers of Mahomed bin Kuteifa, and the
Al. has all the tribes of Esar bin Saruf, who
are with these boats at Maharij.

True Translation

Signed / A. B. Hemball

Asst. Secy. Persian Gulf.

True Copy

Signed / A. B. Hemball

Asst. Secy. Persian Gulf.

1926.

Minute by the Honorable the Governor -
subscribed to by the Honorable Board, dated
5th May 1843.

1. Copy of these despatches should
be sent to the Governor General, and Hon-
orable Board of Directors.

2. We have already issued our
instructions as to the course which the fleet
should pursue, consequent on hostilities in
Bahrain.

3. It is desirable that a review
of

N^o 1926 Cont.

Bombay Castle 18th May 1843. Bagdad 19th

of war should be despatched to this quarter for the protection of British Commerce, and to ensure by all means the observance of the Maritime Law.

4. Every effort should be made to obtain redress for the plunder of the vessel under British Colors in the harbor of Musamah.

3rd May
1843

Signed G. Arthur.

" G. H. Anderson.

" J. H. Crawford.

N^o 3176 Cont.

Bombay Castle 26th July 1843 Political Consultation 37.

Office N^o 196 of 1842.

N^o 3176.

Thos. Smith Esq. B. Kimball.

Asst. Resident in Charge.

To, J. P. Willoughby Esq.

Secretary to Government

Bombay.

Sir,

Dated 22nd April 1843.

I have the honor to request as you will have the goodness to obtain the early orders of Government, as to whether permission should be granted to Abdullak bin Ahmed Bawi bin Tareef on the island of Kham, in the event of his asking the same.

1. The Honorable the Governor will have learnt by Colonel Robertson's letter N^o 180, dated 31st October 1842, and its enclosures, the causes and circumstances that led to the late disturbances at Bahrein, and by my letter N^o 51, dated 17th Instant, its result.

2. It is reasonable to expect that Abdullak bin Ahmed will wish to retaliate upon Bawi bin Tareef for the injuries his subjects have received at his hands, and for the recovery of their property plundered by him.

I am

No. 3176 Cont.

Bahrain Castle 26th July 1842. Political Consultation

From the information, I have been able to obtain it appears, that the late Chief has no wish, if even he had the power, to retain the Chief or ship of the island, and it is more than certain that he would not share it with the house of bin Akulaf, an old enemy, to whom he traces the origin of all his misfortunes and even last evening with his tribe from their possession of influence on the island of Bahrain in 1839, and who, once the coalition would, doubtless be powerful, and at the mercy of Abdullah bin Ahmed.

I shall consider it my duty not to hold any communication with, or grant the request of, Abdullah bin Ahmed, until he has complied with my demands restoring the property plundered, and punishing the delinquents in the lands adjoining at Bahrain but, on the being settled, I can see no way open after warning on no pretence whatever to attack or plunder boats on the sea setting aside the just claims of the injured Chief, notwithstanding the weighty reasons for his not being permitted to carry on a war beyond the limits marked out by Government, and on or so near the Persian Coast, from which the island of Keen is only 10 miles distant. I am not however

No. 3176 Cont.

Bahrain Castle 26th July 1842. Political Consultation 27-

that island can however be considered as Persian Territory, no taxes or revenues being paid to or collected in any way exercised over it by that Government.

Residence in the Persian Gulf. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd April 1842. Signed A. B. Kemball, Agent Resident in Charge

No. 3177

I Minors on the 10th inst. the Governor of Bombay by the Board dated 30th June 1842.

I do not think any formal permission should be granted, but as we have adopted the policy of complete neutrality by land we cannot forcibly prevent this Chief resorting to such measures by land against his opponent as he may see fit.

Copy to be sent to the Governor General and Honorable Council.

30th June 1842

Signed. J. Arthur,

J. W. Anderson,

J. H. Crawford,

No. 3179 Contd.

Bombay Castle 26th July 1843 Political Consultation

Translation of a letter from Hajee Gassim A. Agent at Bahrein to the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 21st Rabiul Awwal 22nd April.

A. G. I have been honored by the receipt of your letter the contents have been understood. With reference to your orders respecting the list of the property belonging to Sheikh Taher bin Aboon that I should collect information and report to you the people and merchants of Bahrein are in great misery in consequence of Esai bin Tharief having on the 18th inst. informed the inhabitants of Muscat that he would allow them three days to leave the town with all their property that they might proceed either to Bahrah or Qutier that no one should be permitted to remain small or great rich or poor that after this announcement if any should remain they would not be spared. The people therefore are in much confusion since he desires to destroy Muscat. He has taken possession of all the boats and property belonging,

Rgt

16

L. M. H.

No. 3179 Contd.

Bombay Castle 26th July 1843 Political Consultation 27

to Abdullah bin Ahmed and has embarked on some of the people in his own boats and some have of their own accord gone to Monamah. I will make enquiries as soon as possible regarding the property above mentioned. Mohammed bin Shaleef and his brothers are at Monamah. Nothing has taken place among them worthy of reporting.

News from Kasep are that Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed is in Dammam has drawn up his boats on shore and is quiet. No news have reached from Muscat.

True Translation

Signed A. B. Hamball

Official Resident in charge.

(True Copy)

Signed A. B. Hamball

Official Resident in charge.

N^o. 3272 Cont^dBombay Castle 26th July 1843 P.M. Cons. 27.Office N^o. 213 of 1843

From

Lieutenant A. D. Humboldt

Maj. Resident in Charge

Bushire

To

J. P. Willoughby Esquire

Secretary to Government

Bombay.

Dated Bushire 29th April 1843

Secret Department.

Sir,

I have the honor to enclose for
the information of Government a translation
of a letter this day received from Abdullah
bin

N^o. 3273N^o. 3273 Cont^dBombay Castle 26th July 1843 P.M. Cons. 27

bin Ahmed Late Chief of Bahrain -

2. With reference to his Complaint that
he had been attacked clandestinely without any
proclamation of War, and that he had obtained
a promise from me, when departed by Colonel
Robertson to visit Bushire and the Arabian
Coast in November 1842 that his enemies should
not be allowed to attack him until the return
of his Vessels and Male Subjects from their tra-
ding Voyages - Government have been made aware
by Colonel Robertson's letters in the Political Sta-
pachment N^o. 100. 196 dated 25th October and 25th No-
vember 1842 and their enclosures that the prin-
cipal object of my visit to his island was to
announce to him in a formal manner, on the
part of the Resident, the intention which Earl
bin Tarif and Rasheed bin Hamad bin Jaber
had intimated of attacking him - no answer
was given by Colonel Robertson to his request
referred to Government / made through me,
and again once or twice through the Matins
against Hajia Jassir, so that his personal
security

N. 3273 Cont.

Bombay Castle 26th July 1843. P.M. Consul 37.

Security must have been guaranteed upon the belief that silence gave consent.

A brief from Khatiffa brought the report, that the three heads of the Coalition have already (as anticipated) fallen out regarding the division of the spoil. It is impossible however to make any surmise as to the probable result. I tried shortly to be able to lay before Government a full and true, and I hope more satisfactory account of the state of affairs on the island of Bahrein.

(Residence in the Peninsula) I have the honour of
Dushore 29th April 1843 } signed, A.D. Hambro
Asst. Resident in Charge

Translation of a letter from Abdulla bin Ahmed Late Sheik of Bahrein to the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 16th Rabi'ul 1st 1240, i.e. 1st April.

A.B. I told your envoy who came to me in the two wasted ships on the subject of my quarrel with Qasim bin Jassim and his

O.K.

N. 3273 Cont.

Bombay Castle 26th July 1843 P.M. Consul 37.

Dushore bin Rasmah that they were desirous of creating a disturbance on the coast, in connection with Mahomed bin Khalifa. I also said that I was your friend and held an agreement with you that no injury should be allowed to reach me by Chanderline or means that all my boats had sailed for India, Malabar and Laccare and in them all my male subjects.

He answered that no injury should be received by me from them and vice versa and that he had forbidden the parties accordingly that when my boats arrived he would consider the case and appoint me as to permission being granted or not. The answer was given in the presence of your agent Hajia Jassim when the ships went away. I remained satisfied in security and permitted my remaining boats

N. 3273 Cont.

Bombay Castle 26th July 1843 P.M. 6 o'clk 27.

to leave. Afterwards Mohamed bin Khe-
lafa came from Sooneyan among the
people of Guttur and sent to the
island of Ques (Honn) for assistance.
His people joined him at Guttur, and
attacked me without proclaiming war. I
have suffered defeat by reason of the
absence of my ships. As God willed
as it happened. The news has
already reached you. I hope you will
not approve of such acts performed with-
out your order or knowledge. At
present Mohamed Khulafa is in the
place, Morumash, and Ene bin
Tarief has seized my boats, I
your

Bombay Castle 26th July 1843. P.M. 6 o'clk.

Your friend, am in hopes you will cause
him to release my boats - since I was
in the fort and surrendered myself they
promised to restore all my property -
when I left for Dammam I gave my
boats into the charge of my family
and to the Mercy of God. - they have
taken possession of them - my hopes are
rested on you - I confide in God and
yourself -

True translation

1 Signed, A. B. Kemball

Assistant Resident in Charge
[True Copy]

1 Signed, A. B. Kemball
Asst. Resident in Charge

No. 4432 Cont.

Bombay Castle 11th October 1842 Political Consultation 38.

Office No. 105 of 1842

Cons. No. 106 of 1842.

No. 4432.

From, Lieutenant A. R. Kimball,

Special Resident in the Persian Gulf and Oman.

To, J. P. Willoughby, Esq.,
Secretary to Government
Bombay.Dated Bushire 2nd Sept. 1842.

Sir,

I have the honor to enclose for the information of Government, translations of a letter from the agent at Bahrain, giving the news of that Island up to 21st Williams, also translations of a letter from Sheikh Jabir, Governor of Kuwait, relative to his proceeding for the purpose of establishing a peace by mediation between the contending chiefs Abdullah bin Ahmed and Mohamed bin & R. Charlespa and my reply thereto.

2. Sheikh Jabir, perfectly aware, I would think, with myself, that to mediate a peace between the parties was hopeless from the conflicting views and interests of the subordinates on either side, between whom, I fear, an irreconcilable hatred now exists.

No. 4432. Cont.

Bombay Castle 11th October 1842 Political Consultation

exists - and unprepared or unwilling to engage actively in the cause of one or the other, refrained from any interference whatever, although, as it would appear, several times solicited by letter - Finding now however, that Abdullah bin Ahmed, his relative, reduced to the last extremity is no longer able to resist; his winning a generous disposition of stopping us to save him from further degradation; and, if possible, to obtain his release, that he may return with him to Kuwait for this, I have decided from what I heard of his letter, a respectable and intelligent man, is object in the event of mediation failing.

3. On these grounds, and with full confidence in Sheikh Jabir's acknowledged peaceable character, I did not hesitate to acquiesce in the proposal contained in his letter, hinting, however, that his proceeding should be confined to mediation alone and not be permitted to assume the appearance of hostilities towards Mohamed bin R. Charlespa, now allied

No. 1432 Contd

11th
 Bombay Castle 11th October 1843 Political Consultation

allied if not subject to the Wahabee & Rashers; for it is improbable that the aspirations, of the latter was secured without a promise at least on the part of the former of some substantial return perhaps in the shape of an annual tribute such as was formerly exacted by Foully.

His Highness the Sonnu has apparently, ever cherished designs upon Bahrain in the hope of adding that fertile island to the list of his possessions; and the execution of these has hitherto been frustrated by the determined and successful resistance of Abdullah bin Ahmed. The latest disclosures of this chief and the disordered state of affairs added to the circumstances of his aid, having been admitted afford now a very favorable opportunity for active interference on his part, and thereby eventually, perhaps, should the British Government or the Wahabee Ruler not interpose, the attainment of his much desired object. - Emir bin Tarif has I would believe invited him to make the attempt, and is prepared to join his standard whenever

No. 1432 Contd

11th
 Bombay Castle 11th October 1843 Political Consultation

whenever he may find his opportunity.

Should on the other hand should Jabir succeed in mediating even a temporary peace - The Sonnu's interference will be recalled for, Emir bin Tarif, as before made known to a Government at least as much the enemy of Mohammed bin Khalifa as of Abdullah bin Ahmed he thrown out, and the influence of the Wahabee Ruler become merely nominal.

With such results to be gained. I beg to assure you that I shall not fail to give cordial assistance to should Jabir when my mediation is solicited by both the contending parties, or any good can be anticipated from my proceeding to Bahrain taking care in no way to guarantee or compromise Government.

Residency in the Port of Gulf. I have the honor to be,
 Dear Sir, 3rd September 1843, signed J. A. R. Mansfield

1843. - Asst. Resident Port of Gulf.
 in charge.

Translated

Bt

No. 1432. Contd.

Bombay Castle 11th October 1843 Political Consultation D.D.

Translated Extract of a letter from Hajji Jassim, Agent at Bushair, to Lieutenant W. B. Kempt, Agent Resident in the Persian Gulf in charge dated 21st Rajab 21st August A.C. On the 20th Rajab arrived Bushair bin Kamal's dhows from Suwayh, in her a man of Syed Souweyeh the son of Syed Saad the bearer of letters to the address of Sayyid Tarif one letter also from Syed Saad himself at Suwayh to Sayyid, saying, I shall arrive at Muscat at the commencement of the Dhu'l-Hijjah. I have directed Syed Souweyeh my son to supply whatever boats, money or you may require. Syed Souweyeh has written my father has directed me to supply whatever you may consider necessary in boats etc.

On the coast reaching Sayyid Tarif and his reading this letter he dispatched them to Mahomed bin Khalefa who has made himself acquainted with their contents.

On the 21st Instant news reached from Kutiff that Mahomed bin Abdullah and Hajji Bushab came from Dammam to Simla a village subject to Bahrain near

at the present

Abdullah bin
of 20-20

No. 1432. Contd.

Bombay Castle 11th October 1843 Political Consultation

near Kutiff, having been sent by Abdullah bin Ahmed to bring the boat belonging to the people of Suwayh; and, on arrival, gave orders that three should be furnished. The inhabitants of Simla's wrote to the Governor of Kutiff Abdullah Muddawar, that Mahomed and Hajji had come to take their boats to Dammam, and that they could not refuse upon this. The Governor sent 60 men who seized and carried them away to Kutiff.

News have also reached that a boat had come from Singa and her Ali bin Abdullah with 15 men of the Abu Samah tribe, desiring to go to Dammam on reaching approach to that place they saw that they were blockaded by boats. Ali therefore landed with his men (elsewhere).

Report of the circumstance was dispatched to the Governor of Kutiff who sent and seized them also. This occurred on the same day of the capture of Hajji and Mahomed.

The Government placed them all in the fort of Kutiff and sending accounts to Sayyid is now awaiting his orders.

Abdullah

N: 1432 Cont.

Bombay Castle 11th October 1842 Political Consultation 32.

Abdullah bin Ahmed is surrounded in the citadel of Dammam which place is blockaded by us. They say he has written a few only of the *Revue des Indes*.

True Translated Extract

(signed) A. B. Kimball,

Asst^t President in charge

(True Copy)

(signed) A. B. Kimball,

Asst^t President

Translation of a letter from Sharikh al-Jabir of Rowiat to Asst^t A. B. Kimball, Asst^t President in the Persian Gulf in a charge dated 27th Rajab, 26th August 1842.

A. C. What has passed between my friends Abdullah bin Ahmed and his nephew up to the present time is not hidden from you. I used to say that the uncle and nephew knew best their own interests and I am not biased in favor of either. But all of them are well men of the same weight in the scales. Now they have increased the number of their letters home, and such as yourself will know arab affairs and customs &

I have

N: 1432. Cont.

Bombay Castle 11th October 1842 Political Consultation

I have therefore no alternatives but to proceed and make peace between the parties since it has become apparent to me that they desire to be dependent on Bin & Saood / the Wahabee Ruler Deyan bin Saood / and whenever they do become so dependent no authority / fact / will remain in their hands.

You know the plans of Bin Saood and what will be the consequences - I will do nothing until I have given you information.

You best know what I should desire to explain.

I hope that you will write me an answer and continue to bear me in mind.

Whatever commands you may have will certainly be attended to.

True Translation

(signed) A. B. Kimball

Asst^t President in charge

Reply to the above by Lieutenant A. B. Kimball Asst^t President in charge dated 01st August 1842

A. C. It was with the greatest pleasure I received your letter wherein -

you

AB

J. H.

No. 1432. Cont.

Bombay Castle 11th October 1843 Political Consultation 38

your intimate & your intention of proceeding to Bahrain for the purpose of establishing a peace by mediation between the belligerent parties and I was greatly gratified at your having referred for my opinion and advice.

I know your well known character as at all times desirous for peace I am fully persuaded that no person is so well suited as yourself as commanding the respect and attention of both parties to bring about as desirable an end, but it is, I fear, hopeless, never the less since it is right that no means should be left undried and moreover the Blessing of God attending all Peace Making I conceive that you should as you are willing make the attempt which although it proves unsuccessful cannot fail to strengthen the good opinion entertained of you by all around as well as by the British Government.

I have learnt from your Envoy that you are apprized of the state of affairs at Bahrain up to the latest date of the news I have received it is therefore needless

to

No. 1432. Cont.

Bombay Castle 11th October 1843 Political Consultation

to recapitulate.

Many and great difficulties will of course present themselves in forwarding the work in which you propose to engage. These are not confined to the dispute between Abdullah bin Ahmed and Mahomed bin Khalifa themselves. The views and interests of their dependents clash - on the one side the colonel - yes; on the other, the sons.

I need not add that I feel assured you will confine your acts to mediation alone and not permit them to assume a warlike character as such cannot fail to lead to difficulties, and perhaps embroil you with the Ruler of medja.

True Translation
Signed A. B. Remballe,
Agent Resident in charge

True copies
Signed A. B. Remballe,
Agent Resident.

unt
A. B. Remballe

Office No 379 of 1846.

Cons: No 94 of 1846

To,

A. Malek Beg.

Secretary to the Government.

Bombay.

Bushire 20th October 1846

Political Department

S. L. B. for 1846.

See Page 365 I have herewith the honor to transmit
for

470

for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council the accompanying translations of two letters from the Agent at Bahrain dated respectively the 27th Ullinn and 11th Ahsanin commencing in detail the state of affairs in that quarter, and the particulars of the hostilities now carrying on between the Shuk of Bahrain and the Governor of Katar. Two actions had taken place on shore near Staraboot. In the first the Bahrain Troops were victorious, but in the second, falling into an ambushade they were worsted. The blockade appears to be maintained with great strictness. I am sorry to notice from the report of the Agent, there is reason to believe that a Vessel from Soor and one from Khaw had a quantity of dates taken out of them. It is probable they were attempting to force the blockade or to carry away more cargo than they had agreed to do. But as it is represented, that they had entered Starab before the place was invested I think a free passage should have been allowed them. I have written to the Bahrain Shuk upon the subject and have pointed out to him how detrimental to his interests it must prove if these proceedings should interrupt the commercial relations at present subsisting between himself and the Maritime Chiefs of Oman.

The measures now adopted by the Bahrain Shuk must I think soon bring their affairs

471

affairs with Amoor. I trust to see success, and will authorize the Wahabee Ruler to come down to the coast with a force sufficiently large to attempt the re-establishment of the Ex-Chief Shuk Abdoolah in Bahrain or else to agree to their terms. It is most likely he will be obliged to adopt the latter alternative, in which case, after such an evident proof of his inability to coerce, there little prospect will remain of his obtaining the payment of the annual tribute promised as the condition of his aid in expelling the old Chief.

I have the honor to be Sir
Yours faithfully
J. Hennell
Resident of

Enclosure No. 1.

Translated Extract of a letter from the Agent at Bahrain to Major Hennell Resident in the Persian Gulf dated the 27th September 1846

By arrivals from Starab I learn that before the feet of Ally ben Shulofa and Saab ben Saif arrived in that neighbourhood, the vessels belonging to Soor and Oman had entered the Port. The Oman Boats were allowed to quit without any opposition. The Kakhodas of 4 Soor Vessels waited upon the Bahrain Shuk, and asked permission to pass out. They were told they could not be permitted to do so with barges, as they were at War with Starab.

472

Statef. The Mahomedas urged in reply, that they had arrived before the blockade was established, and having made advances on account of Statef, they could not now recover their money. Nothing was settled when I last heard from that quarter. Sheikh Isa ben Saif, having boarded two Oman boats found two letters from the Governor of Statef, one addressed to Sheikh Sallam ben Saggia requesting assistance, and the other to himself, begging either his friendly interference to make up matters with the Bahraini Sheikh, or else to keep himself out of the quarrel. He sent a reply to the effect, he was willing to do so on two conditions. One that the Statef Sheikh would restore their possessions to the Amara, and the second that he would not afford an asylum to Sheikh Abdullah ben Ahmed.

On the 25th September the Bahraini Sheikhs landed their troops at Lihoot. In the action which ensued the Amara had a man killed and 4 wounded of the Statef men who were defeated 4 were killed and 10 wounded. A man who swam off from the shore having informed the blockading ships that Statef was denuded of troops, they intended to land and attack that place. Sheikh Abdullah is in Duman, where his two Bateets are drawn up. No collision has yet taken place between him and his rivals. But Isa ben Saif went one night

473

night in a small boat, and having ascended close up to the Bateet, found there was not water enough for larger vessels to approach. Letters have been received from the Governor of Bahrah Ahmed Saif, offering his mediation between the Bahraini Sheikhs and the chief of Statef. In reply they informed him that they would enter into no arrangements so long as Mudawar remained in Statef and Sheikh Abdullah ben Ahmed in Duman. I enclose a letter to your address from Sheikh Mahomed ben Thulefa. I have recovered about a quarter of a Bahraini maund of Copper Sheathing which I have forwarded to you by Mahomed Ahmed Musoor.

True translated Extract.
(Signed) / S. Kennell.
Resident of

Enclosure No. 2

Translated substance of a letter from the Agent at Bahrah to Major Kennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 11th October 1846.

A. C. On the 5th instant intelligence was received from Statef, that an action had been fought between the Amara, and the people of that place in Lihoot. It appears that the Amara had made several landings, to cut down the water trees, without any notice being

474
being taken from Khatif. At last however, a body of
men was placed in Ashub, by the Government. The Leman
having landed as usual, was attacked by the concealed
troops, and in the fight which took place, they lost
12 men killed, besides others wounded. After having
been sent from the Vents, the Leman immediately left and
Man was killed on the Khatif side.

The four Vents have arrived in Bahrain.
without interruption, excepting that after arriving,
permission to pass from Ali bin Khalifa, they were
boarded by the Leman, who took from them about 20
small Bags of Dates, which they carried to their own
Island. When Shaik Ali heard of it, he sent a boat to
their place to recover the Dates, about half was brought
back. The Shaik remonstrated with the Leman for the
proceeding, and apologized to the people of Soor. The
Leman boat having taken on board their cargo left
Khatif before the Bahrain Shaik arrived off that place.
Then that Mahomed bin Mahud, who has lately arrived
at Bahrain, reports, that the son of Sultan bin Bawli
an inhabitant of Man, was met by a Vent, which
took out of him 200 small Bags of Dates. The Mahud
remonstrated with the Shaik, but met with only abuse
and insult. Such is the report of Mahomed bin Mahud.
Four Leman Boats having arrived they have been
sent to the Shaik not to proceed to that Port as it
is the Port. Others have proceeded direct without
touching

475
touching at Bahrain. A Native of Ormuz named Khatif
bin Man has come here and states that having gone
towards Khatif, he met Mahomed bin Ali, eldest son
chief of the Leman and inquired whether he should
proceed into that place, or return. He was told he could
not be allowed to enter. Before leaving, he says, his boat
was boarded by the son of Mahomed, who took from them
a sword, dagger and 10 pieces, without their
having committed any fault. I have detained the Shaik
of the Leman brought for sale by Mahomed Khumari
from Bushahr. He says they were delivered to him
for sale by a Banjaw who got them from Bombay.
They now await your orders.

(Translated Substance)
(Signed) S. Hamid
President.

610

Office No. 301 of 1847—
 Date No. 120 of 1847—

Residence in the Persian Gulf
 Bushire 1st December 1847;

H. M. Esq.

Secretary to Government.

Bombay.

Political Department.

Sir,

Enclosed I have the honor to forward
 for

611

1/2/3/

for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council.
 the accompanying translated extracts of letters dated the
 9th 19th and 21st November from the Native Agent at Bah-
 rain reporting the death of Sheikh Isai ben Ismail, in an
 action fought on the main land near Hawar between
 his troops and those under the personal command of
 Sheikh Mahomed ben Khalifa the chief of Bahrein.
 It appears that on the Bidda side eighty individuals were
 killed, including ten of the principal men of Sheikh Isai
 Isai. On the side of the Bahrein, Sheikh Isai only ten fell. After
 the action the wounded men of Bidda, were embarked in
 two boats and sent to that place, which, I learn by latest
 information has since surrendered to Sheikh Mahomed ben Khalifa.
 The Medgal troops furnished to the Bahrein chief, by
 the Wahabee Numan Aguli order appear contrary to expecta-
 tion to have acted with fidelity and bravery. The old Ex-
 chief of Bahrein was not present in the action, he having
 gone over to the Persian coast, it is said, in order, to ob-
 tain refuge for converts. In doing this, he has violated the
 understanding upon which he was permitted to act, hos-
 tility against Bahrein.

Although I cannot but regret the
 death of a person of such superior energy and char-
 acter as the late Sheikh Isai, it is satisfactory to know
 that the success of the Bahrein chief by confirming
 and consolidating his power will tend finally to the
 maintenance

Shihs are more numerous and they are being daily re-
inforced from Biddah and Kutif.

Al-Husseini has this day arrived from Songah
which had fallen in with Shihs Abdullah bin Ah.
med with two butels and a buggarah opposite
to the island of Shihs Shaail on his way to Mahond.
for the purpose of obtaining men and equipping his
people of Biddah having sent a buggarah
to him with letters pressing him to join them with-
out delay.

True translated extracts-
(Signed) A. B. Kimball.
Assistant Resident of B.

Enclosure No. 3.

Translation of a letter from Hijer Jassim, Agent at Bah.
Binn dated 12th Rabi-ul-Thani 1287.

A. B. I beg to report intelligence of the
Shihs. At pleased God and they encountered on the
12th Rabi-ul-Thani on which day Shihs Bai bin Jacef was
killed and the people of Biddah were completely
defeated and of them were slain to the number of
80 men including ten persons of note of the family
of Al Ali, of the tribe of Bai bin Jacef. of the forces
of the family of Khulafa were killed 10 men. The
combat lasted half the day and very many of the
people of Biddah were wounded. whom the Shihs
(of Bahrain) embarked in two vessels and sent to
Biddah and wrote letters to the Biddah Authorities.

ties

the saying "God has decided matters between us and Bai
bin Jacef has been killed as you have seen. Should any
be for us and desire to save themselves let them approach
us and they and theirs are safe without question except the
family of Al Ali, of the tribe of Bai they are not included in
this amnesty" and they sent these communications to the
people of Biddah and so in like manner they sent letters
of rejoicing by a Buggarah to Bahrain and on the receipt of
this intelligence the inhabitants were glad and spirits
were fired and the country was tranquilized. Busheer
bin Ramah has now sent messengers to Najaf and
letters announcing the glad tidings to Sakah and Kufah
of the occurrence of events and of the victory of the Shihs.
The country is now quiet and the inhabitants are relieved
of their fears. they have now only to learn from Biddah
what will be their answer. whether they will resign their
authority and country into the hands of Shihs Mahomed
bin Khulafa or refuse to do so. Should they tender sub-
mission there will then be no further disturbance and
apparently they have no other resource but to yield as
there was no one (of consequence) amongst them but Shihs
Bai and he is dead. Busheer bin Ramah has written to
the Authorities of Kutif and Sakah not to send any
forces whatever not even one man and should troops
have been assembled to disband them as the affair was
settled and it remained but to await intelligence
from Biddah. that should be satisfactory.

All

all operations would cease.

True translation.

Signed J. B. Kimball.
Assistant Resident &c.

1.14

British influence:
slave trade agreements, 1847-1856;
Muhammad b. Khalifah's request for
British protection, 1849

No. 3.

TRANSLATION OF AN AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY SHAIKH
MAHOMED BIN KHALIFAH, CHIEF OF BAHRAIN, FOR THE
ABOLITION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE, 1847.

It having been intimated to me by Major Hennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, that certain conventions have lately been entered into by His Highness the Imam of Maskat and other powers with the British Government for the purpose of preventing the exportation of slaves from the African Coast and elsewhere, and it having, moreover, been explained to me that, in order to the full attainment of the objects contemplated by the aforesaid conventions, the concurrence and co-operation of the Chiefs of the several ports, situated on the Arabian Coast of the Persian Gulf are required, accordingly I, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmeo tribe, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels and those belonging to my subjects or dependants; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurrum A. H. 1264 (or 10th December A.D. 1847).

And I do further consent that whenever the cruizers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels or those belonging to my subjects or dependants, suspected of being engaged in slave trade, they may detain and search them, and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa, or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatever, they (the Government cruizers) shall seize and confiscate the same.

Dated this 22nd Jamadi-ool-Awal 1263 or 8th May 1847.

Z. B.

SHAIKH MAHOMED BIN KHALIFAH.

معاهدة الشيخ محمد بن خليفة حاكم البحرين في ترك

معاملة الرقيق سنة ١٨٤٧

بسم الله

بملاحظة ما ان جناب عاليجاه ذي الشرفه والجلال الا جل الا فخم منجره من ملاب بالير
خليج فارس اخبرنا ان هذا الا قام قد جرى بعض المعاهدات فيما بين الدولة العلية الانكليزية و جناب
الا فخم السيد سعيد امام بندر مسقط وغيره من الدول في توقيف حمل ونقل العبيد من سواحل
بر الانريقية وغيرها وايضا اتفق لنا ان مرافقة مشايخ سواحل بر العرب من الخليج الفارس و اهلهم
لا تجاوز تمام مطلب تلك المعاهدة المذكورة ضرورة لازمة فلا جل ذلك انا يا محمد بن خليفة شيخ
البحرين لا ستحكم روابط الا اتحاد الكان فيما بيني وبين جناب حضرة السركار ذي الشرفه والجلال
الا فخر الا فخم اتعهد والتزم علي نفسي ان امنع جميع الخشابي والخشاب رعايلي والمتعلقين علي
من حمل ونقل العبيد من سواحل بر الانريقية وغيرها و ابتداء الممنع من غرة شهر محرم سنة ١٢٩٣
مطابق عاشر ذمبير سنة ١٨٤٧ ثم اتقبل ايضاً متى ما لاقت المراكب الدولة العلية الانكليزية
الخشابي والخشاب رعايلي والمتعلقين علي ويظنون بهم انهم مشغولين في تجارة العبيد ان
يتمنئهم ويفتشروهم في الحالة التي يجدون احدى الا خشاب المذكورة مخالفة للمعاهدة
المذكورة في حمل العبيد من سواحل بر الانريقية وغيرها باي عذر وسبب يتبصرها و يضطرها
جرى ذلك في ٢٢ جمادي الاول سنة ١٢٩٣ مطابق ثامن مي ١٨٤٧ -

محمد بن خليفة

No. 3.

No. 4.

TRANSLATION OF A FURTHER ENGAGEMENT ENTERED INTO
BY SHAIKH MAHOMED BIN KHALIFAH, WITH THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT, FOR THE MORE EFFECTUAL SUPPRESSION
OF THE SLAVE TRAFFIC, 1856.

It having been notified to me by Captain Jones, Resident in the Persian Gulf, that an article was omitted to be inserted in the Conventions entered into by the Maritime Chiefs of the Arabian Coast and Oman with the British Government for the purpose of prohibiting the importation of, and traffic in, slaves, which Convention on my part bears date the 22nd Jamadi-ul-Awal 1263 A. H.—8th May 1847, accordingly I, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khalifah, Chief of Bahrain, do hereby engage and bind myself (purely out of friendship to the Sirear, and to assist it in effectually attaining the object it desires) to put into execution the said article.

The article is this :

Whosoever it shall become known and certain that from any quarter whatsoever slaves have been brought to my territories, or to any places subject to my authority, I, of my own free will and accord, will seize the said slaves and deliver them over to the British vessels of war. Further, should it be ascertained that slaves have been carried in any of my vessels or in the vessels of people, my subjects or dependents and it should happen that the Government cruizers did not fall in with the said vessels then, no matter where the slaves have been landed, do I hereby bind myself to place an embargo upon the delinquent boat and her Nakhoda until such time as instructions have been received from the Resident at Bushiro regarding them.

Dated this 15th day of Ramzan A. H. 1272 (or 10th day of May 1856 A.D.).

SHAIKH MAHOMED BIN KHALIFAH.

No. 4.

معاهدة ملحقة لأجل منع فعال للتجارة الرقيق سنة ١٨٥٦ ع -

حيث ان جناب عالي الجاه ذي الشركة والجلال الا فخم الا شيم القبطان جوزس صاحب
باليرز خليج فارس قد اخبرنا ان الا رزاق الا لنظام التي اعطرها مشايخ سواحل عمان لجناب حضرة
السركار ذي الا فخم من جهة منع جلب الخدم والمعاملة بين المورقة ب ٢٢ جمادي الاول
سنة ١٢٧٣ مطابق ٨ مئي سنة ١٨٣٧ لم يدرج فيها شرط واحد فلما جل ذلك انا يا محمد بن
خليفه شيخ البحرين اتعهد و التزم علي نفسي لدرعات مداقة جناب حضرة السركار الا فخم
و المرافقة لتكميل مطلب خاطره الشريف اجراء ذلك الشرط و هو هذا بانه متي ما اتضع و
تحقق توصيل الخدم الى البلدان و المصالح المتعلقة علي من اي ناحية كانت فاعرف و رغبة
مني اقبضهم واسلمهم للمراكب السركارية و ان صار معلوما كانت محمولة في الخشابي و الخشاب
رعائبي و المتعلقة علي و من الا اتفاق ما وقعت عليها المراكب السركارية هي ابي لاحية نزلتها
فالترزم الي لمجر تلك الخشبة و نرخذها عن السفر الى ان يصل الحكم عليها من جناب عالي
الجاه الا فخم الا شيم البا ليرز صاحب هذا و الله تعالي خير شاهد و وكيل - جوي و حرر ١٥ رمضان
سنة ١٢٧٢ (١٠ مئي ١٨٥٦)

محمد بن خليفه حاكم البحرين

Open, N^o 66 of 1849

Cons. N^o 2 of 1849

From, Major Kennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To, A. A. Hall Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government,
Bombay,
Bashire 28 February 1849.

Secret Department
Sir

I have the honour to report for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council that on the 24th Instant a boat arrived from Bahrein having been specially despatched by Sheikh Alla and his kinsmen the chief of that Island, for the purpose of bringing a communication to my address from himself dated the 9th Instant, of which the accompanying is a copy and translation. By the same opportunity a high Castle of War both was sent by the Sheikh as a present.

The apparent object of Sheikh Alla Mohamed's letter is to declare himself a British subject. On first perusing this document, it struck me, the expressions used by the Sheikh might be employed by him in the most unusual mode of Eastern compliment and exaggeration for the purpose of enticing the exercise of my influence in his behalf to induce the late seceders from Bahrein to return to their homes. On reference however to a letter from Major Jaffer in our Agent at that Island I found that the propositions made by Sheikh Mohamed.

Mahomed, to place himself under the British Government, had been debated in an assembly of the principal members of his family and apparently unanimously agreed to.

In my reply dated the 21st January 1848 to a suggestion from the Right Honble the Governor-in-Chief, as conveyed in your despatch No. 555 under dated the 14th December 1847, regarding the formation of a treaty of alliance with the Sheikh of Bahrein, I ventured to submit the reasons which appeared to me to weigh against the policy of entering at that time into more intimate relations with this personage. Although I am still disinclined to alter the opinion I then expressed, I think it right to observe, that the question now presents itself in another point of view, than that which existed at the time it was laid before Government. Before originating a proposition for an alliance on our part, and the spontaneous offer of placing himself under the authority of Great Britain, now made by Sheikh Mahomed himself, lies a material difference; so much so, that in my reply to the Bahrein chief, I have intimated that a point of such importance cannot be decided upon by any subordinate authority, and therefore I have submitted his desire to become a British subject, for the consideration and decision of the Government.

Now I quite satisfied that in case of his proposition being rejected, Sheikh Mahomed ben Khalifa would rest content

in his present position as an independent chief. I should have no hesitation in repeating my decided opinion that the inconveniences attending a closer connexion with him, would outweigh the advantages arising from such an arrangement. It is however evident from the tenor of the Sheikh's letter, that he is strongly impressed by the tranquil and flourishing condition of Kuwait and the Commercial Ports on the Persian coast; the first as a dependency of the Ottoman Porte; the last, as subject to the Persian Government. He is too proud and self-sufficient to see, that the peace and prosperity enjoyed by those towns, arise altogether from the mild and just sway exercised over them by their respective chiefs, and not from their connexion with Turkey or Persia. At the same time it must be admitted, that either of those Powers would be only too happy to accept the offer of Bahrein being placed under its rule, and although the Porte could do little towards maintaining peace and security on that Island, there can be no question that the Persian Government by refusing an asylum on its coasts to the malecontents and seceders from Bahrein, might greatly check, if it did not altogether put a stop to the Cabals and intrigues now supposed to be in operation for the subversion of the rule of Sheikh Mahomed ben Khalifa, and the restoration of that of his Grand uncle, Sheikh Abdollah ben Ahmed. It may be necessary to observe, that the circumstances of Bahrein becoming a Persian, or Turkish dependency

dependency, would not be without its embarrassments; while it certainly would diminish our influence in the Gulf.

5 On the other hand, it is I think equally certain, were it once publicly proclaimed, that by the unanimous desire of the chief and inhabitants of Bahrein that Island had become a British dependency or even taken under the protection of England, all the Seceders of every rank and class would speedily and willingly return to their native land; feeling secure that not only would they be held forth safe from the risk of foreign aggression, but that no acts of oppression or injustice on the part of their local rulers would be tolerated for the future. Under such a change of circumstances I cannot doubt that Bahrein would speedily recover its former flourishing and prosperous condition.

6 I have now attempted to lay before the Right Honble the Governor in Council, both sides of the question. It will remain for the Government to decide whether the loss of our influence, likely to accrue in this quarter from the contingency of Bahrein becoming a dependency of either Persia or Turkey, is of sufficient importance to counterbalance the trouble and embarrassment which may arise from accepting the proposition of the chief of that Island that he should henceforth be considered a subject of Great Britain. It is with diffidence and some hesitation I venture to add, that my own opinion inclines to the negative.

2^d

L. H.

7 In submitting for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council a translation of my reply dated the 28th Instant, to Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifa.

Residency in the P^{er} Gulf.
Bushire 28th February
1849.

I have the honor to be Sir
Yours faithfully
S. Herriott
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Transcription of previous document

Office No 66 of 1849

Cons No 2 of 1849

From

Major Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To

A. Malet Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government,
Bombay

Bushire 28 February 1849.

Secret Department

Sir,

1. I have the honour to report for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council, that on the 24th instant a boat arrived from Bahrein having been specially despatched by Sheikh Mahomed bin Khuleefa, the Chief of that Island, for the purpose of bringing a communication to my address from himself dated the 9th instant, of which the accompanying is a copy and translation. By the same opportunity a high caste Arab colt was sent by the Sheikh as a present.

2. The apparent object of Sheikh Mahomed's letter is to declare himself a British subject. On first perusing this document, it struck me, the expressions used by the Sheikh might be employed by him in the not unusual mode of Eastern compliment and exaggeration for the purpose of enlisting the exercise of my influence in his behalf, to induce the late Seceders from Bahrain to return to their homes. On reference however to a letter from Hajie Jassein our Agent at that Island, I found that the proposition made by Sheikh Mahomed, to place himself under the British Government, had been debated in an assembly of the principal members of his family, and apparently unanimously agreed to.

3. In my reply dated the 21st January 1848 to a suggestion from the Right Honble the Governor in Council, as conveyed in your despatch No 535 under date the 11th December 1847, regarding the formation of a treaty of alliance with the Sheikh of Bahrein, I ventured to submit the reasons which appeared to me to weigh against the policy of entering at that time, into more intimate relations with this personage. Although I am still disinclined to alter the opinion I then expressed, I think it right to observe that the question now presents itself in another point of view, than that which existed at the time it was laid before Government. Between originating a proposition for an alliance on our part, and the spontaneous offer of placing himself under the authority of Great Britain, now made by Sheikh Mahomed himself, lies a material difference, so much so, that in my reply to the Bahrein Chief, I have intimated that a point of such importance cannot be decided upon by any subordinate authority, and therefore I have submitted his desire to become a British subject for the consideration and decision of the Government.

4. Were I quite satisfied that in case of his proposition being rejected, Sheikh Mahomed bin Khuleefa would rest content in his present position as an independent Chief, I should have no hesitation in repeating my decided opinion that the inconvenience attending a closer connexion with him, would outweigh the advantages arising from such an arrangement. It is however evident from the tenor of the Sheikh's letter, that he is strongly impressed by the

tranquil and flourishing condition of Koweit and the commercial Ports on the Persian Coast; the first as a dependency of the Ottoman Porte; the last, as subject to the Persian Government. He is too proud and self-sufficient to see that the peace and prosperity enjoyed by those Towns, arise altogether from the mild and just sway exercised over them by their respective chiefs, and not from their connexion with Turkey or Persia. At the same time it must be admitted that either of these Powers would be only too happy to accept the offer of Bahrein being placed under its authority, and although the Porte could do little towards maintaining peace and security on that Island, there can be no question that the Persian Government by refusing an asylum on its coasts to the malcontents and seceders from Bahrein, might greatly check, if it did not altogether put a stop, to the Cabals and intrigues now supposed to be in operation for the subversion of the rule of Sheikh Mahomed bin Khuleefa and the restoration of that of his Grand Uncle, Sheikh Abdoolah bin Ahmed. It may be necessary to observe that the circumstance of Bahrein becoming a Persian or Turkish dependency, would not be without its embarrassments, while it certainly would diminish our influence in the Gulf.

5. On the other hand, it is I think equally certain, were it once publicly proclaimed, that by the unanimous desire of the Chief, and inhabitants of Bahrein, that Island had become a British dependency or even taken under the protection of England, all the seceders of every rank and class, would speedily and willingly return to their native land; feeling secure that not only would they be henceforth safe from the risk of foreign aggression, but that no acts of oppression or injustice on the part of their local rulers would be tolerated for the future. Under such a change of circumstances I cannot doubt that Bahrein would speedily recover its former flourishing and prosperous condition.

6. I have now attempted to lay before the Right Honble the Governor in Council, both sides of the question. It will remain for the Government to decide whether the loss of our influence, likely to accrue in this quarter from the contingency of Bahrein becoming a dependency of either Persia or Turkey, is of sufficient importance to counterbalance the trouble and embarrassment which may arise from accepting the proposition of the Chief of that Island, that he should henceforth be considered a subject of Great Britain. It is with diffidence and some hesitation I venture to add that my own opinion inclines to the negative.

7. In submitting for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council a translation of my reply dated the 20th instant, to Sheikh Mohamed bin Khuleefa.

Residency in the Pn Gulf,
Bushire 28th February 1849

I have the honor to be
Signed S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Translation of a letter from Sheikh Mohamed
bin Khalifa, Chief of Bahrain to Major Kennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 15th Feb. 1849.
9th February 1849.

A. C. Your letter by the hand of Hamood
bin Mohamed has reached me, and I have un-
derstood what you wrote. That I beg to in-
form you I perceived that all the Countries
in this quarter are, dependent upon one or other
of the Sultans, as for example the Coast of Persia
is dependent upon the Persians, and likewise the
people of Kuwait and the Wahabee Territories are
and dependent upon Turkey, and I as I have
at least, am dependent upon the United (British)
Government, and subject to it, and I am certain
you will not consent to injury accruing to the
dependencies of the Sultans. accordingly my re-
quest of you is, if you approve of what I have
at least and I am built upon, that you will
cause the return to me of those who have seceded
from my territories, to the advantage of the
Country and its inhabitants. otherwise, if you
account me dependent upon others, (as I please)
to acquaint me with whatever is conformable

to

to the policy of the British Government.

True Translation.

(Signed) A. C. B. Kennell.

Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf.

"True copy"

(Signed) A. C. B. Kennell.

Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Copied by
C. A. B. Kennell
Major
Major

Translation of a letter from Major, Hensell, Resident in the Persian Gulf to Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifa, Chief of Bahrain, dated the 28th February 1849.

A. B.

In a fortunate time and suspicious hour your friendly letter, dated 15th Rabi-ul-muwat, has been received, and its contents fully understood; particularly that part, in which you state, you perceive that all the countries in this quarter are dependent upon and beholden of the Sultan, and therefore as you have at heart, you desire to be dependent upon the British Government and subject to it. I cannot doubt the sincerity of the friendly sentiments expressed in your letter, nor the earnestness of your wish to be connected as closely as possible with the Sultan: But my Friend, this is a matter of great importance, and one to which no subordinate authority like myself, can give a full reply. All I can do, is without any delay to forward your letter to the British Government, and as soon as I have received its orders upon the proposition therein made to communicate them to you.

In respect to the orders from Bahrain, I am fully assured how greatly it would

be

be to the advantage of that place, they should return to their Homes upon it. Accordingly I have written twice acquainting them with good friendly sentiments and recommending them, not to expatriate themselves from their native land.

In the course of the present spring, it is my intention I shall be to proceed to the Arabian Coast, should a favorable opportunity offer, I will communicate personally with Yussuf bin Ibrahim, and Jassim bin Mohamed bin Jagger, and as far as friendly advice can go, will endeavor to persuade them to meet your wishes for their return to Bahrain.

True Translation.

(Signed) A. B. Kimball.

Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf.

"True copy"

(Signed) A. B. Kimball.

Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Three Copies

Resident
Bahrain

Copied by
Dadkhay J. J. J.
Chambers
1849

No. 223 of 1849.

Secret Department.

From, A. Alalst Esquire,

Chief Secretary to Government, Bombay,
To, Major L. Hennell,
Resident in the Persian Gulf.Dated 31st May 1849.

Sir,

I am directed by the Right Honble the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 28th February last No. 2 forwarding translation of one from the Kh. Mahomed bin Khawaja, Chief of Bahrein, requesting that he may be taken under the protection of the British Government and considered its dependant, and to transmit to you copy of a communication from the Secretary to the Government of India, with the Right Honble the Governor General dated the 16th Instant No. 209 on the subject in accordance with the last form of which the matter will be submitted to the Home Authorities.

Bombay Castle }
31st May 1849.

I have the honor to be Sir,

[Signed] A. Alalst.

Chief Secretary.

True Copy.

Wheat

Chief Secretary.

107
Signed by
Secretary
Wheat
M. P. P.

No. 209 of 1849.

From the Secretary to the Government of
with the Gov^{ts} India.
To the Acting Secretary to Government,
Secret Department

Bombay

High Depart^{ment}
Secret

Dated 16th May 1849

Sir I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter with its enclosure, under date the 26th ultimo No. 4 relative to a request on the part of the Kh. of Bahrein to be taken under the protection of the British Government and considered its dependant and in reply to inform you that the Governor General concurs with the Resident in the Persian Gulf in thinking that it would not be expedient for the Government to form any closer relations with the Kh. in question than those which exist or to assume a protectorate of Bahrein.

2 His Lordship remarks that the Kh. request may be submitted to the Home Authorities.

Similar } I have the honor to be Sir,
The 16th May 1849 } [Signed] H. M. Elliot.

Copy to the Gov^t of India
with the Governor General
Enc. Copy.

Wheat

Chief Secretary.

Copy to the
Gov^t of India
May 1849
Wheat

1.15
Relations with the Wahhabis,
1851-1859

Office No 131 of 1851.

Case No 31 of 1851.

From, Sheikh Ismail bin Ali,
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

To, A. Malik, Esquire,
Chief Secretary to Government.

Bombay.

Bussur 3. May 1851.

Sir,

Herewith I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council, the accompanying translation of the substance of a letter dated the 26th ultimo, from the Native Agent at Bahrain, reporting the position of affairs between the Wahabee Amier, and the Chief of that Island.

2 From the Agent's statement it would appear, that Sheikh Mohammed bin Tahir had been persuaded, against his better judgment, by the Merchants of Bahrain (who were apprehensive of being deprived of this season's Pearl Fishery) to reopen negotiations with the Amier, and make him an offer of 2000 browns, and two horses for this year's tribute.

3 This proposition has produced the effect, which might have been anticipated, Amier Tahir has now the impression, that it was made by the Chief of Bahrain under a sense of his inability to contend against him. He has consequently resumed his former arrogant tone, and now insists upon the delivery of 10 Horses, 10 camels, and 4000 browns as the only basis upon which he will treat for peace.

4 The scheme of destroying Mishla, and removing

removing all the inhabitants to Bahrein, in the event of their fidelity not being assured in a war with Tynd, is the best which under all the circumstances of the case the Shikhs could adopt; although doubtless open to many objections. Not the least of these will probably be the immediate occupation of that excellent Harbour, and position by the sons of the late Ex-Sheikh of Bahrein, and the other Mithoon refugees at present on the Islands of Koon-Residency in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honor to be Sir,
Yours faithfully,
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Copied by
A. M. H. H. H.
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Translated Substance of a letter from Major Jassim Agait at Bahrein to Lieut Colonel Stannell, Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 24th Jumadul second 1265 or 28th April received 2^d May 1856.

I previously reported to you the arrival of Tynd in the Quatling where he still continues. Peace has not been concluded as yet between him and the Shikhs of Bahrein. I acquainted you formerly with the despatch of a messenger named Shikhi Rashed, a Mithoon to the Wahhabis near by the Shikhs. This person has now returned and has not settled affairs. He remained there one day. Tynd has written a reply to the letter of Shikhi Mahmood ben Khalifa and verbally told the bearer not to delay the answer more than four days. The answer demands as a fine 10 horses and 10 Camels and 4000 Dollars as the hukkat. When this message was delivered by the Baid to Shikhi Mahmood.

Mahomed the latter determined on hostilities, affirming he would rather consent to be driven from Bahrein than comply with such terms. Further Fyzul desired an interview with one of the two Sheiks if they consented they were to come in their own Vessel opposite to Jafir and he would send on board his brother Jullawar, or his son Abdoolah bin Fyzul as a hostage, while the Sheik landed and met him. On receiving this proposal Sheik Mahomed sent his uncle to Biddah to consult with his Brothers, and intimated his own intentions of making war. Sheik Ali was instructed to ascertain whether the people of Biddah would fight. Should they however be likely to betray the cause, he would send Vessels to destroy Biddah and bring away all the inhabitants to Bahrein. He would then blockade Kaseef and protect Bahrein with his Vessels against Ancoop Fyzul. Sheik Mahomed

was rather displeased with the Merchants for having advised him to open a negotiation with the Wahhab Chief against his own inclination. They replied that their intention in proposing a peaceable arrangement was on account of the poor people who would otherwise be deprived of the Pearl Fishing, but that now his offer has been rejected they were ready to stand by him with their lives and property. Some time ago Sheik Saood bin Jahnnoon sent a Ruggarah to Sheik Ali at Biddah, and wrote to him to the effect, that if Ben Saood should march towards Gutter, he was ready to afford aid if called upon. This boat has been detained at Biddah until now he received of Ben Saood movements, should he advance, it is the intention of Sheik Ali to send back the Ruggarah to Aborshab for the aforesaid assistance, as it is now determined by the Sheik to resist by all

all means the appreciation of their blood.
God knows best how it will end.

True Translated Substances.

(Signed) J. Edwards

Accountant

(True Copy)

(Signed) J. Menzies

Residents in the Persian Gulf

True Copies

W. Menzies
Chief Secretary

1851
J. Menzies

1851.

Secret Department

Bombay Castle

N. 71 dated 27th May 1851

Copy of a letter from the
Residents in the Persian Gulf
dated the 27th May N. 34
1851.

N. 10.

Forwarded translation
of two letters from the Native
Agent at Basrah reporting
the failure of negotiations
for peace between the Chief
of the Wahhabis & Sheikh
of Basrah and remarks the
probability of the latter being
able to resist the Wahhabis.
Sub. W. Menzies

Office No. 158 of 1851

No. 39 of 1851

From, Lieutenant Col. H. H. H. H.

Resident in the Persian Gulf

To,

Arthur, Major, Regent

Chief Secretary to Govt

Political Department

Bombay

Rushmore, 24th May 1851

Sir,

Herewith I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Honble the Govt in Council, a translation of the substance of two letters from the Native Agent at Bahrein, dated the 13th and 18th Instant, reporting upon the failure of all negotiations for peace, and the prospect of immediate hostilities between the Chief of that Island, and the Ameer, Faysal, the Ruler of Nedjd.

On Sheikh Aliy bin Khalifa demanding the inhabitants of Bidda in respect to their removal to Bahrein, they at once refused to consent to any such scheme, but they promised to fish in the vicinity of that Port, and to return for the defence of Bidda, immediately notice should be received by them that the Wahabee Ameer threatened an attack.

attack upon the place.

3 In the hope that a personal communication with the son or Brother of Ameer Faysal might lead the way to an accommodation, Sheikh Aliy proceeded by sea to a place called Ajakhruma nearly opposite the Ameer's encampment, and invited the Wahabee Chief to send one or other of the two personages above mentioned to meet him. The Ameer, however, replied, that he would listen to no proposals, unless submitted by Sheikh Aliy in person. This was refused by the Sheikh, who returned to Bahrein. While there he received information from the Acting Govt of Bidda, that two spies from Ameer Faysal had been captured, one of whom was killed, and the other kept a prisoner. He also reported that the Ameer's army had arrived within two stages of Bidda. Upon this Sheikh Aliy immediately returned to that Port, and summoned all the Pearl Fishers from the Banks for its defence. He has likewise called upon Sheikh Saad bin Tahnoon for his promised aid.

4 The return of all the trading vessels from India has greatly strengthened the Bahrein Sheikhs, who have in abundance of Naval resources in boats.

Boats, Men and provisions - As the object of
 Ameer, Faisal is generally believed to be, the
 possession of Bahrain, the Merchants and other
 inhabitants are apparently determined to support
 Sheikh Mahmood bin Khalifa. I have therefore
 every hope, that if the fugitive, although under
 the sons of the late Bahrain - Chief, or even, at least
 from interfering, the present ruler of that Island,
 will be able to resist the hostile designs of the
 Wahabees.

I have the honor, to be &c &c

Residence in the P. G. (Signed) A. Hammett
 Rushmore, 24th May 1851. Resident in the P. Gulf

Recd by J. B. Green
 24th May 1851

Translated substance of a letter from Sayid
 Faisal Agent at Bahrain to Sheikh Abdullah
 Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 11th May 1851

I formerly reported to you the terms
 on which the Sheiks wished to conclude a
 peace with Faisal. Sheikh Ally has this day
 turned from Faisal's proposals, and has
 made with Abdullah. When Sheikh Ally
 arrived at that place he sent Sheikh Abdullah
 a letter, with a letter to Faisal announcing
 his arrival, and requesting him, if desirous
 of peace, to send a negotiator, either his
 Brother Jalaver, or his son Abdullah. When
 Faisal received Sheikh Ally's communication
 he sent a reply to the effect, that he had
 abandoned his former intentions, and requir-
 ed Sheikh Ally to wait on him if he wished
 for peace. To this the Sheikh sent an answer
 to the effect - If you are desirous of peace, and
 will for this year present your with two
 & two Camels and at the time of the Yaka,
 will pay you as usual 4000 Annas. If you
 please to make peace on these terms, well &
 good, otherwise there is no further necessity
 to wait any longer for us - you can go, we are
 like & we will be there before you. The Sheikh
 has returned to Bahrain, where he remains
 & will wait the messenger of Faisal whether
 he would march against Abdullah or the
 Sultan.

gutter boat, remains in his present encampment or return to Katarf - receiving no information he now proposes to return to Biddah. He has agreed with his brother Sheik Mahmud that in the event of Syut marching on Biddah, there should be sent to his assistance all the available vessels. Orders have been received for relief to proceed to the blockading force opposite Katarf. Warlike stores to the fleet there have been despatched. Sheik Rasid bin Khalaf has been informed that no peace has been concluded with Ben Saood, and he is instructed if he possibly can to capture without delay the two Bungaloes which are at Katarf. The Sheiks are making all preparations for hostilities with Ben Saood. I am given to understand that the Sheiks have requested Sheik Saoud bin Tahnoon to order his Dhow into the Pearl Fishery not to rendezvous far from Biddah, until Ben Saood's movements can be ascertained. Permission has been granted to the people of Bahrain to proceed to the Pearl Fishery; they have however been sanctioned regarding the movements of the Sloop and bark. The Sheiks are not dupes; and I think altogether confident of the tribes on the gutter boat & have not the least doubt of their fidelity. If Ben Saood cannot attack them. At present most

most of their Bungaloes have retired from Biddah, and they have many men, Bungaloes, besides plenty of provisions. The Merchants are also resolved to take part with them, consequently they are not without resources for carrying on hostilities with Ben Saood and are inclined to go to war. They have found out that Syut wants to take Bahrain, and does not care about the Gubart. When Sheik Rashid consulted on him, he had a conversation with Ahmed loodery, and asked why he did not advise Syut to be on good terms with the Ruler of a family that he (Rashid) did not come because they were estranged, but solely on account of the poor traders and fishermen. Loodery replied that on the first arrival of the Amier he had spoken of the subject of peace, and endeavoured to persuade the Amier from the conquest of Bahrain so that Biddah could only be held by those who are powerful at sea. Syut replied to Ahmed loodery that Bahrain will place a person like you in charge of it. This conversation has been repeated to the Sheiks, and they naturally concluded Syut wants to get possession of the Island for himself, & will therefore use all exertions to oppose him.

True Translated Substance
Sig of J. Edwards

Accountant

Signed J. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Head Office
Comd
W. M. Hennell

Transcription of previous document

Translated substance of a letter from Haje Jassein, Agent at Bahrein to Lieut Col. Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 11th May 1850.

I formerly reported to you the terms on which the Sheiks wished to conclude a peace with Fysul. Sheik Ally has this day returned from Zukhuonia, no peace has been made with Bin Saood. When Sheik Ally arrived at that place he sent Sheik Bashid Allooillah, with a letter to Fysul announcing his arrival, and requesting him, if desirous of peace, to send as a negotiator, either his Brother Julawie, or his son Abdoollah. When Fysul received Sheik Ally's communication he sent a reply to the effect, that he had abandoned his former intentions, now required Sheik Ally to wait on him if he wished for peace. To this the Sheik sent an answer to this effect: "If you are desirous of peace we will for this year present to you with two horses and two camels and at the time of the Zukat, will pay you as usual 4000 Crowns. If you please to make peace on these terms, well and good, otherwise there is no further necessity to wait any longer for us - you can go where you like and we will be there before you". Sheik Ali has returned to Bahrein, where he remained to watch the movements of Fysul whether he would march against Biddah on the Gutter Coast, remain in his present encampment or return to Kateef - receiving no information he now proposes to return to Biddah. He has agreed with his brother Sheik Mahomed that in the event of Fysul marching on Biddah there should be sent to his assistance all the available vessels. Orders have been issued for a relief to proceed to the blockading Force opposite Kateef. Warlike stores to the fleet there have been despatched. Sheik Rashid bin Khuleefa has been informed that no peace has been concluded with Ben Saood, and he is instructed if he possibly can to capture without delay the two Buglas which are not at Kateef. The Sheiks are making all preparations for hostilities with Ben Saood. I am given to understand the Sheiks have requested Sheik Saeed bin Tahnoon to order his divers at the Pearl Fishery not to rendezvous far from Adeed, until Ben Saood's movements can be ascertained. Permission has been granted to the people of Bahrein to proceed to the Pearl Fishery; they have however been cautioned regarding the movements of the Nedjd ruler. The Sheiks are not supine: and Sheik Alljlo quite confident of the tribes on the Gutter coast has not the least doubt of their fidelity. If so, Ben Saood cannot attack them. At present most of their Buglas have returned from India, and they have many men and vessels, besides plenty of provisions. The merchants are also resolved to take part with them, consequently they are not without resources for carrying on hostilities with Ben Saood and are inclined to go to war. They have found out that Fysul wants to take Bahrein, and does not care about the Zukat. When Sheik Rashid waited on him, he had a conversation with a Ahmed Soodery, and asked why he did not advise Fysul to be on good terms with the Kuleefa family that he (Rashid) did not come because they were straitened, but solely on account of the poor traders and fishermen. Soodery replied that on the first arrival of the Ameer he had spoken on the subject of peace, and endeavoured to persuade the Ameer from the conquest of Bahrein as that Island could only be held by those who are powerful at sea. Fysul replied to Ahmed Soodery - if I take Bahrein I will place a person like you in charge of it. This conversation has been repeated to the Sheiks, and they naturally conclude Fysul wants to get possession of the Island for himself, and will therefore use all exertions to oppose him.

True Translated Substance
 Sig of J. Edwards
 Accountant

True Copy
 Signed J. Hennell
 Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Translation of a letter from Hajee Jussem
Agent at Bahrein to Lieut. Col. G. G. G. G.
Hemall Resident in the Persian Gulf
dated 18th and received 25th May 1881

I previously reported to you the un-
successful result of the Sheikh ally's efforts to
negotiate a peace with Beni Saad, and his
return to Bahrein. It is now reported by passengers
from Bidlah, that two spies had arrived at
that place, belonging to Beni Saad on a mission
enquiries as to whether the Bivins had proceeded
to the Pearl Fishery, knowing that ally's absence
he had appointed a Deputy at Bidlah, who
despatched men to learn the object of their
spies on ascertaining they belonged to the Bedj
tribe, he immediately sent a party of horse
and foot after them. On being seized, one was
immediately put to death, and the other de-
tained in prison. The Deputy Governor of Bid-
dah has written to the ally intimating that
Beni Saad had an idea in March, and arrived at
a spring called Enaj, within two days of Bidlah.
On receiving this communication, the ally
reimbarked for the Sultan's place. Today a vessel
has arrived with information that the ally
had reached Bidlah, and has sent to recall
all the Bivins to that town. He has also dis-
patched Mohamed ben Ahmed, an inhabitant of
Aluthaboo,

Aluthaboo, to the ally, to acquaint him that Beni Saad has marched on
the coast of Gutter. This person had formerly
been sent by the Bedj's chiefs to the Bahrein.
The ally with a message recommending them not
to make any terms with a man. By night, and in
the secret of day, and on being required, he went
on, and returned, being sent back to him,
concerned persons to their assistance. The ally
intention of the ally to fight with Beni
Saad should he attack Bidlah. There is now
at Enaj two days distant from that place. God
knows best what may happen hereafter. The ally
Mohamed has increased his flock of his
people have all returned from Bidah and they
are ready to do battle with the ally's tribe.
Some time ago the ally sent a vessel to
the Sultan's place, the boat has returned bringing
a present of 300 Buz, of rice, powder and lead.
A boat belonging to the Sultan Ben Suggat
having landed a camel and letters for Amos
Tajout in the neighbourhood of the Gutter Coast.
It has been detained along with the crew, by the
Deputy of Bidlah. This happened during the
late absence of the ally.

(True Translation)

Edw. J. Edwards

Accountant

True

(True Copy)
 Signed J. Hennell
 Resident in the Persian Gulf

True Copies
 A. Malet
 Chief Secretary

copied by
 J. Hennell

Transcription of previous document

Translation of a letter from Hajie Jassein, Agent of Bahrein to Lieutenant Colonel Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 18th and received 23rd May 1851.

I previously reported to you the unsuccessful result of the Sheik Ally's efforts to negotiate a peace with Ben Saood, and his return to Bahrein. It is now reported by passengers from Biddah, that two spies had arrived at that place, belonging to Ben Saood, making enquiries as to whether the divers had proceeded to the Pearl Fishery. During Sheik Ally's absence he had appointed a Deputy at Biddah who despatched men to learn the object of these spies. On ascertaining they belonged to the Nedjd ruler, he immediately sent a party of horse and foot after them. On being seized, one was immediately put to death and the other detained in irons. The Deputy Governor of Biddah has written to Sheik Ally intimating that Ben Saood had made a march, and arrived at a spring called Ereej within two days of Biddah. On receiving this communication, Sheik Ally embarked for the latter place. Today a vessel has arrived with information that Sheik Ally had reached Biddah, and has sent to recall all the Divers to that town. He has also despatched Mahomed ben Ahmed, an inhabitant of Aboothabee, to Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon, to acquaint him that Ben Saood has marched on the coast of Gutter. This person had formerly been sent by the Benijas Chiefs to the Bahrein Sheiks with a message recommending them not to make any terms with Ameer Fysul, and in the event of War, and aid being required, he would, on Mahomed ben Ahmed being sent back to him, come in person to their assistance. It is the intention of the Sheiks to fight with Ben Saood should he attack Biddah. He is now at Ereej two days distant from that place. God knows best what may happen hereafter. Sheik Mahomed has increased his fleet off Kateef, his people have all returned from India and they are ready to do battle with the Nedjd rulers. Some time ago Sheik Ally sent a horse to Sh Syed Thowenee; the boat has returned bringing a present of 300 bags of rice, powder and lead. A boat belonging to Sheik Sultan Ben Suggar having landed a camel and letters for Ameer Fysul in the neighbourhood of the Gutter Coast, it has been detained along with the crew, by the Deputy of Biddah. This happened during the late absence of Sheik Ally.

(True Translation)
 (Signed) J. Edwards
 Accountant

(True Copy)
 (Signed) S. Hennell
 Resident in the Persian Gulf

True Copies
 A. Malet
 Chief Secretary

Office No 2741

No 143 of 1851

Political Department

From, A. Malet Esquire

To, Chief Secretary to Government Bombay

Sir H. M. Elliot K.J.B.

Secretary to the Government of India,

with the Governor General

Dated 26th June 1851

Sir, With reference to my letter dated the 16th instant No 128, I am directed by the Right Honble the Governor in Council to transmit to you, for distribution to the Most Noble the Governor Genl. of India, a copy of a letter from the Resident in the Persian Gulf No 158 dated the 27th ultimo, forwarding translations of two letters from the Native Agent at Bahrein, reporting the failure of all negotiations for peace, and the immediate prospect of hostilities between the chiefs of that Island, and Ameer Fysul, the Ruler of Nedjd.

Bombay Castle } I have the honor to be
26th June 1851 } signed A. Malet

Chief Secretary

Duplicate to Bengal

True Copy

W Malet
Chief Secretary

For
1851

Transcription of previous document

Office No 2741

No 143 of 1851

Political Department

From, A. Malet Esquire
Chief Secretary to Government Bombay

To, Sir H. M. Elliot K.J.B.
Secretary to the Government of India
with the Governor General.

Dated 26th June 1851

Sir,

With reference to my letter dated the 18th instant No 128, I am directed by the Right Honble the Governor in Council to transmit to you, for submission to the Most Noble of Governors Genl. of India, a copy of a letter from the Resident in the Persian Gulf No 158 dated the 27th ultimo, forwarding translations of two letters from the Native Agent at Bahrein, reporting the failure of all negotiations for peace, and the immediate prospect of hostilities between the chiefs of that Island, and Ameer Fysul, the Ruler of Nedjd.

Bombay Castle
26th June 1851

I have the honor to be
(Signed) A. Malet
Chief Secretary

Duplicate to Bengal
True Copy
A. Malet
Chief Secretary

Office No. 257 of 1851.
 Com. No. 16 of 1851.
 From, *Chief Department.*
 Lieut. Colonel Hemmell
 Resident in the Persian Gulf
 To, A. Malet Esquire,
 Chief Secretary to the Govt. of
 Bombay
 Camp Near Bushire
 5th August 1851-

Sir,
 I have much satisfaction in forwarding for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor and Council the enclosed copy of a letter from Commodore Porter, dated the 31st ultimo, reporting that Amoor Begum the Mahomed Chief, has concluded a peace with Mahomed ben Khaleefa, the Sheikh of Bushire, through the good offices of which I have been informed of Abu Thabbar, and after giving up possession of the forts of Bushire to Sheikh Ali ben Khaleefa, has returned to Landed.

2. The only favourable condition obtained by the Amoor from the Bushire Sheikh, has been the promise to pay at some future time, the sum of 4,000 Crans on account of the arrears of the "Gardat" or Tithes.

3. After the deposition of Beisloah and the successful forcing of the blockade of Katar by the sons of the Enchiff Sheikh,

that

that had it not been for our interference, and the opportune arrival of the Squadron in Bushire, the Amoor would have succeeded in his views upon that Island.

4. The enclosed transmission of the substantances of two letters from the Agent at Bushire, dated the 28th July and 2^d Instant, respectively communicating in detail, the progress of the negotiations for peace, and their success, full resolution.

5. It is fortunate this affair has been thus brought to an amicable termination, as cholera is raging in Bushire, and other fatal cases have occurred on board the "Sphinxes." The sick list also of the Squadron in the unhealthy neighbourhood of Bushire and Katar was rapidly increasing.

6. I have the honor to enclose for the information of Government, a copy of my reply of this day's date to Commodore Porter, requesting him to remove the Vessels of the Squadron to their several Stations.

I have the honor to be,
 Sir, Your obedient Servant,
 Lieut. Colonel Hemmell
 Resident in the Persian Gulf
 Camp Near Bushire 5th August 1851-

Copy to
 Lieut. Colonel Hemmell
 Camp Near Bushire
 5th August 1851

Transcription of previous document

Office No 257 of 1851
Cons: No 16 of 1851
Secret Department

From

Lieut Colonel Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To

A. Malet Esquire
Chief Secretary to the Govt of Bombay
Camp near Bushire

5th August 1851

Sir,

I have much satisfaction in forwarding for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council, the enclosed copy of a letter from Commodore Porter, dated the 31st ultimo reporting that, Ameer Fysul, the Wahabee Chief, has concluded a peace with Mahomed ben Khuleefa, the Sheik of Bahrein through the good offices of Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon of Aboulhabie, and after giving up possession of the forts of Bidda to Sheik Ally bin Khuleefa had returned to Sahsah.

2. The only favourable condition obtained by the Ameer from the Bahrein Sheik, has been the promise to pay at some future time, the sum of 4,000 Crowns on account of the arrears of the "Zukat" or Tithe.

3. After the defection of Bidda, and the successful forcing of the blockade at Kateef by the sons of the Ex-Chief, I think, that, had it not been for our interference, and the opportune arrival of the Squadron in Bahrein, the Ameer would have succeeded in his views upon that Island.

4. The enclosed translation of the substance of two letters from the Agent at Bahrein, dated the 28th July and 2nd instant, respectively communicate in detail the progress of the negotiations for peace, and their successful results.

5. It is fortunate this affair has been thus brought to an early termination as cholera is raging in Bahrein, and other fatal cases have occurred on board the "Euphrates". The sick list also of the Squadron in the unhealthy neighbourhood of Bahrein and Kateef was rapidly increasing.

6. I have the honor to enclose for the information of Government, a copy of my reply of this day's date to Commodore Porter, requesting him to remand the vessels of the Squadron to their several stations.

Residency, Persian
Gulf, Camp near
Bushire, 5th August 1851

I have the honor to be
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Office No 133 of 1851
From Commodore L. P. Porter R.N.
To Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron
Lieutenant Colonel S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Sir,
In continuance of the proceedings reported in my letter of the 23rd instant, I have the honor to forward information received yesterday from the Native Agent here viz. Ally ben Khuleefa and Fysul ben Farkes have made peace and the former is to give the latter 4000 Dollars a year. It is now 6 days since Fysul ben Farkes and his army left El Bidlah.

Fysul ben Farkes said to Ally ben Khuleefa, I will give up all your Forts but your subjects you must pardon to which the latter answered, No, I shall take the forts but I will not forgive the subjects as they are mine and I will do what I like with them. After which all the Bidda people came to Ally ben Khuleefa to ask pardon and he pardoned them all except Sheikh Firdal the Sheikh of Wakra whom he would not pardon. That Sheikh then took his family and went away to Persia.

After

After this Ally ben Khulafa wanted to bring all the gutter people to Bahrain, but they did excuse us for 2 months while we go to fish for Pearls after which we will go wherever you like.

Now some of the gutter people have come up here to buy in provisions for going upon their fishing excursion.

When Sheikh Abd. ben Fakhr arrived from Aba thabee he brought with him 50 Massas of Rice for Amoo Fagel for which in return he got 2 Horses.

Ally ben Khulafa has written to Sheikh Mohammed ben Khulafa from Bedar desiring him to recall all his Bants from El Kutiff.

The Late Abdullah ben Ahmed son Mahomed went to Fagel here Farkie and said view you have made peace with Ally ben Khulafa and Sheikh Mohammed ben Khulafa what are you going to give to us? I will take you to Kutiff with me and settle you in Dammam Island and give you the island of Farad, as if not 6000 Dollars a year. This I give to you Mohammed and to your brothers, but led all the other Khas people depart from Kutiff.

This day the blackening Squadron of El Biddah has returned.

I have the honor to enclose copy letter just received from Lieut Balfour Commanding H. B. Brig Euphrates from which you will observe that he has lost 2 more men by Cholera I would therefore beg to request explicit instructions in regard to the Kham Bants, so as to bring the matter to an end, as I fear we shall be all catching it if we stop much longer.

There are 24 people in the sick list of the Euphrates.

I have the honor to be
H. B. I. Salive Bahrain signed / S. P. Porter
31st July 1851. Commadore V.
P. S. The Niger has a few severe cases of Diarrhoea supposed to be caused by the water received here.

signed / S. P. P.
Copy communication received from Lieut
Wm Balfour Lieut. Commanding H. B. Brig
"Euphrates"

El Kutiff Hands July 30th 1851.
Sth A. M.

At 11. of 1851
Thomas Morton Esq.
General. 1000 attached
at 5. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

A few hours after despatching my letter of the 26th Lieut Sir Sam. Dargy to say the Cholera re appeared and had carried off the parties named in the margin.

I have further to report the decrease

deceased of Alexander Thompson A. M. General
 at 3079 from "Liver disease" on the night of the
 27th at 8.11.58.11

From the enclosed dispatch report you
 will observe that there are now two cases of
 real epidemic Cholera both in a fair (weak)
 state of recovery. The eleven men in the
 report with Diarrhoea are considered by
 the Surgeon as laboring under a mild
 form of the epidemic and he looks forward
 to not having any of them.

I have the honor to be
 signed, W. Balfour
 Commodore I. P. Porter, Lieut. Commanding &c.

Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron
 (True Copy)

signed, J. P. Porter
 Commodore &c.

(True Copy)

signed, A. Hennell
 Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Copy to
 H. C. S. Clive
 11/11/58

Transcription of previous document

Office No 133 of 1851

From
 Commodore I. P. Porter, I.N.
 Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron

To
 Lieutenant Colonel Hennell
 Resident in the Persian Gulf

Sir,

In continuance of the proceedings reported in my letter of the
 23rd instant, I have the honor to forward information received
 yesterday from the Native Agent here viz. Ally ben Khuleefa and
 Fysul ben Taorkee have made peace and the former is to give the
 latter 4000 Dollars a year. It is now 6 days since Fysul ben Taorky
 and his Army left El Biddah.

Fysul ben Taorkee said to Ally ben Khuleefa, I will give up all
 your Forts but your subjects you must pardon, to which the latter
 answered No; I shall take the Forts but I will not forgive the
 subjects as they are mine and I will do what I like with them.
 After which all the Bidda people came to Ally ben Khuleefa to ask
 pardon and he pardoned them all except Sheikh Fuldal the Sheikh of
 Wukra whom he would not pardon. That Sheik then took his boat and
 went away to Fars.

After this Ally ben Khuleefa wanted to bring all the Guttur
 people to Bahrein, but they said excuse us for 2 months while we go
 to fish for Pearls after which we will go wherever you like.

Now some of the Guttur people have come up here to lay in
 provisions for going upon their fishing excursion.

When Sheikh Syed ben Tahnoon arrived from Aboothabee he brought
 with him 50 Moorass of Rice for Ameer Fysul for which in return he
 got 2 Horses.

Ally ben Khuleefa has written to Sheik Mahomed ben Khuleefa
 from Bedoo desiring him to recall all his boats from El Katiff.

The late Abdullah ben Ahmed's son Mahomed went to Fysul ben
 Toorkie and said now you have made peace with Ally ben Khuleefa and
 Sheik Mahomed ben Khuleefa what are you going to give to us? I will
 take you to Katiff with me and settle you in Dumam Island and give
 you the Island of Farod, or if not 6000 Dollars a year. This I give
 to you Mahomed and to your brothers, but let all the other Nien
 people depart from Kateef.

This day the blockading Squadron of El Biddah has returned.

I have the honor to enclose copy letter just received from
 Lieutt Balfour, Commanding H.C. Brig. Euphrates from which you will
 observe that he has lost 2 more men by Cholera. I would therefore
 beg to request explicit instructions in regard to the Nien Boats, so
 as to bring the matter to an end, as I fear we shall be all catching
 it if we stop much longer.

There are 24 people in the sick list of the Euphrates.

H. C. S. Clive, Bahrain
 31st July 1851

I have the honor to be
 (Signed) I. P. Porter
 Commander

P.S. The Tigris had a few severe cases of Diarrhoea supposed to be
 caused by the water received here.

Transcription of previous document

Copy communication received from Lieutt Wm Balfour, I.N., Commanding H.C. Brig "Euphrates".

No 16 of 1851

El Katiff July 30th 1851
8H A.M.

Sir,

A few hours after despatching my letter of the 26th Instant, I am sorry to say the cholera reappeared and has carried off the parties named in the margin.

I have further to report the decease of Alexander Thompson A.B. General No 3079 from "Liver disease" on the night of the 27th at 8H 58M.

From the enclosed sick report you will observe that there are now two cases of real epidemic Cholera both in a fair (way) state of recovery. The eleven men in the report with Diarrhoea are considered by the Surgeon as laboring under a mild form of epidemic and he looks forward to not losing any of them.

I have the honor to be
(Signed) W. Balfour
Lieutt Commanding

To
Commodore I. P. Porter
Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron

(True Copy)
(Signed) I. P. Porter
Commodore

(True Copy)
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Thomas Herton A.B.
General m.a. 1099 attacked
at 5 p.m. on the 26th
died at 10h 5m p.m.
on the 27th

George Sutherland
B. Mate Genl. No 851
attacked at 11H 30M p.m.
on the 26th died at
1H 10M p.m. on the 27th.

Translated substance of a letter from
Hajee Cassim Agent at Rasheem to Lieutt
Colonel Hennell, Resident in the Persian
Gulf dated 20th July 1851.

According to intelligence received
from Rasheem a peace has been concluded
between him and ally his Khaleefah
through the mediation of Sheikh Saad bin
Tahnoon. On the latter's first arriving there
Ahmed bin Dayas and Ahmed Montassir
waited on him and requested him to meet
Amoor Tyah. He promised to do so after he
had had an interview with Sheikh Ally.
In this interview Sheikh Tahnoon proposed
to mediate between the Rasheem
Sheikh and Amoor Tyah but Sheikh Ally
would not consent. He then said however
explained that he was truly his ally, but he had
received letters from the Command of Muscat,
and Sultan bin Sa'ud to effect an amicable
settlement. He said that the Command wished
to arrange the affairs of Oman and had come
explained to Amoor Tyah regarding the hostile
proceedings of Sultan bin Sa'ud and his ter-
ritories, which he stated he had been the reason
why the Buteh had not been paid by Ajda
Thaweynee. That the Sheikh said he had been
Commissioned by His Highness to settle
matters with Amoor Tyah. Sheikh Ally
replied he was quite at liberty to settle his own
affairs

affairs as well as those of Syed Saood but he was not to interfere in those of Bahrain. The Chief of Aboothabee however learnt from Sheikh Ally that his principal objects were, that Ameer Fysul should have nothing to do with the people of Guttur, and also not to interfere in behalf of the sons of Abdoolah ben Ahmed, that on these conditions some settlement touching the payment of the Zukat might be made after the return of the Wahabee Ruler to Nedjd. Our Sheikh Saood ben Tahnoon waiting upon Ameer Fysul and laying these proposals before him, they were readily agreed to, and he was treated with very great honor and attention. On the day following, Mahomed ben Abdoolah ben Ahmed arrived at Fysul's camp but was received with coldness. It is reported, that the Ameer wrote to Sheikh Ally ben Khuleefa in behalf of the family of the Ex-Chief of Bahrain. Some of the Grandsons of the latter have been favorably received by Sheikh Ally, but he will have nothing to do with the surviving sons. It is now said, that Ahmed ben Soodeyree has waited upon Sheikh Ally to conclude the Treaty of Peace between him and Ameer Fysul, and that he is to proceed to Bahrain and obtain the ratification of the same by Sheikh Mahomed ben Khuleefa.

(True Copy)

Signed S. Hennell,
Resident Persian Gulf

True Translated Substance

Signed I. P. Edwards
Accountant

Copied by
H. B. Anderson
1851

Transcription of previous document

Translated substance of a letter from Hajee Jasseem, Agent at Bahrain to Lieutt Colonel Hannell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 28th July 1851.

According to intelligence received from Biddah, a peace has been concluded between ben Saood and Ally ben Khuleefa through the mediation of Sheikh Saeed ben Tahnoon. On the latter's first arriving there, Ahmed Soodeyree and Ahmed Mootawee, waited on him and I requested him to meet Ameer Fysul. He promised to do so after he had had an interview with Sheikh Ally. In this interview Sheikh Tahnoon proposed to mediate a peace between the Bahraini Sheikh and Ameer Fysul but Sheikh Ally would not consent. Sheikh Saeed however explained that he was truly his ally, but he had received letters from the Imam of Muscat, and Sultan ben Suggur, to effect an amicable settlement. He said that the Imam wished to arrange the affairs of Oman and had complained to Ameer Fysul regarding the hostile proceedings of Sultan ben Suggur in his territories which he stated had been the reason why the Zukat had not been paid by Syed Thoweynee. That he (Sheikh Saeed) had been commissioned by His Highness to settle matters with Ameer Fysul. Sheikh Ally replied he was quite at liberty to settle his own affairs as well as those of Syed Saeed, but he was not to interfere in those of Bahrain. The Chief of Aboothabee however learnt from Sheikh Ally that his principal objects were, that Ameer Fysul should have nothing to do with the people of Guttur, and also not to interfere in behalf of the sons of Abdoolah ben Ahmed, that on these conditions some settlement touching the payment of the Zukat might be made after the return of the Wahabee Ruler to Nedjd. Our Sheikh Saood ben Tahnoon waiting upon Ameer Fysul and laying these proposals before him, they were readily agreed to, and he was treated with very great honour and attention. On the day following, Mahomed ben Abdoolah ben Ahmed arrived at Fysul's camp but was received with coldness. It is reported, that the Ameer wrote to Sheikh Ally ben Khuleefa on behalf of the family of the Ex-Chief of Bahrain. Some of the Grandsons of the latter have been favorably received by Sheikh Ally, but he will have nothing to do with the surviving sons. It is now said that Ahmed ben Soodeyree has waited upon Sheikh Ally to conclude the Treaty of Peace between him and Ameer Fysul, and that he is to proceed to Bahrain and obtain the ratification of the same, by Sheikh Mahomed ben Khuleefa.

(True Copy)

(Signed) S. Hennell,
Resident Persian Gulf

True Translation substance

(Signed) I. P. Edwards
Accountant

Translated substance of a letter from Hajeejoffson
Agent at Bahrain to Lieut. Col. Howell Resident
in the Persian Gulf, dated 2^d August 1851.

I beg to report that on the 29th ultimo, the
Bahrain blockading fleet returned from Biddah and
that the affairs of the Sheikh with Ameer Faisal have
been settled, some of the vessels belonging to the people
of the Gutter Coast have come to Bahrain to take
rice and dates for the Pearl Fishery. This peace has
been mediated by Sheikh Saad bin Tahnoon. The
message of Sheikh Ali to Ameer Faisal was to this
effect - That the latter was to have nothing to do with
the people on the Gutter Coast, that if they were
his subjects their pardon or punishment must
be left to himself. With regard to the Grandsons
of the late Abdoolah bin Ahmed, if they come
to him, they should be treated kindly like
members of his own family, but that Ameer
Faisal must have nothing to do with the sons of
the late Sheikh. To these terms the Wahabee Ruler
agreed. He however demanded the junket for the
past and present years amounting to 8000 crowns.
Through the mediation of Sheikh Saad bin Tahnoon
the Ameer has reduced his demand to 4000 crowns.
This sum Sheikh Ali has agreed to pay, but -

exceeds

exceeds his doing so this year, on account of the expenses
of the War, and their having no ready money. The
Ameer has consented to this. He writes to Sheikh Ali
to the effect that "you say you have nothing, this
does not signify. As you have made the request,
it is accepted, but I must complain of you, not
having visited me. Although Saad bin Tahnoon
was my enemy, yet when I wrote to him to have an
interview with me, he complied without hesitation.
Sheikh Ali answered "you speak true, I am sorry
that you are obliged to quit those parts without
having a meeting. But I swear by God that in
your own place, I will wait on you." Their affairs
are now in a good state. Ahmedood Soodee
visited Sheikh Ali bin Khalifa, and was received
with great honor and respect. He was invited to
come to Bahrain which he however declined doing.
After the arrival of Sheikh Ali here, the Sheikh will
certainly prepare a present for Faisal, such as
horses &c. The Ameer has treated Sheikh Saad
bin Tahnoon with great distinction. It is reported
His Highness has given him 1000 crowns, 100 Abbas,
2 Horses, and an order for 500 Bags of Dates for
a reward he given to him from Kaseef. He has
also appointed him sole director over the affairs
of Oman and the Ports of Buzmee, and entrusted

the

the collection of the *guk* due by the *Siman* and others to him. The *Wahabi* Ruler intends to send some men to occupy the fortifications of *Brigine* under the command of *Said ben Tahnoon*, and has left all things under his authority. The *Benyas* chief has returned to *Abdullah*. Ten days ago the *Ameer* marched from the coast of *Qattar* leaving no troops in that quarter. He will now be at *Salas* where according to report, he will remain for a month. As the *Ameer* could not find an opening to settle the affairs of *Mahomed ben Abdullah* with the *Bahraini* sheik, he has therefore taken him with him. He has promised to place him in *Tarastan* otherwise to give him and his brothers 6,000 *francs* and disburse them in *Duraim* island, on condition of their leaving nothing to do with the *Abd ben Ally* who must remain to *Kenin*. Sheik *Ably* has written to his brother, sheik *Mahomed*, to recall the *lockading* fleet from *Kateif*. When the people of *Qattar* waited on sheik *Ably*, they acknowledged his authority, and said that as he had waited on them to locate in *Qiddah*, on *Bahrain* they would comply, but that as this was the *Pearl* fishing season, to remove at present to the latter place, would lose them the best portion of the season.

season, accordingly he has permitted them to proceed to the *Pearls* - All the inhabitants of the coast of *Qattar* and *Bahrain* are now preparing for the *Pearl* fishing. Hostilities have ceased, and all people greatly rejoice. The *Chaderia* is however very prevalent at *Bahrain* - On the 31st July sheik *Ably ben Khaleef* arrived at *Bahrain*, and had an interview with his brother, regarding the *lockading* fleet off *Kateif*; the former wanted to recall it, the latter thought it would be better to wait till the ultimate proceedings of the *Port* vessels. Sheik *Ably* remarked that the crews were from people who ought not to be detained from the *Pearl* fishing, that if necessary on the return of the *francs* from *Brigine*, their boats could be reassembled. They have at last settled to recall the fleet according to report an messenger had arrived from the *Ameer* to sheik *Ably*, intimating that peace had been established between him and the sheiks, and directing him to disengage the *francs* at *Kateif*, which had been done, and their boats hauled up on shore. The *Abd ben Ally* have done the same with their vessels. They are in much prosperity and are loading up with *Kateif* in their small craft.

Copy of the letter
to the
Sheik
Mulla

I have communicated these particulars to the
Commander

(True Translated Instance)

(Signed) J. A. Hennell.

Accountant &c.

(True Copy)

(Signed) J. A. Hennell.

Resident Persian Gulf

Filed by J. A. Hennell
J. A. Hennell

Transcription of previous document

Translated Substance of a letter from Hajie Jasseem, Agent at Bahrain, to Lieutt Coll Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 2nd August 1851.

I beg to report that on the 29th ultimo, the Bahrein blockading fleet returned from Biddah and that the affairs of the Sheiks with Ameer Fysul have been settled. Some of the vessels belonging to the people of the Guttur Coast have come to Bahrein to take rice and dates for the Pearl Fishery. This peace has been mediated by Sheik Saeed bin Tahnoon. The message of Sheik Ally to Ameer Fysul was to this effect - That the latter was to have nothing to do with the people on the Guttur Coast, that as they were his subjects their pardon or punishment must be left to himself. With regard to the Grandsons of the late Abdoolah ben Ahmed, if they came to him, they should be treated kindly like members of his own family, but that Ameer Fysul must have nothing to do with the sons of the Ex-Chief. To these terms the Wahabee Ruler agreed. He however demanded the Zukat for the past and present years amounting to 8000 Crowns. Through the mediation of Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon, the Ameer has reduced his demand to 4000 Crowns. This sum Sheik Ally has agreed to pay, but excuses his doing so this year on account of the expenses of the War, and their having no ready money. The Ameer has consented to this. He wrote to Sheik Ally to the effect that "you say you have nothing, this does not signify. As you have made the request, it is accepted, but I must complain of your not having visited me. Although Saeed ben Tahnoon was my enemy, yet when I wrote to him to have an interview with me, he complied without hesitation." Sheik Ally answered "you speak true, I am sorry that you are obliged to quit these parts without having a meeting. But I swear by God that in your own place I will wait on you." Their affairs are now in a good state - Ahmed Soodejree visited Sheik Ally ben Khuleefa, and was received with great honor and respect. He was invited to come to Bahrein which he however declined doing. After the arrival of Sheik Ally here, the Sheiks will certainly prepare a present for Fysul, such as horses etc. The Ameer has treated Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon with great distinction. It is reported His Highness has given him 1,000 Crowns, 100 Abbas, 2 Horses and an order for 5,000 bags of Dates per annum to be given to him from Kateef. He has also appointed him sole director over the affairs of Oman and the Forts of Brymee, and entrusted the collection of the Zukat due by the Inam and others to him. The Wahabee Ruler intends to send some men to occupy the fortifications of Brymee under the command of Saeed ben Tahnoon, and has left all things under his authority. The Beniyyas Chief has returned to Aboothabee. Ten days ago the Ameer marched from the Coast of Guttur leaving no troops in that quarter. He will now be at Lahsa where according to report, he will remain for a month. As the Ameer could not find an opening to settle the affairs of Mahomed ben Abdoolah with the Bahrein Sheik, he has therefore taken him with him. He has promised to place him in Taroot or otherwise to give him and his brothers 6,000 Crowns and locate them in Dumam island, on condition of their having nothing to do with the Ab. ben Ally, who must return to Kenn. Sheik Ally has written to his brother, Sheik Mahomed to recall the blockading fleet from Kateef. When the people of Guttur waited on Sheik Ally they acknowledged his authority and said that whether he wanted them to locate in Biddah or Bahrein they would comply, but that as this was the Pearl Fishery season, to remove at present to the latter place, would lose them the best portion of the season. Accordingly he has permitted them to proceed to the Banks. All the inhabitants of the Coast of Guttur and Bahrein are now preparing for the Pearl Fishery. Hostilities have ceased and all people greatly rejoice. The Cholera is however very prevalent at Bahrein. On the 31st July Sheik Ally ben Khuleefa arrived at Bahrein, and had an interview with his Brother regarding the blockading fleet off Kateef; the former wanted

to recall it, the latter thought it would be better to wait the ultimate proceedings of the Govt. vessels. Sheik Ally remarked that the crews were poor people who ought not to be detained from the Pearl Fishery, that if necessary on the return of the Constance from Bushire, their boats could be reassembled. They have at last settled to recall the fleet. According to report a messenger had arrived from the Ameer to Sheik Billal, The Gov of Kateef, intimating that peace had been established between him and the Sheiks, and directing him to dismiss the forces at Kateef, which had been done, and their boats hauled up on shore. The Al ben Ally have done the same with their vessels. They are in much perplexity and intend quitting Kateef in their small craft.

I have communicated these particulars to the Commodore.

(True Translated Substance)
(Signed) Ian Edwards
Accountant

(True Copy)
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident Persian Gulf

Office No. 258 of 1851-
Date No. 17 of 1851.

From
To
Lieutenant Colonel Hennell,
Resident in the Persian Gulf
Arthur Malet Esquire
Chief Secretary to Government, Bombay
Camp near Bushire
Secret Department, 17 August 1851
Sir,

I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council the enclosed translation of a letter dated the 15th July last to my address, from Amur-Supul the Wahabi ruler of Fudjel.
2. This communication was brought by a special envoy named Sheik Abdul Rahim, who arrived at Bushire on the 6th instant, and presented a report yesterday morning.
3. The objects of Sheik Abdul Rahim's mission appeared to be three: first, to impress upon me that his master had been induced to relinquish his intention of punishing the Sheiks of Bahrain for their contumacious withholding the regular payment of the established "Zakat" or tithe solely out of consideration to the British Government; secondly, to induce me to appoint an Officer for the purpose of bringing affairs between the Amir and the Sheiks of Bahrain to a permanent and satisfactory settlement; thirdly, to assist his master's right to consider all the Amirate's Sheiks of the Coast of Oman & Batawah, as subject to his authority. He will premise that the envoy had visited the camp of the Amir before the arrival of Sheik Saad bin Rahim, but subsequently

to the receipt by His Highness of my letter to him of the 1st March announcing that his vessels would not be permitted to trade in Bahrain. He reported therefore of the removal of the Wahhabis and his forces from the Coast, and the terms upon which peace had been made with Bahrain only reached him after his arrival at Kuwait. Sheikh Abdul Rahman, professed to be exceedingly surprised that I could suppose for an instant, a powerful chief like his Master would have been influenced by some dependent like the Sheikh of Bushayrah to give up his intentions in respect to the Bahraini Chiefs. Nothing he said, but the Assured great desire to maintain the friendship and good will of the British Government would have led him to consent to make terms with Sheikh Mohammed bin Thubaihi.

1. Sheikh Abdul Rahman then introduced the subject of the Assured wish that an officer should be deputed to arrange matters in respect to his future relations both with the British Government and the Chiefs of Bahrain upon a more permanent and satisfactory basis than hitherto. He said, he said, would be pleased upon the word of Sheikh Mohammed and the object of the Assured was to secure the due fulfilment of his promise for the regular annual payment of the "Zakat". I replied that however willing to meet the Assured's wishes, I could not take upon myself to depute an officer to wait upon him, unless deemed the previous sanction of my Government for such a measure. The Wahabi Envoy then remarked that as I was now fully aware of Sheikh Mohammed bin Thubaihi's promises to pay regularly the annual Zakat of 4000 brooms or "Zakat" to His Highness, I could offer

no objection to the latter's making the requisite steps to enforce this payment, should it at any future time be suspended or withheld. I answered that we did not concern ourselves with any arrangements that the Chief of Bahrain might consider it expedient to make with the Assured, but that I did not believe the British Government would ever permit under any pretext whatever the possession of the island of Bahrain to fall into the hands of a foreign power. That with respect to Assured's claims of authority over all the Maritime States of the Coast of Oman and Madinah, it could not be acknowledged by us, as we had ever considered and treated them as independent chiefs. That we did not concern ourselves with their internal relations, but that in respect to maritime affairs, each chief would always be considered strictly and individually responsible for the acts of his own subjects.

5. The preceding paragraphs contain the substance of my conversation with the Wahabi Envoy. I am of opinion that his mission was principally for the purpose of endeavouring to obtain that degree of guarantee for the regular payment of the "Zakat" by the Bahraini Chief, which would be implied by our being parties to the arrangement finally concluded between the late belligerents. At the same time, it was no doubt intended

to give a plausible colour, in the eyes of the dependants of Ameen Fyzul, to the withdrawal of his expedition against Bahrein, as being an arrangement mutually agreed upon with the English.

6 I am by no means satisfied that it would be bad policy on the part of the Government, to exert its influence with the Bahrein Sheik, to induce him to pay the "Juswat" on title to the Wahabee Ruler with regularity; taking care however that it was understood this payment was strictly considered in a religious light, as made to the Imam or Chief Priest of the Wahabee Sect, and not as Tribute, and that it implied no acknowledgment of subjection, £1,000 however a year is no great amount, considering the resources of Bahrein, and as this has been paid by the rulers of that island, to the head of the Wahabee Tribe, for a long period, the claims of Ameen Fyzul for its continued disbursement, would not seem without a foundation. I am fully aware, that this suggestion is not free from objections, but still I deem it not altogether unworthy of consideration, as being likely to maintain the peace of the Gulf.

4 So far as political objects are concerned, I can see no advantage in despatching an Officer to visit Ameen Fyzul. But as offering a very favorable opportunity for becoming generally

acquainted with the nature of the country and resources of the province of Avedj, the Right Honorable the Governor in Council might not be altogether indisposed to entertain the proposition of the Wahabee Chief.

8 I have the honor to enclose for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council a translation of my reply to Ameen Fyzul's letter, and to be *for* *you*

Residency Persian Gulf }
Camp near Bushire } Signed J. Stennell
9th August 1851 } Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Cd 14 f. 11
Camp
Stennell

Transcription of previous document

Office No 258 of 1851

Cons: No 17 of 1851

From

Lieutenant Colonel Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To

Arthur Malet Esquire
Chief Secretary to Government Bombay
Camp near Bushire

Secret Department

9th August 1851

Sir,

I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council the enclosed translation of a letter dated the 13th July last to my address, from Ameer Fysul the Wahabee Ruler of Nedjd.

2. This communication was brought by a Special Envoy, named Sheikh Abdool Rahman ben Ibrahim, who arrived at Bushire on the 6th instant, and paid me a visit yesterday morning.

3. The object of Sheikh Abdool Rahman's mission appeared to be three: first, to impress upon me that his master had been induced to relinquish his intention of punishing the Sheiks of Bahrein for their contumacy in withholding the regular payment of the established "zukat" or tithe, solely out of consideration to the British Government. Secondly to induce me to depute an Officer for the purpose of bringing affairs between the Ameer and the Sheiks of Bahrein to a permanent and satisfactory settlement. Thirdly to assert his master's right to consider all the Maritime Sheiks of the Coasts of Oman and Batinah, as subject to his Authority. I should premise that the Envoy had quitted the camp of the Ameer before the arrival of Sheikh Saud ben Tahnoon, but subsequently to the receipt by His Highness of my letter to him of the 1st ultimo announcing that his vessels would not be permitted to invade Bahrein. The report therefore of the removal of the Wahabee Chief and his Forces from the Coast, and the terms upon which peace had been made with Bahrein, only reached him after his arrival at Koweit. Sheikh Abdool Rahman professed to be exceedingly surprised that I could suppose for an instant, a powerful chief like his Master would have been influenced by a mere dependent like the Sheikh of Absoothabee to give up his intrusions in respect to the Bahrein Chiefs. Nothing, he said, but the Ameer's great desire to maintain the friendship and good will of the British Government, would have led him to consent to make terms with Sheikh Mahomed ben Khuleefa.

4. Sheikh Abdool Rahman then introduced the subject of the Ameer's wish that an officer should be deputed to arrange matters in respect to his future relations both with the British Government, and the Sheiks of Bahrein, upon a more permanent and satisfactory basis than heretofore. No reliance, he said, would be placed upon the word of Sheikh Mahomed and the object of the Ameer was to secure the due fulfilment of his promise for the regular annual payment of the "zukat". I replied that, however willing to meet the Ameer's wishes, I could not take upon myself to depute an officer to wait upon him, unless I received the previous sanction of my Government for such a measure. The Wahabee Envoy then remarked that as I was

now fully aware of Sheikh Mohamad ben Khuleefa's promise to pay regularly the annual sum of 4000 Crowns as "zakat" to His Highness I could offer no objection to the latter's taking the requisite steps to enforce this payment, should it at any future time be suspended or withheld. I answered that we did not concern ourselves with any arrangements that the Chief of Bahrein might consider it expedient to make with the Ameer; but that I did not believe the British Government would ever permit under any pretext whatever, the possession of the island of Bahrein to fall into the hands of a foreign power. That with respect to Ameer Fysul's claim of authority over all the Maritime Sheiks of the Coasts of Oman and Batinah, it could not be acknowledged by us, as we had ever considered and treated them as independent Chiefs. That we did not concern ourselves with their internal relations, but that in respect to maritime affairs, each Sheikh would always be considered as strictly and individually responsible for the acts of his own subjects.

5. The preceeding paragraphs contain sum and substance of my conversation with the Wahabee Envoy; I am of opinion that his mission was principally for the purpose of endeavouring to obtain that degree of guarantee for the regular payment of the "zukat" by the Bahrein Chief which would be implied by our being parties to the arrangements finally concluded between the late belligerents. At the same time, it was no doubt intended to give a plausible color, in the eyes of the dependants of Ameer Fysul, to the withdrawal of his expedition against Bahrein, as being an arrangement virtually agreed upon with the English.

6. I am by no means satisfied that it would be bad policy on the part of the Government, to exert its influence with the Bahrein Sheikh, to induce him to pay the "zukat" or tithe to the Wahabee Ruler with regularity; taking care however that it was understood this payment was strictly considered in a religious light, as made to the Imam or Chief Priest of the Wahabee Sect and not as Tribute and that it implied no acknowledgement of subjection. 4,000 Crowns a year is no great amount, considering the resources of Bahrein, and as this has been paid by the rulers of that island to the head of the Wahabee Tribe for a long period, the claims of Ameer Fysul for its continued disbursement, would not seem without a foundation. I am fully aware that this suggestion is not free from objections, but still I deem it not altogether unworthy of consideration as being likely to maintain the peace of the Gulf.

7. So far as political objects are concerned, I can see no advantage in deputing an officer to visit Ameer Fysul. But as offering a very favorable opportunity for becoming more fully acquainted with the nature of the country and resources of the province of Nedjd, the Right Honorable the Governor in Council might not be altogether indisposed to entertain the proposition of the Wahabee Chief.

8. I have the honor to enclose for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council a translation of my reply to Ameer Fysul's letter and to be etc etc.

Residency Persian Gulf)
Camp near Bushire)
9th August 1851)

Signed S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

No. 1 A of 1854

63 112

From,

Captain A. B. Kemball

Resident in the Persian Gulf

To,

H. L. Anderson Esq^r.

Secretary to Government

Bombay

Per Sept.

On board of H.C. Sloop "Chive"
Bahrein Harbour 21 August 1854

Sir,

I have the honor to report for the information of Government that having left Bushire in the H.C. Sloop "Chive" on the 1st Instant agreeable to the intention announced in a former despatch I arrived at Bahrein on the following day and found that the late attack upon the island so far from being an independent effort of Sheikh Mahomed ben Abdullah to dispossess the present Rulers had formed part of a preconcerted design of a more extended character than was even at first supposed: Apart from the co-operation of the Wahabee forces the Al Ali Tribe located at Keen had been drawn into the enterprise and its

its failure it appeared, had been owing not less to the tardy junction of the latter than to the death at the first outset of one of the leaders of the former, which coupled with the unexpected resistance they encountered, so dispirited the assailants as to occasion their rapid retreat. — The above details were elicited from the men of Laksah who were taken prisoners — The posture of affairs at the date of my coming and the steps taken by the Sheiks of Bahrain to guard against a second surprise are detailed in a report from the bonds of the Signis to Com^d Robinson of which a copy forms Enc^y 1.

J. D. Bone
Robinson 9/2/23
dated 4 August

At our interview on the following day Sheikh Mahomed ben Khaleef dwelt with much earnestness upon the magnitude of the danger he had so narrowly escaped and in expressing his fears for the future even ascribed indirectly to British Policy the difficulties in which he was involved. He remarked that owing to his superiority on the sea he was certainly able to cope with his refugee relatives at Dammam and even to hold them in check though supported by the Wahabees provided their means of

of attack were limited to their own resources, but the case he said became materially altered when those means were suddenly augmented from without — be it merely for the purposes of transit — and that too from a quarter which but for our intervention he might at any time have rendered innocuous by extirpating the Al Ali settlement at Henn — It was true he acquiesced that the restriction imposed by the British Government upon their interference with the affairs of Bahrain was avowedly to cease so soon as the truce in question should remove to the Arabian shore of the Gulf, but he put it to myself whether that could be termed a removal bona fide which did not comprise their chieftains and families and in fact consisted of the temporary transfer of their boats without previous notice to swell the ranks of his enemies — With reference to the Wahabees he added I must now be convinced what little faith could be reposed in their professions or promises — He had he reminded me hitherto faithfully discharged the engagement he contracted to Sincer Syed for the payment of annual tribute and yet in addition to the proofs already existing of that Chief's connivance, on the 11th of August.

thence, of his type being invited to explain their conduct they returned for answer that having been placed by their superior in subordination to Mahomed ben Abdullah it was not in their power to controul his actions, a fact I may observe of which I had been previously advised by the British Agent. In reply to my comments on the origin of the outbreak Sheikh Mahomed ben Khalifa urged that if his dependents had been the first aggressors he had at least at my suggestion proceeded to make every reparation in his power, nor could he now regret an occurrence which had had the effect of unmasking the schemes of his opponents, since if any accidental collision were to be made the pretext for a general assault it was clear he would never be safe & the sooner the contest were brought to an issue the more satisfactory must it prove to all parties.

3. Concurring as I did in the force and validity of these arguments I now informed the Sheikh that the assistance to Bahrain had been undertaken with the view if practicable of restoring tranquillity. I was prepared to offer relief under certain contingencies and to afford him assistance in defending himself from contingencies having

65116
in my opinion wisest it only remained to determine the mode of procedure which should be most consistent with the instructions I had from Govt. — I soon found however that my visitors expectations far outstripped my intentions for he proposed that I should peremptorily require and if need were enforce the withdrawal of his refugee Shi'as from their present asylum to some more distant part of the Gulf — in which case he said he would empower me to guarantee to them an annual allowance from the revenues of Bahrain much exceeding that they now enjoyed from the Wahabee Ruler; — but on mentioning that even did the voluntary acquiescence of Mahomed ben Abdullah render such a course otherwise unobjectionable I possessed no authority to assure the conditions; he then expressed an earnest hope that I would at any rate compel the M. Ali tribe to relinquish the confederacy and return to their homes after which if I felt myself at liberty to lend him support against the Wahabees the presence of one vessel of War he conceived, as a pledge of the sympathy of the British Govt. would suffice to discourage any further attempts on their

side.

side. — In pressing this latter point he reminded me that if he had hitherto refrained from attacking his kinsmen at Dammam he had done so chiefly out of deference to my advice in order to avoid giving umbrage to the Wahabees and of provoking the aggression in which they had now so carelessly joined against him.

Consequent upon this conversation I addressed a letter to Commodore

Robinson (Enc. 2) accompanied with a communication for the Chief of the Al Ali tribe to be forwarded to Dammam per "Tiger" calling upon that person to retire with-

out delay with his boats and followers on pain of incurring the serious displeasure of the

British Govt. It will be perceived however from the copies enclosed of further correspondence with the above mentioned

Officer that it was not until a more peremptory tone was adopted that Ali ben Sultan

consented to comply with my Requisition

Two of his boats he said had been captured by the Chief of Bahrain which I must

first recover and it would then become a matter for discussion whether he should

return home or establish himself permanently on the Arabian coast; but as the

occasion

2/ To Comd. Robinson
H.S.B. dated 3rd Aug 41

3/ From Comd. Robinson
H.S.B. dated 3rd August

4/ To — ditto — ditto —
H.S.B. dated 3rd August

5/ To — ditto — ditto —
H.S.B. dated 19th August

6/ From — ditto — ditto —
H.S.B. dated 21 August

These boats captured at sea subsequent to the attack upon the Island

occasion was one that called for promptitude and decision he was informed in reply that 24 hours were allowed him to take his departure nor could I entertain for a moment any demands of the nature referred to until I was satisfied that he had relinquished every design of hostility against the island; on the other hand I am happy to add that on his coming to me subsequently in person and on my bringing his claim to the notice of Sheikh Mahomed ben Khalifa the latter Chief with a laudable degree of moderation promised to restore to him the boats in question. — Before parting with Ali ben Sultan I was at some pains to impress him with a sense of the serious responsibility he had incurred by the wilful disregard of his obligations — for which I observed I might yet be directed to call him to account by Govt. In extenuation he pleaded that his boats though not less than 40 in number had merely put Dammam to refresh their crews; but as he could not deny that in spite of himself they would have been made available for the transport of troops if needed nor could justify his neglect of my first summons I thought it advisable to obtain some security against similar accidents for the future.

When invited by the Govt. of the Ulagas they proved to exceed 50 in number

ture by inviting him to acknowledge in writing the warning I had conveyed to him and the tenor of the document thereon drawn up for his signature of which Enclosure 9 is a translation may I trust meet with the approval of Govt.

— at the same time he was given to understand that the transfer of his tribe from one boat to the other must now be postponed pending the settlement of the general question.

On the despatch of the "Lignis" to Seemann I seized the occasion to address a note to Sheikh Mahomed ben Abdullah requesting an explanation of his late proceedings and the correspondence

that ensued thereon of which I from Sheikh Mahomed ben Abdullah dated 7th August will append translations. I will apprise the Right Honble the Governor in Council of the grounds upon which he based their justification, as well as my reasons for requiring him to desist for the present from further aggressions.

His excuses that he conceived his promise to Count Robinson to refer only to collisions between boats at sea and not to the transport of troops from one point to another are scarcely less futile than his proposal in the same will still to consider the sea as neutral ground whereby his object is plain

plain to deprive ^{67. '30} his opponents of their chief source of defence while he should be himself at liberty to reap the fullest advantage from the numerical superiority of his adherents and allies — But this chief having at length acceded to my Requisition and further restored all the boats captured by his people with the exception of six which having fallen into the hands of Humud ben Maydel will form the subject of a separate despatch, it remains for Government to decide to what extent his actions are to be controlled hereafter — The result of my Arabic Meerzas Mission to Seemann who was directed to sound Mahomed ben Abdullah with respect to the terms offered by his Rival on the condition of his Retirement has served to convince me that nothing short of a direct interposition on our part would induce him to break off his connection with the Wahabees — He admitted that to Anceer Syoud he was indebted for the very means of subsistence and though in obedience to my wishes he would for a while suspend hostilities he possessed hereditary claims to the half of Bahrain which so long as a hope remained of support from the same Quarter he would not cease to enforce — Under these circumstances it is evident that the permission

11
 lion granted to him to carry on war provided he returned to the Arabian Coast is at variance with the interest since imposed upon the sphere. *vide inc. 1 to letter from Sheikh Mulla bin Abdullah dated 23 August forming inc. 12 to this despatch*
 tion of Ameer Syul under whose protection he is living and on the one point or the other therefore, the policy of Govt. would seem to need modification.

6. The grounds upon which our opposition was offered to the schemes of the Wahabees in 1857 were their alleged subservience to the Vice Roy of Egypt and the probability therefore of the island falling through their means under the sway of the Sublime Porte but it is worthy of remark that the Chiefs of Bahrain impute the present animosity of Ameer Syul to his jealousy at their having entered into direct communication with Abbas Pasha for the purpose of relieving their affairs from his interference and thus if our apprehensions be well founded there would seem to be no less danger of their voluntarily resigning their independence into the hands of the latter than of his wresting it from them through the instrumentality of the former. *vide Govt. letter S.D. No. 343 dated 22 December 1850.*

Without however identifying the motives and interests of the two

two Powers I should observe that though ³² years have always been entertained of the separate ascendancy of the Wahabee sect being followed sooner or later by the revival of Piracy the extreme vulnerability of an island position like Bahrain must render such an eventuality even more amenable to our control than it has proved to be in the case of the Maritime Tribes of Oman who for some time past have been more or less indirectly exposed to its influence and on the other hand it may be a question for consideration whether as in 1839/40 European diplomacy would not furnish the best means of arresting Turkish ambition - but if on a review of the question in all its bearings and with respect more especially to the maintenance of a paramount influence at Bahrain the absolute necessity of Ameer Syul in the hands of the ruling Mutorree family be still determined upon I would respectfully suggest that the expulsion of the successful competitor from Seemamuntamount indeed to the extinction of his claims, must afford the only hope of restraining this policy - The number of his immediate followers being very limited ~~being very limited~~ it has been already shown that he is entirely dependent for the means of aggression upon Wahabee levies - his position has become the resort of such lawless characters as Humud bin Mujdel and not only are the

They are stated
 all persons all
 included

respects

Vessels of the Indian Naval Squadron in these seas too limited in number and employed on too many and distant duties to maintain a perfect surveillance over the movements of his confederates but every unwished act of piracy committed under color of supporting his cause must go far to aggravate their labors and unsettle existing arrangements by spreading the spirit of disorder throughout the Gulf. Under this view of the case whatever the hardship to Mahomed ben Abdullah it would seem but right that the preclusions of one individual which have so often compromised the public tranquillity should yield to considerations of the general safety and that he should be at length called upon to relinquish the struggle by accepting the proffered bounty of his rival in any form that may be considered most eligible.

It was formerly proposed by Sir R. Munnell that the revenues of a certain number of villages should be assigned for the maintenance of himself & his brothers & he collected & heine by an agent appointed by themselves.

Having completed the arrangements above reported I now again placed myself in communication with Sheikh Mahomed ben Khalifa in order to persuade him if possible to relax the stringency of his operations against the opposite party and was gratified to hear that though his distrust of Ameer Tysul would not admit of his joining altogether he

the blockade of the Wahabee Ports ^{69/124} would satisfactory assurances had been given with respect to the future, he did not object to suspend the application of this measure to the inhabitants of Ocmanum whose boats would be at liberty to pass to and fro on their lawful avocations without molestation. His own safety he said required that he should allow of no accession to the Naval resources of his enemies at this time unless I would guarantee in writing his security from further attack from that quarter though he assured me that pending the explanations of Ameer Tysul his operations would be confined to the defensive. Alluding to the intentions expressed in my last despatch from Bushire to support with my remonstrances the demand which the Chief of Bahrain might be expected to make upon the Wahabee Chief for the removal of his exiled kinsmen from their dangerous proximity to his territory - It has appeared to me on further reflection that by adopting this course I might involve myself in obligations I should not be justified in contracting without special authority and as moreover no opening presented itself I have refrained thus far from making any communication whatever to Ameer Tysul.

Before concluding this letter

Referring to the payment of annual tribute, response likely for the pro- ceedings of the day to whom an intimation has been extended 6/10/59

I am happy to add that the suspicions which were believed to attach to our Agent of wilful negligence in failing to discover the designs of the confederates have proved to be groundless - Sheikh Mahomed ben Khaleefa admitted that in a moment of irritation and alarm a charge of partizanship had certainly been insinuated against Hajee Jussem but on reflection considering how effectively the expedition had been concealed from his own emissaries before the cessation of intercourse with the Wahabee Ports prevented its being disclosed and considering also that the visit of the British Agent had not extended beyond Semamm he freely acquitted him of all blame in the matter, nor except on the score of credulity in giving too much credence to the word of Mahomed ben Abdullah have my enquiries from other sources led to a different conclusion - For his error in suggesting to Genl Robinson that the crisis was past and that no obstacle existed to his quitting the Port without awaiting the fulfilment of that Chief's engagement I have reprimanded him in a manner to make him more cautious for the future and I trust to be able to do so in the future for Government to

to take more serious notice of his conduct ^{70 126}

10 In apologizing for the great length of this despatch and its enclosures which I trust may be excused by my anxiety to put Govt in possession of all the details of this intricate matter and in requesting that I may be furnished with instructions for my future guidance therein at an early date

I have &c.

/Signed/ L. B. K. Resident &c.

12/ P. S. 23rd August 1854 - I beg to append as Enc: 12 and 13 translation of another letter to my address from Mahomed ben Abdullah dated yesterday together with translation of my reply thereto of this day

/Signed/ L. B. K.

No. 14 A of 1854 816
122
From, Captain A. B. Kemball
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To, H. L. Anderson Esq.
Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department Residency in the Persian Gulf
Bushire 23rd October 1854

Sir,

Adverting to my despatch of 22nd dated 21st August last, I have the honor to report for the information of Govt that calling at Bahrein on my return to this station from the tour of the Gulf I found awaiting my arrival there a letter from Amer-Eynul, the Wahabi Ruler, wherein he opens the subject of the affairs of that land after claiming the allegiance of its chief and attempting to justify the attacks lately made upon them invites me to compel them to raise the blockade they have instituted of the coast lying between Kutiffe & Acmanah whence that attack had proceeded.

Inconsistent as was such a demand under the actual circumstances of the case I have nevertheless arranged to comply with the same in the hope never to be again called upon to do so.

21/1
 I again proposed to Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa to suspend the measure in question pending at least the course of negotiations but finding him, as I expected, resolved to listen to no terms of accommodation which did not include the removal of his exiled kinsmen from Seeman, unless indeed I would in the form of a written engagement guarantee the security of his position for the future, I had no resource but to confine myself to a suggestion in which he acquiesced, that he should be the first to make direct overtures of peace to the Wahabee Ruler by means of a communication to be sent through my medium. He argued I thought justly, that if he concerted now to suspend hostilities he would be unable to resume them hereafter until perhaps too late without placing himself in a false position; while to relinquish the advantage he had gained would be to expose himself to the recurrence of the danger he had so narrowly escaped and to perpetuate the chances of future collision. His opera-

123 21/2
 tions he assured me would still be restricted as far as practicable to the defensive but their effect having been on occasion a scarcity at the Wahabee ports which had led to the dispersion of the forces assembled by the opposite party, he did not doubt that the continuance of the blockade even for a month longer would induce Kueer Tygal to consider more favorably the proposals about to be made to him than he might otherwise be disposed to do.
 2 Not feeling myself authorized to influence the plans or intentions of the Chief of Bahrain in a manner to saddle the Government with any obligations real or implied, I expressed my concurrence in the above views and accordingly addressed a reply to the Wahabee Ruler a translation of which with its enclosure and of the letter from Kueer Tygal which elicited them I have the honor to submit herewith for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council. In that reply I have recounted at length the causes that led to the existing complications and have suggested the only course calculated in my opinion to restore confidence to all parties; but be-

11/2/3/

Yours

13
 would reiterate the Policy of Govt as
 already often declared I have carefully
 abstained from committing myself to
 any particular line of conduct and
 its tenor therefore I trust may be deemed
 satisfactory — At the same time with
 reference to the intension expressed
 in the Sheikh's Missive to make a
 suitable provision for his relatives
 in the event of their withdrawing from
 Seemann I thought it advisable with
 the view of preventing further misun-
 derstanding that he should commu-
 nicate to me also in writing the terms
 of the proposed arrangement — This he
 did by furnishing me with a Memo-
 randum ~~by~~ stating 6,000 broons as the
 sum he would pay to them annually
 if they retired to Sakrah which sum he
 would augment to 10,000 broons pro-
 vided they took up their abode out of
 Wahabee Territory

In reporting my return Yes-
 terday to Bushire

I have H^{ca}.
 / signed J. B. Kimball
 Resident H^{ca}.

*This it will be remem-
 bered was the amount
 before offered to them
 when located on the
 island of Keen —*

Ms. 14 A.

N^o 14 of 1855.

Secret Department

From

Captain J. B. Kimball

Resident in the Persian Gulf

To

H. L. Anderson Esq

Secretary to Government Bombay

Residency in the Persian Gulf

Bushire 3rd April 1855

Sir

I have much satisfaction in announcing
 for the information of Government the arrival
 at Bushire from Persia on the 28th ultimo
 of Sheikh Mohammed ben Abdullah the son of
 the late Soobah of Bahrein, whose motives for
 paying me a visit are probably directly set forth
 in the accompanying translated Report from
 the British Agent at Bahrein to the effect that
 the Wahabee Ruler having had his adventures for a
 separate arrangement declined by Sheikh the
 ben Abdullah and finding that his alleged dependence
 upon the Sultan of Turkey did not avail to divert
 Government from its purpose, he resolved his
 protegee to relinquish further opposition.

This view of the case is indeed
 borne out by the contents of a letter to my address
 from Amir Fozul entrusted to his care, wherein

the Ammiral sends any allusion to the sublime
Pole and invites me to adjudicate the matter
in its own merits, as between the rival branches
of the Almorabid family, proposing to become himself
guarantee for Sheikh Mohammed ben Abdullah.
A translation of his letter is herewith submitted
together with the draft of my reply, the terms of
which I trust may meet with the approval of
the Right Honourable the Governor in Council. If I
might be permitted a suggestion with reference
to the latter document, it would respectfully show
that, were a direct communication in somewhat
similar terms addressed by His Highness in Council
to the Wahabi Ruler, it would probably have a
beneficial effect both in soothing any irritation
he might feel at the operation of our Policy and
in inducing a more ready acquiescence therein
for the future.

At my first interview with Sheikh
Mohammed ben Abdullah I have found him full
of professions of subservience to the wishes of the
British Government, though protesting as was to
be expected, against the proposed sacrifice of his
pretensions to the half of Bahrain, in exchange for
a pension from his rival Government. It will be
remembered that the terms offered to him by Sheikh
Mohammed

Mohammed ben Abdullah were 10,000 Drawas per
annum, if he would finally quit the Wahabi
territory, or 6000 Drawas if he would remove from the
East to Suvaik or to some other place equally
remote in the interior. Confess, however, because
it would be greatly to the advantage of all parties,
both as relieving ourselves from certain embarrassments
hereafter, and as being more agreeable to my visitor,
that for a pecuniary allowance of this nature
should be substituted the assignment of the
revenue of certain villages to a similar amount,
of which the administration should be left to his
agent or Factor on the spot, and in proceeding,
accordingly to invite Sheikh Mohammed ben
Abdullah to fulfil his engagements, it is my
intention to propose to him to deposit his two other
Sheikhs Ali to Basrah for the purpose of discussing
the irredification of our acquaintance how
far he would be disposed to entertain it on
my approaching tour of the Gulf.

I have the honour to be &c
Signed J. B. Sturball
President in the Persian
Court

Translated

Translated substance

From

Hajji Hassan

British agent at Bahrain

To

Captain A. B. Kimball

Resident in the Persian Gulf

Dated 6th Rajab
25th MarchReceived 25th March 1855.

Sheikh Ali bin Abdullah having

returned to Bahrain with all his family, I waited upon him by invitation on his arrival, when he informed me that the expense of the bloodshed being excessive, while on the other hand he observed that matters were improving, he did not think it necessary to remain in this quarter, but if any change took place and the Government should think his boat large and small would be at the disposal of the Resident, to be employed in any way he might think proper for the good of Bahrain he (the Sheikh) would not be absent until the affair should be settled.

To my enquiries for intelligence subsequent to the return of Sheikh Abdullah bin Abdullah to Dumanin and to the visit of Hajji Muhammad Ali bin al-Yazir, Sheikh Ali said that Hajji Muhammad Ali bin al-Yazir had been deputed to him by Amur Teyal prior to the arrival of Muhammad bin Abdullah at Riaz with *John Al-Masri*.

a view to induce him to address a letter to the Wahhabi Ruler so that the existing differences might be arranged between themselves and

*This passage is somewhat
obscure, it is probably meant
that in the opinion of the
people of Riaz, the intervention
of the Al-Masriya with the
English was a reason for
their going to the Riazis to
bring matters against
them.*

the Resident he concluded upon further interference on the matter, for that the people of Riaz acted under a great deal of anxiety to the wishes of the Al-Masriya for the removal of Muhammad bin Abdullah from Dumanin, whom they had gone over to the English. Sheikh Ali added that he had then addressed a letter to Amur Teyal, but without committing himself in any manner, and merely observing with reference to it, a complaint of his (the Sheikh) not writing to him and to the proposals that the matter should be settled among themselves, that he had himself brought on the affair and that if he had not written to him, it was from no notion of pride but because the matter had passed into other hands, which precluded his acquiring it. He answered.

As regards Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdullah, Sheikh Ali informed me he had heard from his acquaintances at Riaz that after the arrival of that person at Riaz it was arranged that Amur Teyal should write to the Resident, inviting him in the way of evidence to adjudge the

the differences between the al Shuhada and the al Abdullah and if he saw good to make over half of Bahrain to the latter with their property and vessels, otherwise to leave the question in abeyance pending a reference to the Sultan which answer would probably shock the English, but the Amir and Sheikh Mohamed ben Abdullah, that if it had not the desired effect and the English were prepared to go to war, he would not fight with them but accede to their wishes. Sheikh also similarly added in his letter that the object of the former suggestion was to sound the English and ascertain whether they were inclined in affecting their object or whether they would be deterred by the mention of the Sultan.

True Translated Substantive

Signed A. P. Kimball

Resident

(True Copy)

Signed A. P. Kimball

Resident Persian Gulf

Translation

From His Highness Sheikh Faisal

Mutabai ruler

To Captain A. P. Kimball

Resident in the Persian Gulf

Dated 10th December 1859

30 March

Received 31st March 1860

Mc

It was fortunate however on the

the ^{20th February} ~~10th December~~ your friendly letter reached me. I was gratified by the assurance of your good health and welfare and understood its contents, more particularly with regard to the affairs of the sea and the maintenance of the security thereof in the interest of those passing therein to and fro. This is good and your status in that respect very proper. I am assured that the Sultan has no object therein beyond the vindication of justice and the preservation of the sea from the oppression of those boatmen, pirates, and plundering. To be truthful all this in the part of the Sultan is excellent. With reference however to the sons of Sheikh Abdullah ben Ahmed, in taking any harm with me and in establishing themselves on my territory it was not their intention to perpetrate crimes but to do something plunder and piracy, neither were they guilty of this nor would I consent thereto, but they sought asylum with me and asked for my territory by reason of our ancient friendship and of their dependence upon me from olden times up to the present date. With regard therefore to your instructions to them to remove from Persia, I know not what has occurred to render this imperative or what

is the intention therein, for which is not
in accordance with the dictates of unity
and friendship and it is not right that
the Sarkar should consent to do this without
reason. If the sons of Abdullah ben Ahmed
have occasioned detriment to the Pasha of
the Sarkar, of which I am not aware, I beg
of you to inform me and I will satisfy you
of the fact being myself responsible for any
irregularity on their part and having
regardance of the same under all circumstances,
but if any enemy has misled by designing
representations, it does not become you to give
credence to the statements of an adversary against
his opponent except upon the clearest evidence.
In the rest, Mahomed ben Abdullah proceeds
with this letter to wait upon you and to im-
plore the observance of friendship and good
will. Please God you will learn from him
personally the particulars of his case and what
he has to advance.

True Translation

Signed M. R. Keirball
Resident in Persian Gulf

(True Copy)

Signed M. R. Keirball
Resident in Persian Gulf

Translation

(S. M. W. M.)

Translation
From
Captain M. R. Keirball
Resident in Persian Gulf

To
His Highness Amir Faysal
Wahabi ruler
Dated 16th Rajab 1271
5 April 1855

Ala. I have received with much satisfaction
your Highness' letter by the hand of Sheikh
Mahomed ben Abdullah and will have no time in
submitting it to the Sarkar as a gratifying proof
of your deference to its views and of your cooperation
in the arrangements requisite to maintain the
peace and tranquillity of the coast. Your Highness
must be sensible that after the attack on Bahrain
in July last, of which the particulars have been
fully discussed in previous correspondence, it
was no longer in my power to restrain Sheikh
Mahomed ben Abdullah from adopting the
measures he might deem necessary to self defence
and from which he had hitherto forbore
solely in deference to the Councils of the British
authority on the ground of giving no
umbrage to your Highness. It must be
evident, therefore, that the continued stay

of

of his spoiled ministers at Persia, amenable to no security against the repetition of his act, could only serve to perpetuate the disorder which for the last 9 months has prevailed in that quarter to the great injury of Your Highness' subjects as well as of others generally. Under these circumstances I cannot doubt that your Highness' disapproval of the matter will be regarded as an additional pledge of the friendship and good will so long subsisting between yourself and the British Government, and will not fail to prove of advantage to Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah in the settlement of his differences with the chiefs of Bahrain.

(True Translation)

Signed A. B. Kemball
Resident P.S.G.

(True Copy)

Signed A. B. Kemball
Resident Persian Gulf

(True Copies)

John Wilson
Secretary to Govt

J. G. Allen
Clerk

From M. B.
Captain A. B. Kemball
To Resident in the Persian Gulf
H. L. Anderson Esquire
Secretary to Government

Secret Department Bombay
At Sea on Board of H.M.S.
Companys Ship "Clive" 26th May 1856

Sir,
Monsieur Bourée, the French Minister in India, having quitted Bichir for Shiraz on the morning of the 12th Instant, I thus found myself at liberty to undertake the annual tour of the Gulf, as previously contemplated, and accordingly embarking in the Honble Companys Ship "Clive" with "Constance" in company on the morning of the 15th I proceeded to Dammam to call for Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah on my way to Bahrain. Such a mark of consideration in him of a sincere notice to meet me agreeable to appointment, I conceived would not be misplaced in the case of one who had relinquished all ideas of contumacy, and that belief having gained force in his own breast arrived together at our destination on the evening of the 20th.

I am happy to state that the issue of this step has been an accommodation between him and Sheikh Mahomed bin Khalefeh, Chief of Bahrain of which the terms are comprised in the enclosed

Translation

translation of an agreement subscribed by both parties, and believing as I do that the objects of Government have been thereby fully attained, I respectfully hope that the modification of its orders respecting the continuance of Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdullah at Dammam, to which I shall be soon to have tacitly assented pending the receipt of further instructions, may not seem to detract from the success of my mediation. It will be remembered that on the occasion of his visit to Bushiri, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdullah declared his complete and unequivocal submission to the will of Government, nor at our present meeting did I find that his sentiments in this respect had undergone any change, but as before he still earnestly implored me to relax, as far as practicable, the stringency of the requisition that had been made upon him. Whatever, he said, might be the opinion of his past conduct, he was now sufficiently convinced of the futility of further opposition and the Govt might be assured he would never be guilty of abusing the confidence they might repose in him. Perceiving, as he did, certain landed property in the neighbourhood of Mithqaf, together with a number of barrels, horses and other cattle, ^{to insist} nevertheless upon his banishment to Kuwait or to the islands of Fes on the Persian coast, would be not only to cast him among enemies or strangers but to debar him also from turning to the best advantage the little resources that were left him; and rather he concluded than he compelled
to

to that course, he would prefer to burn his boats and retiring into the interior adopt the life and habit of the roving Bedouins. It must be confessed that arguments of this nature, coming from one who had acted in such direct defiance of the views and policy of Government, were not entitled to much attention, but on the other hand there were not wanting considerations of some weight to incline me to the side of moderation. It was after all not unnatural in an Arab chief, whom he found himself so powerfully supported by Ameer Teyarib and unrestrained by any special engagement to attempt the recovery of territory over which his father had so long exercised a share of authority. In the event of his forcible expulsion from Dammam without some subsidiary steps being taken to conciliate the Wahabee Khyer, it would still be open to the latter belief to locate in the same position other parties equally subservient to his designs, whose presence would not be less hazard a recurrence of the late complications or necessitate the constant supervision of a Naval force, and even if Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdullah consented to retire to Fes, little additional security would be obtained against his rejoining the confederates on the first favorable occasion after their plans might be matured, as was actually effected

by

by him in 1851, and was again attempted each year by the Al Ali tribe acting in his interests. On the other hand, it appeared to me that if this chief could himself be induced to furnish a solemn pledge for his future good behaviour, such as is realized in the agreement now concluded, and its obligation upon him so long as he continued in the Wahabi Territory were likewise formally acknowledged by Ameer Fyzul, the experiment could be productive of no evil and, should at least be justified in submitting his appeal to the judgment and consideration of Government.

Having duly deliberated on these points I then proceeded to communicate my views in the above sense to Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifah, and, as was to be expected, found him not only favourably inclined to the proposed arrangement. It was true, he admitted, that the Government had in no way bound itself to remove his exiled relative from Dammam, but he was aware nevertheless of the peremptory character of the requisitions made in its name, and if Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdullah in any degree incriminated thereby he had only himself to blame for the consequence. Although these matters perhaps did not directly concern himself, seeing that the British Government must be the best judge of the measures proper to effect the common purpose, still he could not help feeling disappointment at the change, and was deeply depending

depending as it appeared to him to do upon the temper hereafter of Ameer Fyzul, in whose professions and promises he placed no reliance whatever, he apprehended that the good effects expected therefrom would prove to be delusive, on my reminding him, however, that already in two previous instances the support of the British Government had not been withheld to counteract the projects of the Wahabi Ruler, and that it would certainly be both to protect an antagonism which might be set at rest by mutual forbearance, and more especially in acquainting himself with the precise terms of the settlement, whereby his appeal was engaged to break off all Political connexion with Ameer Fyzul, he no longer exhibited the same reluctance to afford his concurrence and it only remained to select and specify the Villages, which, as already agreed, were to be substituted for the pecuniary allowance offered in the first instance.

It is satisfactory to me to add, that at two interviews which took place between the rival chieftains in my presence, their demeanour was distinguished by the utmost courtesy and I cannot doubt that the effect has been to soften their mutual animosity and to lead the way to a more familiar intercourse hereafter. On these occasions, when the terms of the agreement were discussed, some misapprehension seeming to exist as to the extent to which Sheikh Abdullah bin

bin Abdullah had pledged himself not to afford asylum to the enemies of the Chief of Bahrain, I took care to explain clearly to both parties the distinction to be drawn between hostile tribes and mere debtors for debt or criminal offences, whose cases might be decided upon their own merits respectively but who generally speaking could not be supposed to fall within the meaning of the restriction calling for any interference, and to obviate any dispute or avail thereafter, I further committed to writing my sentiments on the subject in the form of a letter to either Chief, of which translations are herewith forwarded. The Postscripts thereto concerning the contribution or kitha were added by desire of Sheikh Mahomed bin Khulafah, who insisted that the lands assigned to Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah must be subject to the same liability in this respect as the estates of other private individuals. It having been however understood by the latter that the kitha in question was payable to the Wahabi Ruler, he enquired whether, in the event of that Chief's foregoing his quota, the proposed exaction would still be enforced. Sheikh Mahomed bin Khulafah replied in the negative and consented to record this concession in the form of a note in the margin of my letter, but to this note though cognizant of the fact I declined of course to affix my attestation or to become in any way a party, observing that the tribute given to Amur Teyal being purely of a religious character did not concern the Govt, the more particularly that its payment was not held to imply any territorial jurisdiction.

As
Capt. By 1851

As regards the conditions of my mediation, I venture to believe that, while no guarantee is involved in the terms of the agreement beyond such as legitimately accrues to the office of Arbitrator, I have likewise abstained from committing the Government to a line of Policy other than that which has in fact been imposed upon it by the course of events since the summer of 1851. In all other respects the principles that have guided me are the same, it will be seen, with those which have uniformly regulated our relations with the Maritime States of Oman, and which regarding these states as strictly independent, have secured by treaty their direct responsibility to ourselves in all matters bearing upon the peace of the Sea, without admitting the intervention of any third party. These principles have already been repeatedly declared, as well as practically demonstrated to Amur Teyal, but the occasion requiring me to announce to him the reconciliation effected between his protégé and the Chief of Bahrain, I have thought that this recitation could not fail to be of advantage, more particularly since upon his recognition or tacit admission of them may depend in some measure the fidelity of Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah to his engagements. A translation of the letter I have accordingly addressed to him on the subject is

is herewith enclosed, and I would only add, with advance to the determination of Govt., consequent on his connexion or pretended connexion with the sublime Porte, to check by force of arm the ambitious designs of the Wahabee Ruler upon Bahrein, that as fairness would demand the like protection of his territory from wanton acts of aggression by the chiefs of that island, I have ventured to assure him of its influence being at all times exercised to this effect, as the natural condition of the forbearance expected at his hands.

Trusting that our proceedings in bringing this long pending matter to a close will meet with the approval of Government,

I have the honor to be Sir

At sea on board } Signed A. B. Kimball
of the U. S. S. } Resident in the Persian
Sloop "Albatross" } Gulf
26th May 1855. }

Co-fund by

Agreement comprising the terms of reconciliation between Sheikh Mahomed bin Khulcefa, the Chief of Bahrein, and Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdillah son of the late Abdillah bin Ahmed, Ex-Chief of that island.

Translation - Praise be to him who has given Peace to be the means of ... adjusting the affairs of mankind and of promoting harmony among all classes of his creatures, and Peace and Reverence be to our Lord Mahomed and to his honored descendants.

These words of sincerity and truth are inscribed in evidence of the reconciliation that has been effected between Sheikh Mahomed bin Khuliefah, Chief of Bahrein, for himself and his adherents the al Khuliefah, on the one side, and Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah, son of the late Abdullah bin Ahmed, for himself and his adherents the al Abdullah, on the other, in the following terms, Vizt, that from this day and henceforward Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah, on the part of himself

and

and his relatives, does renounce all pretension to the chiefship of Bahrain and does bind himself to abstain for the future from any designs of an aggressive or inimical character upon that island and its dependencies, and in consideration hereof Sheikh Mahomed bin Khuliefah, on the part of himself and his relatives, does engage to assign certain villages situated on the island, as enumerated below, to be held by ^{meaning, the place determined by the Sheikh} Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah, and he, Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah, shall be at liberty to appoint an agent on the spot to receive the income derived from the said villages, who shall be treated with all the consideration due to him. It is clearly understood by the present engagement that Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah shall break off his connection with Ameer Fyadh, in all matters militating against the observance of his obligations above recorded, and further that he shall not receive under his protection (collected around him) the enemies of Sheikh Mahomed bin Khuliefah

or

or the subjects of that Chief who may secede from Bahrain with hostile intentions against him, or for example the al bin Ali, the Lulahimeh, and others like them. The above agreement having been concluded through the mediation of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf in the general interests of Peace, and more especially with a view to the maintenance of good order and tranquillity at sea, it is further agreed between the contracting parties, that if any difference shall arise affecting its observance, such difference shall be submitted to the arbitration of the same functionary and on no account shall recourse be had to violence or arbitrary procedure until his decision shall have been declared, and if his decision should not be satisfactory to both parties then must the question at issue be referred to the British Government in Bombay, who will determine what course should be adopted for the vindication of the terms of this agreement and no more. The villages referred to in

the

the body of this document are Sebleh,
and Sar, and Jazirah and Juddum
and Bouz ibn Butti, the last —
including seven villages/plantations,
viz Jid Ali, Jirdab, Sumud, Maronah,
Staneyderah, Rikhar and Tarsijeh,
and of the above God is the best witness
and agent.

Executed and written on the seventh
day of the auspicious month Ruzman
in the year A H 1271-

Mahomed bin Khulufah — Mahomed bin Abd. Allah

Sealed by the contracting parties in the
presence of—

/Sigs/ A. B. Kemball
Resident Persian Gulf

/True translation/

/Sigs/ A. B. Kemball
Resident Persia

True copy

/Sigs/ A. B. Kemball
Resident in the Persian Gulf

From Captain A. B. Kemball Translation

To, Resident in the Persian Gulf
Cheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah
Son of the late Abd. Dullah bin
Ahmed.

Ex-Chief of Bahrain.
Dated 6th Ruzman 1271
25th May 1855
In handing to you herewith the

A. B. Kemball

the draft of an agreement comprising
the terms which appear to me —
calculated to effect an accommodation
between yourself and Cheikh Mahomed
bin Khulufah, I beg to observe that
I have fully particularized the extent
of the obligation by which you are
bound not to receive under your
protection seceders from Bahrain.
It is not contemplated that mere
debtors and Pearl Divers should
be included within the category,
calling for my interference. All such
cases must be judged by their own
merits respectively, but as a rule
they will fall precisely under the
operation of the same system as is
in vogue among the tribes of Oman.

You are apprised of the orders of
Government positively enjoining —
your removal from Oman —
Although some modification thereof
has taken place with respect to the
present settlement, nevertheless the
said settlement must be held to be
binding from this day forward, —
unless a different view should be
taken by the Dirkar, in which case
due

due matter will be given to you.
 P.S. I have been given to understand
 that there is an established contribution
 or tithe exacted from all the plantations
 (of Bahrain) at the rate of 10 per cent.
 But know you then, that the
 same is leviable from the villages -
 specified in the agreement, in common
 with the estates of other parties.

True Translation

Ltjy A. B. Kimball

Resident of

Marginal note added by Sheikh
 Mahomed bin Khaleefah, but of which
 Resident declined to have official
 cognizance.

Touching the Contribution referred
 to as leviable from the estates of
 Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah,
 in the event of his producing a
 document from Sybil to Sheikh
 Mahomed bin Khaleefah, foregoing
 Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah's
 quota of the tithe required from Sheikh
 Mahomed bin Khaleefah, then will
 Sybil.

His wish be carried into effect.
 Mahomed bin Khaleefah

(S) / True translation/
 /Lijy/ A. B. Kimball

Resident of

True Copy

/Lijy/ A. B. Kimball

Resident in the Persian Gulf

Translation from

Captain A. B. Kimball

Resident in the Persian Gulf

To,

Sheikh Mahomed bin Khaleefah

Chief of Bahrain

Dated 6th Rabi'ul Awwal 1271
23rd May 1855

Al.

In handing to you herewith the
 draft of an agreement comprising
 the terms that appear to me calculated
 to effect an accommodation between
 yourself and Sheikh Mahomed bin
 Abdullah, I beg to observe that I have
 fully particularized therein the extent
 of the obligation by which that Chief
 binds himself not to receive under
 his protection seceders from Bahrain
 as stated to you verbally, it is not
 contemplated that mere debtors and
 Poor Divers should be included -
 within

within the category calling for my interference. All such cases will of course be judged by their own merits respectively, but they will as a rule fall precisely under the same system as is in vogue among the tribes of Oman. Although some modification has taken place of the orders of Government with respect to the present settlement nevertheless it must be considered binding from this day forward, unless the views entertained by the Lirkar should be opposed thereto, in which case due notice will be given to you.

P.S. Touching the contributions or tithes which you declare to be established at the rate of 10 per cent, the same is of course leviable from the villages mentioned in the agreement, in common with the estates of other parties.

(True translation)

(Sign) A. D. Kimball
Resident of

(True copy)

(Sign) A. D. Kimball
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Thoms

Translation from

Captain A. D. Kimball

To, Resident in the Persian Gulf
His Highness
Amir Faysal

Rules of Akdjd.

Dated 24th May 1855
4th Rabi-ul-Thani 1271

I have already acknowledged your Highness' letter announcing the visit of Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah to Bushra, and I have now much pleasure in acquainting you with the success of my mediation in effecting a reconciliation between that person and his relative Sheikh Mahomed bin Khaleefah.

Although the instructions I have received from the Lirkar enjoin very positively the removal of Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah from Derran, as affording the best security for the maintenance of peace and good order at a certain consideration, among which I will include the deference due to your Highness' wishes, having induced me upon my own responsibility

To

to modify this arrangement, but on the condition, solemnly accepted by that Chief of renouncing all claims to the Sheikhdom of Bahrain and of abtaining for the future from any hostile designs upon that island. In submitting this result to Government, however, I should count with greater confidence upon its sanction to my proceeding, were I in a position at the same time to declare the peaceful intentions of your Highness, and as your Highness is fully apprised of its views and policy on this head, I encourage the hope that you will not refuse your Co-operation to the attainment of the objects in view. Your Highness may be assured that the influence of the Lirkar, so far as it may be compatible with existing arrangements for the promotion of maritime tranquillity, will ever be expected to repress any attempts at aggression upon Wahabee territory by the Rulers of Bahrain, and such being the case it has a right to expect a similar forbearance at the hands of your Highness, and that for the future your Highness will withhold your countenance and support from parties who seek to serve their own interests

by

by embroiling you with your neighbours.

It is my intention to forward a copy of the present Communication to the Lirkar, and in doing so I will propose to it to suspend its decision regarding the Continuance of Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah at Dammam pending the receipt of your Highness' reply, trusting that the tenor of that reply, so far from raising any doubts as to the expediency of this measure, may furnish an additional pledge of your Highness' desire to confirm the friendly relations that have so long subsisted between the Government and yourself.

True Translation

(Sign) A. B. Hemball

Resident at

(True Copy)

(Sign) A. B. Hemball

Resident in the Persian Gulf

(True Copies)

A. Henderson,
Secretary to Govt.

Copied by
H. J. Davis

Imp. Sec.

Chapter II.—Mahomed bin Abdullah bin Ahmed's threatened attack against Bahrein and piracies, (2) His expulsion from Damaun, 1859.

25. The calm lasted only for a short time. Notwithstanding repeated warnings from the Resident (Captain Felix Jones) and solemn assurances of pacific intentions from the Feysal, in defiance even of the presence of a British corvette, extensive preparations for the invasion of Bahrein were made at Katif and Damaun, including the piratical seizure of some Turkish and Persian vessels and the impressment of their crews for service in the projected expedition. Hereupon Commodore Balfour was despatched with the Persian Gulf Squadron to the scene of action, and the very threatening attitude assumed by this officer soon induced the Wahabi Governor of Katif to abandon his designs, and humbly sue for pardon. In reporting the Commodore's success, the Resident expressed an opinion that we had borne too long with Feysal, who, while giving us fair words, still falsified all he said by steadily pursuing his fixed object of universal dominion along the coast. He recommended direct reprisals upon the ports from which the recent piracies had been effected; "the pirates", he added, "of the Eastern Archipelago, of Tunis, Algiers, of Riff, and Salee have all had their visitation, and no humane Government has ever questioned the legality of such reprisals." There was some correspondence on this occasion between Feysal and the Resident. Feysal, after justifying his proceedings on the ground that the Sheikh of Bahrein was one of his own feudatories, whom for his various misdeeds he had a perfect right to chastise, protested against British interference in the following terms:—"Between the Wahabi Amir and the British Government Treaties have been made by the several authorities, authority after authority; and, in accordance with treaties between the Wahabi Amir and the Sultan Abdul Mejid, there are matters which every one is precluded from meddling with, unless on special grounds." To this the Resident replied by declaring that the British Government recognised Bahrein as an independent Chiefship, and was prepared to oppose all foreign agency, including that of His Highness the Amir, by every means in its power; he also pointed out the inconsistency of Feysal, claiming to be dependent upon Turkey at the same time that Feysal's Lieutenant at Katif was committing piracy on vessels bearing the Turkish flag.

Upon receipt of the Resident's reports the Resolution adopted by the Government of Bombay, and approved by the Government of India, was to insist on the expulsion of the refugee Sheikh Mahomed-bin-Abdullah from the Wahabi port of Damaun, where for 16 years his incessant intrigues for the recovery of Bahrein had been an element of disquietude extending over a considerable portion of the coast.

26. The Resolution of the Bombay Government (dated the 15th February 1860) is quoted below:—
Page 277 of Bombay Political Department, Volume 105-A of 1860.

"Commander Balfour appears to have performed the duty entrusted to him by the Resident, with great skill, firmness and judgment, and the Resident may be requested to convey to him the marked commendation of Government for the services rendered by him on this occasion.

The display of naval force at Damaun has for a time averted the hostile demonstration against Bahrein by Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdulla assisted by the Wahabi ruler, but the Right Honourable the Governor in Council can place reliance on the promises of the Abdulla, and consider that the time has arrived when some measure of coercion must be employed. Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdulla has now for 16 years been attempting by intrigues to re-establish himself at Bahrein, and his plots not only occasion disquiet in Bahrein, but have from time to time endangered the tranquillity of all the neighbouring tribes. The British Government has frequently warned Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdulla, that if he continued to disturb the peace and security of that part of the Gulf, it would be the duty of Government to remove him. This course has been urgently required by the Sheikh of Bahrein, and the reluctance of the British Government to have recourse to an extreme measure evidently created some distrust in the mind of the Bahrein ruler as to the sincerity of the friendship of the British Government. He has seen repeated warnings met by repeated promises, and repeated promises followed by renewed intrigues and renewed hostile organizations. The British Government cannot permit these feelings of insecurity to continue. It must also look to the fact regarding which there can be no reasonable doubt that the Sheikh at Damaun is abetted in his designs by the turbulent ruler of the Wahabis, that he is indeed little more than a tool of Amir Feysal and that the ascendancy of the Wahabis in that part of the Gulf was regarded by Captain Kemball and is regarded by the present Resident as equivalent to their intention of piracy. It appears then to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council that it will be a confidence to the Sheikh of Bahrein, and that it will close a long series of intrigues and petty hostilities, if the measure long threatened be now adopted of expelling Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdulla from Damaun. This is the measure advocated by the Resident and one which the British Government has long foreseen would be necessary. The Resident is therefore authorised to announce to the Sheikh at Damaun that he can no longer be permitted to disturb the peace of the Gulf, that he must leave Damaun and reside either at Gram or on the Persian shore, as may seem most expedient to the Resident. At the same time the Sheikh of Bahrein should be required to assign such a sum for the maintenance of Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdulla as may be considered sufficient, to this the Bahrein ruler has always professed his willingness to consent. The Resident will take care not to demand the expulsion of the Sheikh from Damaun, until he has sufficient force at his command to put down all attempts at resistance, and he will be particularly cautious to make his demonstrations entirely of a naval character and not to be betrayed into any operations on shore".

27. In June 1861 the Resident, in compliance with the Government Resolution above mentioned, wrote to Amir Feysal, requiring him to eject Mahomed bin Abdulla, the refugee Sheikh of Bahrein from Damaun, and recommending him to enter into a peaceable convention with the Sheikh, whom by our recent treaty we had recognised as the rightful ruler of Bahrein. Five months having elapsed without any reply from Feysal, the Resident in November 1861 again took the Squadron down to Bahrein, and after an "hour's firing, in which no casualty occurred on either side," compelled Mahomed bin Abdulla with all his faction to flee from Damaun. "From all I could learn," wrote the Resident "the Wahabi authorities and traders on their coast were inwardly delighted at the long pending question being thus settled, although His Highness the Amir could not with due regard to Arab hospitality, openly compel Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdulla to relinquish the shelter he had offered him. In any case His Highness's castle and garrisons, both at Damaun and Katif, forbore to molest us in any way, and on our part orders were issued to respect them so long as they continued inactive.

CHAPTER III.

(1) Tyranny of the Chief of Bahrein, (2) His unfriendly attitude towards the British Agent, British subjects and their trade, 1858.

27-A. While the security of Bahrein was always threatened by external enemies, the people of Bahrein enjoyed little peace and contentment within the island itself. The ruling chief, Sheikh Mahomed-bin-Abdullah, was a man who combined in himself the worst qualities of a bad tyrant, the most unbridled lust and creed of wealth, and an uncontrollable temper, ignorance and impatience against restraint. He was most arbitrary in his dealings with the merchants, mostly Indians, and any remonstrance against his conduct on the part of the British Agent he responded to only with insults.

27-B. In 1858 the banyahs residing in Bahrein, complained to the Political Resident, Bushire, on two points against the Chief:—

- (1) that he levied duties on exports, as well as imports, which alone had been taxed before.
- (2) that he prohibited them from proceeding to Katif, and actually laid an embargo on one of their vessels carrying the British Flag. It was also reported that the Chief's tone to the British Agent Haji Jassim at Bahrein was very insolent.

27-C. Captain Felix Jones took prompt measures to put a stop to the vagaries of the Chief. He deputed Lieutenant Disbrowe, Assistant Resident, with a letter to the Chief to remonstrate with him. Lieutenant Disbrowe proceeded with Commodore Jenkins to Bahrein on board the sloop-of-war the *Cive* in September 1863. On arrival at Bahrein Lieutenant Disbrowe despatched Captain Felix Jones' letter to the Chief, and warned the British Indian residents to be prepared to leave the island within 24 hours, in case the demands made were refused. The first result of this measure was that the buggalow bearing the British flag, which had been laid under embargo, was released, and Sheikh Ali, brother of the Chief, was deputed to Lieutenant Disbrowe to offer an explanation of his conduct. As regards the prohibition of buggalows bearing the British Flag proceeding to Katif, the explanation was that the Wahabi Governor of Katif was an enemy of the Chief and that, it was feared, the visit of the vessels there might raise disagreeable complications. To this Lieutenant Disbrowe rejoined that the British Flag was fully able to uphold its dignity in every corner of the globe without assistance from other powers. As regards duties, what the British Government wished, was that they should not be of an arbitrary oppressive character. To this Sheikh Ali raised no objection. Assurance was also given that the British Agent would be treated with every respect due to his position. The Chief also requested that Lieutenant Disbrowe would come and visit him, to enable him to discuss divers matters. As this request was not complied with, the Chief proceeded personally to the sloop-of-war *Cive*, and expressed his regret in the presence of Lieutenant Disbrowe and Commodore Jenkins at having by his conduct given cause for offence and disagreement. Both these officers returned the visit of the Chief, when as a compliment to the British Flag, an Arab Flag was hoisted on his residence, and a salute was fired.

27-D. On receipt of the report of these proceedings, the Bombay Government expressed their pleasure to learn that the Chief was induced to make amends for his contumacious conduct and expressed their opinion that Lieutenant Disbrowe performed the duty assigned to him with judgment and firmness (Letter No. 3945, dated 6th November 1858).

Chapter IV.—Mahomed bin Khalifa seeks Turkish as well as Persian protection. Status of Bahrein defined, 1859-1860.

28. Mahomed bin Khalifa then began coquetting with both the Turkish and the Persian Governments and playing them against one another and one or other of them against the British Government, while under the shelter of either of them,

he could pursue his own aims of self-aggrandizement and oppression of British Indian and other traders in the islands of Bahrein, and pursue his forays against the Wahabi ports. In these attempts he was more than once checked by the Political Resident towards the close of 1859. About this time he despatched a messenger to Baghdad to make an offer of his allegiance to the Porte. On account of the absence of the Governor General at Baghdad at the time, there was some delay in accepting this offer, until the arrival of Mustafa Nouri Pasha, who forthwith despatched Mahomed Beg to ascertain the propriety of acceding at once to the request of the Chief of Bahrein, and if satisfied on that point to hoist Turkish flag. Meanwhile the Chief had applied to the Prince Governor of Fars for the Shah's protection. This application met with immediate response and Mirza Mehdi a great anglophobe, was deputed to Bahrein to declare the Persian sovereignty over the islands. The Persian flag was hoisted, when the Turkish Agent Mahomed Beg arrived. The Persian flag was then hauled down and in its place was hoisted the Turkish flag. The Persian Agent, however, refused to leave the place and insisted on exercising the Persian control over the islands. (See letter of Officiating Political Resident, Mr. Hyslop, No. 66, dated 6th June 1860.)

29. When Captain Felix Jones heard of these events, he addressed several despatches to Sir Henry Rawlinson, in which he took somewhat alarming views of the proceedings of the Persian Agent. Sir Henry Rawlinson replied to Captain Jones on 4th May 1860 in an interesting despatch, extracts of which are quoted below:—

"My impression on reading these letters is that you have attached somewhat more importance than they merit to Mirza Mehdi's proceedings at Bahrein. It seems to have been the normal condition of Bahrein for some years past that three rival authorities, the Pasha of Baghdad, the Wahabi Amir and the Prince Governor of Fars, should lay claim to the allegiance of the island, and endeavour either by intimidation or intrigue to supersede the independence of the Sheikh. Hostilities against Bahrein from any quarter are to be repelled by us by force of arms; whilst the voluntary tender of the Sheikh's allegiance to any other power, so long as it is not followed up by military occupation, is to be ignored as of no practical importance.

I have pointed out to the Shah's Ministers that the assertion of a right of sovereignty over Bahrein without the means of realizing that right, or accepting its obligations is simply ridiculous and may place them in a very awkward and indignant position. The Sheikh, for instance, may at any moment tear down the Persian flag and expel the Persian Agent from the island; or Turkish influence being at some future time in the ascendant he may make a parade of transferring his allegiance from the Persian to the Ottoman Government, or the Wahabi Chief may interfere to rescue what has been so long accounted as the soil of Arabia from the Persian dominions.

I have further pointed out that under no possible circumstances can the British Government be expected to concur in the proposed transfer of the sovereignty of Bahrein to the Persian Crown, since we have contracted engagements with the Arab Sheikhs of the island as independent Chiefs, and since the maintenance of their independence is indispensable to the successful working of those plans of maritime policy in the Persian Gulf which we have been at so much pains and expense to establish.

The Shah's Ministers have been so far moved by these arguments as to have promised that no attempt shall be made to realize their claims to the sovereignty of Bahrein by a military occupation of the island and further that orders shall be sent to Shiraz to abstain from any discussions with you on the subject of your relations with the Chief, pending the result of a reference to England and the further consideration of the general question at this place."

30. Captain Lewis Pelly, also wrote to Captain Jones on 6th June 1860 stating that the Sheikh of Bahrein had recently applied to the Prince Governor of Fars for assistance in arms and ammunition and troops, but that the Shah's Government had given him explicit assurances that no further steps would be taken in regard to the relations between Persia and Bahrein, until the Shah was informed by Her Majesty's Government whether they recognized his suzerainty over Bahrein, and if they did, whether it would be conformable to their policy that Persia should assert its authority. Captain Pelly therefore deprecated resistance of any kind to any attempt on the part of Persia to annex Bahrein.

31. Captain Jones, in submitting the correspondence between him and Sir Henry Rawlinson and Captain Pelly, asked for instructions of Government, and the following was the reply given by the Bombay Government (letter No. 245, dated the 8th September 1860):—

"In reply I am desired to inform you that copies of this correspondence will be forwarded to Her Majesty's Secretary of State by the next Overland Mail, and the attention Her Majesty's Government solicited to the important subject under discussion.

In the meantime and until the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government is ascertained the Governor in Council has the following plain instructions to impress on you for your guidance with reference to the complications which now surround the Bahrain question.

The dependence or independence of Bahrain is a subject for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government and no exertion should be spared by you to preserve tranquillity in the Gulf by the diplomacy, or if necessary by pacific demonstrations, until the question has been determined.

But whether the Sheikh of Bahrain displays the ensigns of Persia or of Turkey, he can never be permitted to make hostile encroachments on tribes under the protection of the British Government. Any measures of this nature the Governor in Council anticipates will be immediately rebuffed by a peremptory expression of the Resident's will, supported, if necessary, by a naval determination.

An actual resort to force, which might be justifiable under Article IV of the Treaty with the Sheikhs of Bahrain of 1820, for the coercion of the Chief, should, if possible, be avoided, as tending to engage the British Government in hostilities not merely with a petty Chief in the Gulf, but with one or other of two powers at present in alliance with England. On the other hand, it is desirable that you should sternly control any attempt of any neighbouring tribe, or confederation of tribes, to assail the integrity of Bahrain.

The more difficult question remains, as to the manner in which attempts to assert their claims on Bahrain either by Persia or Turkey are to be met. Captain Lewis Pelly writing without knowledge that the Sheikh had displayed the Turkish flag, deprecates resistance to any attempt on the part of Persia to occupy Bahrain. It may be gathered from his despatches and those of Sir Henri Rawlinson that such an attempt was deemed improbable.

The indication of the Sheikh's allegiance to Turkey may, however, lead to some demonstration of the kind. The Governor in Council deems it therefore advisable to instruct you not to interfere with any occupation of Bahrain either by Persia or Turkey, further than by protest, and by an intimation that the subject has been remitted for consideration by Her Majesty's Government. You should at the same time distinctly inform the Agents of either power that no hostile attempt by Bahrain, or in the name of Bahrain, on the neighbouring tribes will be permitted, and that any such attempt will be opposed by force.

In communicating these instructions for your guidance the object of this Government is to leave Her Majesty's Government without embarrassment in dealing with the Bahrain question, while at the same time the tranquillity of the Gulf, the security of the maritime tribes, and the prestige of British authority will be preserved.

I am desired to add that the tenor of your despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople is approved."

32. The Bombay Government also in their despatch No. 37, dated the 11th September 1860, requested the instructions of the Secretary of State for the guidance of the Political Resident, Bushire, observing as follows:—

"It appears to this Government that the tranquillity of the Persian Gulf which has been so long preserved by the policy of the British Government demands that Bahrain should be regarded as subject neither to the Sublime Porte nor to Persia; but that its independence should be recognised, while those engagements are maintained, which in the interests of commerce, humanity, and public security it has concluded with the British Government.

"The *status quo* appears to us to be the alternative suggested by every consideration of good policy in preference to a recognition of the claims either of Turkey or Persia; claims the establishment of which would lead to no good result to Bahrain, or to either of the contending powers, while to the best interests of the maritime tribes of Oman it would be disastrous."

33. The Secretary of State expressed approval of the views of the Bombay Government in his despatch No. 2, dated 10th February 1861.

From His Highness Amir Faysal
Ruler of Nedjd.

To Captain Felix Jones H. M. S. S.
Poll Resident Persian Gulf.

Letter Dated 1st Rabi-ul-Thani 1276.
3rd November 1859

Received 14th November 1859.

Al: Your letter under date
18th Rabi-ul-Thani 1276
11th September 1859 had been received and
understood. * for Edm

2. The pith of your remarks
is that your design is (the securing
of) tranquillity on the high sea, and
the protection of merchants and
passers to and fro on their lawful
avocations. This is a course that
is incumbent upon us and adds
to our strength in this world. It is
one (moreover) pleasing to the
Almighty. I have therefore collected
forces, and made the requisite
preparations to suppress disorder,
and ensure quiet on the highway.

3. You know that the Chief
of Bahrain and his brother ordered by J. P. King
the people of Quttur, who are my
subjects to oppress others who are (also) my
subjects.

337

subjects; and they did oppress them, having seized upon their property and killed their people, and when they became apprehensive of retaliation from me, why they carried off the (very) parties who had been guilty of oppression together with their goods to Bahrain. (In short) they have been guilty of three distinct deeds:-

1st They directed oppression;

2nd They harboured the oppressors;
and

3rd They created feelings of insecurity, and prepared for hostilities, obtaining troops on requisition from the Province of Fars.

4. Hajee Gasseri, your Agent (at Bahrain), is aware of all this.

5. The Sheikhs of Bahrain, launched their vessels, obstructed the roads, and caused Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah, the Demam Chief, to become alarmed & fearful they intended to attack him. Sheikh Mahomed, therefore, sought my permission to collect people for his protection

protection, and for this purpose it was that he sent to Mahomed bin Ahmed. i. e. Sudgee, or else my resolution is greater than Demam Chief's, and my foresight, thanks be to God exceeds his.

Meaning, the preparations were by Demam Chief, there was a small scale, and nothing as compared with me as I was assured he could not do so.

6. You are aware that Bahrain belongs to the Wahabee Ameer, was founded by him, the orders in force in the Island emanated from him, and the amount of religious tithes it had to pay was regulated by him, as is known and notorious in all quarters.

7. Between the Wahabee Ameer and the British Government treaties have been made by the several authorities, authority after authority, and in accordance with treaties between the Wahabee Ameer and the Sultan Abdul Mejid, there are matters which every one is precluded from *intermeddling with unless on special grounds. On the occasion of the Bahrain Chief withholding payment of the full amount of tribute, war arose between the

M. i. Khulafa.

* Intermeddling with without cause

330

Al-i-Khulafa and the Wahabees. I am
that too with the cognisance of the
British authorities, who did not interfere
between him and his subjects. You are
the Representative of the British
Government, and looked to to found
justice and repel mischief. In your
wisdom you desire to destroy my
claim up on the Bahrain chiefs, this
is though you are aware that
Sheikh Mahomed ben Khulafa has
committed disorders in Bahrain
Island, and caused his own
people to disperse, and remove to
Fars, Oman, Kuwait, and Bushire
where you reside. His mischief
has become apparent.

8. Why do you remain unmoved
ful of open mischief, and why do
you interfere between me and my
subjects, at the bidding of the
person who is creating mischief,
whose mischief (moreover) will be
leading to disagreement between
me and the British Government?

9. Should you be cognisant
of disorders committed by my
subjects, inform me, and I will
rise

rise against them. Having acquainted
me, you will have done the needful
especially if parties be guilty of
outrages on the sea, which element
rests with your self. I hope, hereafter,
from the excessive friendship you
hold towards me that you will
refrain from interference with
my subjects and I trust that our
mutual endeavours may be a
experts for the maintenance of
security, and the prostration of the
disorderly.

*Literally if some of
the roads meaning
is presumed high
and high sea.*

10. I enclose herewith copy of a
paper bearing date A. H. 1262 and
written by a former Resident.

Its purport you will com-
prehend and from it you will
gather that in your words and in
your actions you are the reverse
of former Residents.

11. An answer is solicited
and requisite.

True Translated Purport
[Signature] H. F. Disbrowne
Asst. Resident Persian Gulf

True copy
[Signature] H. F. Disbrowne
Asst. Res. Resident Persian Gulf.

*Original Persian
[Signature]*

341.

From Captain Felix Arce B. M. S. A.
 To: Pol. Resident Persian Gulf.
 His Highness Ameer Syud,
 Ruler of Nedjd.

Dated 29 November 1859.
 Made at Beirut 1860

Sir. I regret that your Highness
 messenger has been unavoidably
 detained owing to the indisposition
 of my Arabic secretary - but I now
 take the opportunity of his recovery
 to reply to the letter which your
 Highness addressed to me under
 date 7th Rabi' al-Thani 1260 in which you
 31 November 1859.

vide were good enough to enclose for my
 copy of Major Kennell's information an old document
 letter to the Governor
 of Hadramout dated 24th
 July 1845 from a former Resident in this
 Gulf.
 Enclosure in that
 officer's Despatch
 to the Secretary
 dated 24th July 1845.
 of 24th July 1845.
 If however your
 Highness had taken the trouble
 to peruse the substance of
 various communications to your
 address

address during the past 8 years and herewith brought again to your notice on the subject which has now unfortunately been so long under discussion, it would not have been necessary for your Highness to refer me to a paper which owing to circumstances has become a dead letter.

3. These circumstances were unceasing disorders alike detrimental to the local trade of Bahrain and the neighbouring ports, as they were dangerous to interests more remotely connected with belligerent parties, and hostile to the tranquillity of this Gulf.

4. The anarchy arising from the efforts of Mohamed ben Abdallah and his adherents threatened to be interminable, and abortive as they were in results of any sort, but have and destruction, it behoved the British Government to come to some decision

Under Captain
Kimball's letter to
H. H. Amey Esq. dated 26th June 1851.

Sent as
Enclosure 2 in the
Officer's Despatch
to Mr. Secretary
Anderson No. 148
dated 23rd October
1851.

Under Captain
Kimball's letter to
H. H. Amey Esq. dated 18th October
1851.

Sent as
Enclosure 2 in the
Officer's Despatch
to Mr. Secretary
Anderson No. 148
dated 23rd October
1851.

Under Captain
Kimball's letter to
H. H. Amey Esq. dated
21st February 1855.

Sent as
Enclosure 3 in the
Officer's Despatch
to Mr. Secretary
Anderson No. 148
dated 23rd October
1851.

Under Captain
Kimball's Despatch
to H. H. Amey Esq. dated 24th May 1855.

Sent as
Enclosure 2 in
Captain Kimball's
Despatch No. 13
dated 30th May 1855
to Mr. Secretary
Anderson.

My despatch to H.
H. Amey Esq. dated 26th December
1854.

Sent as
Enclosure 7 in my
Despatch to Mr.
Anderson No. 148
dated 23rd October 1851.

343
decision which should have the effect of restoring repose to a maritime district so long convulsed by intestine strife.
5. So long as the general repose was not threatened, and disputes were confined to parties at Bahrain, the British Government refrained from all interference in the circumstances there, though it deplored their existence on many grounds. It had a right to expect a similar non-intervention from other parties, but when its forbearance was no longer respected, but was made a pretext for encroachment by those whose aims were not equally disinterested, then it became necessary that the British Government should vindicate its policy; for not only was the independence of Bahrain at stake, but the public interests in a maritime and commercial point of view were in danger from the combination

combination of which, Your Highness became the advised patron and your officers and troops, the executives for open war on the territories of the chiefs chosen by the consent of the Bahrain people.

6. It is however useless for me again to enlarge on a topic which has so often formed the subject of correspondence between your Highness and the Political Resident of the British Government in this Gulf. Our policy therein has been amply defined and its principles explicitly disclosed, to the effect that - while abstaining from all internal intervention - ourselves - we will not tolerate it in others. In short we recognise the independence of Bahrain under the Rulers submitted to by the people and are prepared to oppose all foreign agency, in which

Capt. D. H. Jones
T. J. Jones

345

that of your Highness is included, by every means in our power.

7. To the conservative policy of the British Government in this Gulf is due the comparative repose which its maritime population - whether subjects of Persia, of Turkey, of your Highness, or of the Independent Arab Chiefs - have of late enjoyed. This happy result is the fruit of the decision which, a constant state of anarchy, led the British Authorities to pronounce as well as to carry out at great expense with no selfish ends beyond the honest conviction that all States and all parties - but those bent on destruction - would be benefited by the sacrifice.

8. I regret therefore to perceive the expressions in your Highness' letter which are opposed to a course so praiseworthy. Nay more, it is painful for

for me to remark the misrepresentation which are assigned as the ostensible cause of the late hostile demonstration on the part of Your Highness' emissaries and on that of Mahomed ben Abdallah, though doubtless, to cover their designs, no other argument could be adduced. Moreover experience has taught British Officers to discriminate between operations of a defensive or of an aggressive character and those in course of prosecution by Your Highness' subjects and protégés at Dernaun and Katiff and other places were clearly of a kind not to be mistaken for the former. A little reflection too would have reminded Your Highness of the instability of such reasonings in excuse for acts so openly undertaken, as it was well known that in common with Bahrein and all parts of this Gulf

345

Gulf, Your Highness' coasts, harbours and maritime subjects were safe from all prospect of invasion from Bahrein owing to the watchfulness of the protecting power whose acts you would condemn. Perhaps too Your Highness has not been made aware of the forcible seizure of boats under the Persian and Turkish flags by those now protecting against the proscription and reprisal which such piratical outrages have called forth and which outrages militate strongly against the professions of allegiance to H. M. the Sultan of Turkey, or of regard to his or to our allies on the opposite coast by those under your protection and authority at the places I have named.

I have been thus frank with your Highness as it is full time that you should be made aware of our determination to maintain the independence of Bahrein.

This

This I have endeavoured to do without
circumlocution of any sort and indeed
I had hoped that my letter of ^{29 September 1861} ~~17 September 1861~~
would have sufficed for this end.

Your Highness has however, thought
fit to reply to it in a manner which
I am constrained to refute. Yet it is
no less incumbent on me to express the
same friendly sentiments to your
Highness as are therein conveyed and
above all I trust to be enabled to give
to my Government similar assurances
that in future you will give no
countenance to those who for their
own ends are striving to make
your Highness exhibit an attitude
at variance with your earnest
professions of peace and good will.

Signed Felix Jones

Political Resident

(True Copy)

Signed Felix Jones

Pol. Resident Persian Gulf

Signed
Felix Jones

1.16
Agreement with the British Government,
31 May 1861

CHAPTER V.

Mahomed-bin-Khalifa blockades Wahabi ports, but compelled to raise the blockade by the British and to sign a perpetual treaty of peace, (2) Turkish protest against our proceedings, 1861.

34. In May, 1861, Captain Felix Jones received news that Sheikh Mahomed-bin-Khalifa had entered upon the blockade of the neighbouring Wahabi ports with six armed vessels and was perseveringly employed in harassing the trade and pearl fisheries of Damaun and Katif. Captain Jones thereupon proceeded to Bahrein with the full Gulf squadron. He arrived at Bahrein on 18th May, and from that date to 28th May, he tried in vain to induce the Chief of Bahrein to stop his aggression. The Chief, it appears, was decided upon ignoring all British interference and authority, secretly instigated as he had been by Persian agents, who had promised him even the assistance of a French vessel. Under these circumstances and having regard to the decision of the Secretary of State (Despatch No. 2, dated 18th February 1861), Captain Jones concluded that forbearance had reached its limits, and directed Commodore Drought to take the necessary measures to stop the Chief's ships from blockading the harbours of the Katif coast. The able disposition made by the Commodore placed two of the Chief's finest war boats, then preparing for further aggressions, within the power of the British squadron without firing a shot.

35. The Chief thereupon climbed down, and after some negotiations conducted through his brother Ali, was induced to sign a *Perpetual Treaty of Peace* on 21st May 1861, binding himself to abstain from war, piracy and importation of slaves by sea on condition of protection against similar aggressions and to permit all British subjects to trade with Bahrein on payment of an *ad valorem* duty of five per cent on their goods. Captain Felix Jones caused one of the boats captured (the *Tawileh*) to be restored to the Chief, but retained the other boat (the *Humreh*).

See Appendix D.

36. The Government of Bombay approved of the measures adopted by the Political Resident to compel the Sheikh of Bahrein to withdraw his blockading squadron from the Wahabi coast; but considering the contumacy displayed by him, they thought that the boat *Humreh* should not be returned to him, until the Political Resident deemed his conduct worthy of such consideration being shown to him (letter No. 194, dated 23rd July 1861).

37. The Bombay Government also asked the Government of India for approval of the Treaty signed by the Chief, which though obtained without previous express sanction, would in their opinion be justified in the circumstances and was calculated to render the Sheikh more amenable, than he had for a very long time been to those rules of conduct, his disregard of which had been for several years the occasion of alarm to his neighbours and anxiety to the British Government (letter No. 59, dated the 23rd July 1861).

38. These strong measures elicited a remonstrance from the Turkish Governor General of Baghdad. He wanted to know by what right we have had bombarded Damaun, a place which, as lying within the territory of "Feysal Beg, the Kaimmakam of Nejd," was "part of the hereditary dominions of the Sultan." To which Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad replied that we had hitherto "always maintained direct relations with Amir Feysal as well as with all the Chiefs and Principalities situated on the shores of the Persian Gulf; that our pacific policy in the Gulf was well known, and that in the prosecution of that policy we had never acknowledged the authority or jurisdiction of any other State—an authority or jurisdiction moreover which assuredly the Porte neither does exercise nor has ever exercised in that quarter." In reporting this correspondence to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople the Consul-General wrote as follows :—

Turkish protest against British proceedings in 1861.

"Although it may not be denied that, since the Egyptian invasion of Nejd in 1839-40, Amir Feysal has remained tributary to the Turkish authorities of Mecca, his tribute being regarded probably as an offering to the head of the religion it is certain that the Porte has never exercised any jurisdiction, or attempted to extend its authority, over that country. Were it otherwise, were a Turkish administration established capable of controlling the province, restraining the Wahabis and their dependents from the piratical practices for which they were once so notorious, and finally of preventing or giving satisfaction for any breach of international law, such a state of things might be as conducive to good order, as it would be certainly less burdensome to the British Government than the maritime surveillance, which, in the interests of commerce, the British Government is now compelled to maintain in the Persian Gulf. But in point of fact, the Porte has not the power to punish or coerce its tributary; not a single Turkish functionary exists in the country; and to judge from my own experience of the duties of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, I feel assured that, were the relations of that officer with the Amir of Nejd to be disturbed in a manner to withdraw the Wahabi Coast from his immediate supervision, the effect must be highly prejudicial to the policy which has hitherto obtained under the orders and sanction of Her Majesty's Indian Government in that quarter."

39. In April 1862 the Resident reported that he was making another and a final effort to effect a peaceable settlement between Amir Feysal and the Chief of Bahrein, but that he much feared open war between the two parties was inevitable.

No. 5.

TERMS OF A FRIENDLY CONVENTION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
SHAUKH MAHOMED BIN KHALIFAH, INDEPENDENT
RULER OF BAHRAIN, ON THE PART OF HIMSELF AND
SUCCESSORS, AND CAPTAIN FELIX JONES, HER MAJESTY'S
INDIAN NAVY, POLITICAL RESIDENT OF HER BRITANNIC
MAJESTY IN THE GULF OF PERSIA, ON THE PART OF
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, 1861.

Preliminary.—Considering the tribe disorders which arise and are perpetuated from maritime aggressions in the Persian Gulf, I, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khalifah, independent ruler of Bahrain, on my own part and on that of my heirs and successors, in the presence of the Chiefs and elders who are witnesses to this document, do subscribe and agree to a perpetual Treaty of peace and friendship with the British Government, having for its object the advancement of trade and the security of all classes of people navigating or residing upon the coasts of this sea:—

ARTICLE 1.

I recognize as valid and in force all former Treaties and Conventions agreed to between the Chiefs of Bahrain and the British Government, either direct or through the mediation of its representatives in this Gulf.

ARTICLE 2.

I agree to abstain from all maritime aggressions of every description, from the prosecution of war, piracy, and slavery by sea, so long as I receive the support of the British Government in the maintenance of the security of my own possessions against similar aggressions directed against them by the Chiefs and tribes of this Gulf.

ARTICLE 3.

In order that the above engagements may be fulfilled I agree to make known all aggressions and depredations which may be designed, or have to place at sea, against myself, territories, or subject, as early as possible, to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, as the arbitrator in such cases, promising that no act of aggression or retaliation shall be committed at sea by Bahraïns or in the name of Bahrain, by myself or others under me, on other tribe, without his consent or that of the British Government, if it should be necessary to procure it. And the British Resident engages that he will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for every injury proved to have been inflicted, or in course of infliction by sea upon Bahrain or upon its dependencies in this Gulf. In like manner, I, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khalifah, will afford full redress for all maritime offences which in justice can be charged against my subjects or myself, as the ruler of Bahrain.

ARTICLE 4.

British subjects of every denomination, it is understood, may reside in, and carry on their lawful trade in the territories of Bahrain, their goods being subject only to an *ad valorem* duty of 5 per cent. in cash or in kind. This amount once paid shall not be demanded again on the same goods if exported from Bahrain to other places; and in respect to the treatment of British subjects and dependants they shall receive the treatment and consideration of the subject and dependants of the most favoured people. All offences which they may commit, or which may be committed against them, shall be reserved for the decisions of the British Resident, provided the British Agent located at

Bahrain shall fail to adjust them satisfactorily. In like manner the British Resident will use his good offices for the welfare of the subjects of Bahrain in the ports of the maritime Arab tribes of this Gulf in alliance with the British Government.

ARTICLE 5.

These Articles of alliance shall have effect from the date of ratification or approval by the British Government.

Done at Bahrain this twentieth day of Zilkad, in the year of the Hegira 1277, corresponding with the thirty-first day of May 1861.

Signature and seal of—

L. S.

FELIX JONES,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Seal of Shaikh
Mahomed, Ruler
of Bahrain.

Seal of Shaikh
Ali bin Khalifah,
brother of the
above.

Seal of Shaikh
Hassid bin Maho-
med, cousin of
Shaikh Mahomed.

Seal of Shaikh
Ahmed bin Muba-
rak, cousin of
Shaikh Mahomed.

Seal of Shaikh
Khalifah bin
Mahomed, cousin
of Shaikh Maho-
med.

Elders of Bahrain and witnesses
to this Convention.

Approved by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council on the 9th October 1861, and ratified by the Government of Bombay on 25th February 1862.

No. 5.

الشروط والمعاهدة الودادية المنعقدة فيما بين الشيخ محمد بن خليفة
حاكم البحرين بالاستقلال من طرف نفسه وإخلائه وقبطان
فليكس جونز مأمور البحرية الدولة البهية والباليز الدولة
البهية في خليج فارس من طرف الدولة الانكليزية - ١٨٦١

بملاحظة الاغتناف العشائري الثالر درما من الملتقات البحرية في خليج فارس انا يا محمد
ابن خليفة حاكم البحرين با لا استقلال ومن يعقبني من الخلف اجعل مهربي وقبولتي في هذه
الورقة بمحضر جمع من الشيخوخ والأعيان الشاهدين لها بمعاهدة الصلح الدائم والصداقة مع
الدولة الانكليزية لتتوي المتاجرات والمليمة مايقات الناس المسابلين في هذا الخليج ام القاطنين
في سواحل هذه الشروط ألا تي بيان ذكرها -

الشروط الاول

جميع الشروط والعهد التجارية سابقاً بين مشايخ البحرين والدولة الانكليزية ام باسم الدولة
الانكليزية (ار) بواسطة القاطنين مقامها في خليج فارس انا اتعهد على نفسي بانها تكرر باتية
ومستقيمة على حالها -

الشروط الثاني

اتعهد على نفسي بان اتجلب عن جميع التعيّنات في البحر باي نوع كان سوى بحرب
ظاهر ام بسبيل البطش ام بجلب الخدم ما دامه الدولة الانكليزية حامية ومحافظة ملكها واملاكها
عن مثل تلك التعيّنات في البحر من سائر الحكام والشيخوخ في سواحل هذا الخليج -

الشروط الثالث

لأجل انجاز تلك الشروط المرتومة اتقبل بان ارفع خبر جميع التعيّنات والبطشات التي
تقابل املاكنا ورايانا سراً وعلاية في البحر الى قائم مقام الدولة الانكليزية في خليج فارس
بلا تأخير أو انه هو المباشر لمثل هذه القضايا واعطي قول بان لا يصدر مني التعيّنات ولا انتقام
في البحر ولا ممن هو تحت حكمي من البحرين ام باسم البحرين على سائر الطوائف دون ان
قائم مقام الدولة الانكليزية ام الاجازة من الدولة الانكليزية اذا دعت الضرورة وقائم مقام الدولة
الانكليزية يعطي قول بان نورا يقرر بما يلزم من الاجزاء لاجل جميع المضرات البينة التي لستقنا
ام سرف لتحت بطريق البحر على البحرين ام ترابعها ايضاً انا يا محمد ابن خليفة اتقبل بان
جميع المطالبات التي تثبت عليّ انا يا شيخ البحرين ام على رعاياي بطريق الحق من سبب
التعبيّنات في البحر باي اقوم بنجازها على الترجه الاكمل -

الشروط الرابع

حيث انه من المعلوم ان رعايا دولة الانكليز من كل صنف مقتدرين بان يتخذوا لهم
مساكن في البحرين وترا بها لأجل المتاجرات السالكة ويسلموا العشر من اموالهم وتجاراتهم
نقط في المائة خمس اما من عين المال أم نقداً على اصل قيمته فاذا تسلم ذلك مرة واحدة ولا

على ذلك المال بنفسه شيء آخر إذا أراد صاحبه ان يحمله الى مكان آخر و من جهة السالك مع رعاية دولة الانكليس و متعلقهم فيحق لهم المودة مني كما هي في حق البهايم اي الدولة المتحدة الكاملة الرذان معاً و كل خطاب تصدر من رعاية دولة الانكليس ام يشاءها من الغير فتجعل في طارت الى حصول راي قائم مقام الدولة الانكليزية في خليج فارس في ذلك اذا ما امكن تسديدها من وكيل دولة الانكليس المقيم في البحرين - ايضاً قائم مقام الدولة الانكليزية في خليج فارس يبذل مجهوده و اهتمامه لحصول الرفاهية لرعايا البحرين القاطنين في البلدان التي بين حكامها و بين الدولة الانكليزية رابطة الصداقة -

الشرط الخامس

هذه الشروط الصدفية سرت تجريب من حين امضاء القبولية الدولة الانكليزية حتى انخفض ذلك جري في ٣٠ شهر ذي القعدة سنة ١٢٧٧ -

1.17

The war with Qatar, 1867-1868

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

Treaty violation by certain Arab Chiefs.

No. 138.

No. 140, dated 7th December 1867.

From—Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

To—Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay.

A SERIOUS breach of the peace at sea has occurred in the Persian Gulf under the guidance of the Chiefs of Bahrain and Aboothabee.

2. Reports of the affair have reached me from many quarters. The reports differ as to details, but concur as to the broad facts of the case.

3. It appears that the Chief of the Bahrain Islands claiming sovereignty over the region of Gattar, on the neighbouring mainland of Arabia, plotted an attack on the inhabitants of that region, and secured the aid of the Aboothabee Chief in making the attack. The Bahrain Chief is stated to have sent his brother with some five hundred armed men in boats to the Gattar shore, while the Aboothabee Chief embarked with a body of some fifteen hundred armed men in craft variously reported as numbering from sixty to one hundred. The combined Chiefs then plundered the towns of Al Wahrali and Al Biddah. Finally, it appears that the Aboothabee Chief induced some of the inhabitants to send their goods on board boats under promise of non-molestation, and that the property having been embarked, the craft were attacked and plundered by the Aboothabee tribesmen.

4. As respects the value of the property lost, two reports have been submitted: the one is apparently based on an estimate of the goods plundered and roundly stated at one lakh of krans: while the other report (and which reaches me from a merchant who was one of the principal sufferers) seems to include both the goods plundered and property destroyed, and roundly states the loss at seven lakhs of krans.

5. The Shaikh of Bahrain may probably plead that the people of Gattar are his subjects, and that he had cause for attacking them. In such case, it was his duty, in conformity with the terms of the maritime truce, to appeal to the Resident before breaking the peace at sea, and before inducing a third party to implicate himself in the aggression.

6. As regards the Chief of Aboothabee, there can be no plea of any force. He has no claim to sovereignty over Gattar, and in putting to sea with a large force to attack Gattar, he has openly and on a large scale broken the truce to which he is a subscriber.

No. 143, dated 21st December 1867.

From—Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

To—Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay.

In continuation of my letter as per margin, I have the honor of enclosing copies of two letters* received from the 1st Assistant Resident giving further details concerning the recent breach of the peace at sea, on the Gattar coast.

No. 140, dated 7th December 1867.

* Nos. 172 and 175, dated 27th November 1867.

2. In connection with this breach of the truce, I would respectfully solicit the attention of the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council to my letter No. 142, sent by this opportunity, also to my previous letters now noted.

No. 45, dated 23rd April 1866, and
No. 64, dated 30th April 1867,
paragraphs 11 and 12.

FEBRUARY 1868.

Treaty violation by certain Arab Chiefs.

3. I am respectfully of opinion, it is desirable that Government should notice these breaches of the peace. Five years have elapsed since the heavy squadron of the Indian Navy which used constantly to watch these waters was withdrawn. We have since trusted mainly to moral influence. At present the Gun-bont *Hugh Rose* with a native crew, and able to steam only eight hours consecutively, is the only vessel available for service in the Gulfs of Omman and Persia.

4. His Excellency in Council may, perhaps, deem well to authorize me to at once address a letter to the Aboothabeo Chief informing him that Government will notice his flagrant infraction of truce engagement. I would solicit the favour of a telegram on this subject.

5. The pearl-fishing season will open in April, and if the Chief were informed that, in the event of his failing to make restitution of the plundered property, his township, which lies close to the shore line, will be blockaded, he and his tribesmen might probably feel the inconvenience of losing their pearl season and yield.

No. 172, dated 27th November 1867.

From—CAPTAIN A. COTTON WAX, 1st Assistant Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

To—Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

I HAVE the honor to submit the accompanying complaint made by Ramatoola, a British subject residing at Lingah, that the property in charge of his agents on the Gattar coast has been plundered by the Chief of Bahrein's forces.

From the letter marked B. it appears that the property was at first spared, as being the property of a British subject, but was afterwards, after being shipped, plundered.

Dated—Lingah, 17th Rajab 1284.
24th November 1867.

From—HAJEE RAMATOOLA BIN HAMAD, Hyderabad.

I BEG to forward a list of the goods, &c., that I had in hands of agents at Gattar. At first the Shaikh of Bahrein spared them from being plundered, but on the goods being shipped, they were taken at sea.

List of goods and money in charge of people as below:—

Ben Khazf, Baharance, and son, Medco, 31 bags coffee, 100 thanes of cloth.	
cash due to me	1,300 Krans.
Hajee Mahomed, Baharance	1,400 "
Ghuanee, Baharance	1,100 "
Hajee Ali, Baharance	85 "
Syed Hashem, Baharance	150 "
Syed Moosar, Baharance.	38 "
Total	4,131 "

No. 173, dated 27th November 1867.

From—1st Assistant Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

To—Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

I HAVE the honor to inform you that the British Agent has reported that Sheikh Saeed bin Khalifa has returned with his force to Aboothabeo.

The British Agent has heard that Sheikh Saeed received 20,000 krans and 12 horses from the Chief of Bahrein; that Mahomed bin Sani, who was captured, and would have been killed had not the Chief of Aboothabeo interfered, has been required to pay one lakh and eleven thousand krans; that two other merchants have paid 70,000; that the town of Dobah Mahomed bin Sani has been

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Treaty violation by certain Arab Chiefs.

Political. — destroyed, the inhabitants being sent to "Biddah," and that Mahomed bin Sani's son, who was imprisoned at Bahrein, has either been murdered, or has committed suicide.

No. 139.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

Breach of maritime truce by Chiefs of Bahrain and Aboothabee.

Political. No. 92.

No. 123, dated 6th June 1868.

Nos. 92-93.

From—C. GOWKE, Esq., Secretary to Government of Bombay.

To—Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Dept., with the G. G.

In continuation of the papers forwarded with my letter No. 37, dated the 13th February last, I am directed to transmit, for submission to the Government of India, the enclosed copy of a further letter, with accompaniment, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 55, dated the 9th ultimo, relative to the breach of the maritime truce on the Guttur coast of the Chiefs of Bahrain and Aboothabee.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly has been informed that he may address the Sheikh of Bahrain as proposed by him.

No. 93.

No. 55, dated 9th May 1868.

From—Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

To—Secretary to Government of Bombay, Political Dept.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the Government Resolution as per margin concerning a piratical attack on the Guttur coast by the Sheikhs of Bahrain and Aboothabee.

2. The Native Agent on the Arab coast has since seen the Sheikh of Aboothabee, and reports that he appeared alarmed at what might be the consequences of his flagrant breach of the maritime truce on the Guttur coast. But down to this date I have not received any reply from the Sheikh to my letter of 21st January last.

3. Meantime, however, the Native Agent and others have collected a mass of details and evidence concerning the attack on Guttur, and I have now the honor to annex a very clear and careful Report drawn up by my 1st Assistant, Captain Way, and based upon the Native Agent's Reports, which latter, however, are too voluminous to inflict upon His Excellency in Council.

4. Government will observe from Captain Way's Report that the total of loss sustained under this piracy, and in so far as ascertained by the Native Agent, amounts to Krans 11,14,026½, and includes "property of every description, from vessels, pearls, gold, and jewellery, to the rafters and doors of the houses, and even date poles."

5. But I have reason to believe that there are other sufferers who are afraid to come forward, lest the Sheikhs should afterwards retaliate on them. Concerning one of these sufferers, who is a substantial merchant residing at Lingah, Captain Way reports as follows:—

"Mahomed bin Saeed Boo Kowarah is afraid to give information, alleging, as his reason, that formerly when Captain Jones was Resident satisfaction and compensation were obtained from the Chief of Bahrain for acts similar to those lately committed, but on the last occasion none was received, and the informers incurred the enmity of the Chief, and that he fears a like result in the present instance."

6. Another sufferer is a British Indian subject, who complains to me that he has lost Krans 500.

7. Government will further observe, it is the Sheikh of Bahrain (who for a long series of years has been a source of disturbance) who planned and is at the bottom of the present act of piracy.

JUNE 1868.

Breach of maritime truce by Chiefs of Bahrain and Aboothabee.

8. His Excellency in Council may, perhaps, deem proper to consider whether or not I should be authorized to address to the Bahrain Chief a letter similar to that I addressed to the Chief of Aboothabee, and which Government have approved.

No. 73, dated 23rd April 1868.

From—1st Assistant Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

To—Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

I HAVE the honor to submit the British Agent's Reports regarding the late attack on Guttur by the Chiefs of Bahrain and Aboothabee.

2. These Reports date from the time the British Agent heard of the Chief of Bahrain call on the Chief of Aboothabee for assistance; much of the information therein contained has been, therefore, already submitted to you.

3. From the whole of the Reports and the evidence the circumstances of the case appear to be as follows:—

4. One Ali bin Jhamir-al Naimie, of the Bedowias of Guttur, having been seized and sent to Bahrain by Sheikh Ahmed bin Mahomed bin Sulman, the representative of the Chief of Bahrain on the Guttur coast, for going to his tribe, the Naims of Wakra, the Naims and the people of Beddur, Doha, and Dongha, combined and demanded his release: their demand was refused, and they then determined to turn Sheikh Ahmed out of Wakra.

5. Sheikh Ahmed, hearing of their determination, left with his family and goods in two boats, escorted by 30 men, for Khor-i-Hossan.

6. On arrival at Khor-i-Hossan, Sheikh Ahmed caused the boat in which he had come to be seized and the escort to be detained, and reported what had occurred to the Chief of Bahrain.

7. Upon receiving the report the Chief of Bahrain released Ali bin Jhamir, and sent a friendly letter by him to the chief men in Guttur, desiring a continuance of friendship and inviting some of them to visit him in Bahrain.

8. In answer to the invitation Rashid bin Sabhur was sent by the Guttur people to Bahrain to explain matters, and make apologies for having turned Sheikh Ahmed out of Wakra.

9. The apologies and explanations were received, and the Chief, swearing to keep peace with the Guttur people, invited Jasim bin Mahomed to Bahrain to enter into some new arrangement regarding the carrying on of affairs on the coast.

10. Jasim accordingly proceeded to Bahrain, and, on arrival, was seized and cast into prison.

11. A force of 1,500 men in 24 vessels under command of the Chief's brother, Sheikh Ali bin Kalifa, was then sent to Ras-i-luffan, and assistance solicited from the Chiefs of Aboothabee and Debay. A force also proceeded by land under Sheikh Ahmed bin Mahomed bin Sulman.

12. Under the declarations of peace made by the Chief, the boats on the coast had again proceeded to sea, and it is estimated that 30 of them were fallen in with and captured by the Bahrain fleet en route to, and off, Ras-i-luffan.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

Breach of maritime truce by Chiefs of Bahrein and Aboothabee.

- Political.*
No. 93. 13. On receipt of the Chief of Bahrein's call for assistance the Chief of Debay wrote to the 1st Assistant Political Resident for permission, and was informed that no breach of the maritime truce, or of the peace at sea, could be allowed; he, consequently, declined to afford the aid solicited.
14. The British Agent had in the meantime received intimation that aid had been solicited from the Chief of Aboothabee, and had accordingly addressed that Chief, advising him not to act until reference had been made to the 1st Assistant Political Resident. The Chief had, however, determined to respond to the call without reference, and, before the Agent's letter reached, had left Aboothabee with a fleet of 70 boats, containing a force of 2,000 men, with field pieces and munitions of war for Guttur.
15. *En route* the Aboothabee fleet captured a shogee (small boat) belonging to Guttur, and the Chief sent her back as a prize to Aboothabee.
16. A vessel belonging to British subject Shanoo, a Banian, residing in Debay, was also boarded by one of the vessels of the fleet, and plundered of provisions, water, &c.
17. On arrival of the Aboothabee fleet the Guttur people were greatly alarmed, and embarked all the goods they could in the vessels at the bunders, and sent Mahomed bin Thain to Sheikh Ali bin Kalifa to beg for mercy and protection. These were promised, as also that, to set their fears at rest, Sheikh Ahmed and the Chief of Bahrein's sons should proceed to Wakra and Beddur with their force of 200 men.
18. As promised, Sheikh Ahmed and his force (the land force) shortly after arrived, and were received in a friendly manner; the Chief of Bahrein's sons being accommodated at the houses of the head-men.
19. Two days after the united fleets unexpectedly appeared before Beddur and Wakra, and blockaded the coast; the inhabitants were suddenly disarmed by Sheikh Ahmed's force, the vessels at the Bunders were seized and plundered; and the towns of Wakra, Uddur, Doha, and Dongha given up to plunder by the united forces which were landed from the fleets.
20. At first both forces plundered together, but two of the Banyas tribe having been wounded in a quarrel regarding some of the spoil, the Chief of Aboothabee was obliged to draw his force aside.
21. After the Bahrein forces had taken all they wanted, the Chief of Aboothabee's force returned, and, pulling off the roofs of the houses, carried off the rafters and doors, together with date poles, and any boats, tanks, and domestic utensils that had been left.
22. Some property, flocks and herds, had been placed by the Guttur people in charge of some of the Bedowins of the interior. This was demanded from them by Sheikh Ali, and a force sent to enforce such demand: the force was, however, defeated, and its Commander, Sheikh Ahmed bin Mahomed bin Sulman, killed.
23. The inhabitants, which were of five tribes—the Soudan, the Ali Boo Kowarah, the Ali Muslem, the Naim-il-Wakra, and the Ali boo-Ameen-ill-Wakra—have been completely scattered. The Soudan tribe was deported to Bahrein. Of the Ali Boo Kowarah tribe, some fled to Bahrein and others to Lingah, on the Persian coast; of the Ali Muslem tribe, some are at Aboothabee and others at Bahrein;

JUNE 1868.

Breach of maritime truce by Chiefs of Bahrein and Aboothabee.

- of the Naim tribe, the greater number has taken refuge in Ejjman, some are in the Nejd district, and others in Bahrein; and the tribe of Ali-boo-Ameen is at Ras Rakkam. The country is, consequently, uninhabited and waste.
24. The losses of the Muslem and Naim tribes appear to have been Kraus ... 603,765
- The Soudan tribe, owing to the protection given them by the Chief of Aboothabee, lost only Kraus ... 3,780
- The Ameen tribe escaped being plundered by the order of Sheikh Ali.
- The Ali Kowarah, the richest tribe, suffered most: there not being any of the heads of the tribe in the coast, the exact amount could not be ascertained; the estimated amount is Kraus ... 500,000
- Grand total, Kraus ... 1,107,545
- Beside which, British subject Hajee Ramahala of Lingah has complained that property and cash, amounting to Kraus 7,351½, in charge of his Agents, which were shipped for greater safety, was plundered.
25. The property taken was of every description, from vessels, pearls, gold, and jewellery to the rafters and doors of the houses, and even date poles.
26. The number of vessels lost by the Naim and Muslem tribes by the attack of the combined fleets on the Bunder was—
- | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|
| Naim | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 17 |
| Muslem (names of owners given) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 11 |
| The number taken when at, or proceeding to, sea by the fleet of the Chief of Bahrein of all tribes is supposed to be (proof of two only) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 30 |
| Taken by Chief of Aboothabee's fleet at sea | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1 |
| Plundered by Aboothabee's fleet at sea | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1 |
| Total | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 60 |
- The number of vessels lost by other tribes at the Bunders could not be ascertained.
27. The value of the plunder taken and presents received from the Chief of Bahrein by the Chief of Aboothabee appears to be Kraus 97,200, made up thus—
- | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------|-----|-----|-----|--------|
| Cash, | 35,000 | ... | ... | ... | 35,000 |
| Coffee, 50 bags... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 5,000 |
| Rice, 300 " | ... | ... | ... | ... | 5,600 |
| Horses, 3 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 10,000 |
| Slaves, 3 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1,000 |
| Date poles, rafters, &c., &c., &c. | ... | ... | ... | ... | 2,600 |

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

Breach of maritime truce by Chiefs of Bahrain and Aboothabee.

Political.

No. 63.

Presented after by the Chief of Bahrain—

1 Vessel of 300 rice bags.	
Measurement	10,000
Rice, 100 bags	2,500
Sayah, 10 "	600
Maro, 1 "	5,000

Plunder taken by Ahmed bin Mahomed bin Sulman, and at his death taken to Aboothabee and sold and appropriated by the Chief of Aboothabee under sanction of the Chief of Bahrain 20,000

Vide accompaniments Q, O-2, P-2, Q-2, R-2.

28. It appears that one Rashid bin Azis, who, with 20 men, had been sent by the Chief of Shargah to the Chief of Aboothabee to renew amicable relations, finding that the Chief of Aboothabee had left for Guttur, followed him there, and, joining in the attack, returned to Shargah with a quantity of spoil, including a horse given to him by the Chief.

29. *En route* to Guttur, Rashid is said to have attempted to capture a buggalow belonging to Mahomed bin Lani of Guttur.

Vide accompaniments Y-2, Z-2.

30. Some time after the attack a deputation was sent by some of the Guttur tribes to the Wahabee Ameer, who promised to take up their cause and arrange for their early return to their houses, and accordingly wrote to the Chief of Bahrain, declaring war if the plunder was not restored and the tribes sent back. In giving such promise the Ameer is said to have remarked "that as his intentions and those of the British Government coincided, no further harm should again happen to the people from seaward."

Vide accompaniment U-2.

31. On receipt of the Ameer's letter, the Chief of Bahrain caused Mahomed bin Thani to be imprisoned, and what remained of his property to be confiscated; he also recalled about 40 families of the Soudan tribe, whom he had allowed to return to Dongha.

Vide accompaniment A-2.

Vide accompaniment Z-2.

32. Instructions have, consequently, been issued to the Wahabee Lieutenant to prepare a force to attack Bahrain, and it is rumoured that the Beni Azer tribe, which is subject to the Ameer, has already made an attack on some of the Bahrain people to the west of Guttur, and carried off a number of cattle, slaves, &c.

Vide accompaniments Y-2, Z-2, A-3.

33. The general opinion is, that the Chief of Bahrain could not have despoiled Guttur without the assistance of the Chief of Aboothabee.

Vide accompaniments W-2, D-3, C-3.

34. In return for the assistance given the Chief of Bahrain has offered to assist the Chief of Aboothabee in his present expedition by land or sea. This offer is another example of the light in which treaty obligations under our guarantee have become to be regarded on the coast.

Vide accompaniment E-3.

35. The evidence is far from being so complete on many points as could be wished; but the Agent reports that, such as it is, it was only obtained with the greatest difficulty and secrecy, and that no more can be procured on the coast. He did not proceed to Guttur, as there are none left there to enquire from. It is always a difficult matter to obtain satisfactory evidence of what occurred in a sudden attack, and in the present instance,—in consequence of the attacked tribes having been so scattered, and their being, though so scattered, afraid to offend their Chief; the richer class, because, though they have lost most of their tangible property, they are owed large sums in the country, and look

JUNE 1868.

Breach of maritime truce by Chiefs of Bahrain and Aboothabee.

forward to returning to recover them and resume their positions; and the poorer, because they hope hereafter to regain their homes,—to do so is impossible. I have written to the British Agent at Lingah to try to get the evidence of Mahomed Syed Ali-Kuala, who has taken refuge there, and I propose proceeding there myself to see if any further information is procurable as soon as the *Clyde* is ready for sea.

Political.

Nos. 63-66.